Espartaco

“Is that to say we are against Free Trade? No, we are for Free Trade, because by Free Trade all economical laws, with their most astounding contradictions, will act upon a larger scale, upon the territory of the whole earth; and because from the uniting of all these contradictions in a single group, where they will stand face to face, will result the struggle which will itself eventuate in the emancipation of the proletariat.”

Karl Heinrich Marx · Marx-Engels Collected Works, Vol. VI, p. 290

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Tag: Bayesian econometrics

  • ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE VS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL COMPARISON

    ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE VS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL COMPARISON

    Trade Theory · Econometrics · Policy

    What If David Ricardo Was Wrong?
    A New Econometric Challenge to Comparative Advantage

    Based on: Gómez Julián, J. M. (2025). “Teorías del comercio internacional versus resultados de los tratados comerciales.” Revista Cubana de Economía Internacional, 12(1), 36–57. Read the original paper (Spanish)

    Most people who have taken an introductory economics course have encountered a deceptively simple idea: countries should specialise in what they do relatively best, even if another country is better at producing everything. This is the doctrine of comparative advantage, largely attributed to David Ricardo’s early-nineteenth-century work on trade between England and Portugal. It has become one of the most cited justifications for free trade and for the architecture of modern trade agreements.

    A 2025 paper by Juan Manuel Gómez Julián, published in the Revista Cubana de Economía Internacional, asks a provocative question: does the actual data from trade agreements support comparative advantage — or does it point back to the older, simpler idea of absolute advantage? His answer, reached through a combination of historical analysis, mathematical reasoning, and modern econometric modelling, is likely to unsettle a good deal of conventional trade-policy thinking.

    The Two Competing Ideas, in Plain Language

    Before diving into the paper’s contribution, it helps to be absolutely clear about what is at stake. Imagine two countries:

    • Country A can produce both wheat and steel more efficiently (faster, cheaper, with fewer resources) than Country B.
    • Country B is less efficient at producing both goods.

    Absolute advantage (Adam Smith, 1776) says: Country A is simply better at both. Country B has no obvious reason to compete head-to-head, and trade between them will be shaped by the sheer gap in productive capability.

    Comparative advantage (David Ricardo, 1817) says: hold on — even though Country A is better at both, it is proportionally better at steel than at wheat. Country B, while worse at everything, is relatively less terrible at wheat. So if Country A focuses on steel and Country B focuses on wheat, and they trade, both end up better off. Absolute superiority does not matter; what matters is the ratio of efficiencies within each country.

    This idea is elegant. It is also, as Gómez Julián argues, surprisingly fragile when tested against real-world data.

    What the Paper Actually Does

    Gómez Julián approaches the question from three complementary angles, which gives the paper unusual methodological breadth.

    1. Mathematical Generalisation

    First, he examines how well each theory holds up when you push it mathematically — that is, when you ask whether the logic remains sound under more general and realistic assumptions than the original two-country, two-good textbook models. Comparative advantage, he finds, depends on a narrow set of assumptions (identical technologies in certain respects, constant costs, no transport costs, full employment) that tend to collapse when the model is made more realistic. Absolute advantage, by contrast, remains coherent under a wider range of conditions.

    2. Historical Context

    Second, the paper traces the intellectual history. Ricardo developed comparative advantage in a world where the nature of production was fundamentally different from today’s globalised, technology-intensive economy. The author argues that the theory was a product of its time — useful as a thought experiment, but not a reliable guide for modern trade policy, especially when the technological gap between trading partners is vast.

    3. Econometric Evidence

    This is where the paper makes its most distinctive contribution. Gómez Julián uses two families of statistical models to test which theory better explains the actual outcomes of trade agreements:

    • Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models — large-scale simulation models that attempt to represent the entire economy, sector by sector, and then simulate what happens when a trade agreement changes tariffs, quotas, or market access. These are widely used by institutions like the World Bank and the WTO.
    • Objective Bayesian Generalised Linear Models (GLMs) — a modern statistical approach that uses Bayesian inference (updating beliefs with data) with minimal subjective assumptions (“objective” priors). This allows the researcher to let the data speak more freely, without imposing strong preconceptions about what the answer “should” be.

    The combined results point in the same direction: trade outcomes between countries with significant technological asymmetries are better explained by absolute advantage than by comparative advantage.

    What Does This Mean in Practice?

    The practical implications are significant, and they run against the grain of mainstream trade-policy advice for the past several decades.

    If comparative advantage is the correct lens, then free trade between any two countries — rich or poor, technologically advanced or not — is mutually beneficial almost by definition. The policy prescription is straightforward: liberalise, sign agreements, reduce barriers.

    But if absolute advantage is the better model, then the structure of the agreement matters enormously. A trade deal between a highly industrialised country and a predominantly agricultural one is not inherently win-win. It may lock the less-developed country into low-value-added exports while flooding its markets with manufactured goods that undercut local industry. The technological and wage asymmetries between the signatories become the central concern, not an afterthought.

    In other words, Gómez Julián’s findings suggest that trade agreements should be designed with deliberate attention to the power imbalances and productive capacities of the parties involved — not simply signed on the assumption that any trade is good trade.

    Why This Matters Beyond Economics

    If you are a political scientist, a policy analyst, or simply someone who follows geopolitics, this debate is far from academic. Trade agreements are among the most consequential instruments of foreign policy and domestic economic strategy. They shape industrial policy, labour markets, migration patterns, and even geopolitical alliances.

    The question of whether a trade deal is “fair” or “beneficial” depends on which economic theory you use to evaluate it. If the dominant theory is wrong — or at least incomplete — then decades of trade policy advice may have systematically underestimated the risks of liberalisation between unequal partners.

    This does not mean protectionism is the answer. But it does mean that the terms of engagement matter. A trade agreement that accounts for technological gaps, includes provisions for technology transfer, and builds in adjustment mechanisms is a very different instrument from one that simply eliminates tariffs between unequal economies and calls it a day.

    Reference: Gómez Julián, J. M. (2025). Teorías del comercio internacional versus resultados de los tratados comerciales: ¿ventaja absoluta o comparativa? Revista Cubana de Economía Internacional, 12(1), 36–57. https://revistas.uh.cu/rcei/article/view/11142

  • Inflation Is (Not) Always And Everywhere A Monetary Phenomenon

    Inflation Is (Not) Always And Everywhere A Monetary Phenomenon

    Beyond the Phillips Curve — A Marxist Reinterpretation of Inflation
    Political Economy July 2025 · 8 min read

    Beyond the Phillips Curve

    A new study argues that inflation isn’t just about too much money chasing too few goods — it’s about how the capitalist class converts technological advantage into permanent profit.

    Most of us were taught a tidy story: when unemployment falls, inflation rises, and vice versa. This trade-off — called the Phillips Curve — has anchored central bank policy for decades. But what if that story is not just incomplete, but fundamentally misleading?

    A recent paper published in Realidad Económica by José Mauricio Gómez Julián argues exactly that. Using over fifty years of U.S. data (1968–2021), the study finds no significant long-run relationship between inflation and unemployment. Instead, it identifies a surprising positive link between technological change and inflation — and uses that finding to build a Marxist reinterpretation of what inflation actually does inside a capitalist economy.

    It’s a paper that challenges both mainstream economics and the popular imagination. Let me walk you through it.

    The Phillips Curve: A Love Story with Complications

    In 1958, New Zealand economist A.W. Phillips noticed an elegant regularity in British data: wages tended to rise faster when unemployment was low. Later economists generalized this into a policy menu: want less unemployment? Accept a bit more inflation. Want to tame prices? Brace for a recession.

    This trade-off became gospel in the 1960s. Central bankers thought they could fine-tune the economy like a thermostat — dial inflation up or down by adjusting demand. But the 1970s shattered that confidence. The U.S. experienced stagflation: high inflation and high unemployment at the same time, something the Phillips Curve said shouldn’t happen.

    Since then, economists have debated whether the Phillips Curve is dead, dormant, or merely sleeping. Gómez Julián sides with a more radical verdict: the long-run Phillips Curve doesn’t just flatten — it was never there to begin with.

    What does “long run” mean here? Mainstream economists already accept that the long-run Phillips Curve is vertical (meaning no permanent trade-off). But Gómez Julián goes further: he finds that even in shorter cycles, the supposed inverse relationship is statistically fragile — easily dissolved once you account for other variables, especially technological change.

    The Data, the Tools, and What They Found

    The study uses three complementary statistical approaches — each chosen for a reason:

    Bayesian Correlations

    Unlike classical statistics, which gives you a yes-or-no answer (“significant at 5%”), Bayesian analysis lets you say something more nuanced: “Given the data, here is the probability that this relationship is positive, negative, or nonexistent.” Applied to U.S. inflation and unemployment, the Bayesian results show no consistent inverse relationship. The data simply doesn’t support the Phillips Curve story with any confidence.

    Granger Causality

    This is a standard econometric test that asks: does knowing today’s unemployment help you predict tomorrow’s inflation (or vice versa)? If the Phillips Curve were real, the answer should be yes. Gómez Julián finds that the answer is generally no. Unemployment does not Granger-cause inflation in the U.S. data. What does show predictive power? Research and development spending.

    Error Correction Models (ECM)

    These models examine whether variables that drift apart over time eventually pull back together — like two dancers who briefly separate but remain on the same floor. The ECM results confirm that inflation and unemployment do not share a stable long-run equilibrium. They are, statistically speaking, dancing to different music.

    · · ·

    The Surprising Link: Technology Drives Inflation

    Here is the paper’s most provocative finding: R&D expenditure and inflation move together positively. When firms invest more in technology, inflation tends to rise — not fall, as you might expect from a productivity-enhancement standpoint.

    Why would better technology lead to higher prices? To answer this, Gómez Julián turns to Marx — specifically, to the distinction between two types of surplus value.

    Capitalist innovates
    (new machinery, process)
    Extraordinary surplus value
    (temporary advantage)
    Rivals adopt technology
    Inflation absorbs the gap
    Relative surplus value
    (permanent for the class)
    Fig. 1 — The mechanism proposed by Gómez Julián, simplified.

    Two Kinds of Surplus Value: A Quick Primer

    If you’re not steeped in Marxist theory, don’t worry — the distinction is intuitive.

    Absolute surplus value is what a capitalist gets by making workers work longer or harder for the same pay. It’s the old-fashioned squeeze. Relative surplus value, by contrast, comes from making production cheaper — through technology, efficiency, better organization — so that the value of labor-power (i.e., the cost of maintaining a worker) falls, even if wages don’t.

    Now imagine a single firm introduces a breakthrough technology. It can produce goods faster and cheaper than its competitors. For a while, it earns extraordinary surplus value — a premium profit that exists only because it’s ahead of the pack. But here’s the catch: once competitors adopt the same technology, that advantage vanishes. The extraordinary surplus value disappears.

    Gómez Julián’s argument is that inflation is the mechanism through which this temporary advantage gets converted into a permanent one. How? As the innovating firm’s higher productivity drives down unit costs, prices don’t fall proportionally — instead, the general price level adjusts upward. The gap between the old cost structure and the new one gets absorbed by inflation. What was a one-time windfall for the innovator becomes a structural shift in profitability for the entire capitalist class.

    Inflation, in this reading, is not a policy error or a monetary accident. It is a functional mechanism of capitalist accumulation — one that converts technological advantage into lasting class-wide profit.

    What This Means for Policy

    If the paper is right, the implications are significant:

    For central bankers: If inflation isn’t primarily a monetary phenomenon — if it’s rooted in the structural dynamics of production and profit — then raising interest rates to fight inflation is treating the symptom, not the disease. You might cool the economy, but you’re not addressing the engine that generates inflation in the first place.

    For mainstream economists: The Phillips Curve may be less a stable empirical law and more a historical coincidence — a relationship that appeared to hold in a particular postwar context and has been propped up by theoretical convenience ever since. The paper adds to a growing body of evidence that the curve has become unreliable as a guide to policy.

    For non-economists: This paper reframes inflation as a political question, not just a technical one. If inflation systematically benefits capital at the expense of labor — by preserving the gains of innovation for the capitalist class while workers’ purchasing power erodes — then debates about inflation are, at their core, debates about distribution and power.

    A note of caution The paper uses R&D spending as a proxy for technological change. This is standard in the literature, but it’s not a direct measure of innovation. R&D spending can reflect many things — tax incentives, defense contracts, speculative bubbles in tech. The correlation Gómez Julián finds is suggestive and theoretically grounded, but it warrants further investigation with additional proxies and across different economies.
    · · ·

    A Challenge to Orthodoxy

    What makes this paper worth reading — whether you agree with it or not — is that it does something many economists avoid: it takes a heterodox theoretical framework seriously and tests it empirically. This isn’t armchair Marxism. It’s Bayesian statistics, Granger causality, and error correction models applied to five decades of data. The methodology is conventional; the interpretation is not.

    The mainstream view treats inflation as essentially a monetary phenomenon — too much money, not enough stuff. Milton Friedman’s famous dictum that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon” still echoes through central banks worldwide. Gómez Julián doesn’t deny that money supply matters. But he argues it’s not the whole story — and may not even be the most important part.

    In his framework, the relationship between technology, surplus value, and prices is structural. It doesn’t depend on whether a central bank is dovish or hawkish. It’s embedded in the logic of capitalist production itself.

    So, Is the Phillips Curve Dead?

    Probably not entirely. There are short-run contexts where demand pressures do push prices up, and the Phillips Curve captures something real about those moments. But the paper pushes us to ask harder questions: What determines the baseline around which those fluctuations occur? Why has inflation behaved the way it has over half a century, regardless of the unemployment rate?

    Gómez Julián offers a provocative answer: inflation is the economy’s way of metabolizing technological progress into profit. It’s not a bug in the system. It’s a feature.

    Whether you find that convincing depends, in part, on your theoretical priors. But the data doesn’t lie about what it doesn’t show: a reliable Phillips Curve. And that, at minimum, should give everyone — mainstream, heterodox, and curious layperson alike — something to think about.

  • valueprhr: When Do Market Prices Reflect the Labor That Produced Them? A Modern R Toolkit for an Old Question

    valueprhr: When Do Market Prices Reflect the Labor That Produced Them? A Modern R Toolkit for an Old Question

    You can also find this library at CRAN and download it directly from R and RStudio.

    An introduction to an R package that brings Bayesian inference, panel data econometrics, and rigorous validation to one of political economy’s most enduring empirical debates.


    Why This Package Exists

    Here is a question that has occupied economists for over two centuries: when you pay for something, does the price you pay bear any systematic relationship to the labor required to make it?

    Adam Smith thought so. David Ricardo refined the idea. Karl Marx built an entire theory of exploitation on it. And since the mid-twentieth century, empirical researchers have been trying to measure the strength of this correspondence with real-world data.

    The challenge has always been methodological. The datasets are panel data — prices observed across many economic sectors over many time periods — and they demand techniques that respect both the cross-sectional structure (different industries behave differently) and the temporal dimension (relationships can shift over time). A simple scatterplot of values against prices, however illustrative, will not settle the question.

    valueprhr is an R package built to close this methodological gap. It provides a complete, reproducible pipeline: from raw price matrices to model estimation, from Bayesian inference to out-of-sample validation, from structural break detection to side-by-side model comparison. It was designed for political economy, but as we will see, its toolkit applies to any panel data problem where you need to assess the correspondence between two variables across entities and time.


    The Core Idea (in Plain Language)

    In the classical and Marxian tradition, the value of a commodity is determined by the total labor time — direct and indirect — required to produce it. If a table requires 10 hours of socially necessary labor and a chair requires 5, the table’s value is twice the chair’s.

    This gives rise to what economists call direct prices (denoted pd): prices that are strictly proportional to the labor embodied in each commodity. They represent what prices would be if they perfectly mirrored labor content.

    But capitalism does not work that way. Capital flows between sectors seeking the highest return, and competition tends to equalize the rate of profit across industries. The prices that emerge from this process are called prices of production (denoted pπ). They redistribute surplus value: sectors with higher organic composition of capital (more machinery relative to labor) tend to have prices of production above their direct prices, and vice versa.

    The central empirical question is: despite this redistribution, how closely do direct prices and prices of production correspond?

    The standard test is a log-linear regression:

    ln(pπit) = α + β · ln(pdit) + uit

    where i indexes sectors and t indexes time periods.

    Three hypotheses are at stake:

    • β ≈ 1: a one-percent increase in direct prices is associated with roughly a one-percent increase in production prices (proportionality).
    • R² ≈ 1: direct prices explain the vast majority of the variation in production prices.
    • Stability: the relationship holds consistently across time periods.

    If all three hold, the labor theory of value has strong empirical support. valueprhr gives you the tools to test each one rigorously.


    What’s Inside the Package

    valueprhr organizes its functionality into six modules. Here is what each does and why it matters.

    1. Data Preparation

    Real-world data rarely arrives in the format econometric methods require. The package accepts two data frames in wide format (rows = years, columns = sectors) — one for direct prices, one for production prices — and converts them into the long-format panel structure that econometric models expect.

    library(valueprhr)
    # Wide format: Year | Agriculture | Manufacturing | Mining | ...
    direct <- read.csv("direct_prices.csv")
    production <- read.csv("production_prices.csv")
    # Convert to long panel: Year, Sector, direct, production, log_direct, log_production
    panel <- prepare_panel_data(direct, production, log_transform = TRUE)
    head(panel)
    #> Year Sector direct production log_direct log_production
    #> 1 1960 Agriculture 45.2 48.1 3.81 3.87
    #> 2 1961 Agriculture 46.0 49.0 3.83 3.89
    #> ...

    The function prepare_log_matrices() does the same job but returns matrix format, which is what the multivariate methods (PLS, CCA) need.

    2. Panel Data Models

    This is where the core econometrics happens. The package implements two complementary specifications:

    Two-Way Fixed Effects (FE) controls for both sector-specific and time-specific unobserved heterogeneity:

    Yit = αi + γt + β · Xit + εit

    In plain terms: every sector has its own baseline (some sectors are systematically more expensive), every year has its own macroeconomic conditions (inflation, crises), and the model isolates the within variation to estimate the core relationship.

    fe <- fit_twoway_fe(panel, robust_se = TRUE, cluster_type = "group")
    print(fe)
    #> Two-Way Fixed Effects Model
    #> ============================
    #> Observations: 1200 | Sectors: 20 | Years: 60
    #> R-squared: 0.9876 | Adjusted R-squared: 0.9870
    #>
    #> log_direct coefficient:
    #> Estimate = 0.9754, SE = 0.0123, t = 79.30, p = 0.0000

    The cluster_type = "group" option computes cluster-robust standard errors at the sector level, which accounts for serial correlation within each sector’s time series.

    Mundlak Correlated Random Effects (CRE) takes a different route. Instead of dummy variables for every sector, it decomposes the predictor into a within-sector component (how Xit deviates from sector i‘s average) and a between-sector component (the sector average itself):

    Yit = α + βW · (Xiti) + βB · i + ui + εit

    In data science language: this is a way to control for group-level confounders without the computational cost of N dummy variables. If βW = βB, the within and between effects are the same, and a simpler Random Effects model suffices. If they differ, the relationship between values and prices operates differently within a sector over time than across sectors.

    # Add Mundlak terms
    panel_cre <- create_mundlak_data(panel, x_var = "log_direct")
    # Fit the model
    cre <- fit_mundlak_cre(panel_cre, include_time_fe = TRUE)
    print(cre)
    #> Mundlak Correlated Random Effects Model
    #> =========================================
    #> Within-sector effect (beta_W): 0.9680
    #> Between-sector effect (beta_B): 0.9912
    #>
    #> Mundlak test H0: beta_W = beta_B
    #> F-stat = 2.14, p-value = 0.1438
    #> -> Fail to reject H0: RE/CRE specification is consistent

    The function test_mundlak_specification() formalizes this check. A low p-value means you should stick with Fixed Effects; a high p-value means the simpler model is adequate.

    The package also includes a Panel Granger Causality test (the Dumitrescu-Hurlin procedure), which tests whether past values of direct prices help predict current production prices — and vice versa.

    panel_granger_test(panel, lags = c(1, 2))
    #> direction lag W_stat Z_stat p_value significant
    #> 1 direct -> production 1 8.432 3.126 0.0018 TRUE
    #> 2 direct -> production 2 6.215 2.441 0.0146 TRUE
    #> 3 production -> direct 1 5.890 2.103 0.0354 TRUE
    #> 4 production -> direct 2 4.012 1.332 0.1828 FALSE

    3. Bayesian Models

    Classical (frequentist) estimation gives you a single point estimate for β. Bayesian methods give you a full probability distribution over possible values, incorporating your prior beliefs and updating them with the data.

    In econometric language: instead of β̂ = 0.975 ± 0.012, you get a posterior distribution showing that β lies between 0.95 and 1.00 with 95% probability.

    The package offers two Bayesian approaches:

    Sector-by-Sector Bayesian GLM fits an independent Bayesian linear model for each sector, using weakly informative priors (the rstanarm package handles the MCMC sampling via Stan). Each sector gets its own slope and intercept, along with Leave-One-Out Cross-Validation (LOO-CV) scores.

    bayes <- fit_bayesian_glm_sectors(
    direct, production,
    chains = 4, iter = 4000
    )
    print(bayes$summary_table)
    #> Sector beta_mean beta_sd beta_lower beta_upper elpd looic n_obs
    #> 1 Agriculture 0.982 0.025 0.933 1.031 -42.3 84.6 60
    #> 2 Manufacturing 0.971 0.031 0.910 1.031 -38.7 77.4 60
    #> 3 Mining 0.958 0.042 0.876 1.041 -45.1 90.2 60
    #> ...

    In data science language: LOO-CV is a principled way to assess out-of-sample predictive performance without holding out data. The LOOIC (LOO Information Criterion) is the Bayesian analogue of AIC — lower is better.

    Bayesian Hierarchical Model goes further by pooling information across sectors. Instead of treating each sector in isolation, it assumes that sector-specific slopes are drawn from a common population distribution:

    βi ~ N(μβ, σβ2)

    Sectors with less data “borrow strength” from the population mean. This is especially valuable when some sectors have short time series.

    hier <- fit_bayesian_hierarchical(panel, include_time = TRUE)
    print(hier)
    #> Bayesian Hierarchical Model
    #> ============================
    #> Observations: 1200 | Sectors: 20
    #>
    #> LOO-CV:
    #> ELPD = -312.45
    #> LOOIC = 624.90
    #>
    #> Population-level effects:
    #> parameter mean sd 2.5% 97.5%
    #> 1 (Intercept) 0.1423 0.0892 -0.032 0.317
    #> 2 log_direct 0.9734 0.0145 0.945 1.002
    #> 3 Time_scaled 0.0031 0.0018 -0.0004 0.007

    4. Multivariate Analysis

    When the number of sectors (N) is large relative to the number of time periods (T), standard regression becomes unstable. This is the “small T, large N” problem common in panel data. The package offers three multivariate techniques to handle it:

    Partial Least Squares (PLS) extracts latent components that explain covariance between direct prices and production prices. It handles multicollinearity gracefully and is widely used in chemometrics, genomics, and now in value-price analysis.

    matrices <- prepare_log_matrices(direct, production)
    pls <- fit_pls_multivariate(
    matrices$X_clean, matrices$Y_clean,
    max_components = 8
    )
    print(pls)
    #> Partial Least Squares (PLS) Regression
    #> =======================================
    #> Optimal components: 3
    #>
    #> R-squared by component:
    #> n_components R2_train R2_cv
    #> 1 1 0.942 0.938
    #> 2 2 0.971 0.965
    #> 3 3 0.984 0.980

    Canonical Correlation Analysis (CCA) finds linear combinations of direct prices and production prices that are maximally correlated. In econometric language: CCA extracts the “shared economic signal” — the common factor driving both sets of prices.

    cca <- run_sparse_cca(matrices$X_clean, matrices$Y_clean, n_components = 3)
    print(cca)
    #> Canonical Correlation Analysis
    #> ===============================
    #> Components: 3
    #>
    #> Canonical correlations:
    #> CC1: r = 0.9987 (Var X: 92.3%, Var Y: 91.8%)
    #> CC2: r = 0.9841 (Var X: 5.1%, Var Y: 5.4%)
    #> CC3: r = 0.9523 (Var X: 1.8%, Var Y: 1.9%)

    The first canonical correlation above 0.99 indicates an extremely tight structural link between the two price systems.

    Panel VAR captures dynamic feedback: do lagged values of direct prices predict current production prices, and vice versa?

    pvar <- fit_panel_var(panel, lags = 2, transformation = "fd")

    5. Cross-Validation

    Standard k-fold cross-validation violates temporal ordering. If you train on 1960–1990 and test on 1985–1990, future information leaks into the training set. The package implements two time-aware approaches:

    Rolling Window CV trains on t₀ … tW, tests on tW+1tW+H, then rolls the window forward.

    cv <- rolling_window_cv(
    panel,
    window_sizes = c(20, 30),
    step_size = 2,
    test_horizon = 3
    )
    print(cv$summary)

    Leave-One-Sector-Out (LOSO) trains on all sectors except one and predicts the held-out sector. This tests cross-sectional generalization: does the value-price relationship estimated from other sectors hold for agriculture? For mining? For finance?

    loso <- leave_one_sector_out(panel)
    print(loso$summary)
    #> metric mean sd
    #> 1 RMSE 0.04521 0.01832
    #> 2 MAE 0.03587 0.01456
    #> 3 R_squared 0.96120 0.02340

    An average R² above 0.96 in LOSO-CV means the relationship generalizes robustly across sectors.

    6. Structural Break Tests

    Has the value-price relationship been stable over time? Or did it shift at some point — due to globalization, a methodological change in data construction, a technological revolution, or a regime shift in profit rate equalization?

    The package aggregates the panel to a time series and applies a battery of tests:

    breaks <- test_structural_breaks(panel, break_date = 1990)
    print(breaks)
    #> Structural Break Tests
    #> ========================
    #> Time-series observations: 60
    #>
    #> Chow Test:
    #> Break date: 1990
    #> F-stat = 1.8420, p = 0.1687
    #>
    #> supF / Bai-Perron Test:
    #> supF = 5.2130, p = 0.0842
    #> Breaks detected: 0

    A non-significant result is actually good news here: it means the value-price correspondence has been structurally stable across the entire sample period.


    The Full Pipeline in One Command

    If you want to run everything at once — data preparation, FE and CRE models, cross-validation, structural break tests, and model comparison — the package offers a single entry point:

    results <- run_full_analysis(
    direct,
    production,
    run_bayesian = FALSE, # Set TRUE if you have rstanarm installed
    run_cv = TRUE,
    run_breaks = TRUE,
    verbose = TRUE
    )
    # Access everything
    print(results$comparison)
    print(results$cv_summary)
    cat(format_break_results(results$breaks))

    You can then export the comparison table and CV results to CSV:

    export_results_csv(
    results$comparison,
    results$cv_summary,
    output_dir = "results/"
    )

    Beyond Political Economy: General Panel Data Applications

    Although valueprhr was built for the specific question of value-price correspondence, its methods are general-purpose panel data tools. Any research problem involving the relationship between two variables observed across entities and time can benefit from the package:

    • Health economics: Does out-of-pocket spending track underlying treatment costs across regions over time?
    • Environmental economics: Do carbon prices reflect the embodied emissions of goods across industries?
    • Education: Do standardized test scores correspond to instructional expenditure across school districts over decades?
    • Finance: Do book values predict market valuations across sectors?
    • Any two-variable panel regression where you need fixed effects, Mundlak decomposition, robust standard errors, time-aware cross-validation, or structural break detection.

    The key requirement is that your data has a panel structure (entities × time) and that the distributional assumptions of the models are reasonable for your context. The methods — two-way FE, Mundlak CRE, Bayesian hierarchical models, PLS, CCA, rolling-window CV, structural break tests — are econometric staples that transcend any particular application domain.


    Installation and Dependencies

    The package requires R ≥ 4.1.0. Core functionality depends only on base R and the Metrics package. Extended features (Bayesian models, panel data infrastructure, structural break tests) are handled through soft dependencies that are loaded on demand:

    # Install from GitHub
    install.packages("devtools")
    devtools::install_github("isadorenabi/valueprhr")
    # Optional: install all suggested packages at once
    suggested <- c(
    "rstanarm", "loo", "plm", "lme4", "pls", "vars",
    "panelvar", "strucchange", "lmtest", "sandwich",
    "dplyr", "tidyr", "tibble"
    )
    install.packages(suggested[!sapply(suggested, requireNamespace, quietly = TRUE)])

    Note for Bayesian models: rstanarm requires a working C++ toolchain — Rtools on Windows, Xcode Command Line Tools on macOS, or build-essential on Linux.


    What Makes This Package Methodologically Different

    Three features distinguish valueprhr from a hand-rolled analysis:

    1. Time-aware validation. Most applied work reports in-sample R² as evidence of fit. valueprhr pairs every model with rolling-window and leave-one-sector-out cross-validation, giving you out-of-sample performance that is honest about temporal dependence and cross-sectional generalization.
    2. The Mundlak decomposition. By splitting effects into within-sector and between-sector components, the package lets you test whether the value-price relationship operates at the sector level (structural), at the temporal level (cyclical), or both. This is a nuance that most empirical studies in this literature overlook.
    3. Bayesian hierarchical pooling. Sectors with short time series are a common headache. The hierarchical model lets small sectors borrow statistical strength from the population, producing more stable estimates than independent sector-by-sector regressions.

    A Note on the Underlying Data

    The wiki documentation mentions that market price indices used in this framework are constructed by temporally disaggregating the aggregate Consumer Price Index using the Input-Output matrix as a structural indicator, relying on closed-form Bayesian solutions from the BayesianDisaggregation library. This is a methodological detail worth understanding: the sectoral prices are not raw market quotes but statistically consistent decompositions of the macroeconomic aggregate. This ensures that the estimated sectoral price movements add up to the observed CPI, a property that many ad hoc sectoral price datasets lack.


    Citation

    If you use valueprhr in your research:

    @software{gomezjulian2025valueprhr,
    author = {Gómez Julián, José Mauricio},
    title = {valueprhr: Value-Price Analysis with Bayesian and Panel Data Methods},
    year = {2025},
    url = {https://github.com/isadorenabi/valueprhr},
    note = {R package version 0.1.0}
    }

    Author: José Mauricio Gómez Julián — ORCID — isadore.nabi@pm.me

    License: MIT

    Repository: github.com/IsadoreNabi/valueprhr


    The labor theory of value is either one of the most important ideas in the history of economics or one of the most contested. Either way, it deserves better tools than a spreadsheet and a prayer. valueprhr brings the full machinery of modern econometrics to the question — and lets the data speak for itself.

  • Sectorial Exclusion Criteria in the Marxist Analysis of the Average Rate of Profit: The United States Case (1960-2020)

    Sectorial Exclusion Criteria in the Marxist Analysis of the Average Rate of Profit: The United States Case (1960-2020)

    What Counts as “The Economy”? A Marxist Framework for Measuring Capitalism’s Rate of Profit
    Marxist Economics  ·  Econometrics  ·  Political Economy

    What Counts as “The Economy”?
    A Marxist Framework for Measuring Capitalism’s Rate of Profit

    How one researcher built a theoretically rigorous rulebook for a question everyone answers differently — and what happens when you let the data decide for itself.

    In 1984, two economists named Anwar Shaikh and Edgardo Ochoa opened a research tradition that would span four decades: empirically measuring Marx’s most consequential prediction — that capitalism’s average rate of profit tends to fall over time. Since then, dozens of studies have followed, each arriving at the same fundamental calculation, but each choosing differently which sectors of the economy to include. Some count everything. Others exclude finance and government. Still others carve out a narrower productive core. The results? They disagree — sometimes dramatically — about whether the profit rate actually falls.

    The problem isn’t sloppy math. It’s that nobody has ever agreed on a standard for deciding which economic activities belong in the calculation. José Mauricio Gómez Julián’s recent paper aims to change that.

    The Question Nobody Agrees On

    Here’s the issue in plain terms. Suppose you want to calculate the “average rate of profit” for the entire U.S. economy over sixty years. You need two things: the total surplus value produced and the total capital invested. To get these, you aggregate data from individual sectors — agriculture, manufacturing, finance, retail, government, and so on.

    But should finance be in there? Finance doesn’t manufacture anything; it redistributes money. Should government? The government doesn’t compete for profits. Should retail trade? A retailer buys finished goods and sells them at a markup, but Marx argued that the act of buying and selling doesn’t create new value — it merely realizes value already embedded in the commodity.

    These aren’t arbitrary questions. If you include sectors that redistribute value rather than create it, you can artificially inflate or deflate the measured profit rate, potentially masking the very tendency Marx predicted. Different researchers have made different choices, and the field has lacked a unified standard — until this paper.

    Three Pillars: The Theoretical Logic Behind the Criteria

    Gómez Julián’s framework is built on three interlocking concepts from Marx’s political economy. The underlying logic of the entire procedure can be stated simply: an economic sector should be included in the average-rate-of-profit calculation if, and only if, its workforce performs productive labor as Marx defined it — labor that is subordinated to capital and directly produces surplus value, or that constitutes an indispensable material condition for that production to occur. Everything else is excluded.

    Let’s walk through each pillar to see how this logic unfolds in practice.

    1. Productive vs. Unproductive Labor

    The most fundamental distinction in Marx’s economics is between labor that creates value and labor that doesn’t. Productive labor, in the Marxist sense, isn’t about whether work is “useful” in everyday language. It’s a technical category: productive labor is work performed under the subordination of capital that produces surplus value — the unpaid portion of the working day that capitalists appropriate for free.

    Unproductive labor, on the other hand, doesn’t generate new value. It may be socially necessary (think of a cashier or an accountant processing invoices), but it merely facilitates the transfer or realization of value that was already created elsewhere in the production process. It is, as Marx called it, a faux frais — a cost that must be paid out of surplus value rather than one that generates it.

    The mere functions performed by capital in the sphere of circulation — the operations necessary to serve as the vehicle for the metamorphoses of commodity-capital — do not create value or surplus value.

    — Karl Marx, Capital, Volume II

    In other words, the act of buying and selling, however essential for capitalism to function, is not productive in the value-theoretic sense. The merchant who buys goods cheaply and sells them at a markup doesn’t create value through the exchange itself; they merely appropriate a share of value created by productive workers elsewhere.

    2. Location in the Circuit of Capital

    Capital doesn’t just sit still. It moves through a circuit: it begins as commodities filled with freshly produced surplus value (C’), converts into money through sale in the market (M), and then transforms back into new commodities — raw materials, machinery, labor power — to restart production (C → C’). Activities that feed into this productive cycle — that help produce, maintain, or prepare commodities for the next round of production — sit inside the circuit. Activities that operate outside it (like government services aimed at general welfare, or purely redistributive financial operations) sit outside.

    This criterion is critical because it captures something the productive/unproductive distinction alone might miss: even an activity that doesn’t directly produce surplus value can be included if it constitutes an indispensable material precondition for the circuit to continue. Transportation is the classic example — it doesn’t transform a commodity’s physical form, but it physically moves goods to where they’re needed for consumption or further production, which Marx explicitly recognized as a productive act that adds value.

    3. Relationship with Surplus Value

    The final criterion is the most direct: does this activity produce surplus value, or is it an indispensable condition for surplus value production? If it directly creates value through productive labor, include it. If it’s a necessary supporting activity embedded in the productive circuit, include it. If it merely redistributes value already produced, or operates on entirely different logic (like government), exclude it.

    The logic here is that surplus value is the lifeblood of capitalist accumulation. Any sector that doesn’t contribute to its creation or materially enable it is, from the standpoint of the accumulation process, extraneous to the dynamic you’re trying to measure.

    The Service Sector Problem

    One of the paper’s most valuable theoretical contributions is its treatment of services. When Marx wrote, there was no statistical concept of a “service sector.” Modern macroeconomic data lumps together wildly heterogeneous activities under this label — everything from software development to hairdressing to hospital care.

    Gómez Julián, drawing on Tregenna (2009), identifies three types of service activities:

    • Those that directly produce surplus value (e.g., software development subcontracted by a manufacturing firm, transportation of goods)
    • Those that facilitate surplus value production elsewhere (e.g., warehousing that preserves commodity properties, scientific research contracted by industry)
    • Those that remain outside the circuit of capital (e.g., government administration, purely redistributive finance)

    This means you cannot simply include or exclude “services” wholesale. Each activity must be examined on its own terms, disaggregated, and asked: does this particular service perform productive labor, or doesn’t it? For “hybrid” sectors that contain both productive and unproductive components, the researcher must determine the proportions and decide based on which dominates.

    Applying the Criteria: What’s In, What’s Out

    Using Bureau of Economic Analysis data for the United States (1960–2020), Gómez Julián applies these theoretical criteria to 46 consolidated economic sectors. The result is a clear binary classification.

    Included — Productive

    • Farms
    • Forestry, fishing & related activities
    • Oil & gas extraction
    • Mining (except oil & gas)
    • Support activities for mining
    • Utilities
    • Construction
    • All manufacturing (wood, metals, machinery, electronics, motor vehicles, textiles, chemicals, petroleum, paper, printing, plastics, rubber, furniture, food & beverage, apparel, computers, etc.)
    • Transportation
    • Warehousing & storage
    • Information
    • Professional, scientific & technical services
    • Management of companies & enterprises
    • Administrative & waste management services
    • Educational services
    • Arts, entertainment & recreation
    • Accommodation
    • Food services & drinking places
    • Other services (except government)

    Excluded — Non-Productive

    • Wholesale trade
    • Retail trade
    • Finance & insurance
    • Real estate
    • Rental & leasing services
    • Health care & social assistance
    • Federal general government
    • Federal government enterprises
    • State & local general government
    • State & local government enterprises

    Most of these are straightforward once you accept the theoretical framework. Agriculture, mining, manufacturing — clearly productive. Finance, real estate, government — clearly outside the surplus-value production process. But several borderline cases required careful reasoning.

    The Borderline Cases

    Warehousing and storage might seem like a pure logistics function, but the paper argues that preserving the physical properties of commodities before they enter the sphere of circulation is a material precondition for their existence as commodities. Without storage, many goods would deteriorate and lose their use-value. This makes warehousing an indispensable part of the productive process, not merely a cost of circulation.

    Educational services is perhaps the most controversial inclusion. It encompasses private, public, and non-profit components. The classification system doesn’t specify their proportions. But excluding the sector entirely would mean ignoring a fundamental element for reproducing the skilled labor force in a highly industrialized economy — a cost that productive capital must bear one way or another.

    Administrative and waste management services includes activities that generate surplus value (document preparation for productive firms, personnel placement) alongside activities that don’t (security services, household cleaning). The paper argues that since most of the economy consists of productive sectors, and most of these services are contracted by those productive sectors, the productive component likely dominates.

    Information produces and distributes cultural products, software, broadcasting content, and data. In accordance with the criteria — these are material products of creative and technical labor, increasingly subcontracted by productive enterprises — it is included.

    The Econometric Validation: Three Blind Tests

    Here is where the paper’s methodology becomes genuinely innovative. Gómez Julián doesn’t merely propose theoretical criteria and declare victory. He subjects the entire framework to empirical testing using three fundamentally different statistical methods.

    A critical point: These econometric methods operate with zero knowledge of Marxist theory. They do not distinguish between “productive” and “unproductive” labor. They have never heard of the circuit of capital. They simply analyze the raw data for all 47 economic sectors and tell you which ones structurally matter for the economy’s behavior. This makes them a powerful independent test — a way to ask the data itself which sectors form the economy’s real core.

    Test 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA)

    PCA is a dimensionality reduction technique that identifies the directions (called “principal components”) along which the economy’s sectoral data varies most. Think of it as asking: if the entire economy were a cloud of data points, which directions through that cloud capture the most movement?

    Applied to all 47 sectors simultaneously, PCA found that economic variance is highly concentrated: a small number of sectors drive most of the variation, while many others contribute only marginal noise. Using a rigorous statistical criterion — fitting probability distributions to each sector’s contribution and selecting those in the top decile — PCA identified 26 sectors as structurally significant. A post-hoc validation confirmed that none of the 21 excluded sectors had sufficient statistical weight (eigenvalue exceeding 1) to constitute an independent driver.

    The first principal component was dominated by corporate and financial services. The second by a logistics-industrial chain. The fourth by extractive natural resources. The seventh by education and public administration.

    Test 2: Regularized Horseshoe Regression (RHR)

    This Bayesian method uses a “global-local shrinkage” prior that aggressively compresses noise toward zero while preserving strong signals — think of it as a statistical metal detector that ignores pebbles but rings loudly for gold. The name “Horseshoe” is not a metaphor; it refers to the literal U-shaped geometry of the shrinkage coefficient’s probability distribution, which piles mass at the extremes (fully suppress or fully preserve) rather than settling at mediocre intermediate values like conventional methods.

    Gómez Julián specified the model to predict total gross operating surplus from total variable capital across all sectors — deliberately grounding the specification in the labor theory of value. The severe multicollinearity inherent in input-output data (sectors move together — when steel production grows, automobile production grows) meant that no individual sector achieved traditional statistical significance. This isn’t a failure. As economists Christopher Achen and Olivier Blanchard have argued, multicollinearity in macroeconomic data is not a “problem” to be fixed with clever statistics; it’s an intrinsic, ontological property of how economies work. Blanchard memorably called it “God’s will.”

    What the model could provide was a predictive ranking based on projected predictive density (ELPD): which sectors reduce prediction error fastest. The top 15 sectors identified were:

    1. Retail Trade
    2. Textile Mills & Products
    3. Fabricated Metal Products
    4. Administrative & Waste Management Services
    5. Miscellaneous Manufacturing
    6. Construction
    7. Educational Services
    8. Electrical Equipment, Appliances & Components
    9. Nonmetallic Mineral Products
    10. Support Activities for Mining
    11. Printing & Related Support Activities
    12. Primary Metals
    13. Food Services & Drinking Places
    14. State & Local General Government
    15. Transportation

    Test 3: Dynamic Factor Model (DFM)

    The DFM extracts hidden “latent factors” from the 47 sectoral time series — unobserved forces that cause sectors to move together. The model found two such factors: one capturing short-term cyclical shocks (low persistence, autoregressive coefficient of 0.33) and one carrying the secular, long-term trend (high persistence, autoregressive coefficient of 0.91). These two factors together explain about 34% of total sectoral variation.

    Through an elaborate multi-stage validation involving stability selection, synchronized block bootstrap resampling (300 replications), and a novel “Full-Robust Thresholding” algorithm that generates counterfactual null distributions and corrects for factor indeterminacy via the Hungarian algorithm, the model identified which sectors are most structurally synchronized with these systemic factors.

    The sectors with the highest structural weight were: Real Estate, followed by State & Local General Government and Federal General Government, then Retail Trade and Food Services, with Utilities and Chemical Products providing the industrial baseline.

    The Key Revelation: Theory and Data Diverge

    Now comes the most thought-provoking finding in the paper. The econometric methods — which are purely data-driven and completely agnostic to Marxist theory — identify a set of “core” sectors that overlaps with but also substantially differs from the theoretical classification.

    Where Theory and Data Agree

    Manufacturing sectors (textiles, metals, fabricated products, miscellaneous manufacturing) appear across multiple econometric methods and are unambiguously included by the theoretical criteria.

    Administrative & waste management services ranks 4th in the RHR and is theoretically included as productive.

    Educational services appears in the RHR ranking (7th) and is theoretically included.

    Transportation appears in the RHR ranking (15th) and is theoretically included.

    Construction appears prominently in both RHR (6th) and PCA, and is theoretically included.

    Utilities appear in the DFM results and are theoretically included.

    These convergences suggest that the theoretical criteria are tracking something real in the data: the sectors that Marx identified as productive are indeed among those that structurally drive the economy.

    Where Theory and Data Disagree — And Why It Matters

    Real Estate dominates the DFM results (ranked #1 in structural weight) but is theoretically excluded as non-productive and fictitious.

    Government sectors (federal and state/local) rank among the top DFM sectors but are theoretically excluded because they don’t pursue profit maximization.

    Retail Trade ranks #1 in the RHR and appears prominently in the DFM, yet is theoretically excluded as pure circulation.

    Finance & insurance dominate the first principal component in PCA but are theoretically excluded.

    Health care has the highest eigenvalue among all excluded sectors in PCA’s post-hoc validation table but is theoretically excluded.

    What does this divergence mean? The paper interprets it as profoundly significant. Sectors like real estate, government, and retail trade have “effectively colonized the macro-dynamics of the US rate of profit.” They statistically dominate the national accounting aggregates — they are the forces that shape the observed numbers — even though Marxist theory classifies them as unproductive or revenue-consuming.

    In Marx’s own philosophical vocabulary, the phenomenon (what the data shows on its surface) and the essence (what theory identifies as the true engine of value production) diverge. The sectors driving the observable statistical dynamics are not the same as the sectors that, according to the theory, actually generate surplus value. This is not a refutation of either the theory or the data; it’s an insight into how modern capitalism’s surface appearance differs from its underlying structure — exactly as Marx’s own method predicted it would.

    Does the Rate of Profit Fall?

    With the theoretically selected sectors, all three trend-extraction methods — Daubechies wavelet filters (with 8 vanishing moments at decomposition depth 4), Empirical Mode Decomposition, and the Embedded Hodrick-Prescott filter (implemented within a Bayesian unobserved components model with Gibbs sampling) — produce a clear declining long-term trend in the net average rate of profit over 1960–2020. This is precisely what Marx predicted, and it serves as evidence of the internal consistency of the proposed criteria: the new proposition (the sectoral classification) fits harmoniously within the existing system of Marxist propositions.

    For the econometric criteria, the results are remarkably robust: with the single exception of the Hodrick-Prescott filter under the DFM sector selection, all combinations of econometric sector-selection criteria and filtering methods also produce a declining long-term trend. That means:

    • PCA sectors + Wavelet → declining
    • PCA sectors + EMD → declining
    • PCA sectors + HP → declining
    • RHR sectors + Wavelet → declining
    • RHR sectors + EMD → declining
    • RHR sectors + HP → declining
    • DFM sectors + Wavelet → declining
    • DFM sectors + EMD → declining
    • DFM sectors + HP → not clearly declining

    Regardless of which sectors you choose — based on careful Marxist reasoning or on pure data analysis — and regardless of which statistical filter you use, the long-term profit rate falls. The HP-DFM exception is attributed to the filter’s parametric specifications (its linear structure and second-order Markov assumption for the trend) potentially interacting poorly with a sectoral composition heavily weighted toward government and real estate — sectors whose dynamics may follow different logics than productive capital.

    The Empirical Mode Decomposition, being a non-parametric technique that adapts to the data’s intrinsic patterns without imposing prior assumptions about functional form, consistently produced the most accentuated declining trend across all sector selections.

    Why This Paper Matters

    Gómez Julián’s work makes three contributions that will resonate well beyond the boundaries of Marxist economics:

    First, methodological standardization. For the first time, there is a theoretically grounded, explicit, and reproducible set of criteria for deciding which sectors belong in Marxist profit-rate calculations. This addresses a four-decade-old methodological gap and enables meaningful comparison across future studies. Researchers can now reproduce the same classification, apply it to different countries or time periods, and test whether the declining tendency holds universally.

    Second, the theory-data tension as an analytical asset. Rather than hiding the divergence between theoretical classifications and empirical results, the paper treats it as a finding in its own right. The fact that unproductive sectors statistically dominate the macro-dynamics of the profit rate tells us something important about how modern capitalism appears on its surface versus how it functions at its core. It demonstrates, empirically, that Marx’s concept of “essence” and “phenomenon” isn’t merely philosophical abstraction — it describes a real, measurable gap in economic data.

    Third, the robustness of the declining trend. Whether you select sectors based on careful Marxist reasoning or let unsupervised statistical methods decide for you, the long-term profit rate declines. This convergence across radically different methodologies strengthens the empirical case for what may be Marx’s most famous — and most contested — prediction.

    The paper does not claim to have proven Marx right beyond doubt. Internal consistency, it notes, does not guarantee overall theoretical validity. But it has demonstrated that when you take the theory seriously — when you build your measurement instrument to match the conceptual categories rather than stuffing everything into the equation and hoping for the best — the data speaks in a direction that Marx would have recognized.

  • Quantitative Theory of Money or Prices? A Historical, Theoretical, and Econometric Analysis

    Quantitative Theory of Money or Prices? A Historical, Theoretical, and Econometric Analysis

    Does Money Drive Prices, or Do Prices Drive Money?
    Econometrics · Monetary Theory · Machine Learning · Political Economy

    Does Money Drive Prices, or Do Prices Drive Money?

    A 300-year-old debate, four countries, six decades of data, Bayesian statistics, and neural networks — a deep dive into one of the most ambitious monetary studies in recent years

    What you will find in this post
    1. The oldest argument in monetary economics — Hume, Friedman, and why it still matters today
    2. Marx’s forgotten critique — four logical objections that mainstream economics never answered
    3. The role of gold in a post-gold-standard world — why the Fed still dances around the price of gold
    4. A mathematical model for the money-prices relationship — equations explained without the jargon
    5. The data and the methodology — four countries, Bayesian models, neural networks, and random forests
    6. Country-by-country results — what the United States, Canada, the UK, and Brazil each reveal
    7. Why money is never neutral — and what that means for how we think about the economy
    8. Policy implications and open questions — what this means for central banks and for you
    · · ·

    1. The Oldest Argument in Monetary Economics

    There is a question at the heart of economics that sounds deceptively simple: when governments print more money, do prices go up because there is more money chasing the same goods — or does the economy first produce goods at certain prices, and then the amount of money in circulation simply adjusts to match? Put differently: does money cause prices, or do prices cause money?

    This is not an abstract riddle for seminar rooms. The answer determines how central banks set interest rates, whether governments choose austerity or stimulus in a recession, and how we understand inflation. If the quantity of money determines prices, then controlling the money supply is the key to controlling the economy. If prices determine the quantity of money, then the real action is in production, technology, and competition — and monetary policy is, at best, a secondary lever.

    The debate begins with the Scottish philosopher David Hume, writing in the mid-eighteenth century. In his essays on money and trade, Hume proposed what became the foundation of mainstream monetary thought: if you double the quantity of money in an economy while keeping everything else constant, prices will eventually double. Money, in this view, is a veil — it changes the numbers on price tags but does not alter the real productive capacity of the economy. The ratio of money to goods simply adjusts until equilibrium is restored.

    This idea was not without immediate critics. The Scottish economist James Steuart attacked it almost as soon as it appeared (1767). Adam Smith, often considered the father of modern economics, held the opposite view — that prices, not money, are the active variable. But the idea proved remarkably resilient. Over the following two centuries, it was refined into what economists call the Quantity Theory of Money, which reached its most influential modern form in the work of Milton Friedman. For Friedman, Hume was the starting point of all monetary theory. For Robert Lucas, another Nobel laureate, Hume marked the beginning of modern monetary economics.

    But there was always an alternative tradition, running from the classical economists through Karl Marx, that saw the relationship in exactly the opposite direction. A new paper by the Costa Rican economist José Mauricio Gómez Julián, published on arXiv in January 2025, takes this alternative tradition seriously, subjects it to rigorous empirical testing with the most modern tools available — Bayesian statistics, machine learning, deep learning, and ensemble methods — and arrives at conclusions that challenge the mainstream consensus.

    · · ·

    2. Marx’s Forgotten Critique

    When most people hear “Marx” and “money” in the same sentence, they expect ideology. But in his Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859), Marx offered something far more valuable: a meticulous logical dissection of Hume’s reasoning. Gómez Julián’s paper draws on four central aspects of this critique, each of which makes testable claims about the real world.

    First: Money is subordinated to exchange values, not the other way around

    Marx’s fundamental point is that the sphere of circulation (where money changes hands) is ultimately subordinated to the sphere of production (where goods are actually made). This is not just a philosophical claim — it has a concrete implication. The quantity of money in circulation must maintain a certain equilibrium with the quantity of goods and services available for sale. If there is too little money, commercial transactions become difficult — there are not enough means of payment to go around. If there is too much money, sellers can raise prices to absorb the excess.

    But here is the crucial mechanism: if the quantity of money falls below or rises above its “necessary level,” a coercive correction occurs through commodity prices. Prices adjust, and money supply follows — not the other way around. The direction of causation runs from prices to money, mediated by the real commodity foundation of money (in Hume’s and Marx’s time, gold and silver).

    This means that money’s non-neutrality — the fact that changes in the money supply do affect real economic outcomes — is not caused by money determining prices. It is caused by the mediating relationship between prices and the material foundation of money, which creates a feedback loop over time.

    Second: An epistemological critique of Hume’s evidence

    Marx points out that when Hume formulated his theory, he was observing a very specific historical situation: the discovery of American mines and the increase in slave labor, which lowered the extraction cost of gold and silver. Under these conditions, the price of commodities exchanged directly for gold and silver (i.e., exported commodities) did indeed rise. But this rise occurred because gold and silver were functioning as commodities — their production cost had dropped — not because more money was chasing the same goods. The effect on gold as a means of payment (i.e., domestic money) took much longer to materialize. Hume, in Marx’s reading, confused a change in the relative value of a commodity (gold) with a general monetary phenomenon.

    Third: Accounting money vs. means of circulation

    Marx argues that Hume made a fundamental category error: he confused accounting money (the unit in which prices are denominated) with money as a means of circulation (the physical medium of exchange). These are different things with different behaviors. Moreover, Hume failed to consider historical events of his own time that demonstrated the need to account for the exchange value of gold and silver when linking money to prices.

    Fourth: Two critical corollaries

    This is where the theory makes its sharpest predictions. Marx draws two conclusions from his analysis that can be tested empirically:

    Marx’s two testable corollaries
    • Corollary 1: If metallic currency is a symbol of value, then the sum of commodity prices determines the quantity of circulating money. But if the monetary unit is a symbol of value, then the quantity of circulating money is determined by the sum of commodity prices. Marx argues it is the monetary unit — not the metallic currency — that is the symbol of value.
    • Corollary 2: If money derives its value from prices (Marx’s position), then there can be more money in circulation than the sum of commodity prices. But if money determines prices (Hume’s position), then there cannot be more money circulating than the sum of prices. Marx argues that the former is true — and it can be checked against data.

    Gómez Julián checks Corollary 2 directly. “Circulating money” is defined as the monetary aggregate M1 (cash plus checking deposits), and the “sum of commodity prices” is, by definition, nominal GDP. Looking at the statistical systems of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Brazil, the paper finds that M1 exceeds nominal GDP in multiple years for each country. This is straightforward evidence in favor of Marx’s position. The author also notes that previous work on El Salvador showed M1 consistently below nominal GDP — which might seem to contradict the pattern until one considers El Salvador’s dollarization, which fundamentally changes the monetary dynamics.

    “Marx’s central thesis is that the value of money depends on the purchasing power of the commodity or commodities that underlie it, and this purchasing power, in turn, depends on the general level of prices. Such prices, the market prices, are determined by capitalist competition.” — Gómez Julián, summarizing Marx’s framework

    The value theory question

    One cannot discuss Marx’s monetary theory without addressing the foundation beneath it: the labor theory of value (LTV). Marx argues that market prices oscillate around “prices of production,” which are themselves grounded in the socially necessary labor time required to produce goods. If the LTV is correct, then exchange values have an objective basis in production — and the subordination of money to prices follows naturally.

    The paper acknowledges that these monetary claims stand or fall with the validity of the LTV, but it also notes that the neoclassical alternative — the subjective theory of value based on marginal utility — has its own deep problems. The famous Cambridge Capital Controversy of the 1960s demonstrated that the neoclassical foundations (the so-called “neoclassical parables”) do not provide a coherent scientific explanation of economic phenomena. Even Paul Samuelson, one of the greatest neoclassical economists, admitted that capital aggregation problems can only be resolved by adopting something very close to the labor theory of value. Joan Robinson went further, arguing that capital can be nothing more than “accumulated past labor.” Notably, the Penn World Tables — one of the most important databases in empirical economics — do not use marginal productivity of capital to measure capital remuneration, but instead use the real average internal rate of return, precisely because of the aggregation problem.

    · · ·

    3. The Role of Gold in a Post-Gold-Standard World

    If money is ultimately subordinated to prices, and prices are anchored in the real economy, what gives money its value in the modern era? Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, when President Nixon ended the dollar’s convertibility to gold, most economists have treated modern money as purely “fiduciary” — backed by nothing but government decree and public trust. Gómez Julián argues, with substantial evidence, that this is not the full picture.

    The paper presents three pillars of evidence for gold’s continuing monetary role:

    Gold’s enduring monetary significance
    • Greenspan’s own words: “Gold still represents the ultimate form of payment in the world. Fiat money in extremis is accepted by nobody. Gold is always accepted.” This is not a gold bug’s fantasy — it was stated by the man who chaired the Federal Reserve for nearly two decades.
    • The inverse relationship: Gold and the US dollar consistently move in opposite directions. When gold rises, the dollar tends to fall, and vice versa. This has been documented by multiple financial analysts and is visible in decades of market data.
    • Policy history: After the turbulence of the 1970s (high inflation, debt crises, savings crises), Paul Volcker — who took over as Fed chair in 1979 — formally abandoned the monetarist experiment in 1982 and adopted policies aimed at stabilizing the dollar’s value against gold and other commodities. This was supported by the Plaza Accord (1985) and the Louvre Accord (1987). The result was the “Great Moderation” (1982–2007), a period of unusual macroeconomic stability.

    The paper traces a revealing pattern through subsequent Fed chairs. Greenspan continued Volcker’s gold-aware approach. When Ben Bernanke — an economist who openly declared Friedman as his central intellectual influence — took over in 2006, policies diverged from the gold anchor, and gold price volatility surged to its highest level since the end of Bretton Woods. The dollar declined. Janet Yellen, who succeeded Bernanke in 2014, returned to the Volcker-Greenspan orientation, and gold prices stabilized. Jerome Powell initially followed this path but gradually moved away, declaring in 2019 that tying the dollar to gold would prevent the Fed from maximizing employment.

    Gómez Julián pushes back on Powell’s argument on two grounds. First, periods when the Fed stabilized the dollar around gold showed at least the same level of employment stability as periods when it did not. Second, since Bretton Woods, no country has used the gold standard directly — they have anchored their currencies to the dollar, and the dollar has been anchored (in varying degrees) to gold. So Powell’s claim that “no country uses it” misses the layered structure of the international monetary system.

    The dialectical contradiction of gold

    The paper draws on the Marxist economist Ernest Mandel to explain why the United States both needs and resists the gold standard. The gold standard provides stability — but it also requires contractionary policies during recessions, which can deepen crises and, as the case of Heinrich Brüning’s Germany (1930–1932) showed, can undermine democracy by creating the conditions for fascism. The gold standard also requires a delicate balance between short-term dollar demand (from foreign investors parking reserves) and long-term dollar outflow (from American investments abroad). When this balance tips — as it did in the late 1960s — the result is a monetary crisis.

    “The ‘dollar crisis’ and the search for means of international payment independent both of gold and ‘currency reserves’ reflect clear recognition on the part of big international capital of a contradiction inherent in the present-day capitalist system: the contradiction between the dollar’s role as an ‘international money,’ and its role as an instrument to assure the expansion of the American capitalist economy. To fulfill the first function, a stable money is needed. To fulfill the second function, a flexible money is necessary, i.e., an unstable one. There’s the rub.” — Ernest Mandel, 1968, quoted in the paper

    This dialectical tension — the system needs gold stability but also needs monetary flexibility — explains the recurring oscillation between gold-anchored and gold-detached monetary regimes. The paper describes the current arrangement as a “loose gold standard”: not a formal peg, but a persistent gravitational pull.

    · · ·

    4. A Mathematical Model for the Money-Prices-Gold Relationship

    Gómez Julián formalizes the above arguments into a mathematical model. The basic version is elegant in its simplicity:

    Core equation Qm = λp / λgold · β

    In plain language: the quantity of money in circulation (Qm, measured as M1) is equal to the sum of commodity prices (λp, measured as nominal GDP) divided by the international price of gold (λgold), multiplied by a coefficient (β) that represents the velocity of money circulation (assumed, for simplicity, to equal one).

    This equation encodes several intuitive relationships:

    What the equation says — in words
    • If prices (nominal GDP) rise while gold stays the same, the money supply must increase — more money is needed to express the same goods at higher prices.
    • If the gold price rises while prices stay the same, the money supply decreases — fewer monetary units are needed to express the same sum of prices, because gold is now more valuable per unit.
    • If both prices and gold rise, the effect on money depends on which change is larger — it could go either way.
    • If prices rise and gold falls, money unambiguously increases — both forces push in the same direction.

    The paper works through all eight possible combinations of price and gold movements (both up, both down, one up one down, one fixed one moving, etc.), showing that the model’s predictions are internally consistent. This is not just algebra — it is a stress test of the theory’s logical coherence.

    The model can also be expressed in logarithmic form, which has a practical advantage: when you run a regression on logarithmically transformed variables, the coefficients can be interpreted directly as elasticities — percentage changes. For example, a coefficient of 0.13 means that a 1% increase in prices is associated with a 0.13% increase in the money supply, holding gold constant. This logarithmic transformation also tends to smooth out extreme values in the data, improving statistical performance.

    A more general version of the model simply states that the money supply is a function of both prices and gold, without specifying the exact functional form — leaving the data to reveal the shape of the relationship.

    · · ·

    5. The Data and the Methodology

    Four countries, carefully chosen

    The empirical analysis covers quarterly data from four countries, each chosen for a specific reason:

    Country selection and rationale
    • United States (1959–2022): The most developed Western capitalist economy. Economic laws derived from its study are, to varying degrees, applicable to other capitalist countries. It represents the highest stage of development reached by Western capitalism and serves as a mirror of the future for other economies. 63 years of data — longer than a Kondratieff wave (the long cycles of capitalist dynamics, typically 40–60 years).
    • Canada (1961–2022): Chosen for similar reasons to the UK, but representing the welfare state variant of Western capitalism — a different model from both the US and the UK. 61 years of data.
    • United Kingdom (1986–2022): A major developed capitalist economy with more available data than other candidates like Germany or France. 36 years of data.
    • Brazil (1996–2022): An emerging economy (developing country), chosen to test whether the findings generalize beyond advanced capitalism. Since the study had already been done for El Salvador (an underdeveloped country), verifying the results for Brazil would suggest the patterns are general economic laws of capitalist development. 26 years of data.

    A multi-layered methodological approach

    This is not a paper that runs one regression and calls it a day. The methodology unfolds in several stages, each building on the previous one:

    Stage 1: Pairwise direction analysis. The first question is: for each pair of variables (money-prices, gold-prices, money-gold), which variable best predicts which? This is done using Bayesian simple linear regression, where the direction of the relationship is determined by comparing the Expected Log Pointwise Predictive Density from Leave-One-Out cross-validation (ELPD-LOO) — a rigorous measure of how well a model predicts data it has not seen. Higher (less negative) ELPD-LOO means better predictive performance.

    Stage 2: RESET tests for nonlinearity. Linear models assume straight-line relationships. But what if the real relationship is curved? The paper runs Ramsey’s RESET test with quadratic, cubic, and combined terms, bootstrapped using a Bayesian posterior distribution. This reveals whether linear models are missing important nonlinear patterns — and, if so, what kind of curvature is present.

    Stage 3: Empirical distribution fitting. Before building multivariate models, the paper determines the best-fitting probability distribution for each variable (log-normal, Weibull, Gamma, Normal, etc.) using the maximum goodness-of-fit method, with results selected by the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). This is not just a technical exercise — it directly informs how the variables are transformed in later models.

    Stage 4: Bayesian Generalized Linear Models (BGLM). The paper constructs multivariate models using different statistical families (Gamma, Gaussian) and link functions (logarithmic, identity), with gold often transformed into a natural cubic spline (a flexible curve that can capture nonlinear patterns) or fitted as a Weibull random variable. The choice of family, link, and transformation is driven by predictive performance metrics.

    Stage 5: Machine learning and deep learning. Four different ML models are tested individually and in combination:

    Machine learning models used
    • Quantile Random Forest (QRF): An extension of random forests that estimates the entire distribution of the predicted variable, not just its average.
    • Conditional Inference Random Forest: A variant that uses statistical tests to select splitting variables, reducing bias toward variables with many possible splits.
    • Bayesian Regularized Neural Network (BRNN): A neural network that uses Bayesian regularization to prevent overfitting — the model learns to be cautious about its own complexity.
    • Support Vector Machine with Radial Basis Kernel (SVMRadial): A powerful classification/regression method that maps data into higher-dimensional spaces to find optimal decision boundaries.

    Stage 6: Ensemble learning. Finally, the paper tests whether combining multiple models through boosting (a technique where each new model focuses on the errors of the previous ones) produces better predictions than any individual model. The ensemble is structured as a Bayesian Generalized Linear Model with Gaussian family and identity link.

    A critical philosophical point: the paper uses objective Bayesian analysis. This means that all prior information — the starting assumptions the model uses before seeing the data — is derived from empirical analysis of the dataset itself, not from subjective beliefs or assumptions. This approach incorporates what the author calls “epistemological doubt” about parameter estimation, acknowledging that we can never be perfectly certain about any estimated value.

    · · ·

    6. Country-by-Country Results

    United States (1959–2022)

    The pairwise analysis reveals something striking: the simple relationship between M1 and prices is undecidable — both directions fit about equally well by ELPD-LOO. This is already a blow to the simplistic Quantity Theory, which claims a clear causal arrow from money to prices. However, gold is clearly best predicted by prices (not the reverse), and M1 is clearly best predicted by gold (not the reverse). This suggests a chain: prices → gold → money, consistent with Marx’s framework.

    The RESET tests confirm that the relationships are nonlinear. For the M1-prices pair in both directions, all RESET tests yield p-values of zero — meaning the linear models are definitively inadequate. Nonlinearity is everywhere.

    The multivariate model that best fits the data is a BGLM with Gamma family, logarithmic link, and gold transformed into a natural cubic spline with five degrees of freedom. The coefficient on log(prices) is +0.13 — confirming the direct, positive relationship between prices and money supply. The spline coefficients for gold alternate in sign across the five basis functions, confirming the theoretically predicted nonlinear, segment-dependent relationship. The model achieves an MAE of just 0.12 (2.43% of the log(M1) minimum) and an RMSE of 0.21.

    The ensemble model — combining a Bayesian Regularized Neural Network (weight: 0.41) and a Quantile Random Forest (weight: 0.59) — further improves performance: MAE drops to 0.08 on test data, RMSE to 0.25, and the R² reaches 0.985 in training. All coefficients are highly significant (p < 2e-16). The US is the only country where the ensemble outperforms the best individual ML model.

    Canada (1961–2022)

    The pairwise results are cleaner than in the US case: M1 is best predicted by prices, gold is best predicted by prices, and M1 is best predicted by gold. The chain prices → gold → money is clearly visible. RESET tests again confirm pervasive nonlinearity.

    The best multivariate model uses a BGLM with Gamma family, logarithmic link, and gold transformed as a Weibull random variable (shape = 5.88, scale = 6.47). The coefficient on log(prices) is +0.045 — smaller than in the US but still positive and confirming the prices-to-money direction. The Weibull transformation captures the nonlinear gold dynamics in a single parametric term. The model achieves an MAE of 0.23 and RMSE of 0.28.

    Unlike the US, the ensemble did not improve on the best individual ML model. A Quantile Random Forest performed best on its own, achieving a remarkable R² of 0.998 in training and an MAE of just 0.04 on test data. The near-perfect fit suggests that the money-prices-gold relationship in Canada is highly regular and predictable over this period.

    United Kingdom (1986–2022)

    With a shorter sample (36 years), the UK shows a more mixed pattern in pairwise analysis. Notably, the simple relationship between M1 and prices runs in the reverse direction — prices are best predicted by M1, not the other way around. This might seem to support the Quantity Theory, but it only holds in the simple bivariate case. When gold is included in the multivariate model, the direct relationship between prices and money reasserts itself.

    The best multivariate model is a BGLM with Gamma family, logarithmic link, and gold transformed as a natural cubic spline with five degrees of freedom — similar to the US specification. The coefficient on log(prices) is +0.071, and the spline coefficients alternate in sign, as predicted by theory. The model achieves an MAE of 0.06 and RMSE of 0.07 — the tightest fit among the four countries.

    As with Canada, the ensemble did not improve on the best individual model. A Quantile Random Forest again performed best, with R² of 0.993 in training and near-zero RMSE on test data.

    Brazil (1996–2022)

    Brazil, as an emerging economy with a turbulent monetary history, presents the most complex picture. In pairwise analysis, the money-prices relationship again runs in the reverse direction (prices predicted by M1), and the gold-prices relationship is bidirectional. RESET tests show the strongest nonlinearity signals of any country, with many p-values at or near zero.

    The best multivariate model uses a BGLM with Gaussian family (the only country where Gaussian outperformed Gamma), logarithmic link, and gold transformed as a natural cubic spline. The coefficient on log(prices) is +0.05, again confirming the direct relationship. Model performance is solid: MAE of 0.07, RMSE of 0.21.

    Among ML models, a Support Vector Machine with Radial Basis Kernel performed best, achieving R² of 0.991 in training and an MAE of 0.012 on test data. As with Canada and the UK, the ensemble did not improve on this individual model.

    Summary: In all four countries, the multivariate models confirm a positive relationship between prices and money supply, and a nonlinear, segment-dependent relationship between gold and money supply — exactly as the theoretical model predicts.
    · · ·

    7. Why Money Is Never Neutral

    The paper’s central conclusion, stated plainly: money is not neutral at any time horizon — not in the short run, not in the long run, across all four countries studied.

    This is a strong claim, and it contradicts one of the most fundamental assumptions of mainstream economics. The concept of “monetary neutrality” holds that changes in the money supply eventually affect only nominal variables (prices, wages) and leave real variables (output, employment) unchanged. In the long run, the argument goes, the economy returns to its “natural” state regardless of what the central bank does with the money supply.

    Gómez Julián’s results, based on data spanning up to 63 years — longer than a full Kondratieff cycle — provide no support for this proposition. But the paper is careful to explain why money is non-neutral, and the explanation differs from what both mainstream and some heterodox economists might expect.

    Non-neutrality, in this framework, is not caused by the money supply determining prices (the monetarist claim). It is caused by the mediating relationship between prices and the real commodity foundation of money (gold), which determines the money supply. This creates a feedback loop: prices influence gold, gold influences money, and money — through aggregate demand — feeds back into prices. The exchange value of money as a monetary unit is the transmission mechanism.

    Because this feedback is nonlinear (as confirmed by the RESET tests and the spline models across all four countries), and because it operates over time with dynamic lags, the money-prices-gold system constitutes what complexity scientists would call a complex system — a system where small changes can have disproportionate effects, where cause and effect are intertwined, and where linear prediction is fundamentally limited.

    · · ·

    8. Policy Implications and Open Questions

    What this means for policy

    The findings have practical consequences for how we think about monetary policy:

    Policy takeaways
    • The best way to control prices is directly — through industrial policy, competition policy, supply-side interventions, and measures that address the real determinants of production costs. Since prices are ultimately grounded in the sphere of production, intervening there is the most effective approach.
    • But controlling the money supply also works — because the feedback relationship runs in both directions. Contracting M1 can reduce prices, even though the primary direction of causation runs from prices to money. This “theoretically justifies a commonly effective practice in economic policy,” as the author puts it.
    • Friedman’s narrative about the Great Depression is weakened. The Federal Reserve expanded the monetary base during the Depression, yet the Depression happened anyway. During the 2008 crisis, the Fed adopted an aggressive expansionary monetary policy — and it alone was not enough. It had to be accompanied by massive fiscal intervention (the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act), direct asset purchases, near-zero interest rates, and other measures. As Krugman noted, “The Monetary History thesis has just taken a hit.”
    • The gold standard is not incompatible with employment stability. This challenges the argument, made by Jerome Powell and others, that returning to a gold anchor would sacrifice the Fed’s ability to maximize employment. The historical record shows at least equivalent macroeconomic stability during gold-anchored periods.

    Two open questions for future research

    The paper is transparent about what it does not answer:

    Question 1: In the current loose gold standard, how exactly does the feedback between prices, gold, and the money supply work through specific economic policy instruments? The Fed’s tools — interest rates, quantitative easing, reserve requirements — act as latent variables mediating the gold-money relationship. The paper establishes that this mediation exists but acknowledges that its precise mechanisms require further study.

    Question 2: What are the quantitative and temporal limits of monetary non-neutrality? If too much money enters circulation, commodity prices eventually correct the imbalance through a “coercive correction.” But how large can the distortions become before correction occurs, and how long does the adjustment take? Understanding these limits could illuminate phenomena traditionally attributed to monetary factors — such as the “liquidity trap” — from an entirely new angle.

    A methodological statement

    Beyond its economic findings, the paper is also an argument about method. By combining objective Bayesian statistics with modern machine learning — neural networks, random forests, support vector machines, and boosted ensembles — Gómez Julián demonstrates that the tools of artificial intelligence can serve heterodox economic theory, not just mainstream modeling. Using Bayesian regularized neural networks and gradient-boosted ensembles to test predictions derived from Marx’s nineteenth-century monetary theory is, to put it mildly, unusual. But the results are robust, the fit is strong, and the patterns are consistent across four countries with very different economic structures.

    The paper’s approach to the so-called “transformation problem” — the long-standing debate about how labor values map onto market prices — also deserves attention. By assuming inventory valuation at the cost of reproduction (where the current technological state determines the value of inputs), Gómez Julián shows that the system of equations has a unique solution given the degree of exploitation of labor power, sidestepping a controversy that has occupied Marxist economists for over a century.

    · · ·

    The Takeaway

    Three hundred years after David Hume proposed that money determines prices, and one hundred and sixty-five years after Karl Marx argued the opposite, we still do not have a settled answer. Gómez Julián’s paper does not claim to settle it — but it does something arguably more valuable. It shows, with rigorous data and modern methods across four countries and six decades, that the question itself may be wrongly framed as a binary choice.

    Money and prices, along with gold, form a complex, nonlinear, feedback-driven system in which both directions of causation operate simultaneously. But the relationship is asymmetric: prices hold the upper hand. Money is ultimately subordinated to the real economy — to production, to labor, to the commodities that give currency its value — even as it feeds back into prices through aggregate demand. Money is never neutral, but it is never the master either. It is, in the deepest sense, a dependent variable that nonetheless shapes the system it depends on.

    In an era of quantitative easing debates, cryptocurrency experiments, inflation anxiety, and questions about the very nature of money, this is not just an academic finding. It is a framework for thinking about the monetary world we actually inhabit — one that is messier, more dynamic, and more deeply rooted in material reality than either Hume or Friedman imagined.