“Is that to say we are against Free Trade? No, we are for Free Trade, because by Free Trade all economical laws, with their most astounding contradictions, will act upon a larger scale, upon the territory of the whole earth; and because from the uniting of all these contradictions in a single group, where they will stand face to face, will result the struggle which will itself eventuate in the emancipation of the proletariat.”
Karl Heinrich Marx · Marx-Engels Collected Works, Vol. VI, p. 290
Dollarization and De-dollarization: A Technical, Historical, and International Analysis
Part III · The Ecuadorian Case
JOSÉ MAURICIO GÓMEZ JULIÁN
Originally published: Revised:
From financial liberalization and the 1999 bank holiday to the adoption of the dollar: historical background, price stability, monetary sovereignty, and proposals to reorganize payments and foreign exchange outflows.
· · ·
I. Historical Background
The bank holiday and deposit freeze in the crisis of Ecuador’s neoliberal model
Ecuador’s replacement of its currency with the US dollar is a case of full dollarization: the official adoption of the US currency as the unit of account, means of payment, and store of value, replacing the sucre. As discussed by Roura (2020), the technical arguments advanced by the Ecuadorian government and intellectual supporters of this monetary replacement—regardless of their validity—gained popular acceptance in the context of the economic events known as the bank holiday, which lasted five days, and the legally mandated freeze on bank accounts for one year, intended to prevent mass withdrawals and avert hyperinflation. Together, these events marked the most acute phase of what was then the worst economic crisis in Ecuador’s history, as M. C. Hernández (2020) notes. It is therefore necessary first to examine the factors that led to the bank holiday of March 8, 1999, and the subsequent deposit freeze.
As Basantes (2020) explains, a decisive financial precedent was established in 1994, when the government of Sixto Durán-Ballén approved the General Law on Financial Institutions. It permitted related-party lending: bank loans to companies, shareholders, and managers linked to the bank itself. Diego Borja, interviewed by Basantes, argues that reduced oversight facilitated the abuse of these operations. These financial factors, combined with structural economic conditions and external shocks, contributed to the outbreak of the 1999 crisis.
From both a fiscal perspective (Banco Central del Ecuador [BCE], n.d.-b, p. 1) and a monetary perspective (BCE, n.d.-a, p. 1), Ecuador’s official institutions identify the effects of El Niño on domestic production during 1997 and 1998 as a fundamental trigger of the 1999 economic crisis.1 A crisis’s outbreak should not be confused with its origins: the former is the acute manifestation of the latter. Agriculture on Ecuador’s coast was particularly affected by the destruction of much of its productive infrastructure and road network. According to these accounts, the disruption altered the business cycle and aggravated latent negative trends in inflation, financial-system solvency, and macroeconomic stability—in other words, pre-existing structural weaknesses in the Ecuadorian economy.
External agricultural disruptions acted as triggers, but distinguishing a trigger from the conditions that enable its effects to spread is essential. The BCE’s own report (n.d.-a, p. 1) connects the climatic event with earlier vulnerabilities: inflation, financial fragility, and macroeconomic instability. From the political economy perspective developed here, the natural shock alone cannot explain the depth of the crisis. Comparison with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020–2021 illustrates this distinction between an immediate disturbance and the economic structure through which it operates.
Several issues nevertheless require clarification concerning the condition of Ecuador’s agricultural sector before the climatic event that precipitated its crisis, El Niño.
An exclusive reading of the BCE and other official accounts might suggest that the agricultural sector had no underlying vulnerabilities before El Niño. That interpretation would be far removed from the historical reality.
As Bravo (2008, pp. 7–8) notes, various studies document the use of food aid as an instrument of US foreign policy.2
Ecuador received food aid through the Food for Progress program, which supplies commodities3 to countries undertaking “market-oriented”—that is, neoliberal—economic or agricultural reforms. The Ecuadorian and US governments agreed on these reforms in 1991, as set out in the document entitled “Food for Progress Program in Ecuador.”
What specific commitments did the Ecuadorian government undertake? They included eliminating tariffs on sensitive products such as maize, rice, and soybeans; changing the Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Agropecuarias (INIAP); and supporting two foundations, the Instituto de Estrategias Agropecuarias (IDEA) and the Fundación para el Desarrollo Agropecuario (FUNDAGRO), to promote changes in economic policy. NGOs have never been, and will never be, detached from politics. Assuming their neutrality can introduce systematic, suboptimal biases into the analysis of social phenomena in which they play a significant role.
More specifically, the program provided for removing prior licensing requirements that restricted imports and exports of maize, sorghum, soybeans, and soybean meal, and for eliminating quotas on imports and exports of vegetable oils and tallow. To provide some protection for domestic production, the importing country’s government could consider retaining certain tariffs, ranging from 15% to 25% ad valorem, distinguishing between raw materials and domestically processed products. For maize, the tariff was reduced from 65% to approximately 5%, as it was for sorghum imports.
The program also proposed granting INIAP institutional autonomy and providing sufficient budgetary support for agricultural research—after its independence had been established, a point worth emphasizing. The importing country’s government, Ecuador, would process and enact a new law governing INIAP, including an increase in the research budget4 and the creation of an endowment fund.
By the time El Niño struck in 1998, the neoliberal model in agriculture had been taking shape in practice since the 1980s and had received formal expression seven years earlier, in 1991. These developments form part of the structural weaknesses discussed above with reference to the Banco Central del Ecuador.
The underlying dynamics referred to above are those of a capitalist political economy. A full examination lies beyond the scope of this study, but their general outlines were developed by Marx and can be observed across Latin America and the global capitalist system as a whole. This research focuses particularly on Latin America, where the monetary replacement processes—specifically dollarization—examined here occurred. Their fundamental structure can nevertheless be presented in outline.
As Martín-Mayoral (2009, p. 120) shows, fundamentalist free-market policies emerged in Ecuador during the 1980s. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States promoted this economic outlook more systematically and formally worldwide during the 1990s. John Williamson’s 1989 document “What Washington Means by Policy Reform” became associated with what is commonly known as the Washington Consensus (WC). This policy environment helped establish the conditions for the crisis that erupted in 1999, following the agricultural damage caused by El Niño.
As Ecuador en Vivo (2020) reports, external factors also contributed to the conditions underlying the crisis: the Asian crisis of 1997, financial tensions in Brazil in 1998–1999, the collapse of oil prices to very low levels per barrel, and tighter credit from international lenders amid a severe external debt burden that reached 100% of GDP.
The misuse of bank funds by senior executives—encouraged by the substantial commissions shareholders offer for maximizing profitability—combines with corruption arising from politicians’ abuse of bureaucratic power. The inefficiency of public officials unqualified for their duties, itself a form of corruption in this interpretation, also complements the economic and public policy framework outlined by Williamson in the document cited above.
Robalino (2021) traces the origins of this financial crisis to the government of Sixto Durán-Ballén and Alberto Dahik, promoters of neoliberalism in Ecuador. In 1994, they introduced the Financial Institutions Law, which liberalized interest rates, allowed capital to circulate freely, and enabled related-party lending to expand without effective control. This situation generated speculation, capital flight, and bank failures. The policies of the subsequent president, Jamil Mahuad, intensified the crisis.
According to Robalino (2021), financial power became particularly visible in 1998. Bankers such as Fernando Aspiazu financed Mahuad’s campaign, while others joined his cabinet. “Bank rescue” policies channeled millions in loans to banks through public institutions. In the National Congress, the coalition known as the “steamroller,” formed by the Partido Social Cristiano and Democracia Popular, created laws and institutions, including the Agencia de Garantía de Depósitos (AGD), through which the state assumed private banks’ liabilities. Mesías (2002, pp. 127–131) additionally reports the following:
Financial information was of uneven quality, with manipulated balance sheets and practices that concealed the actual condition of the institutions examined. This points to inadequate financial supervision by Ecuador’s Superintendencia de Bancos, referred to below as the SB.
Interventions by the SB were late and inadequate.
The SB implemented neither preventive nor corrective measures, and did not even provide adequate monitoring.
In its supervision, the SB failed to distinguish the risks of banks placed under intervention from those of the rest of the banking system. This impaired its preventive response to the collapse of the banking system and, consequently, the broader financial system.
Analysis of depositors’ behavior indicates that more than half of the banks subsequently placed under intervention tended to attract more deposits before intervention than other banks. Customers therefore tended to choose riskier institutions because the signals issued by the SB—monthly balance sheets and financial indicators—did not allow them to recognize individual banks’ actual condition.
The business conduct of banks, executives, and shareholders was also problematic. Private banks did not inform customers that they were under intervention; instead, they used marketing strategies and deposit interest rates across different maturities to attract potential customers. During the period examined, 1993–1999, the researcher reports a significant positive relationship of 78.32% between total deposits and interest rates on deposits with maturities of 84 to 91 days.
Oleas (2020) distinguishes the bank holiday from the subsequent deposit freeze:
The bank holiday ordered by the Superintendent of Banks on March 8, 1999, was not initially intended to prepare a freeze on customers’ deposits in Ecuador’s financial system. The sequence of events during that week, which also included a national strike against other government economic measures on March 10–11, and especially the declaration mobilizing the financial system and its customers—the basis for the deposit freeze—indicate that the government reacted as events unfolded during that unusual week. The available information shows that the bank holiday was not designed to prepare the deposit freeze. Nevertheless, both events formed part of Ecuador’s financial crisis, which culminated in the dollarization of its economy. This crisis, in turn, belonged to the period of monetary and financial instability that began in 1982 on the periphery of capitalism with Mexico’s external debt crisis.
(Oleas, 2020, p. 64; translated from Spanish)
The author places the suspension of operations within a sequence of interventions and rescues:
The bank holiday was one of five milestones in the financial crisis at the end of the last century. The first occurred in early 1996 when, by granting subordinated credit to Banco Continental, the economic authorities began a prolonged period of moral hazard that ended in 2000, after the BCE had lost its lender-of-last-resort functions. The second took place between September and November 1998, when the BCE’s board approved several liquidity loans to Filanbanco, yielding to political pressure from government authorities. The passage of the Reorganization Law in December 1998 deepened the crisis by creating incentives to avoid financial services and encouraging exchange-rate speculation, thereby draining bank liquidity. The fourth milestone was the bank holiday, which sought to prevent, or at least delay, the collapse of Banco del Progreso. These events demonstrate the importance of political connections in the management of the crisis.
(Oleas, 2020, p. 64; translated from Spanish)
On the deposit freeze and its institutional context, the author adds:
The fifth and final milestone was the freezing of customers’ deposits in the financial system. This arbitrary decision, effective from March 15, 1999, was declared unconstitutional on December 24 of that year. By then, the damage to the domestic currency’s function as a means of payment was irreversible. Decisions taken in the preceding four episodes favored specific banks with strong political connections: Banco Continental, linked to the conservative government of Sixto Durán-Ballén; Filanbanco, linked to legislators from the PSC and PRE; and Banco del Progreso, linked to the DP government and legislators from that party and the PSC. Ultimately, all these banks failed, causing severe losses to customers throughout the country. The bank holiday occurred in the late 1990s, when neoliberal structural adjustment and reforms had already become established across practically all Latin American countries. In Ecuador, this process did not follow the Washington Consensus as a faithful transcription of its economic policy principles. In the financial sector, implementation was slow and intermittent and, unlike in other countries, was not directed by a hegemonic leadership committed to the purported advantages of the WC. This distinctive adoption of WC principles did not displace the corporatist practices of Ecuadorian elites, as shown by the different procedures applied to banks facing similar insolvency problems. The AGD’s restructuring processes remained faithful to this tradition. The Reorganization Law in Economic Matters in the Tax-Financial Area was the immediate precursor of the bank holiday. Its tax provisions encouraged economic agents to exchange sucres for dollars and avoid financial services, reducing liquidity throughout the system. Although all institutions were affected, the Superintendent of Banks’ decision clearly enabled Banco del Progreso at least to postpone its final closure.
(Oleas, 2020, pp. 64–65; translated from Spanish)
The bank holiday also had other consequences. By extending through the week of March 8–12, it reduced the political risk associated with the national strike of March 10–11. The IMF mission that had arrived to negotiate a new letter of intent left the country after four of the five BCE board members resigned, leaving it without negotiating counterparts. When it became public that part of Jamil Mahuad’s presidential campaign funding had come from the banking system, the last vestiges of support for the Democracia Popular government disappeared (Oleas, 2020, p. 65). In April 1999, the executive submitted a bill to Congress to restore income tax and modify other taxes. The legislature, however, made the capital circulation tax (ICC) deductible from income tax, preserving the financial-market distortion introduced by the Reorganization Law. The market for reschedulable deposit certificates (CDRs),5 which partly offset the liquidity shortage caused by that law and Executive Decree No. 685, deepened mistrust. Together with the dollarization of economic agents’ portfolios, this stripped the sucre of much of its economic functionality and pushed the country toward adopting the dollar as compulsory legal tender. Dollarization was presented as a lifeline against imminent hyperinflation—price increases exceeding 50% per month—which threatened to render the domestic currency worthless. In just one year, from January 1999 to January 2000, the dollar’s price in sucres rose by more than 250%, according to Ecuador en Vivo (2020).
An increase in the dollar’s price in sucres and the percentage loss in the sucre’s value are different magnitudes. If the exchange rate rises from E to 3.5E, the dollar becomes 250% more expensive, while the sucre’s external value falls by approximately 71.4%. High annual inflation must likewise be distinguished from the monthly threshold commonly used to characterize hyperinflation.
Table 1Reschedulable deposit certificates: sequence and effects
Period
Measure or process
Financial effect
March 1999
Deposits are frozen and reschedulable deposit certificates (CDRs) are delivered to savers.
A claim to repayment replaces immediate access to the deposit.
1999
Certificates are traded and used to settle obligations.
Selling at a discount provides liquidity in exchange for losing part of the face value. The historical account of CDRs reports discounts of 40% to 60% in certain transactions.
November 1999
Provisions require the Corporación Financiera Nacional (CFN) to accept certificates at face value.
Accepting securities at 100% contrasts with their discounted trading value and transfers risks to the receiving institution.
1999–2000
CDR use differs according to the issuing institution and its customers’ circumstances.
Research by León Cercado and Triana Villanueva finds differences between customers of operating banks and those of institutions undergoing restructuring.
2007 and subsequent debates
Reports and controversies concerning losses incurred by the CFN.
The historical account reports allegations of losses of at least USD 1,178 million. This figure is attributed to those reports; it is neither an independent estimate nor a judicial finding.
Note. Summary of “Certificado de depósito reprogramable” (n.d.) and León Cercado and Triana Villanueva (n.d., pp. 1–2). The mechanisms are distinguished from allegations of individual responsibility. The chronology of constitutional decisions should not automatically be equated with the dates of individual decrees.
II. Dollarization, Stability, and the Productive Structure
Dollarization was initially presented as a technically valid response to the economic and financial catastrophe that erupted in Ecuador after March 8, 1999. It was later also defended as the best option for a country said to have a tradition of economic and fiscal indiscipline.
Regarding the second argument, one might reasonably prefer correcting indiscipline to relinquishing monetary policy. The first argument, however, appears harder to dismiss given the scale of the agricultural disruption: according to the Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería, Acuacultura y Pesca (2016, p. 98), agriculture’s average annual share of total GDP during the 1990s was 21%.
Agricultural liberalization, the consequences of El Niño, and the failure of twenty banks intensified the urgency of stabilizing prices.6 Financial concentration also increased: three institutions—two based in Quito and one in Guayaquil—held more than 52% of the surviving banks’ assets, while three of the ten largest banks were foreign-owned (Oleas, 2020, p. 65).
The risk of accelerating inflation must be distinguished from stagflation, which combines inflation with stagnation or recession and does not require preceding hyperinflation. The choice of stabilization instruments is not socially neutral either. From this essay’s perspective, the protection of major financial interests restricted the range of policies considered; a different economic project would have required a change in that balance of power.
Under the supervision of the Agencia de Garantía de Depósitos (AGD),7 failed banks were grouped as banks undergoing restructuring. They represented 53.4% of the banking system’s pre-crisis assets and 60.9% of its liabilities. These figures show why financial reorganization and its fiscal costs are inseparable from the analysis of dollarization (Oleas, 2020, p. 65).
Oleas (2020, p. 65) notes that, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the AGD held 90.2% of the entire financial system’s overdue loans, while the country no longer had an institution able to act as lender of last resort.
M. C. Hernández (2020) recalls that Jamil Mahuad announced dollarization on January 9, 2000, and that his government was overthrown twelve days later. His close ties with banking interests form part of the process’s political context. In this essay’s political economy interpretation, the management and resolution of the crisis favored groups wielding financial power. This distributive conclusion does not establish that every event had been planned in advance.
Nevertheless, according to M. C. Hernández (2020), monetary stability was one of dollarization’s advantages when viewed twenty years later. Previously, under the sucre, devaluation, inflation, and monetary issuance without a corresponding productive expansion made the currency’s value volatile. This impoverished the middle class because real wages, ceteris paribus, were more vulnerable to erosion than under a robust dollar such as the US currency was at the time, roughly a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Table 2Inflation in Ecuador, 1990–2018
Year
Annual inflation (%)
Magnitude · 0–100% scale
1990
48.52
1991
48.72
1992
54.61
1993
44.96
1994
27.31
1995
22.93
1996
24.41
1997
30.66
1998
36.10
1999
52.24
2000
96.10
2001
37.68
2002
12.48
2003
7.93
2004
2.74
2005
2.17
2006
3.30
2007
2.28
2008
8.40
2009
5.16
2010
3.55
2011
4.47
2012
5.10
2013
2.72
2014
3.59
2015
3.97
2016
1.73
2017
0.42
2018
-0.22
Note. Annual percentage change in consumer prices; values rounded to two decimal places. Data from the World Bank (n.d.), indicator FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG, accessed November 4, 2026. Dollarization was announced on January 9, 2000; 96.10% is the rate for the whole of 2000, not the announcement date. The 2018 observation is negative, indicating deflation. The time trend alone does not identify the exclusive causal effect of the currency change.
The sustained decline in inflation after the transition is one of the strongest arguments advanced by dollarization’s supporters. Monetary stability and productive transformation are nevertheless different dimensions: more stable prices do not, by themselves, eliminate dependence on primary exports, employment problems, or inequality.
As Westreicher (2019) explains, the expression dinero inorgánico—loosely, unbacked monetary issuance—is commonly used to describe monetary expansion without a corresponding increase in output. In a dollarized economy, the government and central bank cannot issue US dollars to finance the deficit. Fiat money, however, is not mechanically backed by a fixed quantity of goods or gold. The effect of monetary expansion on prices also depends on money demand, productive capacity, and financial conditions. Debt monetization means financing public obligations through money creation; it does not, by definition, imply unlimited borrowing.
Pablo Dávalos, interviewed by Roura (2020), emphasizes the other side of a strong dollar: the greater attractiveness of imports can weaken domestic production and encourage deindustrialization and a renewed concentration on primary production. In his interpretation, the absence of productive policies makes it cheaper to buy fruit from Peru or vegetables from Colombia than to produce them in Ecuador. The regime’s external sustainability requires attention to exports, imports, and the financing of imbalances.
George Selgin offers a different interpretation in M. C. Hernández’s (2020) report. He attributes many difficulties to dependence on oil and argues that oil-price fluctuations would affect Ecuador under other monetary regimes as well. He also considers high tariffs a factor behind price differences with neighboring countries and proposes lowering them before altering dollarization.
Dávalos’s and Selgin’s interpretations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A poorly diversified productive structure exposes a country to external shocks, while relinquishing an independent exchange-rate policy changes the instruments available to address them. From this essay’s perspective, dependence on external financing can strengthen the bargaining power of creditors and international institutions. Borrowing is one possible response to a foreign exchange constraint, but others include changes in exports, remittances, investment, imports, and capital flows.8
An economic system shaped by the Washington Consensus—in practice from 1980 and formally from 1991—would, in this interpretation, have considerable difficulty functioning adequately, as suggested by experience in Latin America and Europe.9 This contributed to a sequence of political crises10 beginning in 1996 and continuing until Rafael Correa took office in 2007. His arrival coincided with a systematic dismantling of the neoliberal model and the “Citizens’ Revolution,” situated within the Latin American political movement known as “Twenty-First-Century Socialism.”
Table 3Political instability and presidential succession, 1996–2007
Presidency
From
To
Abdalá Bucaram Ortiz
1996
1997
Fabián Alarcón Rivera · first interim presidency
1997
1997
Rosalía Arteaga Serrano · provisional presidency
1997
1997
Fabián Alarcón Rivera · second interim presidency
1997
1998
Jamil Mahuad Witt
1998
2000
Gustavo Noboa Bejarano
2000
2003
Lucio Gutiérrez Borbúa
2003
2005
Alfredo Palacio González
2005
2007
Rafael Correa Delgado
2007
2017
Note. The final row shows the presidential term beginning at the end of the period examined. A succession dispute in February 1997 included Arteaga’s provisional presidency between Alarcón’s two interim presidencies; the table does not list the juntas lasting less than a day in January 2000. Sources: CIDOB (n.d.-a, n.d.-b, n.d.-c, n.d.-d, n.d.-e, n.d.-f).
III. Correa: Criticism and the Continuation of Dollarization
Why, then, did Rafael Correa retain dollarization during his presidency despite his academic criticism of the regime? In 2004, he argued for recovering sovereign instruments of development:
As Fander Falconí also rightly noted, the debate on dollarization truly concerns our countries’ economic and social future. It means moving beyond simplistic ideas such as the “dogma of stability,” whose most extreme expression is undoubtedly Ecuadorian dollarization. An irreversible fixed exchange rate in a small, open economy with low productivity is clearly a technical absurdity: it may eventually control inflation, but probably by bankrupting the real sector of the economy. As Alberto Acosta, Carlos Parodi, and Carlos Larrea point out, it means rethinking the concept and strategy of development, recovering sovereign economic policies in the service of genuine national projects, and preventing economies and the common good from being subjected to the whims of the market abstraction. As Emilia Ferraro reminds us, it also means addressing people’s dissatisfaction with a worn-out state and national identity—in other words, recovering our social capital, shattered by absurd economic policies.
(Correa, 2004, p. 89; translated from Spanish)
His recorded interventions explain the distinction between judging the adoption of a regime undesirable and considering its abandonment costly once it is established (IOL Inversiones, n.d.; JuanK, n.d.). They present the arguments developed below.
Correa maintains that an abrupt exit could generate economic and social disruption whose costs would fall on workers. The decision therefore involves more than listing the advantages of having a national currency: it must consider contracts, deposits, wages, debts, and expectations already expressed in dollars. In his interpretation, the combination of social desperation and pressure from powerful interest groups helps explain the regime’s initial adoption.
Electronic means of payment should not automatically be confused with a new monetary unit. They can facilitate transactions and reduce the need for cash while retaining dollar-denominated accounting. Their liquidity effects depend on their design: a transfer system, a fully backed balance, and an instrument that expands credit do not necessarily produce the same result.
Correa’s constitutional objection concerns the monetary rule in force in 1998. Article 264 assigned currency issuance to the central bank and established the sucre as the monetary unit (Constitución Política de la República del Ecuador, 1998, art. 264). This is the relevant historical text for examining the argument; legal assessment of the change requires distinguishing the executive announcement, the implementing legislation, and constitutional controversies.
Optimum currency area theory provides a framework for examining the costs of sharing a currency or adopting another country’s currency. Correa highlights two elements: synchronized business cycles and labor mobility as an adjustment mechanism.11
Shared business cycles, leading to compatible economic policy objectives.
Where that condition is absent, perfect labor mobility.
The main problems arising when these conditions are not met occur when the dollar—or the foreign currency replacing the domestic currency—moves in the opposite direction to the dollarizing country’s economic policy needs.
A two-condition summary does not exhaust the theory: price and wage flexibility, financial integration, productive diversification, and the possibility of fiscal transfers also matter. The central point here is that the same movement in the dollar may be appropriate for the United States and harmful to Ecuador’s economy.
Finally, Correa argues that keeping dollarization in a relatively healthy condition requires the following measures:
Improving systemic competitiveness12 internationally through investment in research, development, and innovation, as well as transport infrastructure such as roads, ports, and airports. Ecuador pursued such improvements through public investment. Better positioning domestic products in world markets can increase exporters’ sales and, consequently, dollar inflows into the dollarized country—in this case, Ecuador.
Policies to maximize public-sector efficiency and reduce costs. Such savings can support systemic competitiveness, including the public sector’s own performance, while avoiding cuts to social programs that guarantee decent living standards.
IV. Andrés Araúz’s Proposal
1. Two meanings of de-dollarization
Correa retained dollarization throughout his government, from 2007 to 2017. In April 2020, Andrés Araúz—later the correísta political movement’s presidential candidate in 2021—published a distinction between “bad” and “good” de-dollarization. The proposal combines a distributive argument with instruments for managing payments and foreign exchange; it does not, by itself, constitute a complete monetary transition program (Araúz, 2020).
2. “Bad” de-dollarization
For Araúz (2020), a regressive exit would have two main effects: facilitating capital flight and reducing real wages. Higher-income groups’ surpluses could remain in dollars outside Ecuador, through financial circuits in Panama, Miami, and New York, while workers would receive income in a lower-value domestic currency.
The distributive dimension is decisive. If wages and public-sector remuneration are converted into a depreciating currency while foreign assets remain dollar-denominated, the adjustment burden is distributed unequally. Araúz links this possibility to pressures to reduce labor costs and to constitutional restrictions on rolling back rights.
The author illustrates a decline in purchasing power from the equivalent of USD 400 to USD 250. The exact reduction is 37.5%, leaving 62.5% of the initial level; references to 37% and 60% are approximations. This is an illustrative scenario of the distributive mechanism, not an inevitable outcome of every monetary reform (Araúz, 2020).
Araúz also advances a political hypothesis: faced with social and legislative resistance, such a transition might be imposed through executive decisions and constraints on democratic deliberation. His references to the National Assembly and the laws then under discussion belong to the circumstances of April 2020; they do not describe an already implemented reform.
3. “Good” de-dollarization
The alternative Araúz (2020) calls “good” retains the dollar as the monetary unit while seeking to expand domestic means of payment and raise the cost of certain external uses of foreign exchange. The quotation marks therefore have conceptual significance: the proposal does not amount to replacing the dollar fully with a national currency.
Its instruments include domestic payment systems for internal transactions, dematerialized securities usable through mobile phones, mechanisms for expanding liquidity, and territorial and sectoral clearinghouses. The stated purpose is to sustain domestic circulation without reducing workers’ nominal remuneration; higher import costs can nevertheless affect their purchasing power over foreign goods.
The timbre cambiario, or foreign exchange transfer permit, would be a tradable right to transfer foreign currency abroad. The state would establish an adjustable quota, and the central bank would sell the permits to importers and others seeking outward transfers. Araúz approximates the initial cost at 27 cents per dollar: a higher transfer cost accompanied by a quantitative restriction. The design thus combines price and quantity.
Politically and legally, Araúz argued that the instrument could rely on existing powers or on legislation capable of securing parliamentary support. This was his assessment in the context of 2020; determining legal feasibility requires examining the powers and procedures applicable to each instrument.
4. Figures and internal consistency
The proposal uses 2019 figures and crisis assumptions for 2020. It reports private outflows of USD 28,418 million, a negative net contribution to reserves of USD 2,105 million, and private foreign assets of USD 27,000 million. These are not 2026 data: they define Araúz’s (2020) historical exercise.
The initial objective was to reduce gross private outflows and repatriate USD 12,000 million over four years, equivalent to a net annual target of USD 3,000 million. The author illustrates an increase in official reserves to USD 15,000 million and a reduction in private foreign assets to USD 15,000 million. This comparison approximates orders of magnitude; actual reserve changes depend on all balance-of-payments components.
Table 4Reconstructing Araúz’s scenario for 2020
Item
Calculation or assumption
USD millions
Reference private inflows
Base used in the projection
26,658
Projected inflows
26,658 × 0.70 ≈ 18,668
18,668
Projected outflows without a quota
28,418 × 0.70 ≈ 19,893
19,893
Autonomous deficit
19,893 − 18,668
1,225
Annual repatriation target
12,000 ÷ 4
3,000
Required restriction
1,225 + 3,000
4,225
Available outflow quota
19,893 − 4,225
15,668
Note. Based on Araúz (2020), retaining the scenario’s rounding. Reference outflows of 28,418 and inflows of 26,658 yield a balance of −1,760, which differs from the −2,105 contribution to reserves cited in the text. The two magnitudes should not be equated without reconciling their coverage and accounting adjustments.
The proposal’s substantive distinction lies in asking which monetary relationships change, for whom they change, and who bears the adjustment costs. Retaining the dollar as the unit of account, expanding domestic payments, and regulating capital outflows are different decisions from redenominating wages, deposits, and contracts. Policy assessment must address financial consistency, distributive effects, and institutional conditions together.
· · ·
V. Notes
Basantes (2020) describes flooding, damage to roads and bridges, agricultural and fishing losses, and falling oil prices as part of the context of 1998. Monetary estimates reported in the press depend on the categories of damage included.
Bravo (2008, pp. 7–8) refers, among others, to studies by Oxfam, Noah Zerbe, Wilma Salgado, and Frédéric Mousseau on food aid, trade, and sovereignty. Those works are mentioned here as sources cited by Bravo; they are not presented as documents directly consulted.
The term commodities refers to relatively standardized goods traded in broad markets, such as cereals, oil, and metals. It does not imply that they literally lack added value; the relevant feature is their relative commercial homogeneity.
The INIAP budget increase discussed in this passage is expressed as an approximate amount equivalent to 2% of agricultural GDP, according to Bravo’s (2008) account.
Reschedulable deposit certificates represented claims on frozen funds. The ability to sell them or use them to settle certain obligations was not equivalent to recovering the deposit in cash at face value. See Table 1 and the study by León Cercado and Triana Villanueva (n.d.).
Oleas (2020, p. 65) reports bank losses of USD 1,520 million and the closure of twenty banks during the crisis. The concentration of surviving banks’ assets and the scale of banks undergoing restructuring describe different dimensions of the reorganization.
The Agencia de Garantía de Depósitos (AGD) played a central role in guaranteeing and restructuring bank deposits. The transfer of private obligations to the state is one of the distributive mechanisms examined by Oleas (2020).
The argument concerns economic power associated with the need for external financing, sovereign risk, and primary exporters’ exposure to international prices. It does not imply that every credit operation is speculative or that every dollar inflow creates debt.
For advanced economies during the crisis, Blanchard and Leigh (2013, pp. 4–6, 19) find a relationship between planned fiscal consolidation and growth below forecast, consistent with fiscal multipliers larger than those assumed. Ostry et al. (2016) examine the distributive costs of capital-account liberalization and austerity, as well as their possible effects on growth. These findings have a specific scope; by themselves, they do not establish a universal conclusion about every country or policy. From this essay’s critical perspective, they reinforce the need to examine adjustment programs in their concrete social conditions.
The instability of 1996–2007 included interrupted presidencies, vice-presidential successions, and interim administrations. Table 3 distinguishes these episodes and separates the 2006 presidential election from the beginning of Correa’s government in January 2007.
In optimum currency area theory, the loss of exchange-rate adjustment may be less costly when business cycles are synchronized or other mechanisms can absorb asymmetric shocks. Labor mobility, flexibility, integration, and transfers are complementary dimensions; a short list should not be read as a necessary and sufficient criterion for every case.
R. A. Hernández (2001, p. 5) distinguishes four levels of systemic competitiveness: micro—the capabilities of firms and plants; meso—infrastructure, institutions, factor markets, and targeted policies; macro—fiscal, monetary, trade, and exchange-rate policies; and meta—strategic orientation, political structure, and development agreements. The concept avoids reducing competitiveness to wages or the exchange rate.
The dates attached to the BCE reports identify the period examined; “n.d.” is used where the publication date has not been verified. Videos are attributed to the accounts that published them, rather than to the interviewee. Bravo’s document retains the available bibliographic details; its historical link may be inactive. A document’s upload date does not replace the date of its printed journal issue. Spanish-language reference titles are retained in their original language; translated passages are identified as such.
Blanchard, O. J., & Leigh, D. (2013). Growth forecast errors and fiscal multipliers (IMF Working Paper No. 13/1). Fondo Monetario Internacional. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781475576443.001
Hernández, R. A. (2001). Elementos de competitividad sistémica de las pequeñas y medianas empresas (PYME) del Istmo Centroamericano (Estudios y Perspectivas series, No. 5). Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe. https://repositorio.cepal.org/items/d0dda9dd-010d-4070-b8a2-df2058c167a5
León Cercado, A., & Triana Villanueva, M. (n.d.). Efecto e influencia de los certificados de depósitos reprogramados (CDR’s) durante 1999–2000 en el mercado ecuatoriano [Thesis article]. Escuela Superior Politécnica del Litoral. https://www.dspace.espol.edu.ec/bitstream/123456789/2188/1/4302.pdf
Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería, Acuacultura y Pesca. (2016). La política agropecuaria ecuatoriana: Hacia el desarrollo territorial rural sostenible 2015–2025 (Part I). http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/ecu183434.pdf
Roura, A. M. (2020, January 9). 20 años de la dolarización en Ecuador: ¿Por qué es tan popular la dolarización entre los ecuatorianos? (y cuál es su lado oscuro). BBC News Mundo. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50916554
A Technical, Historical, and International Analysis · Part II
The Oriental Republic of Uruguay: crisis, financial vulnerability, and the rebuilding of peso markets
JOSÉ MAURICIO GÓMEZ JULIÁN
Originally published: December 2, 2021 Revised: November 4, 2026
· · ·
I. Structural conditions and monetary crisis
1.1. Overview
As Aboal et al. (2006, p. 8) explain, following the devaluation experienced by Uruguay at the beginning of this century, the government needed to define a monetary anchor that could no longer be the exchange rate. This process took several months and culminated in late 2002 with the adoption of the monetary base as the system’s anchor. As expected, the period following devaluation and the move to a floating exchange rate brought substantial exchange rate volatility. This reflected both the transition from a relatively fixed to a flexible rate and market uncertainty while the future course of monetary policy remained unclear (see Figure 2).
The figures below illustrate these developments. BM denotes the monetary base, and MI denotes the inflation target, retaining the abbreviations used in the Spanish source.
Figure 1 The evolution of de jure monetary and exchange rate policy, 1990–2005
Exchange rate bands
Floating exchange rate
Point target for the monetary base
Monetary base target range and inflation target
Inflation targeting?
Note. BM = monetary base; MI = inflation target, using the Spanish abbreviations. The question mark in the final milestone is retained from the published diagram. Adapted from Aboal et al. (2006, p. 8).
Note. Approximate vector reconstruction of the published trace; the underlying daily numerical series was not recovered. Annual labels are indicative. The source truncates the largest fluctuations so that the remaining changes remain visible; on some days the change exceeded 10%. Adapted from Aboal et al. (2006, p. 9), using BCU data.
The period after 2002 is the starting point for Labat and Licandro’s (2021) examination of monetary policy, rather than the beginning of dollarization in Uruguay. Dollarization was an earlier, unofficial process whose origins Licandro and Mello (2018, p. 368) trace to the 1950s. It is therefore necessary to distinguish the conditions that produced and consolidated dollarization from the reforms undertaken after the 2002 crisis to reduce its vulnerabilities.
1.2. Inflation
As Labat and Licandro (2021) explain, Uruguay began conducting monetary policy under a freely floating exchange rate only after the 2002 crisis, shifting its nominal objective toward inflation. Uruguay’s history had been marked by successive forms of fixed exchange rate arrangements, interrupted by short and disorderly episodes of floating, until the abandonment of the exchange rate band in June 2002.
During the crisis, the Central Bank chose to manage the monetary base. Its authorities considered it important to commit to an attainable short-term target in order to build credibility over time. From September 2002, the Bank announced quarterly monetary base targets, initially without referring to an inflation target. After the debt exchange was completed in the first half of 2003, the Bank began introducing an explicit numerical reference for inflation.
Policy commitments gradually shifted first toward monetary aggregates and then toward inflation. By early 2005, Uruguay operated under what could be described as an inflation targeting regime, using monetary aggregates as the policy instrument. The Ministry of Economy and Finance initially set the midpoint of the target range at 5.5%; this was reduced to 5% in early 2005 and remained there until August 2020. The band was initially set at ±2 percentage points, temporarily narrowed to ±1 percentage point in 2009, and restored to its earlier design in 2013.
The initial monetary policy instrument under inflation targeting was M1′. In July 2007, the Banco Central del Uruguay switched to the overnight interbank interest rate, before returning to monetary aggregate management in July 2013.
According to Labat and Licandro’s (2021) assessment, the Central Bank’s new charter was approved in 2008. Although the law gave the financial services regulator greater autonomy, its initial intention to improve the monetary policy framework was not fulfilled. The draft sent by the Central Bank to the Ministry of Economy and Finance was aligned with established principles of central bank institutional design and proposed several improvements that were absent from the final text. These included prioritizing inflation as the principal objective, introducing overlapping eight-year terms for board members, and strengthening accountability. Such proposals failed during the parliamentary process, as similar initiatives had in the 1995 discussions.
None of these proposals was ultimately adopted. Instead, the creation of a Macroeconomic Coordination Committee (CCM), with an ambiguous mandate and a clear predominance of the Ministry of Economy and Finance over the Central Bank, reduced the latter’s independence; see Licandro and Licandro (2010, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021). The new charter also described the Bank’s objectives ambiguously, leaving considerable room for different interpretations of how policy should be conducted.
In Labat and Licandro’s (2021) interpretation, monetary policy practice did not remedy the institutional design. The Central Bank maintained close institutional coordination with the Ministry of Economy and Finance. After the CCM was established, its quarterly meetings were held the day before, or even on the same day as, Monetary Policy Committee meetings, immediately before the COPOM sessions. This remained the usual coordination practice until early 2020. The authors also characterize the period as one of persistent and visible conflict among the Central Bank’s objectives.
The Central Bank highlighted this conflict in its public communication through images presenting monetary policy as a balancing exercise, an imperfect discipline, and an activity requiring flexibility in the use of instruments. This reflected an interpretation of its statutory mandate in which the conflict between economic activity and inflation was permanent. In practice, inflation became the priority when it approached 10%, while activity took precedence when inflation approached its target.
Alegre (2008, p. 148) describes the evolution of inflation and real wages as follows (English translation):
As inflation declined progressively to single digits by the late 1990s—from 81% in 1991 to slightly above 8% in 1998—real wages increased much more moderately over the same period, by approximately 7.5% cumulatively between 1991 and 1998 (INE, 2003).
The reference to the INE’s 2003 data appears within Alegre’s discussion and is therefore used here as an indirect citation.
1.3. External debt
Alegre (2008, p. 148) describes the implications of the Brady Plan as follows (English translation):
The refinancing of Uruguay’s external debt through the Brady Plan involved debt reductions for Uruguay and other participating countries in the region, in exchange for commitments to accelerate reforms in areas such as public enterprises, trade, and the labor market. The renegotiation also redirected exchange rate policy away from achieving external balance and toward an anti-inflationary role, since maintaining a high exchange rate to generate trade surpluses for debt payments was no longer necessary (Rodríguez, Cozzano, & Mazzuchi, 2001).
Rodríguez et al. (2001) are cited within Alegre’s passage and are used here through that secondary source.
To reconstruct the external debt background, the research conducted on June 7, 2021 used a copy of the Banco Central del Uruguay report preserved by the Internet Archive, because of the access difficulties encountered at the time. Within the initial period of interest, 1990–2003, the recovered material covers 1999–2003. The reproduced report also contains subsequent annual figures and quarterly observations through December 2015, all of which are retained in the tables below. Difficulties encountered in that consultation do not imply that institutional portals currently lack relevant data.
Table 1. Gross external debt by debtorMillions of US dollars · end-of-period balances
Period
Total
Central government
Local governments
Public enterprises
BCU
Public banks
Private banks
Private nonbank sector
1999
13,382
4,120
83
530
858
378
7,413
N/A
2000
14,607
4,697
105
499
791
346
8,169
N/A
2001
15,967
4,586
128
494
621
681
9,458
N/A
2002
12,876
7,161
136
440
562
340
4,237
N/A
2003
13,241
8,200
147
440
770
343
3,340
N/A
2004
14,082
8,628
151
392
1,035
317
3,559
N/A
2005
13,717
8,767
150
417
842
322
3,218
N/A
2006
12,977
8,582
148
532
50
326
3,340
N/A
2007
14,864
9,928
138
895
105
318
3,480
N/A
2008
15,425
9,533
128
919
155
329
4,361
N/A
2009
17,969
10,640
118
1,392
619
348
4,853
N/A
2010
18,425
10,593
108
1,283
838
361
5,243
N/A
2011
18,345
11,319
141
1,784
814
379
3,909
N/A
I.12
20,959
11,762
145
1,837
753
396
3,779
2,287
II.12
21,312
11,337
145
1,990
993
393
3,919
2,534
III.12
22,230
11,581
153
1,995
1,237
420
4,081
2,762
2012
24,030
12,902
157
1,939
1,248
417
4,324
3,044
I.13
23,568
12,956
159
1,270
1,211
431
4,367
3,174
II.13
24,516
13,127
168
1,301
1,386
459
4,648
3,427
III.13
25,795
13,839
168
1,433
1,568
465
4,718
3,605
2013
26,518
14,255
173
1,546
1,586
485
4,640
3,833
I.14
26,686
13,796
172
1,707
1,713
515
4,636
4,147
II.14
28,553
15,010
166
1,736
1,744
515
4,869
4,514
III.14
28,405
14,756
165
1,687
1,596
528
4,898
4,775
2014
28,100
14,904
171
1,817
1,513
545
4,961
4,188
I.15 *
29,513
15,775
171
1,877
1,402
757
5,322
4,209
II.15 *
29,464
15,467
164
1,973
1,555
773
5,204
4,327
III.15 *
28,105
14,976
164
1,411
1,178
815
5,202
4,359
2015 *
28,678
15,491
158
1,373
1,043
873
5,164
4,576
Note. Source: Banco Central del Uruguay (n.d.), report containing data through December 2015. Commas separate thousands; N/A means data are not available. I, II, and III identify quarters; full-year labels refer to December closing balances. The source’s asterisk for 2015 is retained; its meaning is not specified in the reproduced extract.
Composition by debtor · December 2015
Central government
54.0%
Local governments
0.6%
Public enterprises
4.8%
BCU
3.6%
Public banks
3.0%
Private banks
18.0%
Private nonbank sector
16.0%
Percentages calculated from the balances in Table 1. These replace the pie chart and may differ from its whole-number percentages because of rounding.
Table 2. Gross external debt by instrumentMillions of US dollars · end-of-period balances
Period
Total
Debt securities
Brady bonds
International loans
Trade credits
Deposits
Other
1999
13,382
2,398
644
2,496
493
6,633
718
2000
14,607
2,848
593
2,603
474
7,237
853
2001
15,967
2,719
431
2,625
478
8,760
953
2002
12,876
2,955
410
4,881
483
3,489
658
2003
13,241
3,567
156
5,709
554
2,818
437
2004
14,082
3,976
143
5,950
563
3,018
432
2005
13,717
4,383
26
5,564
625
2,686
433
2006
12,977
6,306
3
2,717
705
2,814
432
2007
14,864
7,702
0
2,722
1,059
2,949
433
2008
15,425
6,980
0
3,271
898
3,845
431
2009
17,969
7,188
0
4,717
1,270
4,361
433
2010
18,425
7,802
0
4,138
1,286
4,415
784
2011
18,345
8,813
0
4,176
1,471
3,881
4
I.12
20,959
9,336
0
6,675
1,257
3,569
122
II.12
21,312
9,190
0
7,027
1,363
3,610
121
III.12
22,230
9,685
0
7,366
1,259
3,796
124
2012
24,030
11,056
0
7,763
1,194
3,890
127
I.13
23,568
11,628
0
7,446
527
3,853
114
II.13
24,516
11,986
0
7,846
515
4,069
100
III.13
25,795
12,880
0
8,016
639
4,173
88
2013
26,518
13,280
0
8,381
581
4,202
74
I.14
26,686
12,916
0
8,633
784
4,232
122
II.14
28,553
14,142
0
8,931
870
4,479
130
III.14
28,405
13,782
0
9,270
714
4,431
208
2014
28,100
13,866
0
8,709
865
4,428
232
I.15 *
29,513
14,695
0
9,158
850
4,564
247
II.15 *
29,464
14,508
0
9,173
959
4,566
257
III.15 *
28,105
13,645
0
9,094
367
4,728
270
2015 *
28,678
13,996
0
9,202
461
4,741
278
Note. Source: Banco Central del Uruguay (n.d.), report containing data through December 2015. Commas separate thousands; N/A means data are not available. I, II, and III identify quarters; full-year labels refer to December closing balances. The source’s asterisk for 2015 is retained; its meaning is not specified in the reproduced extract.
Composition by instrument · December 2015
Debt securities
48.8%
Brady bonds
0.0%
International loans
32.1%
Trade credits
1.6%
Deposits
16.5%
Other
1.0%
Percentages calculated from the balances in Table 2, replacing the source’s pie chart.
Table 3. Gross external debt by contractual maturity and currencyMillions of US dollars · end-of-period balances
Period
Total
Up to one year
Over one year
Pesos
US dollars
Yen
Euros
SDRs
Other
1999
13,382
7,388
5,994
6
12,606
144
7
157
462
2000
14,607
8,099
6,508
5
13,713
133
176
149
431
2001
15,967
9,729
6,238
7
14,932
324
345
143
216
2002
12,876
3,651
9,225
2
10,267
294
462
1,794
57
2003
13,241
2,966
10,275
210
9,864
251
435
2,416
64
2004
14,082
3,371
10,711
447
10,133
262
474
2,683
81
2005
13,717
3,036
10,681
405
10,046
229
665
2,311
63
2006
12,977
3,157
9,820
542
11,531
221
626
7
51
2007
14,864
3,553
11,310
1,774
11,943
472
632
8
35
2008
15,425
4,221
11,204
1,517
12,829
556
488
7
28
2009
17,969
4,996
12,973
1,225
15,211
538
497
465
33
2010
18,425
5,177
13,248
1,781
15,168
544
455
458
19
2011
18,345
4,071
14,274
3,202
13,993
528
146
456
20
I.12
20,959
5,049
15,909
3,745
16,091
491
149
461
20
II.12
21,312
5,299
16,012
3,604
16,561
507
169
451
19
III.12
22,230
5,421
16,809
4,158
16,921
519
153
459
20
2012
24,030
5,562
18,468
5,458
17,498
470
128
457
20
I.13
23,568
5,620
17,948
6,284
16,266
428
126
444
20
II.13
24,516
5,895
18,621
6,664
16,863
406
116
447
19
III.13
25,795
5,873
19,922
6,443
18,368
410
100
455
19
2013
26,518
5,815
20,703
7,020
18,529
383
110
457
19
I.14
26,686
6,009
20,677
6,645
19,068
389
106
458
20
II.14
28,553
6,293
22,260
6,774
20,805
396
99
458
20
III.14
28,405
6,379
22,026
6,413
21,075
366
94
439
19
2014
28,100
6,347
21,753
6,545
20,348
586
174
429
18
I.15 *
29,513
6,473
23,040
6,430
21,921
584
154
408
16
II.15 *
29,464
6,399
23,064
6,284
22,016
572
160
416
16
III.15 *
28,105
6,391
21,714
5,534
21,388
584
171
415
14
2015 *
28,678
6,318
22,360
5,079
22,431
580
164
410
13
Note. SDRs = special drawing rights. Source: Banco Central del Uruguay (n.d.), report containing data through December 2015. Commas separate thousands; N/A means data are not available. I, II, and III identify quarters; full-year labels refer to December closing balances. The source’s asterisk for 2015 is retained; its meaning is not specified in the reproduced extract.
Composition by maturity · December 2015
Up to one year
22.0%
Over one year
78.0%
Percentages calculated from Table 3.
Composition by currency · December 2015
Pesos
17.7%
US dollars
78.2%
Yen
2.0%
Euros
0.6%
SDRs
1.4%
Other
0.0%
Percentages calculated from Table 3. External debt is defined by the creditor’s residence and may therefore include liabilities denominated in pesos.
Table 4A. External assets: total and public sectorsMillions of US dollars · end-of-period balances
Period
Total assets
NFPS · short
NFPS · long
BCU · short
BCU · long
Public banks · short
Public banks · long
1999
-10,502
0
-62
-2,606
-255
-648
-43
2000
-11,237
0
-95
-2,742
-258
-561
-67
2001
-12,898
0
-85
-3,099
-263
-638
-70
2002
-5,682
-505
-127
-777
-282
-296
-20
2003
-6,932
-230
-184
-2,088
-256
-866
-58
2004
-7,877
-20
-103
-2,514
-332
-1,154
-328
2005
-8,956
-52
-148
-3,398
-288
-1,384
-313
2006
-8,815
-67
-151
-3,091
-291
-1,094
-810
2007
-11,239
-251
-231
-5,016
-273
-1,839
-402
2008
-13,233
-94
-183
-6,659
-548
-1,611
-295
2009
-16,630
-245
-283
-8,210
-609
-1,307
-1,082
2010
-18,270
-144
-29
-7,940
-622
-2,134
-1,441
2011
-19,568
-76
-4
-10,314
-752
-1,491
-2,391
I.12
-31,254
-136
-27
-11,296
-708
-2,915
-969
II.12
-32,568
-107
-5
-12,101
-705
-2,979
-967
III.12
-31,945
-69
-22
-12,817
-733
-2,999
-980
2012
-31,879
-64
-28
-13,567
-731
-2,752
-1,127
I.13
-32,521
-100
-16
-13,478
-733
-2,779
-1,142
II.13
-34,409
-112
-24
-14,863
-729
-2,952
-1,120
III.13
-35,830
-11
-32
-15,861
-760
-3,022
-1,167
2013
-35,565
-93
-26
-16,275
-765
-2,923
-1,180
I.14
-36,472
-101
-38
-16,504
-785
-2,748
-1,262
II.14
-38,291
-174
-26
-18,603
-796
-2,828
-1,330
III.14
-39,318
-115
-27
-17,757
-831
-2,979
-1,521
2014
-37,420
-42
-40
-17,555
-818
-2,750
-1,561
I.15 *
-39,599
-65
-33
-18,584
-816
-2,843
-1,536
II.15 *
-39,962
-95
-44
-18,324
-820
-3,050
-1,572
III.15 *
-38,018
-54
-39
-16,424
-855
-3,348
-1,901
2015 *
-37,923
-49
-40
-15,634
-861
-3,257
-2,023
Note. NFPS = nonfinancial public sector. Assets retain their negative signs because they are deducted from gross debt. Source: Banco Central del Uruguay (n.d.), report containing data through December 2015. Commas separate thousands; N/A means data are not available. I, II, and III identify quarters; full-year labels refer to December closing balances. The source’s asterisk for 2015 is retained; its meaning is not specified in the reproduced extract.
Table 4B. Private sector external assetsMillions of US dollars · end-of-period balances
Period
Banks · short
Banks · long
Nonbanks · short
Nonbanks · long
1999
-3,928
-2,960
N/A
N/A
2000
-4,809
-2,705
N/A
N/A
2001
-4,551
-4,192
N/A
N/A
2002
-2,419
-1,256
N/A
N/A
2003
-1,682
-1,568
N/A
N/A
2004
-2,086
-1,340
N/A
N/A
2005
-2,375
-997
N/A
N/A
2006
-2,336
-974
N/A
N/A
2007
-2,231
-996
N/A
N/A
2008
-2,790
-1,053
N/A
N/A
2009
-3,804
-1,091
N/A
N/A
2010
-4,543
-1,417
N/A
N/A
2011
-3,782
-757
N/A
N/A
I.12
-4,212
-975
-8,287
-1,728
II.12
-4,031
-965
-8,979
-1,728
III.12
-3,687
-1,140
-7,774
-1,726
2012
-3,365
-1,200
-7,629
-1,416
I.13
-3,732
-1,127
-7,996
-1,418
II.13
-3,517
-1,214
-8,461
-1,418
III.13
-4,032
-1,067
-8,464
-1,415
2013
-3,128
-990
-8,729
-1,456
I.14
-3,417
-999
-9,163
-1,455
II.14
-3,159
-823
-9,095
-1,457
III.14
-4,199
-799
-9,634
-1,456
2014
-3,603
-782
-8,764
-1,507
I.15 *
-4,406
-807
-9,319
-1,190
II.15 *
-4,552
-862
-9,614
-1,029
III.15 *
-4,581
-892
-9,048
-876
2015 *
-4,236
-1,465
-9,378
-979
Note. Continuation of the same external assets table; short and long refer to contractual maturity. Source: Banco Central del Uruguay (n.d.), report containing data through December 2015. Commas separate thousands; N/A means data are not available. I, II, and III identify quarters; full-year labels refer to December closing balances. The source’s asterisk for 2015 is retained; its meaning is not specified in the reproduced extract.
Table 5A. Net external debt: national total and public sectorMillions of US dollars · end-of-period balances
Period
National total
Public · total
Public · short · net
Public · short · gross
Public · short · assets
Public · long · net
Public · long · gross
Public · long · assets
1999
2,880
2,668
-2,070
536
-2,606
4,738
5,055
-317
2000
3,370
2,997
-2,117
625
-2,742
5,114
5,467
-353
2001
3,069
2,381
-2,528
571
-3,099
4,909
5,257
-348
2002
7,194
6,608
-404
878
-1,282
7,013
7,421
-409
2003
6,309
6,800
-1,338
980
-2,318
8,138
8,577
-440
2004
6,205
7,237
-1,309
1,225
-2,534
8,546
8,981
-435
2005
4,761
6,290
-1,494
1,957
-3,450
7,783
8,220
-437
2006
4,162
5,711
-2,819
339
-3,158
8,529
8,972
-443
2007
3,625
5,295
-4,620
646
-5,266
9,915
10,419
-504
2008
2,192
3,252
-6,243
509
-6,752
9,495
10,226
-732
2009
1,340
3,424
-7,589
866
-8,455
11,012
11,904
-892
2010
176
4,107
-6,835
1,249
-8,084
10,942
11,593
-651
2011
-1,221
2,912
-9,291
1,099
-10,390
12,203
12,960
-757
I.12
-10,295
2,329
-10,293
1,138
-11,431
12,622
13,358
-736
II.12
-11,256
1,548
-11,461
747
-12,208
13,008
13,718
-710
III.12
-9,713
1,329
-10,826
2,060
-12,885
12,155
12,909
-755
2012
-7,848
1,857
-11,567
2,064
-13,631
13,424
14,182
-759
I.13
-8,951
1,270
-11,897
1,681
-13,578
13,168
13,917
-749
II.13
-9,894
254
-13,205
1,770
-14,975
13,459
14,212
-752
III.13
-10,034
345
-14,231
1,641
-15,872
14,576
15,367
-791
2013
-9,047
400
-14,807
1,562
-16,368
15,207
15,997
-791
I.14
-9,785
-40
-14,734
1,871
-16,605
14,694
15,517
-823
II.14
-9,737
-944
-16,888
1,890
-18,777
15,944
16,766
-822
III.14
-10,913
-527
-15,910
1,962
-17,872
15,384
16,242
-858
2014
-9,321
-48
-14,632
2,964
-17,596
14,585
15,442
-857
I.15 *
-10,086
-274
-15,721
2,927
-18,649
15,448
16,297
-849
II.15 *
-10,498
-123
-15,579
2,840
-18,418
15,455
16,320
-864
III.15 *
-9,913
357
-14,545
1,934
-16,479
14,901
15,795
-894
2015 *
-9,245
1,480
-14,332
1,352
-15,684
15,812
16,713
-902
Note. Assets are shown with negative signs. Source: Banco Central del Uruguay (n.d.), report containing data through December 2015. Commas separate thousands; N/A means data are not available. I, II, and III identify quarters; full-year labels refer to December closing balances. The source’s asterisk for 2015 is retained; its meaning is not specified in the reproduced extract.
Table 5B. Private sector net external debtMillions of US dollars · end-of-period balances
Period
Private · total
Short · net
Short · gross
Short · assets
Long · net
Long · gross
Long · assets
1999
212
3,153
7,728
-4,576
-2,940
63
-3,003
2000
373
3,104
8,475
-5,371
-2,731
41
-2,771
2001
687
4,906
10,096
-5,190
-4,219
43
-4,262
2002
586
1,823
4,538
-2,715
-1,237
39
-1,276
2003
-491
1,103
3,651
-2,548
-1,594
33
-1,626
2004
-1,033
-386
2,854
-3,241
-646
1,021
-1,668
2005
-1,528
-1,181
2,578
-3,759
-347
963
-1,310
2006
-1,549
-724
2,707
-3,430
-825
959
-1,784
2007
-1,670
-1,196
2,874
-4,070
-474
924
-1,399
2008
-1,059
-708
3,692
-4,401
-351
997
-1,348
2009
-2,083
-925
4,185
-5,110
-1,158
1,015
-2,173
2010
-3,931
-2,417
4,259
-6,676
-1,513
1,345
-2,858
2011
-4,133
-1,526
3,747
-5,273
-2,607
542
-3,148
I.12
-12,625
-11,162
4,252
-15,415
-1,462
2,210
-3,672
II.12
-12,804
-11,661
4,329
-15,990
-1,143
2,518
-3,660
III.12
-11,042
-9,971
4,488
-14,459
-1,071
2,775
-3,846
2012
-9,704
-9,034
4,712
-13,746
-670
3,073
-3,743
I.13
-10,222
-9,749
4,758
-14,507
-473
3,213
-3,686
II.13
-10,148
-9,927
5,002
-14,929
-221
3,531
-3,752
III.13
-10,379
-10,454
5,063
-15,517
75
3,724
-3,649
2013
-9,447
-9,826
4,954
-14,780
379
4,005
-3,626
I.14
-9,745
-10,290
5,038
-15,328
545
4,260
-3,716
II.14
-8,794
-9,795
5,286
-15,082
1,001
4,611
-3,610
III.14
-10,387
-11,437
5,374
-16,811
1,051
4,828
-3,777
2014
-9,273
-9,666
5,451
-15,117
393
4,243
-3,850
I.15 *
-9,812
-10,720
5,848
-16,567
907
4,441
-3,533
II.15 *
-10,375
-11,468
5,747
-17,215
1,093
4,557
-3,464
III.15 *
-10,270
-11,098
5,879
-16,978
829
4,497
-3,668
2015 *
-10,725
-10,967
5,904
-16,871
242
4,709
-4,467
Note. Continuation of Table 5A. Source: Banco Central del Uruguay (n.d.), report containing data through December 2015. Commas separate thousands; N/A means data are not available. I, II, and III identify quarters; full-year labels refer to December closing balances. The source’s asterisk for 2015 is retained; its meaning is not specified in the reproduced extract.
1.4. Exchange rate
According to Alegre (2008, pp. 147–149), Uruguay in the 1990s combined an exchange rate anchor with fiscal imbalances sensitive to economic and electoral cycles, and with a financial market vulnerable to international shocks. The Banco Central del Uruguay managed a fluctuation band for the peso against the dollar, buying and selling foreign currency to maintain its limits. An exchange rate band is not identical to every form of managed floating: in this case, explicit boundaries constrained exchange rate movements.
Alegre (2008, p. 148) links overvaluation and import growth as follows (English translation):
(…) relief from external indebtedness and access to low-interest credit under an overvalued exchange rate created incentives for imports of final consumption goods, generating import booms that were not matched by increases in economic productivity. This combination created serious difficulties once conditions changed. Regional devaluations weakened our country’s competitiveness.
Alegre (2008, p. 149) explains that weaker international demand, the loss of export markets, and falling commodity prices contributed to large capital outflows. Higher interest rates increased the cost of credit, while exchange rate overvaluation and persistent borrowing undermined the system’s sustainability. The crisis culminated in the abandonment of the exchange rate band in 2002. Reserve losses and the need to support bank deposits intensified pressure on public finances and increased reliance on international financing.
The estimate of reserves at approximately one billion dollars in late June 2002 comes from the BCU’s 2002 figures, cited indirectly by Alegre (2008, p. 149).
II. The historical evolution of dollarization in Uruguay
In 2021, dedollarization regained prominence in Uruguay’s economic policy debate. El País (2021) reported on the proposal promoted by Diego Labat, then president of the Banco Central del Uruguay, and Gerardo Licandro. Their document Hacia una moneda de calidad [Toward a quality currency] sets out an agenda for stabilization, rebuilding peso markets, and reducing dollarization (Labat & Licandro, 2021).
Labat and Licandro (2021) argue that a quality currency supports growth, financial stability, and less pronounced economic cycles, and can mitigate certain distributional effects of inflation. Their approach, situated within the neoclassical macroeconomic tradition, draws on research connecting inflation, growth, and financial development: Barro (1995), Sarel (1995), Khan and Senhadji (2001), and Ibarra and Trupkin (2016), all cited in Labat and Licandro (2021). The reference to a threshold near 8% reflects the empirical result of Ibarra and Trupkin discussed by the authors; it is not a universal law applicable to every country, period, and institutional regime.
Labat and Licandro (2021) propose that chronic inflation erodes financial markets denominated in domestic currency and encourages indexation mechanisms, including dollar denomination. In their account, Rousseau and Wachtel (2002, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021) connect financial depth with growth and show that high inflation can weaken that connection. Financial dollarization—the currency denomination of assets and liabilities—should be distinguished from real or price dollarization—the currency used for invoicing and price setting—even though the two interact.
High inflation combined with external macroeconomic shocks, in a setting where the domestic currency’s role is progressively shrinking, considerably increases the risk of structural financial failure. Such shocks are common in small, highly open economies such as Uruguay. This configuration made dollarization a critical concern for Uruguay’s monetary authorities and other public institutions (Labat & Licandro, 2021).
Labat and Licandro (2021) describe a balance sheet vulnerability mechanism: an adverse external shock may raise the real value of the dollar while reducing activity, employment, and real incomes. When a firm or household receives peso income but owes dollar debt, depreciation increases debt service expressed in domestic currency. This can occur even without an increase in the contractual dollar interest rate. Adequate peso financing provides an alternative for reducing that mismatch. When many borrowers are affected, default risk increases and can spread to the financial system and public finances.
This is a systemic risk conditioned by balance sheets, hedging arrangements, and institutional responses, rather than an inevitable generalized default.
According to Labat and Licandro (2021), the shortage of peso financing induces corporate responses that affect both balance sheets and production and marketing decisions. Licandro et al. (2014, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021) document lower leverage, faster inventory turnover, input accumulation, and liquidity holdings as substitutes for derivative-based hedging. Mello (2017), Licandro and Mello (2017), and Barón et al. (2017), cited in Labat and Licandro (2021), analyze liquidity accumulation and dollar invoicing as exchange rate hedging strategies used by Uruguayan firms.
Dollar-denominated prices can deepen real economic cycles because dollar price rigidities shift a greater adjustment burden onto quantities than domestic currency price rigidities. With rigid prices, a negative demand shock affects quantities more strongly than when prices are flexible. Dollar price rigidity can be particularly damaging: when an adverse shock raises the dollar’s value, as in Uruguay, the peso price of the good rises rather than remaining unchanged, as it would under peso price rigidity, producing a steeper decline in output.
Uruguay’s housing sector provides an example: it responds negatively to shocks that raise the real value of the dollar, in contrast with countries such as Colombia and Chile, where property prices are not conventionally quoted in dollars (Labat & Licandro, 2021).
Labat and Licandro (2021) also examine distributional effects. When a mortgage has a fixed nominal balance in domestic currency, higher inflation reduces the real value of that balance; the household’s outcome also depends on its income, assets, and interest rate adjustments. This mechanism does not carry over unchanged to indexed or dollar-denominated debt. The authors draw on Coleman et al. (2010) and Lluberas and Odriozola (2014), as cited in Labat and Licandro (2021), to discuss inflation, poverty, inequality, and wealth distribution in Uruguay.
They consequently present the development of peso markets as a central bank contribution to social welfare. This argument does not imply that monetary expansion necessarily reduces inequality.
Dollarization in Uruguay was an unofficial historical process: the dollar expanded its roles in saving, credit, and valuation without legally replacing the peso as the national currency. There is therefore no single legal starting date comparable to one that might be identified in an official dollarization process. Licandro and Mello (2018, p. 368) trace its background to the 1950s. Monetary policy after 2002 must be understood within that longer trajectory.
The 2002 crisis exposed vulnerabilities associated with currency mismatches. Drawing on Licandro and Licandro (2001, 2003, 2010, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021), Labat and Licandro (2021) describe a two-pillar strategy: recognizing through regulation the risks and incentives that favored dollarization, and rebuilding peso markets to provide an alternative to dollar financing.
The regulatory agenda advanced in several directions. Recognition that the Central Bank cannot provide unlimited lender-of-last-resort support in foreign currency led to a deposit insurance scheme offering greater coverage in pesos than in dollars. Liquidity regulation was reformed, previous subsidies to dollar banking activity were removed, and peso reserve requirements were reduced. To address the exchange rate component of credit risk, access to the highest credit ratings was made conditional on balance sheet resilience under severe exchange rate stress.
Bank capital regulation was revised to incorporate exchange rate risk. Dollar exposure limits were also reduced for pension funds and insurance companies. Under the second pillar, floating removed the implicit exchange rate guarantee. Public debt management increased the share of peso liabilities, helping to develop a peso yield curve. Indexed instruments offered alternatives to the dollar: the Unidad Indexada (UI), linked to inflation, and the Unidad Previsional (UP), linked to wages. The Central Bank helped develop an exchange rate futures market, and public banks were oriented more strongly toward peso activity.
These measures illustrate the extensive monetary and financial regulatory reforms intended to reduce dollarization-related vulnerabilities. Regulation and supervision also improved in other areas. Labat and Licandro (2021) argue that charter changes allowed a substantial improvement in regulatory practice, assessed against established international standards. The UI and UP were not created simultaneously: the UP was established in 2018 (Law No. 19,608, 2018).
This overview combines measures introduced at different stages of the post-2002 agenda (Labat & Licandro, 2021).
Labat and Licandro (2021) note that the effectiveness of monetary policy has been highly contested in Uruguay. International institutions and domestic analysts have questioned its capacity to manage inflation because dollarization weakens monetary transmission, even though Uruguay’s dollarization is unofficial and does not involve a currency board regime.
On the positive side, Labat and Licandro (2021) argue that monetary and regulatory reforms substantially corrected currency mismatches and reduced financial fragility. As Figures 3 and 4 indicate, mismatches in corporate balance sheets were greatly reduced, while lower public debt dollarization reduced the public sector’s currency mismatch. Peso operations also increased their share of total transactions, dollarization fell on both sides of bank balance sheets, and evidence of reduced price dollarization appeared in some sectors.
On the negative side, Uruguay continued to exhibit shortcomings in peso market development and in long-term and risk financing. The authors interpret the reduction in fragility as having coexisted with a small, indexed financial system; this does not imply that all financial risk had disappeared.
Figure 3 Short-term foreign exchange positions of Uruguayan firms
1982
≈ 0.32
1983
≈ 0.37
1984
≈ 0.36
2008
≈ -0.25
2009
≈ -0.26
Note. Approximate heights read from the chart, whose scale runs from −0.4 to 0.6. The reproduced figure does not specify the denominator of the foreign exchange position, so these values should not be interpreted as verified percentages. Adapted from Labat and Licandro (2021, Figure 2).
Figure 4 Dollarization in Uruguay: selected indicators, 2002 and 2019
Common scale: 0–100%. Dark tobacco: 2002 · light copper: 2019.
Corporate debt
2002 ≈ 75 %
2019 ≈ 70 %
Public debt
2002 ≈ 96 %
2019 ≈ 50 %
Deposits
2002 ≈ 91 %
2019 ≈ 74 %
Loans
2002 ≈ 88 %
2019 ≈ 50 %
AFAP portfolios
2002 ≈ 90 %
2019 ≈ 27 %
Credit transactions
2002 ≈ 31 %
2019 ≈ 12 %
Check transactions
2002 ≈ 62 %
2019 ≈ 34 %
Debit transactions
2002 ≈ 40 %
2019 ≈ 8 %
Note. Approximate values read visually from the published chart; these are not official microdata. AFAP refers to pension savings fund administrators. Adapted from Labat and Licandro (2021, Figure 3), who identify their own calculations based on BCU data.
Labat and Licandro (2021) conclude that insufficient inflation control and limited peso market development reinforce one another. This interaction creates inefficiencies in production and corporate balance sheet management, making it harder to consolidate an alternative to the dollar.
III. The dedollarization proposal in Uruguay
3.1. General framework
Sustainable dedollarization requires peso markets to offer a credible and functional alternative to dollar financing. Labat and Licandro (2021) organize their proposals around a new monetary policy framework and specific measures to rebuild domestic currency markets.
3.2. Credibility and expectations
Labat and Licandro (2021, p. 15) make the following argument (English translation):
The first and most important problem to correct is the lack of monetary policy credibility. Monetary policy institutions should therefore be reformed, for example by separating board appointments from the political cycle or requiring greater accountability. Although legal change would be desirable, provided fiscal and monetary policies are consistent, considerable room remains to improve the practices of existing monetary institutions.
Credibility helps economic agents align their expectations, and consequently their actions, with the monetary policy conducted by the central bank. A prerequisite is that agents understand the Bank’s objectives, which requires adequate information. Transparency helps them understand the Bank’s assessment of the economy and the effects of monetary policy, guiding expectations if a crucial condition is met: agents with sufficient economic influence to counteract policy must find those policies sufficiently beneficial to align their behavior with them to some degree.
This applies insofar as no legal and institutional framework compels those agents to achieve a specified degree of alignment with the policies in question.
3.3. Independence and accountability
Labat and Licandro (2021) propose strengthening the central bank’s operational independence and accountability. They identify as a 2020 improvement the separation of Macroeconomic Coordination Committee (CCM) and Monetary Policy Committee (COPOM) meetings, alongside less frequent CCM meetings and more frequent COPOM sessions. The central bank and the Ministry of Economy and Finance must coordinate financial stability, debt policy, and information exchange. The CCM should focus on long-term objectives, while monetary management remains the central bank’s responsibility.
Accountability should explain how decisions support the achievement of targets and why those targets were missed when deviations occurred.
3.4. Objectives and transparency
Labat and Licandro (2021) argue that, to strengthen accountability, the Central Bank’s reports to the executive branch and the public should explain how policy would achieve its objectives and why it had previously failed to do so.
Transparency is another dimension of Labat and Licandro’s (2021) program. The authors describe changes undertaken through 2021: publishing minutes and forward-looking statements, revising the monetary policy report, and increasing communication with analysts and the press. They also propose disclosing core inflation, forecasts, and explanations of target deviations. In their account, each decision is communicated through a short document followed by minutes, while quarterly information is supplemented with projections and public presentations. These mechanisms make the links between diagnosis, decisions, and results understandable. They further propose gradually lowering the long-term inflation target toward 3% and using the interest rate as the policy instrument.
The discussion of nominal adjustment space and incentives for carry trade belongs to the program formulated in 2021, rather than describing the targets in force at the time of this revision.
Policy implementation and market operations should be consistent with these principles. In Uruguay’s proposed framework, a target for headline CPI inflation is set within a range. The overnight money market interest rate is the key policy rate, supported by standing facilities and remuneration of excess reserves aligned with that rate. Smoothing volatility in short-term financial markets, including the foreign exchange market, is also important, provided it does not conflict with monetary policy’s principal objectives or undermine its communication (Labat & Licandro, 2021).
3.5. Balancing objectives
Labat and Licandro (2021, p. 15) make the following argument (English translation):
First, the balance of objectives must be interpreted in light of the discussion at the beginning of this essay. Because the inflation that supports growth and employment is low and stable, the Central Bank should normally ensure an inflation rate consistent with the long-term development of peso markets. There will, of course, be times like the present when clear emergencies require bold action to support the economy. Under normal conditions, however, such action should be permitted only to the extent that inflation expectations remain anchored to the long-term target.
3.6. The dedollarization program
Labat and Licandro (2021) explain that, as inflation converges toward a lower long-term target, microeconomic and macroeconomic measures can help reduce dollarization and improve peso markets. The dedollarization initiative has four principal avenues:
Microeconomic reforms within the financial system
Changes in borrowing policy
Addressing price dollarization, particularly for durable goods.
Studying and addressing the causes of dollarization at a more granular level.
As discussed above, the financial system had already undergone extensive reforms. Despite these changes, Labat and Licandro (2021) note that domestic currency deposits remained small, peso intermediation spreads remained wide, and access to peso financial products was still insufficient. Part of the problem stems from price dollarization, which encourages people to save in dollars to purchase durable goods. Another part reflects financial intermediation costs and the financial sector’s microstructure.
The authors nevertheless identify further, more granular explanations that require additional research.
Labat and Licandro (2021) further argue that borrowing policy, together with regulatory changes, has been a major contributor to progress in peso market development and dedollarization, while still leaving an unfinished agenda. Debt instruments denominated in indexed units 1 (UI) and pension units 2 (UP), together with the more recent push toward nominal peso instruments, are among the principal initiatives led by the Debt Management Unit. The Banco Central del Uruguay and that Unit were developing a new approach to coordinating debt issuance to deepen peso markets.
Expanding nonresident access to peso instruments through Euroclear and concentrating BCU issuance at shorter maturities were two measures under development to support this agenda.
Price dedollarization adds a further dimension by addressing the peso’s role as the economy’s numeraire. The evidence discussed suggests that price dollarization recedes as inflation declines. The experience of Peru also suggests that changes to consumer protection regulation can help reduce price dollarization. Because progress has nevertheless been slow, it is necessary to understand the underlying obstacles and persuade agents of the need to return to peso pricing.
Because the choice of numeraire is a coordination equilibrium, returning to peso pricing requires both persuasion and coordination: explaining the externalities that dollarization creates for growth, economic cycles, financial stability, and distribution; and working with stakeholders to identify the reforms needed to change established behavior (Labat & Licandro, 2021).
Labat and Licandro (2021) propose dialogue among financial institutions, public bodies, and firms to understand the specific mechanisms of dollarization. The aim is to identify regulations, practices, and laws requiring change, coordinate the peso’s return as the dominant numeraire, and use public communication to facilitate the process. Private behavioral alignment depends on the institutional conditions and incentives discussed above.
Finally, Labat and Licandro (2021) reaffirm that inadequate peso markets, arising from chronic inflation and embedded in government practices, culture, business, and the financial system, generate significant externalities requiring policy action. This points directly to cultural dollarization: the socially entrenched use of the dollar as a unit of account and a reference for value.
IV. References
Aboal, D., Lanzilotta, B., & Perera, M. (2006). ¿Flotación de jure y de facto? La política monetaria-cambiaria en el período poscrisis en Uruguay [De jure and de facto floating? Monetary and exchange rate policy in post-crisis Uruguay]. Centro de Investigaciones Económicas. https://www.bcu.gub.uy/Comunicaciones/Jornadas%20de%20Economa/iees03j3070806.pdf
Alegre, P. (2008). Democracia y reformas en el Uruguay: Un caso de gradualismo perverso [Democracy and reforms in Uruguay: A case of perverse gradualism]. Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política, 17(1), 137–158. https://revistasfcs.edu.uy/index.php/rucp/es/article/view/786
Law No. 19,608, Creación de la Unidad Previsional (UP) [Creation of the pension unit (UP)]. (2018, April 13). Diario Oficial de la República Oriental del Uruguay, April 19, 2018. https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/leyes/19608-2018
Licandro, G., & Mello, M. (2018). Dolarización cultural y financiera de los hogares uruguayos [Cultural and financial dollarization of Uruguayan households]. In M. J. Roa & D. Mejía (Eds.), Decisiones financieras de los hogares e inclusión financiera: Evidencia para América Latina y el Caribe [Household financial decisions and financial inclusion: Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean] (pp. 365–404). Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos. https://www.cemla.org/PDF/ic/ic-2016/ic-2016-11.pdf
V. Notes
Indexed unit (Unidad Indexada, UI). A unit of value adjusted according to the CPI. Its value changes daily under the official methodology; indexation incorporates lags and should not be confused with an immediate adjustment to the price of every individual good (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, n.d.). ↩
Pension unit (Unidad Previsional, UP). A unit of value created by Law No. 19,608 of 2018. It changes daily under the methodology linked to the Nominal Average Wage Index, with the lags specified in Article 2. ↩
A Technical, Historical, and International Analysis · Part I
JOSÉ MAURICIO GÓMEZ JULIÁN
Originally published: December 2, 2021 English version: November 4, 2026
I. Foreword
In the economic crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, some countries are considering redesigning their economies, partially or entirely as circumstances require, to address the challenges that a cyclical crisis of capitalism poses to national economies, especially non-industrialized economies such as those of Latin America. Consequently, countries such as Uruguay and El Salvador are considering reversing the dollarization present in their economies’ channels of circulation.
The main objective of this research is to establish the general characteristics of dedollarization processes and their effects on economic performance, while also accounting for departures from the general case. The analysis considers both the particular characteristics of the country implementing the process and the abstract, theoretical case that sets those characteristics aside, without thereby being any less real. The purpose is to determine with sufficient rigor whether undertaking this process is advisable for any country, beyond its particular circumstances, without implying that these circumstances are irrelevant or should be disregarded. In other words, the aim is to understand what the outcome depends on and why it takes one form rather than another. This objective is pursued through the following steps.
First, the research seeks to identify common elements in dollarization across countries worldwide, relatively independently of specific structural and conjunctural macroeconomic conditions. Particular attention will be paid to economic systems with greater structural similarities, such as those of Latin America. This should improve the reliability of the comparisons because the group under analysis is more homogeneous or, more precisely, less heterogeneous.
Because the package of economic policies promoted worldwide from Washington, imposed through the IMF, and organized around the philosophy that Soros himself has called “free-market fundamentalism,” popularly known as neoliberalism, is broadly the same throughout Latin America, comparability in the sense defined above would appear, in general, to be assured.
Second, the research seeks to identify, at least in general terms, how the process of dollarization and its effects, as previously defined, differ according to the particular national economic system under analysis. These differences arise from specific sets of characteristics that vary across economic systems. The research also seeks to explain why these differences take the forms they do.
The aim is therefore to construct a general theory of dollarization and dedollarization, fully grounded in empirical evidence coherently integrated through dialectical-materialist logic[1], to answer the research questions above and understand the geopolitical economy behind monetary replacement processes in Latin America, where monetary replacement takes the form of dollarization.
Accordingly, this research will comprise eight parts. In addition to the general introduction, the first part presents fundamental theoretical concepts, a discussion of orthodox theories of monetary integration, and historical considerations concerning the international monetary system. The second part examines dollarization in Uruguay; the third, Ecuador; the fourth, El Salvador; the fifth, Argentina; the sixth, Costa Rica; and the seventh, Colombia. Finally, the eighth part develops the general theoretical model from the preceding findings.
II. Fundamental concepts
II.I. Money as the universal equivalent of commodities (goods and services)
As Borisov et al. (2009, pp. 88–89) explain, the universal equivalent is a commodity, understood here as a good or service, that expresses the value of all other commodities and for which they are all exchanged. When different commodities are exchanged for the universal equivalent, the latter’s value appears as the general form of value: the quantity of social labor crystallized in a commodity. The emergence of this equivalent implies a relatively advanced level of commodity production and the existence of regular exchange.
One commodity enjoying consistently high market demand spontaneously separated itself from the world of commodities. Direct exchange, or barter of one commodity for another, was thereby displaced by commodity circulation, in which transactions occur through an intermediary: the universal equivalent. Exchange began to divide into two connected acts. First, producers exchanged their commodities for the universal equivalent; then they exchanged that equivalent commodity for what they needed. Different peoples, depending on the conditions of production and exchange, adopted different commodities as universal equivalents: livestock, cereals, hides, metals, and so forth.
As commodity production and international trade developed, precious metals, gold and silver, increasingly came to serve as universal equivalents and became money. Eventually, gold assumed the function of universal equivalent in commercial transactions.
II.II. Definition and brief history of money
As Borisov et al. (2009, p. 72) explain, money is the commodity whose specific function is to serve as the universal equivalent of every kind of commodity. Money arose spontaneously in remote antiquity through the development of exchange and the forms of value. In the initial stages of exchange, various commodities served as universal equivalents. Gradually, the monetary function spontaneously became attached to silver and gold because their distinctive physical and chemical properties made these metals particularly suitable for this role. In the twentieth century, the function of the money commodity became restricted exclusively to gold[2]. Money emerged from the development of the commodity’s internal contradiction, between use-value[3] and exchange-value[4][5]. Consequently, the entire world of commodities split into two poles: (1) all commodities as use-values, and (2) money as the general embodiment of value.
The value of all other commodities is expressed in money’s use-value. The concrete labor[6] contained in money serves as the general form in which abstract labor[7] manifests itself, and the private labor embodied in money appears in a socially recognized form. Money makes possible the social accounting of labor and the measurement of labor contained in commodities. This measurement does not occur directly and immediately in units of labor time, but indirectly, through commodity prices. Unlike other commodities, money can be exchanged directly and universally for any other commodity. The nature and economic role of money manifest themselves in its functions (Borisov et al., 2009).
II.III. Functions of money
As Borisov et al. (2009, pp. 109–110) explain, the functions of money are the concrete forms in which its nature as universal equivalent manifests itself. In a developed commodity economy, money performs the following five functions:
Measure of value
Medium of circulation
Means of accumulation or hoarding
Means of payment
World money.
II.III.I. Measure of value
Money’s function as a measure of value means that money, in the form of gold, as discussed in the final section, provides the material through which the value of all other commodities is expressed. Every commodity, whatever it may be, expresses its value in money. This makes it possible to compare different commodities quantitatively. Money can perform this function as mentally represented or ideal money because a definite relationship exists between the value of gold and that of the commodity concerned. This relationship rests on the socially necessary labor expended in producing each. The value of a commodity expressed in money is its price (Borisov et al., 2009).
II.III.II. Medium of circulation
Money’s function as a medium of circulation consists in mediating the circulation of commodities. Actual money must be available for this purpose. Money performs this function momentarily: once one commodity has been exchanged, it immediately begins to facilitate the realization of another, and so forth. This circumstance allows money in its function as a medium of circulation to be replaced by its representatives: subsidiary coins of less than full intrinsic value and paper money (Borisov et al., 2009).
II.III.III. Means of accumulation or hoarding
Money serves as a means of hoarding because, as the universal representative of wealth, it can purchase any commodity and can be held in any quantity. Accumulating wealth and treasure therefore takes the form of accumulating money. As the capitalist commodity economy develops, the power of money, the power of the rich over the poor, intensifies. Money’s social power becomes the power of private individuals. Under these conditions, accumulating money becomes an end in itself. In this account, the function of hoarding can be performed only by money of full value: gold coins, bullion, and gold objects. When gold coins circulated, hoarding played an important role in the spontaneous regulation of monetary circulation in capitalist countries (Borisov et al., 2009).
II.III.IV. Means of payment
Money acts as a means of payment when commodities are bought and sold on credit, meaning that payment is deferred. In this case, money enters circulation when payment falls due, serving as a means of payment rather than as a medium of circulation. It performs the same function in lending, tax payments, ground rent, wages, and so forth. Money’s function as a means of payment allows debt obligations to be offset against one another and economizes on cash (Borisov et al., 2009).
II.III.V. World money
Money performs its universal function in the world market and in payments between countries. In the world market, money operates in its natural form as precious-metal bullion. The development of money’s functions reflects the development of commodity production and its contradictions. With the emergence and development of capitalism, money’s role changes fundamentally. It becomes capital: a means of exploiting wage labor and appropriating wage workers’ unpaid labor. At the same time, simple commodity producers, such as peasants and artisans, and workers use money in its ordinary functions within capitalist society (Borisov et al., 2009).
II.IV. Paper money, “inorganic money,” and fiat money
As Pedrosa (2016) explains, fiat money, also called “inorganic money” in the terminology used here, rests on society’s confidence. In other words, it does not derive its backing from the value of precious metals, but from the general belief that it has value. It is also known as paper money or inconvertible money.
For much of history, money had intrinsic value: its value corresponded to that of its material composition. Gold and silver were generally the metals most widely used and valued across societies. However, as populations and transactions expanded, this method could not be maintained in the same way. A mixed arrangement subsequently emerged, known as the gold standard, under which coins and banknotes were backed by a quantity of gold. Although a coin did not itself contain gold and its material composition might have little value, its stated denomination entitled the holder to a certain amount of that metal.
Today, we use a fiat system based on confidence or faith in the valuation of coins and banknotes. For example, the physical material of a €20, €100, or €500 banknote does not itself have that value, nor does the material of a coin necessarily equal its denomination. Nevertheless, the community accepts these denominations as valid for conducting trade.
People trust the value represented, relatively independently of whether that confidence is sufficiently well founded.
II.V. Monetary replacement as a broader concept than dollarization
According to the Banco Central del Ecuador (n.d.), dollarization in a broad sense refers to any process in which foreign money replaces domestic money in any of its domestic functions: unit of account, store of value, means of payment, and medium of exchange. What orthodox economists call a store of value appears in Marxist theory as a means of accumulation or hoarding; what they call a unit of account and medium of exchange appears in the account presented here as a medium of circulation; and means of payment has the same name in Marxist theory. In the Marxist terminology used here, orthodox economic theory contains no corresponding reference to value. The broad concept of dollarization presented by the Central Bank of Ecuador can be termed monetary replacement.
In this framework, Banco Central del Ecuador (n.d.) presents dollarization as a form of currency substitution in which the US dollar takes over the domestic currency’s functions as a store of value, unit of account, means of payment, and medium of exchange.
II.VI. Types of dollarization as concrete forms of monetary replacement
II.VI.I. General considerations
Types of dollarization are concrete expressions, though not the only possible expressions, of types of monetary replacement. They are concrete because they specify the foreign currency that will replace the national currency, partially or entirely and in a particular manner. As Bulat (2019) explains, monetary replacement can penetrate an economic system’s channels of circulation to different degrees. In other words, dollarization reaches different levels of depth across national economies.
II.VI.II. Financial dollarization
This form of dollarization involves replacing local-currency assets and/or liabilities with foreign-currency assets and/or liabilities. Costa Rica is a country with financial dollarization.
According to Loría and Martínez (2018, p. 16), financial dollarization exists in Costa Rica and has the following principal characteristics in that specific national setting:
For 1997–2017, no evidence was found of hysteresis generated by high inflation: the continuation of financial dollarization despite low inflation rates. The results reported in the cited study and the authors’ methodological criteria are presented below (Loría & Martínez, 2018).
Figure 1Private financial wealth in foreign currency and lagged inflationCosta Rica · 1997–2017 · left: % of total wealth; right: inflation (%)
Note. Loría and Martínez (2018, p. 9). Inflation is lagged one year; the reference US-dollar buying exchange rate is used. Wealth figures do not exclude exchange-rate effects. The source’s discussion of adjustment at a fixed exchange rate cautions that price stability alone may be insufficient to reduce financial dollarization when expectations remain consistent with higher future inflation.
Reconstructed in HTML and CSS. Approximate readings from the published figure; these are not the original series and are unsuitable for precise calculations.
View approximate chart values
Table 1Approximate values · Private financial wealth in foreign currency and lagged inflation
Period
Foreign-currency wealth
Inflation t−12
1997
59.8
14.33
1998
55
11.25
1999
55
12.43
2000
55
9.71
2001
55
10.45
2002
55
11.03
2003
55
9.79
2004
55
8.76
2005
55
13.6
2006
55
13.53
2007
55
11.4
2008
55
8.91
2009
55
15.07
2010
55
6.56
2011
55
6.34
2012
55
5.02
2013
55
4.95
2014
55
5.83
2015
55
3.92
2016
55
2.23
2017
55
-0.99
In making investment and borrowing decisions, economic agents respond to volatility in domestic prices and the exchange rate, exchange-rate expectations, and the interest-rate differential between domestic and foreign currencies. It should be added that, over the preceding ten years, Costa Rica’s exchange rate against the US dollar had shown a general and progressive tendency toward depreciation, while inflation had remained stable following the adoption of inflation targeting. The country’s annual target was 3%, with an accepted tolerance of one percentage point. At first sight, this does not appear to constitute rigorous monetary discipline, independently of whether inflation-targeting regimes generate or intensify growth problems when particular structural conditions are absent (Loría & Martínez, 2018).
Administrative measures introduced by regulators to discourage financial dollarization have produced mixed results. They were effective in some periods and less so in others (Loría & Martínez, 2018).
Measures adopted by monetary and regulatory authorities to control inflation, stabilize the exchange rate, and modify economic agents’ behavior reduced dollarization over the preceding two decades. The dollarization of financial savings showed a sustained downward trend. Credit dollarization also declined, although with fluctuations (Loría & Martínez, 2018).
II.VI.III. Real dollarization
As Bulat (2019) explains, this form of dollarization involves indexing domestic transactions to the prevailing exchange rate.
Labat and Licandro (2021, pp. 9–10) explain that dollarization, as a form of indexation, generates inflationary inertia in price formation and raises the cost of stabilizing inflation, a point acknowledged even in orthodox economic literature. Nevertheless, dollarization does not appear to have prevented dollarized economies such as Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Costa Rica from stabilizing inflation. How substantial an obstacle, then, is dollarization in Uruguay? To address this issue, the question is divided into two parts: can monetary policy anchor expectations in Uruguay, and are monetary transmission channels functioning?
Central banks commonly work with the following model of inflation expectations:
πeit − π* = αi + μitInflation expectations · firm i, period t
Here, π denotes the inflation expected by firm i at time t; π* is the central bank’s target; αᵢ is a persistent bias in inflation forecasts, or the amount by which the firm believes the effective target exceeds the central bank’s announced target; and μᵢₜ is a firm-specific error term. If the firm believes the central bank’s target, αᵢ should be zero. If αᵢ is significantly positive, the firm believes the effective target is higher than the announced target (Labat & Licandro, 2021).
Figure 2Density of bias in firms’ individual inflation forecastsUruguay · 2009–2020 · horizontal axis: α, percentage points; vertical axis: density
00.10.20.30.40.4501.534.567.5910.51213.51515
Density
Note. Labat and Licandro (2021, p. 11). Curve height represents density, not the probability of an individual point value.
Reconstructed in HTML and CSS. Approximate readings from the published figure; these are not the original series and are unsuitable for precise calculations.
View approximate chart values
Table 2Approximate values · Density of bias in firms’ individual inflation forecasts
Period
Density
0
0
0.5
0
1
0
1.5
0.01
2
0.05
2.5
0.18
3
0.38
3.5
0.41
4
0.33
4.5
0.21
5
0.15
5.5
0.1
6
0.06
6.5
0.04
7
0.02
7.5
0.01
8
0.01
8.5
0.01
9
0
9.5
0
10
0
10.5
0
11
0
11.5
0
12
0
12.5
0
13
0
13.5
0
14
0
14.5
0
15
0
The preceding graph displays the distribution of the amount by which surveyed firms believe the central bank’s target exceeds its announced value. The Central Bank of Uruguay obtains these measurements through its survey of firms’ inflation expectations. The graph provides a basis for three observations (Labat & Licandro, 2021).
First, inflation expectations measured in this way indicate that economic agents do not have complete confidence in the monetary authority. Second, agents’ inflation expectations were anchored approximately 3–4 percentage points above the central bank’s target. Third, the breadth of the distribution of α indicates uncertainty about the effective inflation target, insofar as agents do not trust the officially announced target (Labat & Licandro, 2021).
As Labat and Licandro explain, although firms understood that the announced target was not the effective target, the lack of information about the latter generated uncertainty and disagreement about its value. The target signal was consequently noisy, and this affected price formation, partly working against achievement of the announced target. These findings have three significant implications. First, the announced target was clearly not credible. Second, monetary policy was able to anchor inflation expectations, although evidently not in the intended manner. Third, concealing the effective target from the public generates uncertainty that ultimately passes through to inflation, at least in the absence of complementary policies, which may be legal as well as economic, to prevent this outcome. If uncertainty becomes substantial and is managed through generally inadequate complementary policies, it can discourage investment, whatever the precise magnitude of that effect (Labat & Licandro, 2021).
Labat and Licandro also find clear evidence that monetary policy transmission appears to function despite the small size of peso markets. This should not be surprising, since other countries in the region with similarly underdeveloped local-currency markets and dollarization have been able to conduct independent monetary policy with considerable success; examples include Peru, Bolivia, and Paraguay (Labat & Licandro, 2021).
Labat and Licandro (2021, pp. 12–13) report that all monetary policy transmission channels appear to function in the data except those operating through asset prices other than the exchange rate. Uruguay’s stock market is scarcely developed, and households lack mechanisms for realizing liquid capital gains on housing through the financial system. This limits monetary policy’s associated wealth effects. Evidence nevertheless supports the operation of the other channels. Basal et al. (2010, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021) show that interest rates affect aggregate demand through both investment and consumption. Bucacos (2017, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021) also finds evidence that financial conditions influence activity through investment. The transmission of monetary policy and policy communication to inflation expectations has been extensively documented by Borraz and Mello (2020, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021), Licandro and Mello (2014, 2015, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021), Mello and Ponce (2020, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021), and Frache and Lluberas (2019, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021). More recently, Cuitiño et al. (2020, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021) and Guenaga and Zacheo (2019, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021) have suggested that weak policy credibility may help explain poor monetary policy performance. Overall, the evidence indicates that monetary transmission channels function and that their functioning should improve with greater monetary policy credibility and the development of peso markets.
II.VI.IV. Transactional or incomplete dollarization
II.VI.IV.I. General considerations
According to Alfaro Ramos (2005), transactional dollarization becomes evident when residents make extensive use of the US dollar or another foreign currency alongside or instead of the local currency. Dollarization can take two forms. Unofficial dollarization occurs when individuals hold foreign-currency bank deposits or banknotes to protect themselves against high domestic inflation. Official dollarization occurs when a government adopts a foreign currency as the exclusive or predominant legal tender.
II.VI.IV.II. Unofficial (de facto) dollarization
Unofficial dollarization has existed in many countries for years. Although economists have studied it, governments have not always given the process sufficient attention. If its risks are not managed adequately, rapid depreciation can precipitate banking crises with severe consequences. Two arrangements discussed in connection with official monetary commitments are currency boards and full dollarization. Most developing countries, including transition economies adopting market mechanisms, already use some limited, unofficial form of dollarization. Their residents hold foreign cash and foreign-currency deposits in domestic banks to varying degrees. In high-inflation countries, the US dollar or another strong currency is widely used alongside the national currency in everyday transactions. Unofficial dollarization arises in response to economic instability, high inflation, and residents’ desire to diversify and protect their assets against domestic-currency depreciation. This option is available, of course, only to those who can afford it, often a small group whose incomes are denominated in dollars rather than the average resident of a non-dollarized or weakly dollarized economy. Two reasons for capitalists’ demand for foreign-currency assets should be distinguished (Alfaro Ramos, 2005):
Currency substitution.
Asset substitution.
With currency substitution, foreign assets are used as money, principally as a means of payment and unit of account. This often occurs under high inflation or hyperinflation, when the high cost of using the national currency leads the public to seek alternatives. Once foreign currency becomes accepted in transactions, its use may persist. Dollarization in some Latin American and Asian countries has continued and accelerated even after economic conditions stabilized. Asset substitution, by contrast, reflects considerations of risk and return on domestic and foreign assets. Historically, foreign-currency assets have offered protection against macroeconomic risks, including price instability and prolonged economic downturns in many developing countries. Even during periods of stability, these assets can serve that purpose if residents perceive some probability that inflation will return. Important differences between unofficial and full dollarization create transition problems for governments considering the latter. Under full dollarization, public and private debt is denominated in dollars, and public and private accounts must be converted into US dollars. Countries must therefore establish the exchange rate at which outstanding debts, contracts, and financial assets will be converted. Finally, the stability promised by dollarization is itself relative: the value of the US dollar, like that of any other strong currency adopted by a country, fluctuates against other widely traded currencies. Such fluctuations have sometimes been substantial in the period since Bretton Woods (Alfaro Ramos, 2005).
II.VI.IV.III. Official dollarization: de facto and formal dimensions
II.VI.IV.III.I. Currency boards
As described by Alfaro Ramos (2005), a currency board establishes full convertibility at a fixed exchange rate and commits to issuing domestic currency only against financial assets realizable in the international reserve currency, thereby backing issuance in the selected currency. A currency board of this kind cannot therefore operate as a lender of last resort to the government or commercial banks, nor can it regulate the money supply through open-market operations or rediscounting banks’ domestic financial assets. It otherwise has the characteristics of a fully fixed exchange-rate regime, but with a stronger commitment because changes to the parity generally require legislation by the national congress.
According to the International Monetary Fund (2000), the principal differences between a currency board and dollarization concern seigniorage and sovereignty. Countries retaining their own currency under a currency board keep seigniorage revenue, whereas dollarization transfers that revenue to the issuer of the anchor currency unless special arrangements are made. Dollarization also represents a more complete surrender of national sovereignty. That the IMF itself speaks of a loss of national sovereignty is, undoubtedly, noteworthy.
As described in “Caja de conversión” (n.d.), a currency board rests on a legislative commitment to exchange domestic currency for a specified foreign currency at a predetermined rate. The issuing authorities accept restrictions intended to ensure compliance with that legal obligation. Domestic currency is issued only against foreign-currency backing and is fully supported by external assets. This removes traditional central bank functions, including discretionary monetary control and the conventional lender-of-last-resort role, leaving little room for discretionary monetary policy. Some room for maneuver may nevertheless remain, depending on how rigidly the supplementary rules are specified around the core commitments. In brief, the country retains its own currency but backs it fully with another country’s currency to establish monetary policy credibility.
Enoch and Gulde (1998) list the following countries and regions as having adopted currency board arrangements:
Table 3Currency boards · historical list published in 1998
Country or region
Years in operation
Anchor currency
Special features
Antigua and Barbuda
32
US dollar
Member of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB).
Argentina
6
US dollar
One third of coverage may consist of US-dollar-denominated government bonds.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
1
German mark
—
Brunei Darussalam
30
Singapore dollar
—
Bulgaria
1
German mark
Excess coverage in the banking department to address banking-sector weaknesses.
Djibouti
48
US dollar
The anchor currency changed from the French franc to the US dollar.
Dominica
32
US dollar
Member of the ECCB.
Estonia
6
German mark
Excess coverage for domestic monetary interventions.
Grenada
32
US dollar
Member of the ECCB.
Hong Kong SAR
14
US dollar
—
Lithuania
4
US dollar
The central bank has the right to appreciate the exchange rate.
St. Kitts and Nevis
32
US dollar
Member of the ECCB.
St. Lucia
32
US dollar
Member of the ECCB.
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
32
US dollar
Member of the ECCB.
Source: Enoch and Gulde (1998); underlying table sources: Baliño et al. (1997) and Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (1998). Years in operation and monetary arrangements refer to that historical publication, not to a current classification.
II.VI.IV.III.II. Full dollarization
IMF researchers Berg and Borensztein (2000, pp. 2–3) explain that full dollarization consists in a country officially adopting another country’s currency for all financial transactions, with the possible exception of subsidiary coinage.
II.VI.V. Cultural or ideological dollarization
Gerardo Licandro and Miguel Mello examine cultural dollarization in Dolarización cultural y financiera de los hogares uruguayos, published by the Center for Latin American Monetary Studies. Their account can be summarized as follows (Licandro & Mello, 2018, p. 366):
Licandro and Mello (2018, p. 366) distinguish cultural dollarization from financial dollarization. The former occurs when people use the dollar as their numeraire in situations where most countries would use the national currency. In Uruguay, public officials and private individuals commonly express large amounts in dollars to convey their scale. Examples include a minister discussing a budget or a tax-administration director discussing total revenue. The authors regard this practice as unusual internationally and particularly characteristic of Uruguay.
II.VII. Involuntary dedollarization and its forms
Arauz (2019) identifies four specific risks of involuntary dedollarization in his analysis of Ecuador’s agreement with the IMF. These concern reserve availability, capital outflows, banking stability, and the social viability of adjustment:
Dedollarization through reserve scarcity: the central bank runs out of net international reserves with which to obtain dollars and consequently cannot maintain the dollar flows required for the economy to function adequately under full dollarization. Reserve scarcity may also lead to dedollarization through default. Here, default refers to a situation in which a lender or group of lenders expects, generally on substantive grounds, that a borrower cannot repay on the agreed terms, leaving debt forgiveness, described here as involuntary restructuring, or renegotiation, described here as voluntary restructuring, as the available alternatives.
Eliminating the foreign-exchange outflow tax, known in Ecuador as the Impuesto a la Salida de Divisas (ISD), may make dollarization unsustainable following a speculative attack. The economy becomes more vulnerable to such attacks as the government removes restrictions on their operation.
A generalized recession, implying dedollarization through a banking crisis: the same forces that brought dollarization about can also drive its reversal.
Internal devaluation, understood here as the risk that dollarization loses its social viability.
Arauz (2019) does not endorse dollarization, but recognizes its potential to limit speculative attacks and generalized inflationary outbreaks and to provide medium- and long-term certainty for investment. He argues, however, that appreciation and substantial inflation during dollarization’s initial years created an inertial path dependence[8] of continuing real-exchange-rate appreciation. In his account, this left Ecuador exposed to neighboring countries’ devaluations, chronic non-oil current-account deficits with those countries, and large inflows of laundered drug dollars. These are serious observations.
As Arauz argues, dollarization can help prevent speculative attacks principally because domestic currency speculation no longer exists. Together with capital-account regulations under a creative dollarization arrangement, such as the Tobin-type foreign-exchange outflow tax (ISD), and the limited importance of the equity market, this provides a degree of protection against the most common speculative attacks. In the setting discussed here, Ecuador’s principal vulnerabilities concern speculation in external-debt bond prices, reflected in the familiar “country risk” measure, and the prices of export commodities. The former vulnerability is also common in non-dollarized developing countries (Arauz, 2019).
Arauz (2019) argues that dollarization, through the Dutch-disease mechanism[9] associated with it, reinforces an economic structure based on primary exports and manufactured imports[10]. He links this structure to environmental depletion and the export of natural resources. Preserving dollarization without intensifying that depletion would, in his view, require substantial productive investment in infrastructure, energy, and especially human capabilities to make the exchange rate less decisive for competitiveness. He envisages a sustained effort of approximately twenty years.
For Arauz (2019), dollarization is a social contract concerning the unit of account used in transactions, accounting, and records. The other rules commonly associated with it are not inherent necessities: arrangements can be orthodox or creative. Remaining dollarized or dedollarizing is ultimately a political decision, even during crisis. A rigid unit of account can nevertheless cause enough social suffering to break the contract and make dedollarization politically viable. He contrasts Greece, where an enormous crisis did not break the social and political commitment to the euro, with Zimbabwe, where the second crisis did break the commitment to dollarization.
II.VIII. The Marxian conception of crisis
According to Borisov et al. (2009, p. 57), an economic crisis of overproduction is the phase of the capitalist cycle characterized by the eruption of the contradictions of the capitalist economy. It manifests itself in commodity overproduction and sharply intensified difficulties in selling output. Enterprises close or substantially reduce production; mass involuntary unemployment increases; workers’ living standards decline markedly; trade is disrupted; monetary and credit relations become unbalanced; and industrial, commercial, and banking firms fail. Under capitalism, commodity overproduction is relative rather than absolute: commodities are excessive only in relation to solvent demand, connected here with Keynes’s concept of effective demand, beyond mere need or desire for a product. The cause of overproduction crises lies in capitalism’s fundamental contradiction between the social character of production and the private capitalist appropriation of its results. This contradiction manifests itself in the anarchy of capitalist production, continually disrupted economic proportions, and contradictions between production and consumption and between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Capitalist reproduction inevitably exposes the antagonism between the aims of capitalist production and the means of achieving them. Seeking to maximize profit, capitalists attempt to expand production without limit, bringing ever more goods to market. This is also related to the tendency of the average rate of profit to fall, identified by Adam Smith and rigorously formulated by Karl Marx, discussed in Gómez Julián (2017) and Part Three of Volume III of Marx’s Capital. At the same time, capitalists intensify workers’ exploitation and reduce their living standards. The population’s solvent demand consequently begins to fall behind productive capacity, creating difficulties in realizing commodities produced by capitalist enterprises. Commodities remain unsold; firms cannot recover their expenditure and cannot continue production. The production process is disrupted within individual enterprises, their industries, and the capitalist economy as a whole.
The axis around which the elements of this multidisciplinary definition of crisis revolve is therefore the generalized collapse of a pattern of capital accumulation. Because society is organized around that pattern, a collapse of the economic base or social being will, sooner or later, manifest itself in a generalized crisis of the superstructure’s forms: ideology and culture, or social consciousness. These encompass the political, legal, moral, aesthetic, religious, and philosophical conceptions of a particular historical moment, also called forms of social consciousness. This entails a generalized crisis of society’s official institutions at that historical moment.
Capitalism emerges from crisis by destroying part of the productive forces through enterprise closures, commodity destruction, and other forms of negative expanded reproduction[11], intensifying workers’ exploitation, and renewing fixed capital. Yet because capitalism cannot eliminate the fundamental cause of overproduction crises, these recur, appearing throughout economic life: production, distribution, exchange, and consumption; industry and agriculture; and the capitalist world as a whole. During pre-monopoly capitalism, such crises recurred approximately every ten or eleven years, including 1825, 1836, 1847–1848, 1857, 1866, 1873, 1882, and 1890. The deepest was that of 1873. The replacement of free competition by monopoly domination made crises more frequent and prolonged and shortened periods of expansion. Under the general crisis of capitalism, overproduction crises became much sharper and more destructive. As capitalist contradictions intensified and crises deepened, essential changes also appeared in the capitalist cycle. In the postwar period, the capitalist economy was marked by more uneven national development, more frequent interruptions of reproduction, and new crisis phenomena. The United States illustrates this clearly, experiencing four post-Second World War downturns: 1948–1949, 1953–1954, 1957–1958, and 1960–1961. State monopoly capitalism, economic militarization, and inflation generated further difficulties and contradictions in capitalist reproduction. These intensified production anarchy, uneven development, workers’ exploitation, and the conflict between the volume of production and the population’s limited purchasing power. Economic crises thus demonstrate that capitalism develops by squandering productive forces while condemning millions of workers to near-starvation. They expose the mismatch between bourgeois relations of production and the level and condition of the productive forces, revealing the historically transitory character of the capitalist mode of production (Borisov et al., 2009).
III. Historical considerations on the international monetary system
III.I. The gold standard in the twenty-first century
Astarita (2006) argues that official dollar–gold convertibility under Bretton Woods remained in operation until at least 1968 and that this constituted an international gold-exchange standard. Against the claim that money had already become entirely dematerialized, he asks why runs into gold intensified from the late 1960s and why the official gold price and gold reserves remained central concerns until the system’s breakdown. In his view, the thesis of complete detachment from gold can be sustained only by restricting monetary validation to the national sphere and disregarding the conditions of international validation.
Besides introducing a historically false division, the dematerialization thesis cannot explain why gold continues to function as a reserve and a means of hoarding. Several facts deserve emphasis (Astarita, 2006):
After almost three decades without convertibility into gold, official reserves still exceeded 30,000 tonnes, approximately one quarter of all gold extracted throughout history.
By contrast, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) did not become an international fiat currency, particularly after losing their gold backing. In other words, SDRs do not establish a ‘pseudo-international validation’ of currency. Neither the dollar nor the euro refers to SDRs as an ultimate reference of value.
Gold as a proportion of official reserves stood at 61.6% in the United States, 55.4% in France, 30.6% in Germany, 44.2% in Italy, 49.5% in Switzerland, 29% in Austria, and 41% in Belgium, according to 1994 data.
In 1995, the IMF affirmed gold’s monetary role and decided that any mobilization of its gold stock that would weaken its overall financial position should be avoided. It maintained that gold holdings provided room for maneuver and added credibility to its balance sheet.
When the European Central Bank was established, it was decided that gold would constitute 15% of its reserves.
The increase in gold’s price from $265 to $425 between September 1999 and March 2005 was not matched by a similar increase in metals generally, nor did it correspond to increased industrial demand for gold.
By the mid-1990s, private gold stocks were estimated at approximately 60,000 tonnes in jewelry, including jewelry held primarily for investment, and a further 24,000 tonnes in bars and coins.
Gold was traded principally through bullion banks, including Credit Suisse, Union Bank of Switzerland, Swiss Bank Corporation, Republic National Bank, and N. M. Rothschild. These banks had their own gold refineries and price-setting mechanisms. This banking mechanism for establishing prices deserves attention and will be revisited.
Annual gold trading, in physical form or contracts, was estimated to exceed 300,000 tonnes: more than one hundred times annual production and more than twice the worldwide stock. By the late 1990s, daily transaction volumes were comparable to the daily trading volume between two major currencies, such as the yen and the German mark.
Astarita (2006) contends that these developments cannot be explained by treating gold as an ordinary metal without monetary functions. He asks why such substantial value remains immobilized, particularly in official reserves, if gold has lost all monetary significance. He invokes Lipietz’s account of money’s capacity to validate social production without itself requiring validation (Lipietz, 1983, as cited in Astarita, 2006). Although gold does not ordinarily circulate as a means of payment, Astarita interprets its role in international hoarding as a continuing monetary function. He connects this with Marx’s account of money becoming fixed as an embodiment of value, wealth, and social power (Marx, 1999, as cited in Astarita, 2006).
This implies, first, that gold is demanded not simply as a metal, but as the universal equivalent, through its economic existence as commodity money. Second, it is demanded not as coinage bearing a national form, but as the embodiment of human labor as such, as the worldwide universal equivalent. Its use-value consists in preserving value, directly social labor time. How can this circumstance be overlooked after acknowledging that hoarding is one of the forms of ‘true money,’ the other being means of payment (Astarita, 2006)?
This raises the question of the ultimate backing of the dollar or euro. Senior central bankers seem to perceive the relationship between banknotes and gold more accurately when they justify holding gold reserves, and buying gold when confidence in banknotes weakens, by observing that gold is the only reserve that is not some government’s liability (Astarita, 2006).
Astarita’s argument also finds support in Alan Greenspan’s[12] position in a February 2017 interview with Gold Investor, reproduced by Haynes (2019). Greenspan regarded gold as the foremost global currency and emphasized that, like silver, it did not require a counterparty’s signature. Gold had historically been far more valuable per ounce than silver, yet both differed from credit instruments and fiat currency because they did not depend on an issuer’s creditworthiness and were understood to possess intrinsic value. He recalled gold’s longstanding acceptance in settlement and its coinage in Asia Minor around 600 BCE. He associated the gold standard’s late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century peak with global prosperity, productivity growth, and little inflation. In his view, blaming the standard for the interwar failures resembled condemning shoes after wearing the wrong size: political decisions were the central problem. The First World War had disrupted fixed parities, but countries resisted exchange rates against the dollar below their 1913 levels.
In that interpretation, Britain made a decisive mistake by returning to gold in 1925 at the 1913 rate of $4.86 per pound sterling. Greenspan attributed that decision to Winston Churchill, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, and linked it to severe late-1920s deflation and the suspension of convertibility in 1931. The problem, he argued, lay in restoring prewar parities after a war that had affected national economies very unevenly (Haynes, 2019).
Greenspan acknowledged that a contemporary return to the gold standard could be perceived as desperation. He nevertheless maintained that keeping the standard would have prevented the monetary situation he was criticizing (Haynes, 2019).
The Hungarian central bank also cites Greenspan’s statement that fiat money is accepted by no one in extremis, whereas gold is always accepted (Palotai & Veres, 2020).
Greenspan (1999) related employers’ resistance to wage increases to their reduced pricing power. He acknowledged monetary policy’s contribution to moderating the general price level and inflation expectations during the 1980s and 1990s, but argued that discretionary monetary policy faced difficulties in anchoring prices over time in the manner of the previous century’s gold standard.
The following is a brief chronology of the geopolitical economy of gold since the end of Bretton Woods, with particular attention to developments from 1999 through the period covered by this essay.
July 10, 2014. Writing for Forbes in “Paul Volcker Dreams of a ‘New Bretton Woods.’ But What Would That Look Like?”, Lewis reports: Volcker was Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Monetary Affairs from 1969 to 1974. The United States ended the Bretton Woods system’s official link to gold in 1971, and the system finally dissolved in spring 1973. This gave him considerable perspective on subsequent developments. His conclusion was that the absence of an official, rules-based, cooperatively managed monetary system had not been a great success. International financial crises appeared at least as frequent and more destructive in obstructing economic stability and growth (Lewis, 2014).
April 14, 2015. RT en Español reports that numerous financial analysts were questioning national currencies’ performance as the principal international means of payment and discussing a possible gold-backed currency that might end dollar reserve hegemony. The report suggests that the IMF might also favor gold amid unstable economic conditions. Meghnad Desai, associated with the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF), an independent research and advisory organization, argued that IMF Special Drawing Rights should include some gold to stabilize that synthetic instrument. According to the report, citing Zero Hedge, Desai told a precious-metals conference in Dubai that a little gold would help stabilize SDRs, that gold could be designated as part of them, and that such a development was plausible. He added that it would be easier if China increased its official gold reserves (RT en Español, 2015l).
June 17, 2015. RT en Español reports that Texas was establishing its own gold depository outside Washington’s control. A law signed by Governor Greg Abbott contemplated bringing approximately $1 billion in holdings back to Texas and creating a depository that would not recognize federal authority over its contents. Abbott described it as the first institution of its kind in the country, intended to strengthen the security of Texas’s gold reserves and eliminate fees paid outside the state. The bill’s sponsor, Republican Giovanni Capriglione, said people worldwide were contacting him about storing gold and other precious materials in Texas because they regarded it as a strong state. The proposal prohibited federal or quasi-federal confiscation of the depository’s contents. The decision prompted speculation that Texas secessionists sought financial autonomy and readiness to issue a currency of their own if federal economic support ended (RT en Español, 2015n).
August 31, 2015. RT en Español alleges that the United States was concealing the true value of its reserves by refusing a public audit, amid investor expectations of an increase in the benchmark federal funds rate (RT en Español, 2015j).
September 14, 2015. RT en Español reports that China and India were buying the available physical gold associated in its account with the London Metal Exchange (LME), described as the world’s largest market for options and futures in nonferrous metals. The report claims that little “real” gold remained because China and India had purchased it (RT en Español, 2015d).
September 15, 2015. RT en Español reports that several European countries would withdraw gold from the United States. Between 2014 and the report’s publication, foreign central banks had withdrawn 246 tonnes from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, a major precious-metals custodian. The report interprets these moves as responses to adverse global economic conditions, emphasizing the liquidity of the assets and the possibility of investing the gold by returning it to circulation (RT en Español, 2015o).
September 19, 2015. RT en Español reports that BRICS countries were buying gold to reduce dependence on the dollar amid expectations of its possible collapse. Rising gold demand is interpreted as reflecting mounting geopolitical tensions (RT en Español, 2015f).
July 21, 2015. RT en Español reports a major decline in gold prices to a five-year low. Colin Cieszynski, chief market strategist at CMC Markets, is cited in connection with three factors: reduced demand for inflation protection, with oil then around $50 per barrel; reduced demand for defensive safe havens as uncertainty subsided; and China’s large gold purchases, with its reserves increasing by 60% between 2008 and 2015. These purchases inherently represent increased demand (RT en Español, 2015m).
September 1, 2015. According to RT en Español, some experts interpreted large Russian and Chinese gold purchases as part of a strategy to create a new BRICS financial instrument (RT en Español, 2015g).
September 6, 2015. RT en Español reports withdrawals of gold deposited at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. An estimated 90% of the gold stored there before those withdrawals belonged to foreign countries (RT en Español, 2015p).
September 8, 2015. RT en Español reports a record shortage of available gold associated with global financial instability. Gold is described as the quintessential safe-haven asset to which investors turn during uncertainty. This suggests that investors still perceived structural fragility in the international financial system in 2015, alongside growing geopolitical tensions worldwide. The account also associates this episode with exceptionally high gold prices over the preceding period (RT en Español, 2015a).
October 2, 2015. RT en Español cites RBC Capital Markets analysts attributing the recent rise in gold prices partly to the Federal Reserve’s decision not to increase the federal funds rate. They nevertheless warned that this favorable influence might end: RBC still expected a December rate increase, which could reduce the gold price (RT en Español, 2015i).
October 17, 2015. RT en Español reports that gold reached a four-month high as major investors purchased it because they considered a Federal Reserve interest-rate increase during 2015 unlikely (RT en Español, 2015c).
September 30, 2015. RT en Español reports investors’ concerns about speculative financial developments and their decision to seek protection in gold. These concerns are connected with the consequences of the end of dollar–gold convertibility under Bretton Woods in 1971 (RT en Español, 2015k).
November 12, 2015. RT en Español reports that Chinese geologists discovered 470 tonnes of gold beneath the East China Sea after three years of exploration. Following the discovery, twelve drilling platforms were established, with approximately one thousand people working at the site (RT en Español, 2015e).
November 13, 2015. RT en Español reports that rumors of falling stock markets increased gold demand. Citing the World Gold Council, it describes two distinct phases during the third quarter: exchange-traded fund outflows contributed to July’s price decline and stimulated consumer demand worldwide; subsequently, a favorable shift in institutional investor sentiment brought ETF inflows in August and September and pushed prices upward. Central banks reportedly purchased another 175 tonnes in recognition of diversification benefits. Some commentators interpreted large sovereign purchases as part of a strategy to break the dollar’s monopoly. Analyst Mac Slavo argued that aggressive buying signaled an ongoing change in the world reserve currency and invoked the maxim that whoever holds the gold makes the rules. The report also describes Stanley Druckenmiller, a billionaire hedge-fund investor associated with George Soros, purchasing almost three million shares linked to gold after warnings of a possible stock-market decline. The cited commentators interpreted the scale of the purchase as signaling concern about a serious financial collapse (RT en Español, 2015b).
December 4, 2015. Reporting for Forbes México, Barba describes recommendations by investor Jim Rogers[13], based on his experience, about possible preparations for a collapse of the US currency. Rogers suggested that the dollar could become a bubble while gold, silver, and other precious metals remained under pressure. If that assessment proved correct, he intended to sell dollars at an appropriate moment and move into gold and silver (Barba, 2015).
December 22, 2015. RT en Español reports that the Bank of Russia increased gold reserves by 186 tonnes between January and November 2015, exceeding its purchases during all of 2014. This accumulation is related to expectations surrounding international financial instability (RT en Español, 2015q).
December 23, 2015. RT en Español, citing CNBC, reports that despite the sharp decline in gold prices, some experts still described gold as the “sun” of the monetary universe because of persistently strong demand (RT en Español, 2015h).
January 5, 2016. RT en Español cites Mark O’Byrne, research director at GoldCore Ltd., discussing a shift in gold’s center of gravity toward China. The report speculates about a gold-backed yuan and presents his view that such a currency could severely undermine the dollar (RT en Español, 2016).
July 10, 2016. Business Insider reports Greenspan’s support for a return to the gold standard, recalling his 1966 argument that the credit an economy can sustain under gold is constrained by tangible assets because credit instruments ultimately represent claims on such assets. His earlier argument maintained that abandoning the gold standard allowed proponents of the welfare state to use the banking system for unlimited credit expansion (Bonner, 2016).
February 21, 2017. The Mises Institute cites Greenspan recalling his exchanges with US Congressman Ron Paul, a firm advocate of gold. Greenspan explained that US monetary policy had attempted to follow signals resembling those a gold standard would have generated. He regarded this as sound monetary policy even under fiat currency and said that returning to gold would not, in that respect, have changed policy very much (McMaken, 2017).
November 16, 2018. In Forbes, Lewis argues in “The Gold Standard Didn’t Disappear in 1971, It Just Went Underground” that academic dismissal of gold overlooks its long historical operation across very different societies. His argument is that gold was the formal foundation of the world monetary system until Bretton Woods disintegrated in 1971 and also served, in an approximate and unofficial way, as a reference for much of the period afterward (Lewis, 2018).
May 30, 2019. Mora Lleonart reports that Serbia and the Philippines were increasing their central banks’ gold reserves, a development interpreted as a movement away from the US dollar standard (Mora Lleonart, 2019).
July 9, 2019. Pedraza reports Chinese savers turning to gold to protect savings against yuan depreciation. Slowing economic activity was affecting consumers and firms, while failures at several financial institutions increased interest in gold as protection against an emerging crisis. Some customers were withdrawing bank savings and buying gold to preserve wealth. The report places this behavior within China’s longstanding connection to the metal: the country had been the world’s largest producer for more than a decade and was also its largest consumer. Citing the Chinese-American newspaper The Epoch Times, the account describes a substantial decline in the yuan, or renminbi, against the US dollar in early July, reported as a movement of approximately 300–400 points (Pedraza, 2019).
August 8, 2019. In Forbes, Lewis argues in “We Just Tested the Gold Standard—It Still Works” that monetary policy had often been guided by gold after 1971. In his account, Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker abandoned the monetarist experiment in 1982 and adopted a flexible, ad hoc approach that nevertheless sought to stabilize the dollar relative to gold and other commodities, moderating the swings of the 1970s and early 1980s. International cooperation reinforced this effort: the 1985 Plaza Accord addressed a dollar judged too strong, with gold near $300 per ounce, and the 1987 Louvre Accord addressed a dollar judged too weak, with gold near $400 per ounce. Lewis interprets these actions as guiding the dollar toward an approximate $350-per-ounce band. He argues that Alan Greenspan refined this process after succeeding Volcker in 1987 and later acknowledged its intentional character. Lewis cites Greenspan’s 2004 observation that successful central banks under fiat money had tended to replicate outcomes that would probably have occurred under a general commodity standard (Lewis, 2019).
Source: Lewis (2019).
May 6, 2020. Cava discusses Chinese and Russian gold accumulation, interpreting China’s strategy as an attempt to replace the petrodollar. His account also discusses sovereign digital currencies, identifying the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, and India as potential participants. It presents cryptocurrencies as a possible vehicle for a monetary “reset.” According to the report, the People’s Bank of China had confirmed that four major state-owned banks and payments groups Tencent and Ant Financial were testing electronic payments using a digital yuan in four Chinese regions. Nineteen restaurants and retailers, including Starbucks, McDonald’s, and Subway, were said to be involved in pilot programs, with a possible launch connected to the 2022 Winter Olympics under consideration. Cava argued that Chinese consumers’ familiarity with electronic payments would facilitate adoption. He also claimed that a digital currency would preclude quantitative easing and helicopter money. The account describes China’s official preference for replacing the dollar with an IMF-approved currency basket including the dollar, euro, yuan, and yen, while speculating that China might privately prefer another arrangement because US influence would persist in such a basket. The People’s Bank of China had not confirmed gold backing for its digital currency. Cava nevertheless predicted that a gold-backed digital currency would severely destabilize the dollar. He situated this within a strategy beginning around 2000, when China and Russia agreed to reduce dollar use in trade, initially between themselves, and interpreted their gradual gold accumulation accordingly (Cava, 2020).
July 2, 2020. BBC News Mundo reports that an English court denied Nicolás Maduro’s government access to Venezuelan gold held at the Bank of England, citing the United Kingdom’s recognition of Juan Guaidó as interim president. The High Court’s decision arose from the Maduro government’s attempt to sell gold bars deposited at the Bank of England (BBC News Mundo, 2020).
June 18, 2020. Reporting for the BBC, Pichel describes the political and legal dispute over 31 tonnes of Venezuelan gold held by the Bank of England. The bars, valued at approximately $1 billion, belonged to Venezuela and were at the center of proceedings involving the Central Bank of Venezuela and the British institution. According to Maduro’s government, Venezuela wanted to sell the gold and use the proceeds to combat the spread of coronavirus (Pichel, 2020).
September 7, 2020. RT en Español (2020) reports that Peter Schiff acknowledged being wrong in his Bitcoin forecasts. This episode forms part of the debate over the relative performance of gold, cryptocurrencies, and the dollar.
May 22, 2021. RT en Español reports that Richard Kelly, head of global strategy at TD Securities, told CNBC that he strongly favored investment in gold (RT en Español, 2021b).
May 26, 2021. RT en Español reports that dollar weakness and falling Bitcoin prices pushed gold to its highest price since January 2021 (RT en Español, 2021c).
May 29, 2021. RT en Español reports a sharp fall in Bitcoin’s price, which is associated with increased gold demand as a safe-haven asset (RT en Español, 2021a).
May 31, 2021. According to RT en Español, Robert Kiyosaki recommended gold as protection against dollar depreciation, favoring it even over Bitcoin because of its relative stability (RT en Español, 2021d).
June 1, 2021. Becedas and Nieves (2021) discuss gold’s lower volatility relative to Bitcoin. They cite JPMorgan strategist and cryptocurrency specialist Nikolaos Panigirtzoglou, who argued that Bitcoin’s failure to move decisively above $60,000 would generate bearish signals and encourage further position unwinding, contributing to the preceding week’s correction. He regarded the recent boom-and-bust dynamics as a setback for institutional adoption, especially for Bitcoin and Ethereum. Greater volatility relative to gold, he argued, reduced the attraction of “digital gold” compared with traditional gold in institutional portfolios.
June 3, 2021. RT en Español reports that Russia planned to remove the dollar from the reserves of its National Wealth Fund within one month, replacing approximately $40 billion with gold and other currencies to reduce exposure to US sanctions (RT en Español, 2021e).
There appears to be a substantial divide between academic discourse and central bank practice on this issue. In academia, orthodox or otherwise, the thesis that money has become entirely dematerialized and that gold has no monetary role predominates. Yet years and decades pass without central banks, at least in industrialized countries, disposing of their gold, while monetary policymakers continue to turn to the metal as an ultimate reserve of value. An academic inability to theorize gold’s continuing place in the modern monetary system persists.
III.II. On optimum currency area theory
III.II.I. General considerations
As Brown del Rivero (2018, p. 70) explains, optimum currency area (OCA) theory developed alongside European integration. Although the theory predates the European monetary system, its subsequent development accompanied that experience. Before the euro crisis, two stages could be distinguished: the first examined the conditions appropriate for establishing or joining a monetary union; the second examined its costs and benefits. The euro crisis revealed a third stage, exposing limitations and previously neglected issues. In this stage, a monetary union’s institutional design becomes critical. One major limitation concerns the magnitude and nature of asymmetric shocks and the suitability of the mechanisms proposed to offset them. Unanticipated problems included confidence crises arising from rapidly increasing fiscal burdens and governments’ lack of solvency, aggravated by losing the capacity to issue an autonomous currency. Another neglected issue was the absence of federal-level guarantees for bank deposits in affected countries.
III.II.II. Optimum currency area theory
III.II.II.I. Historical and theoretical stages of development
III.II.II.I.I. First stage
As Brown del Rivero (2018, pp. 73–75) explains, this stage emerged from the contributions of Mundell (1961, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018), McKinnon (1963, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018), and Kenen (1969, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018). They sought to establish the optimal conditions under which a country or group of countries should fix exchange rates against another currency or participate in a monetary union. International capital mobility was limited in the period under discussion, making the exchange rate a powerful instrument for adjusting external imbalances. The optimal conditions encompass the following dimensions:
Symmetry. The most important requirement for a currency area to function well is the absence of asymmetric shocks and asymmetric responses to external disturbances. For an asymmetric shock, such as an abrupt change in demand, GDP growth, unemployment, or inflation, to create a major problem, it must have a significant national macroeconomic impact. If its effects are concentrated in one industry or in a cross-border region, an exchange-rate adjustment is insufficient. Common policies or coordination among national policies are more effective in such circumstances. National and regional shocks should therefore be distinguished. National shocks presuppose substantial differences between economies and inter-industry trade. Regional shocks instead involve similar conditions and intra-industry trade. Exchange-rate adjustments can help mitigate national shocks, provided they do not produce proportional price movements, but are ineffective against regional shocks affecting two or more countries.
Price and wage flexibility. Once the exchange rate is lost as an adjustment instrument, flexibility in product and labor markets becomes particularly important because both can substitute for exchange-rate adjustment in correcting external imbalances. The more flexible prices and wages are, the faster relative prices realign and the smaller the adverse effects on employment and inflation.
Mobility of factors of production. Highly integrated factor markets, especially labor markets, reduce the need for real-price adjustments. Factor mobility substitutes for the exchange rate as a mechanism of external adjustment. Financial integration was expected to cushion temporary shocks through capital flows and reduce interest-rate differentials in the long run (Mundell, 1961, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018). As discussed below, however, it can also become a source of disturbance.
Fiscal integration. Kenen (1969, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018) emphasized the need for an interstate fiscal transfer system that redistributes resources toward countries or regions adversely affected by asymmetric shocks when exchange rates are unavailable as adjustment instruments. Alongside a common pool of fiscal resources, tax harmonization would be desirable, although it presents a substantial political obstacle.
Financial market integration. According to Ingram (1962, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018), this can reduce the need for exchange-rate adjustments. Capital inflows from surplus regions can temporarily cushion adverse conditions, while foreign assets can be run down as adjustment proceeds. With extensive financial integration, even modest interest-rate changes can balance capital movements among partner countries.
Economic openness. For McKinnon (1963, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018), relinquishing the exchange rate is not a major loss for countries highly open to international trade. The more open an economy, the greater the influence of tradable-goods prices on domestic prices and the less adjustment is required in other variables. Smaller economies tend to be more open and to benefit more from monetary union.
Diversification of production and consumption. Highly diversified production, consumption, exports, and imports reduce the effects of sector-specific disturbances. Diversification provides some insulation against these shocks and reduces the need to adjust the terms of trade through exchange-rate changes (Kenen, 1969, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018).
Similar inflation rates. Many balance-of-payments imbalances arise from differences in national inflation rates. The need to correct external-account imbalances is therefore smaller when inflation resembles that of partner countries. Similar price developments within a monetary union reduce changes in the terms of trade and the need for exchange-rate adjustment (Fleming, 1971, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018).
Political integration. Political will is fundamental to any monetary union. It entails sharing decisions and accepting rules adopted by supranational institutions even when they affect national interests. In Mintz’s (1970, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018) formulation, the principal, and perhaps only, real condition for establishing a monetary union is prospective members’ political willingness to integrate. Bordo and Jonung (1999, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018) and Bordo and James (2008, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018) reached similar conclusions after examining historical monetary unions.
III.II.II.I.II. Second stage
As Brown del Rivero (2018, p. 75) explains, OCA theory’s second stage emerged alongside greater international capital mobility after the breakdown of Bretton Woods. Corden (1972, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018), Mundell (1973, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018), and Ishiyama (1975, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018) focused on the costs and benefits of monetary union. Thereafter, costs were generally evaluated from a macroeconomic perspective, while benefits were analyzed through a microeconomic approach.
III.II.II.I.III. Third stage
As Brown del Rivero (2018) argues, the euro’s creation encouraged many investors to believe that investment risks in some southern European countries had disappeared. Large investments from Germany and other northern European countries into the Mediterranean region generated an economic boom and higher inflation in Spain, Greece, and Portugal than in Germany (Figures 3 and 4).
Note. Brown del Rivero (2018, p. 80). Figure 1 in the cited study.
Reconstructed in HTML and CSS. Approximate readings from the published figure; these are not the original series and are unsuitable for precise calculations.
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Table 4Approximate values · Foreign direct investment
Note. Brown del Rivero (2018, p. 80). Figure 2 in the cited study.
Reconstructed in HTML and CSS. Approximate readings from the published figure; these are not the original series and are unsuitable for precise calculations.
View approximate chart values
Table 5Approximate values · Inflation
Period
Germany
Greece
Spain
Portugal
2000
1.5
3
3.5
2.9
2001
2
3.8
2.8
4.4
2002
1.4
3.9
3.6
3.7
2003
1.1
3.5
3.1
3.3
2004
1.8
3.1
3
2.4
2005
1.9
3.5
3.5
2.3
2006
1.8
3.5
3.6
3.1
2007
2.3
3.1
2.8
2.4
2008
2.8
4.2
4.1
2.7
2009
0.2
1.4
-0.3
-0.8
2010
1.1
4.7
1.8
1.4
2011
2.5
3.3
3.1
3.6
2012
2.1
1.5
2.4
2.8
2013
1.6
-0.7
1.5
0.4
2014
0.8
-1.3
-0.2
-0.3
2015
0.3
-1.1
-0.5
0.5
These southern European countries accumulated substantial current-account deficits requiring external financing (Figure 5) (Brown del Rivero, 2018).
Note. Brown del Rivero (2018, p. 81). Figure 3 in the cited study.
Reconstructed in HTML and CSS. Approximate readings from the published figure; these are not the original series and are unsuitable for precise calculations.
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Table 6Approximate values · Current account
Period
Germany
Ireland
Greece
Spain
Italy
Portugal
2000
-1.8
0.5
0.2
-4.1
0.2
-10.7
2001
-0.3
0.6
0.6
-4.1
0.5
-10.2
2002
1.8
0.1
-6.8
-3.4
-0.1
-8.4
2003
1.3
0.5
-8.4
-3.5
-0.3
-7.1
2004
4.5
-0.2
-7.5
-5.1
-0.1
-8.1
2005
4.6
-3.4
-8.9
-6.8
-1
-9.8
2006
5.6
-5.3
-11.7
-8.8
-1.5
-10.5
2007
6.7
-6.6
-15.2
-9.5
-1.4
-9.3
2008
5.6
-6.5
-15.1
-9.2
-2.9
-12.1
2009
5.7
-4.8
-12.3
-4.3
-2
-10.3
2010
5.6
-1.6
-11.3
-3.6
-3.6
-10
2011
6.1
-2.1
-10
-3.1
-3
-6.2
2012
7
-2.4
-3.8
-0.6
-0.3
-2
2013
6.7
2.2
-2.1
1.6
1.3
0.8
2014
7.4
1.6
-1.7
1.3
1.8
0.1
2015
8.4
10.2
0.3
1.4
1.5
0.4
Contrary to what often occurs, these current-account deficits did not originate in equivalent public-finance imbalances (Figure 6), but in the volume and composition of incoming foreign direct investment (FDI) (Brown del Rivero, 2018).
Figure 6Government deficit% of GDP; signed balance
Note. Brown del Rivero (2018, p. 81). Figure 4 in the cited study.
Reconstructed in HTML and CSS. Approximate readings from the published figure; these are not the original series and are unsuitable for precise calculations.
View approximate chart values
Table 7Approximate values · Government deficit
Period
Germany
Ireland
Greece
Spain
Italy
Portugal
2000
1.5
5
-3.2
-1.3
-0.8
-3.5
2001
-3
1
-4.7
-0.8
-3.1
-4.8
2002
-3.2
0.1
-4.6
-0.5
-3
-3.2
2003
-3.8
-0.2
-5.6
-0.3
-3.5
-3.7
2004
-3.8
1.4
-7.4
-0.4
-3.5
-4
2005
-3.6
1.7
-5.4
1.1
-4.1
-5.8
2006
-1.7
2.8
-6
2.1
-3.5
-4.3
2007
0.2
0.1
-6.5
2
-1.5
-3
2008
0
-7.2
-9.9
-4.5
-2.7
-3.8
2009
-3.1
-13.5
-15
-11
-5.3
-9.8
2010
-5.1
-32
-12
-9.4
-4.3
-11.2
2011
-1
-13
-10.3
-9.6
-3.6
-7.4
2012
0.1
-8.3
-8.7
-10.5
-3
-5.7
2013
0
-6.1
-13.2
-7.2
-2.8
-4.8
2014
0.4
-3.6
-3.6
-6
-3
-7.2
2015
0.7
-1.8
-7.5
-5.3
-2.6
-4.4
2016
1
-0.7
-4
-4.5
-2.3
-2
Southern countries attracted a greater share of FDI into real estate (Figure 7) than into productive sectors, while the opposite occurred in northern countries. This changed the composition of capital stocks between tradable and nontradable sectors. Northern countries increased tradable-goods production, while southern countries increased nontradables. The former consequently improved their trade balances and current accounts, while the latter experienced deterioration. This is merely the accounting perspective, setting aside the geopolitical economy and the social tragedy that followed (Brown del Rivero, 2018).
Note. Brown del Rivero (2018, p. 82). Figure 5 in the cited study.
Reconstructed in HTML and CSS. Approximate readings from the published figure; these are not the original series and are unsuitable for precise calculations.
View approximate chart values
Table 8Approximate values · Annual change in house prices
Period
Germany
Ireland
Greece
Spain
Italy
Portugal
2000
0.2
14.5
15
9.5
5.2
5.2
2001
-1.6
13.2
4.5
15.3
11.6
0.5
2002
0.5
6.3
14.1
17.2
5.7
1.2
2003
-1.5
2.1
11.4
17
6
0.6
2004
1.2
9.8
9.8
14.1
7.5
2.7
2005
-0.5
10.5
12.1
13.3
6.1
2.2
2006
-2.3
15
13.3
10.5
4.4
1.7
2007
0.7
3.2
7.4
7.3
3.4
0.3
2008
-0.9
-9
-4
-2.1
-0.5
4.2
2009
-0.4
-19
-4.8
-6.6
0
-3.5
2010
0.6
-13.2
-5.2
-1.7
1.8
-3.7
2011
-2.8
-16
-10
-7.2
3.4
-5.5
2012
-5.4
-14.2
-11.6
-15
3.4
-7.2
2013
-5.7
3.3
-10.4
-9.9
3
-0.5
2014
-4
16.8
-7.1
-1.2
3.6
1.8
2015
-2.3
9.4
-5.2
3.1
4.7
3.9
Competitiveness diverged between 2000 and 2009. Effective exchange rates based on labor costs deteriorated considerably in Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece, as Figure 8 illustrates, while Germany’s position improved markedly. Divergent wage policies and differences in the implementation of the structural reform agenda agreed under the Lisbon Strategy contributed to this outcome (Brown del Rivero, 2018).
Note. Brown del Rivero (2018, p. 82). Figure 6 in the cited study.
Reconstructed in HTML and CSS. Approximate readings from the published figure; these are not the original series and are unsuitable for precise calculations.
Contrary to Frankel’s expectations, creating the euro thus became an asymmetric shock of unanticipated proportions. Its effects could be financed while private capital continued flowing into southern countries. Once those flows declined, prices and unit labor costs had risen well above those in Germany, the most competitive benchmark. Common policies and the instruments available to the European Central Bank were insufficient to correct the accumulated imbalances. Rather than promoting greater convergence, the euro’s creation produced the opposite result (Figure 9) (Brown del Rivero, 2018).
Note. Brown del Rivero (2018, p. 83). Figure 7 in the cited study.
Reconstructed in HTML and CSS. Approximate readings from the published figure; these are not the original series and are unsuitable for precise calculations.
View approximate chart values
Table 10Approximate values · Unit labor costs
Period
Germany
Ireland
Greece
Spain
Italy
Portugal
1999
1
2.8
1.8
3.5
1.8
2.8
2000
0.3
1.7
0.1
1.4
1.5
4.5
2001
-0.1
1.7
4.9
4
3.4
4.3
2002
0.8
8.8
1.4
3.1
3.9
2.1
2003
1.1
2
4.3
4
4.3
3.3
2004
-0.6
1.8
2
1.7
2.2
0.1
2005
-0.5
8.7
4.4
3.5
2.1
3.3
2006
-1.8
-0.8
3.2
3.3
2.2
0.9
2007
-0.5
6.1
6.2
3.4
1.9
0.8
2008
2
7.8
7.9
5.2
4.3
3.2
2009
6
-4.5
1
5.2
4.7
2.8
2010
-1
-9.3
0.1
-1.8
0.2
-1.5
2011
0.9
0.1
-1.3
-1.4
0.4
-2.2
2012
3.2
-2.2
-2.2
-2.1
1.5
-3.4
2013
1.8
-7
-7
-0.6
1.1
-0.6
2014
1.9
-3
-2.6
-0.6
0.2
-1.4
2015
1.6
-16.8
-2.3
-0.2
0.8
-0.6
III.II.III. The euro’s failure, rather than the ideal of integration
Consistent with Rafael Correa’s position on Ecuadorian dedollarization, IMF economic stabilization programs in some European Union countries contradict a lesson of practical experience: successful monetary integration requires sufficient fiscal freedom to protect countries against adverse circumstances and deep recessions. The IMF describes its advice as promoting stability, reducing crisis vulnerability, and encouraging sustained growth and high living standards (International Monetary Fund, 2016). Stiglitz[14] argues that rules must nevertheless be flexible enough to accommodate different circumstances, beliefs, and values. Europe recognizes this through subsidiarity, assigning public-policy responsibility to national rather than European institutions wherever possible. The EU budget amounts to only about 1% of its GDP, compared with US federal expenditure exceeding 20% of GDP, leaving direct EU expenditure relatively small. Yet power was centralized in the ECB, established in 1998, in monetary policy, an area crucial to employment and livelihoods. Strict limits on deficit spending denied countries sufficient flexibility over taxation and expenditure to address adverse circumstances and avoid deep recession (Stiglitz, 2016).
The argument goes further. Stiglitz observes that extensive economic literature asks what is required for countries to share a currency and prosper. Economists broadly agreed that sufficient similarities were necessary, although the relevant similarities remained debatable. What many Europeans, especially Germans, considered indispensable, namely fiscal prudence, low deficits, and low debt, was insufficient and perhaps not even necessary. These fiscal concerns became the “convergence criteria,” yet the euro’s design encouraged divergence. Adverse shocks allowed stronger countries to benefit at weaker countries’ expense, while deficit and debt limits relative to GDP reinforced the divergence. The eurozone’s structure encouraged people, particularly the most talented and educated, and capital to move from poorer, weaker economies to richer, stronger ones. Stronger countries could invest in better schools and infrastructure, while their banks could lend more, enabling entrepreneurship. Meanwhile, EU restrictions prevented lagging countries from implementing some policies that might have helped them catch up. Beyond solidarity rhetoric, Stiglitz describes a more divided Europe with fewer policy options for restoring prosperity (Stiglitz, 2016).
Monetary integration therefore also requires a common social policy, or at least coordination, and consequently a common budget or coordinated budget execution. These arrangements can help individual countries and the bloc pursue sustained growth and high living standards despite structural asymmetries. The United States is a successful example of monetary integration. As Correa argued, its fifty states either share a business cycle or seek to minimize imbalances through labor mobility. In practice, adjustment also depends on public policies that are generally federal and therefore common or coordinated. The public-policy needs, especially economic-policy needs, of less developed economies such as Portugal, Greece, or Spain differ significantly from those of more developed economies such as France or Germany.
In the eurozone, monetary policy is conducted by the European Central Bank. Its functions include setting the interest rates at which it lends to commercial banks, managing monetary conditions and inflation, managing foreign-exchange reserves and transactions, supporting the proper supervision of financial institutions and markets, safeguarding payment systems and banking soundness, authorizing euro banknote issuance, monitoring prices, and assessing risks to price stability (European Union, n.d.). Because monetary and fiscal policy are interdependent, controlling nominal variables through monetary policy also requires member countries to coordinate fiscal policies: nominal variables affect real variables in multiple ways. For example, inflation differentials reduced German costs relative to neighboring countries. Combined with technological asymmetries favoring Germany[15], this shifted trade advantages toward high-technology products. Leadership in such production requires the creative destruction discussed by Schumpeter, supported by substantial research and development. Monetary policy’s primary objective is price stability, yet inflation in industrialized economies such as Germany remained lower than in peripheral countries. Paul Krugman[16] suggested reversing this pattern to help save the euro. In economies such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal, limited systemic competitiveness combined with inflation-related competitiveness losses, revealing misaligned monetary-policy requirements, can restrict euro inflows. In an interview conducted by Xavier Sala i Martín[17], Krugman argued that combining higher inflation in the core than in the periphery with ECB intervention as lender of last resort could save the euro (Sala i Martín, 2012).
This conflict is longstanding. Discussing Greece’s crisis, Stiglitz argued that the debate over Greek public-debt restructuring illustrated Europe’s political crosscurrents, special interests, and shortsighted economic decisions. Germany insisted on substantial restructuring, involving creditor haircuts of at least 50%, while the ECB insisted that debt restructuring be voluntary (Stiglitz, 2012). Germany’s dominant influence within the eurozone is therefore unsurprising; one need only consider where the ECB is headquartered.
This explains the euro’s “chronicle of a death foretold”: the institutional architecture designed for monetary integration had embedded fundamental weaknesses before an optimum currency area had been established. The euro was born stillborn because of that architecture.
BBC News Mundo. (2020, July 2). Oro de Venezuela: Tribunal británico niega al gobierno de Maduro acceso al oro depositado en el Banco de Inglaterra por considerar a Guaidó el presidente [Venezuelan gold: British court denies Maduro’s government access to gold at the Bank of England, recognizing Guaidó as president]. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-53263887
Borisov, E. F., Zhamin, V. A., & Makarova, M. F. (2009). Diccionario de economía política [Dictionary of political economy] (L. H. Mijangos Juárez, Comp.). Grijalbo.
Brown del Rivero, A. (2018). La teoría de las áreas monetarias óptimas: Una actualización a la luz de la experiencia europea [Optimum currency area theory: An update in light of European experience]. Economía UNAM, 15(43), 70–87. https://doi.org/10.22201/fe.24488143e.2018.43.384
Greenspan, A. (1999, February 23). The Federal Reserve’s semiannual report on monetary policy [Testimony before the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs]. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/1999/february/testimony.htm
International Monetary Fund. (2000, June 26). Los regímenes cambiarios en el contexto de la creciente integración de la economía mundial [Exchange-rate regimes in an increasingly integrated world economy]. https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/esl/062600s.htm
Licandro, G., & Mello, M. (2018). Dolarización cultural y financiera de los hogares uruguayos [Cultural and financial dollarization of Uruguayan households]. In M. J. Roa & D. Mejía (Eds.), Decisiones financieras de los hogares e inclusión financiera: Evidencia para América Latina y el Caribe [Household financial decisions and financial inclusion: Evidence for Latin America and the Caribbean] (pp. 365–403). Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos. https://www.cemla.org/PDF/ic/ic-2016/ic-2016-11.pdf
Pichel, M. (2020, June 18). Oro de Venezuela: Por qué el Banco de Inglaterra retiene 31 toneladas de lingotes del país sudamericano (y cuál es la pelea política y judicial que genera) [Venezuelan gold: Why the Bank of England holds 31 tonnes of bullion and the political and legal dispute it creates]. BBC News Mundo. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-53078808
The dictionary edition cited as 2009 retains the pagination used in the essay. Makarova’s coauthorship has been restored, but the complete copy of that compilation could not be checked. The historical Mora Lleonart (2019) and Pedraza (2019) links did not yield the documents, so their metadata is retained from the available bibliographic information. Banton refers to the consulted 2026 update. The Bujarin passage was checked against the 1972 Spanish translation. The research-and-development figures in Note 15 still lack an identifiable source and reference year.
Original-language titles are retained, with English translations in brackets where applicable. Passages translated by the author are treated as paraphrases rather than verbatim English quotations; secondary citations identify the work through which an earlier argument was consulted.
Notes
[1] For a general understanding of the operational implications, see Nabi (2021).
[2] Further discussion appears in the section on gold’s role in the contemporary monetary system.
[3] The usefulness of a thing: its capacity to satisfy a human or social need of any kind.
[4] Producers’ social labor materialized in commodities.
[6] Labor considered as the performance of a specific technical task, producing use-value. For example, a carpenter makes chairs so that people can sit on them.
[7] Labor considered as the objective crystallization of human physical and mental expenditure, producing exchange-value, whose monetary expression is price.
[8] As Banton (2026) explains, path dependence describes continued use of a product or practice on the basis of historical preferences or previous use. A firm may retain a product or practice even when newer, more efficient alternatives exist. Continuing along an established path is often easier or more profitable than creating a new one. Scholars discuss path dependence within historical institutionalism in political science: institutions may change less than expected and constrain subsequent development. Legislators make assumptions and consequential decisions and do not necessarily learn from experience. Path dependence may also result from an inability or reluctance to change because of the costs involved. A town built around a factory illustrates the concept. Ideally, the factory might be located at some distance from housing, but factories are often built first, followed by nearby workers’ homes and services. Relocating an established factory can be prohibitively costly even when an outlying location would be preferable for the community. Cultural factors also plainly play an important role.
[9] Dutch disease refers to adverse economic effects arising from a substantial increase in a country’s foreign-currency income. The term emerged in the 1960s when Dutch foreign-exchange earnings increased following the discovery of large natural-gas deposits at Slochteren near the North Sea. Increased inflows appreciated the guilder and weakened the competitiveness of other exports. The phenomenon need not follow a resource discovery: it can arise from any large foreign-currency inflow, including higher commodity prices, foreign assistance, or foreign direct investment (“Mal neerlandés,” n.d.).
[10] This means encouraging exports of primary products, such as agricultural goods, and imports of manufactured products. The essay argues that dollar use makes manufactured imports cheaper than under a lower-valued domestic currency, while exports become less competitive because foreign buyers using other currencies face higher prices for goods from the dollarized economy, here Ecuador. Oil is treated separately because it is priced in dollars. The term petrodollars refers to dollar earnings and reserves obtained by oil-producing countries through crude-oil sales.
[11] Negative expanded reproduction involves the physical destruction and degradation of elements of production, the disruption of their connections, and the reorganization of productive forces toward unproductive consumption. Bujarin (1920/1972, p. 26) characterizes this process as increasing underproduction, distinct from both expanded and simple reproduction.
[12] Alan Greenspan, born in New York on March 6, 1926, is a US economist who chaired the Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006. He earned a bachelor’s degree in economics in 1948, a master’s degree in 1950, and a doctorate in economics in 1977, all from New York University.
[13] James B. Rogers Jr. is a US investor and financial commentator who co-founded the Quantum Fund and Soros Fund Management with George Soros. He has also taught at college level, written books, and created the Rogers International Commodity Index (RICI). The biographical account used in the essay places him in Singapore as chairman of Rogers Holdings and Beeland Interests, Inc.
[14] Joseph Eugene Stiglitz is a US economist and professor. He received the John Bates Clark Medal and the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, commonly called the Nobel Prize in Economics. The economics prize was not established by Alfred Nobel; it was created in 1968 on the initiative of Sweden’s central bank, is administered by the Nobel Foundation, and is awarded by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. Stiglitz has also been associated with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and is a member of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences. He served as World Bank chief economist and senior vice president and chaired the Council of Economic Advisers during the Clinton administration.
[15] The essay reports research-and-development expenditure of €12,820.756 million in Spain, €1,488.74 million in Greece, and €2,229.134 million in Portugal, compared with €48,107.8 million in France and €83,636.5 million in Germany. The citation attached to these figures is unresolved, and the reference year is not specified.
[16] Paul Robin Krugman is a US economist. The biographical account used in the essay lists associations with Princeton University, the London School of Economics and Political Science, the Luxembourg Income Study at the CUNY Graduate Center, and The New York Times as an opinion columnist. He received the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, commonly called the Nobel Prize in Economics. This prize was not established by Alfred Nobel; it was created in 1968 on the initiative of Sweden’s central bank, is administered by the Nobel Foundation, and is awarded by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences.
[17] Xavier Sala i Martín, born in Cabrera de Mar, Barcelona, on June 17, 1962, is a Spanish-born US economist and public commentator associated with Columbia University and known for research on economic growth. He has advanced economic arguments in favor of Catalan independence and has defended globalization. Vicenç Navarro described him as one of the most visible and outspoken representatives of neoliberal thought in Spain (“Xavier Sala i Martín,” n.d.).
Debates at IIPPE 2021: value, uneven development and structural determinations of essence
JOSÉ MAURICIO GÓMEZ JULIÁN
Original publication: September 30, 2021 Revised and expanded edition: November 2, 2026
GDP in constant 2010 dollars Comparison across economies. Source shown in the graph: World Bank and OECD.
Introduction: a controversy over relations, mechanisms and measurements
Imperialism poses a problem that cannot be resolved by listing powerful countries. It requires an investigation of how the relations that enable particular capitals to appropriate surplus labour generated in other territories are produced and reproduced. Technology, wages, ownership, credit and state power participate in that reproduction, but their roles cannot be established through a single label.
IIPPE—the International Initiative for Promoting Political Economy—is a pluralistic forum for critical research. Its name refers to political economy, a field of inquiry, rather than exclusively to economic policy, understood as public intervention. [1]
Michael Roberts’s review, published in September 2021, provides the documentary starting point. It connects imperialism, China, financialisation and interest, adding a Colombian study that was not presented at the conference. Our purpose is to reconstruct the underlying problems, examine their mediations and clarify the differences between hypotheses, measurements and conclusions. [2]
Three questions guide the essay: Which social relation is being explained? What mechanism is proposed, and under what conditions? Which observation could test it? Convergent findings can strengthen an interpretation without automatically making the models that generate them equivalent.
I. Background: from finance capital to unequal exchange
A genealogy that neither begins nor ends with one author
Hilferding published Finance Capital in 1910; Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital in 1913. Bukharin investigated the internationalisation of capital and its articulation with states; Lenin wrote Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism in 1916, and the book appeared in 1917. Their contributions constitute a historical controversy, not interchangeable stages of a homogeneous theory. [3, 4, 5, 6]
To study this controversy, it is useful to distinguish corporate concentration, the articulation of banking and industry, capital exports, problems of reproduction and interstate rivalry. An author can illuminate one relation without providing a complete explanation of all the others. Lenin’s centrality does not require attributing absolute priority to him over every Marxist investigation of the world economy.
Emmanuel shifted the discussion towards international wage differences and prices of production. His formulations of 1962 must be distinguished from the French book of 1969 and its English edition of 1972. His proposal integrates international exchange into an inquiry into value and the worldwide distribution of surplus. [7]
Emmanuel: economic assumptions and political implications
In his characteristic formulation, capital mobility and restrictions on labour mobility make it possible to examine a tendency towards equal profit rates alongside persistent wage differences. The question is how these assumptions affect international prices and the distribution of social labour. [7]
Evaluating the argument requires making the time horizon, degrees of mobility, wage determination and price formation explicit. Altering an assumption may alter the conclusion. This does not invalidate modelling: it specifies the explanation’s domain.
The implications for international solidarity deserve their own discussion. A relative distributive advantage for some workers does not automatically turn them into owners of the means of production or eliminate their antagonisms with capital. Conversely, acknowledging exploitation within each country does not require denying international hierarchies. Class position and territorial insertion must be examined together.
Explaining Emmanuel’s reception exclusively through political convenience would replace investigation with imputation. Both political conflicts and theoretical disagreements are recognised here. Controversial attributions—for example, that an author treats capital as an autonomous source of value—require precise passages and contexts; they do not follow from the use of simultaneous equations.
II. Value, surplus value and transfers: distinctions that explain
Production and appropriation are different processes
In Marx’s theory, value concerns socially necessary abstract labour, rather than any individually clocked expenditure of effort. The formation of a general profit rate and prices of production makes it possible to investigate differences between the surplus produced by a capital and the surplus it ultimately appropriates. [8, 9]
For an introductory scheme, assume one turnover and that all the constant capital considered is consumed during the period:
W = c + v + s
Here c is the value of consumed means of production transferred to the product; v, variable capital advanced for labour power; and s, surplus value. The expression organises theoretical categories. Estimation requires deciding which observations represent each term and how labour magnitudes are translated into monetary magnitudes.
e = s / v · r = s / (C + V)
The surplus value rate relates the surplus to variable capital. The profit rate relates a flow of profit per period to the relevant total capital advanced, C + V; this must not be confused without justification with consumed costs, c + v. The rates are comparable only when periods, turnover and valuation conventions are aligned.
A teaching example of redistribution
Consider two capitals of 100 units each, with one turnover, full consumption of constant capital and a surplus value rate of 100%. A uses 70 units of constant and 30 of variable capital; B uses 40 and 60. Their surplus values are 30 and 60. Total surplus value is 90, and the hypothetical average profit rate is 90/200 = 45%. If each realises 45 in profit, A appropriates 15 more than it produced and B appropriates 15 less.
This is a teaching construction, neither a historical estimate nor a universal solution to the transformation problem. Costs are held given to isolate the mechanism; a complete system must also explain input prices. Redistribution does not create the 90 units of surplus value: it changes their appropriation.
What zero-sum means—and what it does not
If Tᵢ denotes a net transfer within an accounting universe that is closed and uses the same unit of valuation, then:
Σᵢ Tᵢ = 0
This identity concerns the distribution of a given magnitude. It does not imply that every economic interaction or expanded reproduction is zero-sum. Production can generate new value; transfers redistribute its appropriation. If the data do not sum to zero, coverage, valuation and statistical discrepancies must be examined before the residual becomes a theoretical conclusion.
Material welfare, the quantity of use values and the magnitude of value must also be distinguished. Productivity gains can increase available goods without proportionately increasing value per unit. “Benefiting from trade” and “appropriating a net transfer of value” are different questions.
III. One concrete essence and multiple structural determinations
Components, common essence and material totality
The components of a totality, represented through equations articulated within a system, may share determinations of a common essence that makes their unity and differences intelligible. This essence is expressed through set-theoretic, topological, differentiable, metric, operational, and historical and dynamical determinations: each makes particular constitutive relations available for investigation. When a correspondence preserves the relations of a defined structure, an isomorphism can be established at that level; equivalence in one determination can coexist with differences in others.
The articulation of components admits an integrodifferential representation when the problem requires rates of change, distributed effects or accumulated memory. Under determinate initial conditions and constraints, interactions constitute an internal structure of a material nature: objective through the efficacy of its relations, dynamic through its reproduction and transformation, and nonlinear where its functional dependencies have that property. The coherence of this articulation includes the compatibility of its relations and equations alongside antagonisms and tensions that can drive its development.
The totality’s structure, generated through component activity, in turn conditions those components’ possibilities of existence, reproduction and transformation. System composition and structural conditioning form a reciprocal relation: interactions produce organisation, and organisation modifies the conditions under which those interactions continue. Emergent properties are explained through this articulation rather than a simple inventory of isolated components.
The laws guiding the investigation of this genesis and reproduction acquire a generalised realisation within a totality with new mediations. The unity and struggle of opposites allows investigation of the constitution and transformation of antagonistic relations and their processes of emergence and self-organisation; the transformation of quantity into quality concerns regime changes, which can be formalised through bifurcations in particular models; and the negation of the negation examines reorganisations preserving and transforming previous determinations. Chemical synthesis provides a concrete example of material reorganisation and the emergence of properties. These connections are developed by specifying mechanisms and conditions: a general dialectical law does not by itself impose an identical functional form, a bifurcation or self-organised criticality on every system.
Integrodifferential composition and reciprocal conditioning
Representing a component through an equation means selecting variables and relations relevant to the problem. Representing the totality must additionally incorporate couplings between components and the restrictions imposed by their organisation. Integration can capture distributed or accumulated effects; differentiation can describe rates of change. Their articulation expresses a concrete possibility for formalising the thesis.
In a domain where differentiable evolution is an appropriate description, reciprocal conditioning can be schematised as follows:
x(t) collects the component states; S(t) represents organisational variables or structural constraints; Ht, the relevant history up to that moment; and θi and Θ, model parameters. The first equation expresses how component behaviour depends on the organised totality. The second expresses how that organisation is reproduced or transformed through component activity. Both must satisfy compatible initial conditions and constraints.
Where accumulated memory needs representation, an integral contribution can be added:
mi(t) = ∫0t Ki(t, τ) Qi(x(τ), S(τ)) dτ
Qi represents the contribution of earlier interactions and Ki their present weighting. This formulation allows investigation of how different histories can modify current possibilities. It is a modelling scheme requiring functions, units and observations to be defined for each application; it does not assert that every system must take this specific form.
The structure is material and objective insofar as the represented relations are effective in the object and do not depend on the investigator’s will. The objectivity of a relation and the adequacy of its mathematical representation are connected but distinguishable questions. Structural reproduction can constrain particular actions while those same actions contribute to sustaining or altering it.
Emergence, nonlinearity and generalised lawfulness
The totality contains relations and capacities that cannot be explained by listing isolated components. Explanation requires investigating their organisation and interactions. A dynamics is nonlinear when its functional dependencies do not satisfy the relevant linearity property; couplings can supply concrete mechanisms for this nonlinearity. Explaining the difference between a totality and the sum of its parts requires identifying these organisational relations.
Generalised lawfulness retains the relation between the system’s genesis and reproduction conditions. The processes constituting a structure subsequently operate within an organisation that modifies their scale, mediations and effects. Continuity of lawfulness can coexist with a transformation of its concrete form of realisation. Sharing general principles does not require using an identical equation at every scale.
In the problem of imperialism, capitals participate in general valorisation relations while their worldwide articulation configures production chains, monetary hierarchies and access to technology and credit. These structural relations condition particular capitals’ reproduction, while those capitals reproduce them through investment, production and appropriation. Moving from the national to the international requires investigating this reciprocity and its historical mediations.
The following layered table specifies the determinations of this articulation; section IV develops the three dialectical laws orienting its interpretation.
What a layered interpretation contributes
Essence can be interpreted as the articulation of constitutive relations that makes an object’s identity and reproduction intelligible. Understanding it requires abstractions, but no single abstraction necessarily exhausts that articulation. Mathematics can specify particular relations; the correspondence between formalism and object requires additional justification.
Interpreting essence as an articulation of structural determinations makes it possible to distinguish the following levels. [10]
Determination
Structural question
Possible formalisation and scope
Set-theoretic
Which elements or states are distinguished?
A set and correspondences; a bijection preserves cardinality, not every additional relation.
Topological
What continuity, neighbourhood and connectedness exist?
A topology; homeomorphisms preserve its structure.
Differentiable
Which smooth variations can be described?
A smooth structure; diffeomorphisms compare that structure.
Metric
How are lengths or distances quantified?
An appropriate metric; isometries preserve the corresponding geometry.
Operational
Which transformations preserve selected relations?
Automorphisms and group actions; Lie groups apply in cases with a compatible smooth structure.
Historical and dynamical
How was the system constituted, and which transitions does it admit?
Evolutions, path constraints and categories of transitions; irreversible histories do not reduce to invertible symmetries.
These layers are articulated determinations of a concrete essence, not six independent substances. Their selection depends on the object. A trade network does not automatically possess a manifold’s topology; an economic inequality does not by itself constitute a mathematical distance. States, relations and observation procedures must be defined in each case.
Adding structure and preserving structure
Equipping a set with a topology differs from establishing a homeomorphism between spaces. Transformations should therefore not be drawn as if they independently created the next level’s structure. For a smooth manifold M with Riemannian metric g, transformations of the object satisfy:
Isom(M, g) ⊆ Diff(M) ⊆ Homeo(M) ⊆ Bij(M)
Preserving the metric imposes additional conditions beyond preserving only differentiable structure; preserving the latter imposes additional conditions beyond topological equivalence. The inclusions are not asserted to be universally strict. Moreover, not every topology admits a smooth manifold structure, and this chain does not classify all mathematical structures.
The same underlying space can admit different geometries
On the upper half-plane U = {(x,y): y > 0}, compare:
gE = dx² + dy² · gH = (dx² + dy²) / y²
The set, usual topology and smooth structure coincide. Gaussian curvature differs: K = 0 for gE and K = −1 for gH. No isometry exists between these geometries. Topological equivalence does not decide metric equivalence.[11]
Curvature does not prevent a global metric from existing. Under the usual assumptions—a smooth, Hausdorff, second-countable manifold—Riemannian metrics can be constructed using partitions of unity. A global metric differs from a global chart, a constant matrix in every coordinate system or a globally Euclidean geometry. [11]
Invariance, identity and historical transformation
An invariant is always relative to a class of transformations. Remaining unchanged under coordinate changes, under isometries or during physical evolution are different properties. Knowing an abstract symmetry group is also insufficient to reconstruct uniquely every structure admitting it.
“Operational essence” can designate the restrictions delimiting particular structurally admissible transformations. This does not identify every change that leaves a system recognisable with an exact symmetry. An organism or an economy can persist through dissipative processes that do not preserve a metric.
For irreversible transitions, a category or semigroup may be more suitable than a group. A groupoid permits partial composition and multiple objects, but requires invertible morphisms: having additional objects does not itself introduce irreversibility. Noether’s connection between symmetry and conservation requires variational dynamics and the corresponding assumptions. [12]
From the national to the international scale
The persistence of wage labour, surplus appropriation and competition between capitals makes common relations across scales a legitimate research question. Currencies, borders, jurisdictions, intellectual property and migration restrictions nevertheless introduce specific mediations. An international structure cannot be obtained merely by multiplying a national structure.
Establishing an isomorphism would require defining the compared structures and constructing a correspondence that preserves their relations. Many applications instead involve aggregations, projections or partial correspondences. Sharing a general law does not prove that components are mutually isomorphic, or that each is isomorphic to the whole.
This qualification retains a decisive dialectical insight: general relations are realised under concrete conditions and can acquire new determinations within a more complex totality. Investigating that articulation requires specifying what is preserved, what emerges and what ceases to be equivalent.
IV. Dialectics, complexity and time: connections with conditions
The three dialectical laws in the constitution and transformation of the totality
The constitution and transformation of the totality are examined through three laws: unity and struggle of opposites, transformation of quantity into quality, and negation of the negation. Their function in this essay is to guide a reconstruction of the material totality’s genesis, reproduction and transformation. Each proposed mathematical relation must show which aspect of this reconstruction it expresses.
1. Unity and struggle of opposites. The terms of a contradictory relation presuppose and condition one another within an organisation, while their tendencies can oppose one another. Inquiry must explain both the reproduction of this unity and the tensions transforming it. In the capital–labour relation, for example, capital’s reproduction presupposes wage labour, but surplus appropriation places participants in antagonistic positions over its distribution and control. The totality is constituted through these relations and imposes conditions on their realisation.
The reference to emergence and self-organisation opens a positive question: how do interactions produce an order which subsequently regulates its own reproduction conditions? A model can investigate feedback and emergent constraints to address it. If self-organised criticality is additionally proposed, the mechanism and properties warranting that specific concept must be identified. The analysis of reciprocal organisation thus connects philosophical explanation with a defined research requirement.
2. Transformation of quantity into quality. Accumulated variations can modify a system’s organisation and possibilities until a different regime is constituted. The problem is to investigate what accumulates, which relations mediate that accumulation and when the relevant quality changes. A bifurcation represents this passage when parameter variation changes a dynamics’ qualitative structure. In political economy, a hypothesis about concentration and market power must establish how changes in magnitude reorganise relations between capitals; accumulating figures alone does not demonstrate that change.
3. Negation of the negation. Transformation can supersede an organisational form through processes which that form itself helped generate. The new organisation preserves determinations of the preceding process while transforming their articulation. This perspective investigates historical continuity within qualitative discontinuity: which relations are displaced, which are preserved and in which new configuration they reappear. It does not assume that every trajectory necessarily advances towards a favourable outcome or repeats an identical cycle.
Chemical synthesis illustrates material reorganisation and the emergence of a compound’s properties. Extending this to a general dialectical law requires explaining the mediations and meaning of the negations in the investigated process. The connection requires determining which relations and processes warrant generalising from each example.
The three laws are articulated within the argument: contradictory relations constitute a unity, variations can transform its organisation, and transformation incorporates a history preserving and modifying previous determinations. Integrodifferential modelling and the layers of essence make particular aspects of this articulation available for investigation.
Scope of the mathematical correspondences
The unity and struggle of opposites directs attention to antagonistic relations; it does not by itself imply that a model exhibits self-organised criticality. The latter requires a dynamical definition and evidence of its properties. Similarly, emergence and non-additivity are insufficient to demonstrate mathematical nonlinearity: the relevant equations, operations or functional relations must be identified.
A bifurcation provides one possible formalisation of particular qualitative changes when dynamics change regime as a parameter varies. Not every qualitative change is a bifurcation in the technical sense. Chemical synthesis can illustrate concrete transformations; identifying it with the negation of the negation would require an independent argument.
Self-similarity likewise does not follow from the existence of relations between parts and a whole. It can be exact, approximate or statistical and must be established through a defined scaling transformation. Dialectical inquiry gains precision when mathematical connections become testable problems.
Temporality and simultaneity in the transformation problem
One axis of Marxist debate contrasts simultaneous valuation of inputs and outputs with interpretations that distinguish moments of valuation. It matters, but does not exhaust the classification of schools. Relations between value and price systems, money, reproduction and distributive closure also matter.
Simultaneous equations can represent conditions within a period or states of a dynamic process; they do not automatically deny time’s existence. A temporal formulation does not become historically adequate merely by introducing a subscript t. It must explain what is inherited, what changes and how periods are connected.
The MELT—monetary expression of labour time—connects labour and monetary magnitudes under a chosen formulation. Its definition, units and valuation date must be declared. Labour hours and money cannot be added as a homogeneous magnitude without such mediation.
Differences between models demand more than observing different numerical results. They require comparison with relevant data, explicit closures and assumptions. Not every methodological controversy has an immediate empirical resolution, nor does comparison with other philosophies of statistics settle this debate by itself.
V. Unequal exchange: theories, indicators and evidence
A map of mechanisms
Approach
Explanatory focus
Question requiring examination
Emmanuel
Wage differences and international price formation under mobility assumptions.
How do results change with mobility, wages and model closure?
Carchedi–Roberts
Transfers estimated through capital composition, surplus value and production prices.
How are theoretical categories translated into national accounts and export sectors?
John Smith
Super-exploitation and the international organisation of production.
How are labour-power reproduction and the location of appropriation observed?
Andrea Ricci
Unequal-exchange measurement and international productive structure.
Which monetary conversions and sectoral aggregations make labour comparable?
Cogliano–Veneziani–Yoshihara
International exploitation, endowments and credit markets in a calibrated model.
What depends on the index’s definition, and what on mechanisms of persistence?
This table proposes reading questions; it does not equate different mechanisms. Indicators classifying some countries similarly may differ in their measured object and causal explanation. [7, 13, 14, 15, 16]
Carchedi–Roberts: measurement and decomposition
The 2021 presentation estimates trade transfers separately from primary income. Its comparison of methods records $600 billion for 2019, equivalent to 1.3% of reference GDP, and $600 billion in primary income for 2017, equivalent to 1.4%. The graph uses each bloc’s own denominator; it is not a homogeneous time series of one combined sum. [13], slides 16–17
Figure 1. Unequal exchange as a share of each bloc’s GDP, 1950–2019. Carchedi–Roberts, 2021 presentation. IC-GDP: imperialist bloc; DC-GDP: dominated bloc. Denominators differ. Series expressed as percentages of each bloc’s GDP.
The positive and negative lines need not have equal percentage magnitudes: the same flow can be divided by different GDPs. Nor should they automatically be equated with the rounded 1.5% in the 2021 account. Reproducing the calculation requires specifying the estimation procedure, year and denominator.
Figure 2. Relative contributions of OCC and RSV to unequal exchange, 1950–2019. Carchedi–Roberts. OCC: organic composition of capital; RSV: rate of surplus value. Shares in a model decomposition, not growth rates.
The decomposition between OCC—organic composition of capital—and RSV—rate of surplus value—belongs to the model. A rising relative contribution does not necessarily mean that the other factor’s absolute contribution is falling. Organic composition is not a direct, universal measure of technological superiority: its relation to productivity depends on techniques, wages, prices and sectoral composition.
Super-exploitation: production organisation and appropriation
Smith emphasises working conditions and wages in global production, challenging the identification of where value is generated with where national accounts record its appropriation. His linked study makes it possible to examine the objection without reducing it to terminology. [14]
The disagreement requires distinguishing criticism of an indicator from denial of all unequal exchange. It also requires avoiding identification of the immediate employer with the sole beneficiary without studying contractual and ownership relations. Subcontracting, commercial control and ownership can articulate successive appropriations. Evaluation must follow the chain and its concrete conditions.
Ricci: transfers per person and units of comparison
Figure 3. Annual transfers per person and percentages by period, 1995–2019. Ricci (2022), table 2. Current dollars and period-average percentages; accessible transcription below.
The figure distinguishes annual amounts per person in current dollars for 1995, 2007 and 2019, and percentage columns for 1995–2019, 1995–2007 and 2007–2019. These percentages must not be presented as growth rates, or the last monetary column mechanically paired with a single annual percentage. [15, 27]
Transcription of figure 3; checked against Ricci (2022), table 2. Positive signs: inflows; negative signs: outflows. Groupings follow the source.
Region
USD/person 1995
USD/person 2007
USD/person 2019
Mean % 95–19
Mean % 95–07
Mean % 07–19
North America
761
1965
2680
3.9
3.7
4.1
EMU
1720
4939
4836
10.3
8.5
12.2
West Europe
2429
7531
6921
12.7
10.6
14.8
East Asia
1984
1766
2540
5.8
5.9
5.7
Oceania
526
2626
3638
7.1
4.5
9.8
China
−196
−810
−426
−14.1
−19.0
−10.0
Russia
−767
−1108
−1850
−29.7
−40.9
−17.2
East Europe
−901
−615
−1309
−14.7
−18.9
−9.9
South America
−269
−472
−490
−6.1
−8.4
−3.9
Central America
−471
−379
−454
−11.9
−13.6
−9.8
Middle East
−1443
−1502
−950
−18.9
−24.8
−12.8
South Asia
−77
−220
−351
−21.5
−20.2
−23.0
Southeast Asia
−463
−1350
−1631
−46.8
−53.9
−40.3
Central Asia
−272
−380
−924
−11.9
−13.6
−9.8
North Africa
−426
−1099
−1034
−30.7
−31.6
−30.4
S. Sahara Africa
−65
−120
−132
−10.0
−11.6
−8.3
In particular, South Asia must not be renamed India; East Asia is not simply Japan; and South America and Central America are not one regional observation. The table reports regions, not individual findings for each country.
In Global locational inequality (2022), table 2 shows that percentages are period averages and monetary amounts are nominal dollars. EMU denotes the European monetary union bloc in that classification. Its regions also need not coincide with states: “China” incorporates Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan in this statistical aggregation; “Russia” includes other countries, and “Central America” includes Mexico and the Caribbean. These groupings follow Ricci’s statistical classification. Findings must be interpreted according to that territorial coverage. [27]
An international index is not the axiomatic article
Figure 4. Exploiter and exploited countries: basic economy. Exploitation intensity index and wealth per person. Cogliano–Veneziani–Yoshihara’s international model differs from Yoshihara–Veneziani’s axiomatic foundations.
Yoshihara and Veneziani’s article (2018) examines exploitation’s axiomatic foundations. The Dynamics of International Exploitation by Cogliano, Veneziani and Yoshihara (2022) develops a model of international exploitation. Its basic economy assigns China an index of 0.9935: just on the exploiting side of the threshold 1, with the authors advising against a definite conclusion. [16, 17]
The graph relates exploitation classification to wealth per person in a basic economy. An index close to the threshold requires sensitivity analysis. Partial agreement with other studies must not erase classification differences.
VI. China: three questions that must be distinguished
Transfers, mode of production and international power
Roberts’s presentation When did China become capitalist? argues for a trapped transitional economy: it emphasises state direction and planned investment while acknowledging the law of value’s operation. The argument is documented as a position held in 2021, not a classification accepted by all authors. [18]
Dimension
Object of investigation
Relevant evidence
International transfers
Net appropriation under an indicator and period.
Trade, production, primary income, conversion assumptions and sensitivity.
Socioeconomic organisation
Ownership, control, labour and surplus allocation.
Corporate governance, investment decisions, labour discipline, planning and markets.
Imperialist power
International domination and the reproduction of hierarchies.
Credit, monopolies, coercion, institutions, foreign policy and military capacity.
Being a net recipient under an indicator does not by itself establish comprehensive imperialist domination; being a net donor does not exclude relations subordinating third parties. Scale matters: different positions may coexist across sectors, firms, partners and territories.
Sam King examines monopoly over technologically complex activities as a mechanism reproducing international hierarchy. His 2021 book, Imperialism and the Development Myth, frames the question of productive upgrading and its limits. [19]
The review also records Walter Daum’s political objection and different positions from Dic Lo and Cheng Enfu. These interventions are acknowledged as disagreements without attributing to them a demonstration that the review does not provide. [2]
What a growth trajectory cannot decide
Growth, poverty reduction and the capacity to sustain investment require explanation. They do not by themselves identify a mode of production. Connecting them causally with an ownership form would require mechanisms, comparators, periodisation and external conditions; a favourable outcome is insufficient to identify its cause.
It would also be circular to declare that every capitalist economy must reproduce precisely one crisis trajectory and exclude any differing case from the category. A theory must specify tendencies, mediations and conditions, and admit observations capable of challenging its scope.
Dates are decisive. A productivity comparison using aggregate data preceding 2021 does not authorise indefinite descriptions of every Chinese industry as technologically backward. Each conclusion’s scope depends on its period, sectoral disaggregation and supporting sources.
VII. Financialisation: specify the hypothesis before rejecting it
One term, several objects
Research can examine finance’s share of value added, credit expansion, household indebtedness, financial income of nonfinancial firms or shareholder power. Each dimension needs its own indicators. None automatically substitutes for every other dimension.
Mavroudeas challenges finance’s independence from productive accumulation. Rabinovich specifically examines the financial rentierisation hypothesis for US nonfinancial corporations, finding that asset and income composition require a more differentiated interpretation. These arguments have different scopes. [20, 21]
Methodologically, a declining sectoral share can coexist with increasing absolute size. An average can conceal corporate concentration. Changes in value added do not directly equal changes in assets, credit or institutional power. Indicator selection must answer a hypothesis defined in advance.
What the percentages 51.2% and 65.9% measure
This distinction changes the evidence’s meaning. Counting countries measures how widespread a sign of change is; it does not measure the aggregate magnitude of that change or automatically weight countries by economic size. The chosen time window also matters for detecting earlier expansion.
Concluding that financialisation explains deindustrialisation requires temporality, mechanisms and alternative variables. An association between sectoral shares does not itself identify causality. Conversely, rejecting an exclusively financial explanation of crises does not eliminate the roles of credit, collateral and liquidity in their transmission.
VIII. Interest and profitability: structural relations and statistical tests
Interest as distribution and as a price
Marx investigates interest as part of profit and examines its division between lender and functioning capitalist. This distributive restriction does not establish a mechanical equality between interest and profit rates at every moment. The analysis itself allows exceptions and distinguishes determinants of fluctuations. [23]
A concrete explanation must specify whether nominal or real magnitudes, expected or realised rates, and equivalent maturities are being compared. Contractual interest can temporarily exceed realised profitability, resulting in losses or default. Two declining trends are insufficient to identify a unique causal relation.
Stravelakis: what the “60%” represents
Nikos Stravelakis’s presentation uses the incremental rate of profit, IROP = ΔPr / I, examining its difference from interest. Slide 7 reports a normalised mutual-information-based measure around 0.606 for 1962–2019. This is not an R² explaining 60% of interest-rate variance, and the statistic alone does not identify causality. [24]
ΔPr is the change in profit, and I is investment as defined in the study. Their ratio depends on the period and does not by definition coincide with the average rate on the capital stock. A statistic’s economic content depends on the variables it relates and how they were constructed.
Roberts reports an observation by Karl Beitel concerning profitability trends and bond yields. The association requires examining the series, definitions and estimation procedure before using it as causal evidence. [2]
IX. Colombia, 1967–2019: evidence with a defined scope
Figure 5. Growth, profit rate and accumulation in Colombia, 1967–2019. Duque García (2021), figure 2. Growth and profit rate: left axis. Accumulation rate: right axis. Vertical lines delimit historical periods.
Carlos Alberto Duque García’s document investigates growth, accumulation and the profit rate using a VAR with generalised impulse responses. It uses 53 annual observations and warns about sample size. Its evidence bears on the Marxian models examined, but does not independently prove a universal law or identify a structural causal effect without further assumptions. [25]
The graph uses different scales: growth and profitability on the left axis, accumulation on the right. Comparing visual heights without reading the axes can manufacture similarities or differences. Vertical lines delimit historical periods; they do not automatically constitute statistical tests of breaks.
Evaluation must consider variable definitions, stationarity, lags and stability. Generalised responses’ invariance to variable ordering does not remove the conditions for causal interpretation. Independent replication requires the data and estimation choices, together with an assessment of the findings’ sensitivity.
World in Crisis, edited by Carchedi and Roberts, brings together profitability studies. Cross-country comparison requires methodological alignment before all its series can be treated as one measurement. [26]
X. Assessment: investigate the whole without erasing its mediations
A Marxian perspective can contribute a research programme on surplus production, appropriation and reproduction across scales. Imperialism becomes intelligible through concrete relations between capitals, classes, states and territories, rather than by turning a set of countries into an indivisible subject with homogeneous internal interests.
The layered interpretation of essence supplies a useful discipline: define which relations constitute the object, which abstraction represents them, which transformations preserve that representation and which history explains its configuration. Formalisation establishes consequences under assumptions; material adequacy requires testing and comparison with alternatives.
Political action and scientific inquiry can be articulated without replacing one another. Solidarity among workers requires understanding both shared exploitation and the inequalities shaping their reproduction. Specifying these mediations makes the critique of capitalism more demanding and the discussion of its transformation clearer.
· · ·
XI. Documentary library
The library brings together works of conceptual reference, axiomatic foundations, econometric analysis and international political economy. Each entry includes its cover or opening page and access to the document.
CONCEPTUAL REFERENCE · PDF
Diccionario filosófico
Rosental · Iudin
Reference dictionary for studying philosophical vocabulary and conceptual relations.
Gómez Julián, José Mauricio (2026). Geometría, historia y legalidad: fundamentos dialéctico-materialistas de los espacios con estructura métrica. Manuscrito de investigación / Research manuscript. ↩
Marxian refers to concepts, problems and arguments associated with Marx; Marxist, to traditions and programmes identifying with Marx’s work. Unequal exchange denotes a family of mechanisms and measurements, not one indicator. Super-exploitation requires an explicit definition relative to labour-power reproduction. MELT is a monetary labour relation defined within each interpretation. PPP means purchasing power parity and cannot simply be interchanged with current dollars. OCC and RSV denote organic composition of capital and rate of surplus value. IC and DC name the imperialist and dominated blocs in the Carchedi–Roberts figures.
Further resources
The following resources extend the essay’s definitions and debates. Research works, explanatory articles and reference materials serve different documentary functions.
In a recent post, I pointed out that US corporate profit margins (that’s profits as a share of national income) had reached record levels, 19.4%—the highest recorded in the US since the 1940s! The converse was the case for labour’s share which had fallen to a new low. If we measure the ratio of profits
Braking “for Humanity”: The Political Economy of Silicon Valley’s Proposed AI Slowdown
José Mauricio Gómez Julián · September 14, 2026
Abstract. On Saturday, September 12, 2026, the chief executive of Anthropic publicly called for slowing the pace at which the capabilities of artificial intelligence models are improved; the chief executive of OpenAI agreed and, in passing, ruled out taking his company public this year; Elon Musk endorsed the proposal; on the following Monday, chipmakers fell on the stock market while the large companies that buy those chips rose. This article argues that braking “for humanity” is better understood as a way of managing capital, and in particular of defending its rate of profit, than as a technical decision: it reduces what has to be financed at a moment when investors are beginning to withdraw, it is presented as prudence, and it leaves intact the premise that sustains valuations, namely that an artificial general intelligence is near. Every claim carries its source, every technical term is defined when it first appears, and the closing section lists the facts that, in the coming weeks, could refute the thesis.
· · ·
1. Who Is Making and Who Is Losing Money Today
It is best to begin with the accounts, because the whole discussion about bubbles and brakes rests on them. Three terms suffice to read them. Revenue is what a company bills for what it sells. An operating loss is what it loses in its ordinary activity, that is, revenue minus the costs of producing and selling, before interest, taxes and accounting adjustments. A net loss is the final result, which also incorporates those other items; among them there may be non-cash accounting charges, losses recorded in the books without any money leaving the till, for example when the value assigned to certain securities issued by the company changes.
With those definitions, OpenAI’s situation is as follows. According to its audited financial statements for 2025, obtained by the journalist Ed Zitron and independently verified by the Financial Times, the company billed $13.07 billion, had an operating loss of $20.92 billion and a net loss of $38.53 billion; the gap between the two losses is explained mostly by a non-cash charge of $41.55 billion tied to its restructuring as a for-profit company (Zitron, 2026b; Tolomia, 2026). In plain terms: even without the accounting charge, OpenAI loses more than it bills. Nor was this a surprise to its executives: as early as September 2025, internal projections reported by The Information anticipated burning $115 billion of cash through 2029, with more than $17 billion in 2026, $35 billion in 2027 and $45 billion in 2028 (Reuters, 2025).
Google’s case requires separating two things that are usually conflated: the model race and the company’s business. In the model race, Google is currently behind. In the Artificial Analysis Intelligence Index, a table that combines dozens of standardized tests, no Gemini model appears in the leading group; in the version of the index published this week the best Gemini ranks twenty-first, with 41 points against 53 for Claude Fable 5.1 and GPT-6 Astra, and in the previous version of the same index the best Gemini ranks eighth, with 50.2 points against 58.9 for GPT-5.6 Sol (Artificial Analysis, n.d.; BenchLM, 2026). The two versions disagree on the order of the leaders, but they agree on what matters here. It is reasonable to suppose that Google’s artificial intelligence unit loses money, although this cannot be asserted with certainty, because Alphabet, the parent company, does not publish that result separately. What it does publish shows that it is not out of business: in 2025 it earned $132.17 billion in net income; in the second quarter of 2026 it had an operating income of $40.8 billion and a net income of $112.1 billion, the latter inflated by $99.0 billion of accounting gains on stakes in other companies; its cloud, which is where it sells Gemini to enterprises, grew 82% in the quarter and yielded $8.8 billion of operating income; the Gemini app went from 750 million to 950 million monthly users between the fourth quarter of 2025 and the second quarter of 2026; and the cloud’s backlog of contracted revenue stood at $240 billion in December (Alphabet Inc., 2026a, 2026b; Pichai, 2026; Cabili, 2026). The consequence for the argument is precise: if Gemini loses money, that loss is paid out of the rents of the search business, where rent means the profit that a dominant position allows a company to charge above cost, and not with outside capital. Google can lag in model quality without depending on external financing, and that puts it in a different position from OpenAI and Anthropic.
The Chinese bet is of another nature. The main Chinese laboratories publish the open weights of their models, that is, the numerical parameters that result from training and that anyone can download and run, and they charge far less for their use than their American competitors. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission summarizes it thus: Chinese laboratories “charge far less to use high-end products than their global competitors” and do so “backed by sustained state support,” although the Commission itself leaves open whether that strategy “reflects genuine strategic preference or adaptation to necessity” in the face of chip export controls (Luong, 2026). The size of the discount is measured in tokens, the fragments of text in which models count what they read and write: DeepSeek V4-Flash charges $0.14 per million input tokens against $2 for Claude Sonnet 5 (Mann, 2026); in May 2026, Chinese open models accounted for about 61% of the tokens consumed on OpenRouter, an intermediary that routes requests to many models, and Alibaba’s Qwen functions as a customer-acquisition expense for that company’s cloud (Zeoli, 2026). State support includes energy: Nvidia’s chief executive, Jensen Huang, stated in November 2025 that in China “Power is free,” referring to subsidies that cut by up to half the electricity bill of data centers that use domestic chips (Schepkov, 2025; Yildirim, 2025).
Two clarifications prevent a simplistic reading. The first is that an intention to ruin Silicon Valley is not documented, and the available evidence points to an effect rather than a plan: DeepSeek’s founder, Liang Wenfeng, stated in 2024 that “We didn’t mean to become a catfish” and that his company does not subsidize its prices but sets “just a small profit margin above costs” (ChinaTalk, 2024), and DeepSeek itself published that its inference system would have, at list prices, a theoretical margin of 545% over cost, which speaks of efficiency rather than selling at a loss (DeepSeek-AI, 2025). The second is that Chinese laboratories do care about losing money, because they too depend on capital: Zhipu and MiniMax went public in Hong Kong in January 2026 with net losses of about $330 million and $512 million on revenues of $27 million and $53 million (Lo, 2026), and DeepSeek took its first external funding round in 2026, of $7.4 billion, at a valuation of $52 billion (Caixin Global, 2026). Whether or not they seek to ruin anyone, the effect of their strategy is to destroy the monopoly rent of the model layer, which is precisely where OpenAI and Anthropic live.
Anthropic is the only frontier company that has begun to show positive numbers, and it must be said exactly which. In the second quarter of 2026 it billed more than $11.5 billion, against $787 million in the same quarter of 2025 and $4.73 billion in the first quarter of 2026, and it recorded for the first time a positive adjusted operating income, according to documents seen by Bloomberg and described as preliminary (Lipschultz & Metz, 2026; Stanciuc, 2026; Park, 2026). “Adjusted” means that the company excludes certain expenses from the calculation, and since Anthropic does not yet report publicly, it is not known which: the Wall Street Journal noted that “it is unclear what accounting methods Anthropic has used to book revenue and costs,” and one critic warns that the cost of rented computing would rise sharply from July onward (Zitron, 2026a). Adjusted operating income is not net income; its cumulative losses remain negative, and its own projections, reported in November 2025, place positive cash flow only in 2028 (Bellan, 2025). Even so, it is the first time a frontier laboratory has shown an operating quarter in the black, and that explains why capital treats it differently.
Company and period
Revenue
Result
Source
OpenAI, 2025
$13.07 billion
Operating loss of $20.92 billion; net loss of $38.53 billion, including a non-cash charge of $41.55 billion
Operating income of $40.8 billion; net income of $112.1 billion, including $99.0 billion of gains on equity stakes
Alphabet Inc. (2026b)
Note. Figures in U.S. dollars.
2. The Speculative Turn
There is a major turn of the market toward artificial intelligence, and a significant part of that turn is speculative. To say this precisely, a concept from classical political economy is needed: fictitious capital, the value of securities such as shares or bonds insofar as they capitalize, that is, discount to a present price, future profits that do not yet exist. That value is real as long as the expectation holds and vanishes when the expectation falls. A valuation of $852 billion for OpenAI and $965 billion for Anthropic, companies that lost money in 2025, is fictitious capital in the strictest sense: a price paid today for profits that would only arrive if the technology delivers what was promised (Bellan, 2026a, 2026b).
On that base a layer of derivatives has been built. A futures contract is an agreement on an organized market by which two parties fix today the price at which an asset will be bought or sold on a future date; the reference assets may be individual stocks, sector indices, which are baskets of stocks, or exchange-traded funds. Such instruments now exist specifically for artificial intelligence: Cboe has listed since December 8, 2025 futures and options on its Magnificent 10 Index, which groups the seven largest technology companies plus AMD, Broadcom and Palantir (Cboe Global Markets, 2025), and CME Group launched on July 27, 2026 seventy-seven single-stock futures contracts, Nvidia and SpaceX included (CME Group, 2026). It is important to understand what they do and do not do. The money in a futures contract does not enter the company: the contract is settled between the two parties and, for one of them, the gain is exactly the other’s loss. What futures do is push the price of the shares, because those who trade them hedge by buying or selling the reference asset, and a high price attracts investment and makes raising capital cheaper. And they amplify in both directions: the same leverage that accelerates the rise accelerates the fall. All of this is extremely speculative in a precise sense: some realize present gains on the expectation that others will obtain much larger future gains, and the chain rests on very high levels of expected profitability, subject to a great many variables that are hard to control.
The figures give the scale of the risk. The seven largest technology companies account for about one third of the S&P 500 index, with Nvidia alone at 7.7%, and explained about 42% of that index’s total return in 2025 (Greenberg, 2026). The Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England warned in October 2025 that valuations “appear stretched, particularly for technology companies focused on Artificial Intelligence,” that “the risk of a sharp market correction has increased” and that, because of index concentration, “any AI-led price adjustment would have a high level of pass-through into the returns for investors exposed to the aggregate index,” with a cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio comparable to the peak of the dot-com bubble (Bank of England, 2025). On the real side of the economy, investment in computing infrastructure, that is, data centers, chips and networks, stands at about 1.5% of United States gross domestic product, double its historical level (Juniewicz, 2026); it contributes between 0.5 and 0.7 percentage points to growth in 2025 and 2026 (Subran et al., 2026), and it accounted for nearly 92% of growth in the first half of 2025 (Wells, 2026). That is why, if the artificial intelligence sector of the stock market collapses, the whole stock market collapses with it, or at least a part large enough for a crash to occur. The only qualification is one of form: a correction of expectations compresses the multiples of profitable companies and destroys the capital of loss-making ones; for the fall to become a financial crisis and not merely a stock market one, the credit channel is needed, and that is exactly the channel that has grown the most and is seen the least.
3. Why It Would Collapse: The Patience of Investors
Investors are growing more impatient waiting for net profits that do not arrive, and financing is not cut off suddenly or by announcement: it withdraws little by little. This is already visible on the indebted periphery of the sector. A credit default swap is an insurance policy that an investor buys against a borrower’s default; its price is measured in basis points, hundredths of a percentage point, and rises when the market sees more risk. The swaps of CoreWeave, a company that rents out computing for artificial intelligence and finances itself with debt, went from 675 basis points in November 2025 to about 855 in July 2026, which implies close to a 50% probability of default over five years; those of Oracle, the largest non-financial borrower in the high-grade bond index, rose from 108 to more than 215 over the same span, with its 2054 bond yielding 7.8% (Roberts, 2025; Moadel, 2026). The $12.5 billion bond with which Meta financed a data center in El Paso was priced in July at a wider spread than a comparable 2025 project, because, as the account puts it, lenders “are still writing checks, but they are demanding more in return” (MarketScale Newsroom, 2026). Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook counted more than $1.5 trillion in data-center plans, financed with bonds by the large players and with private debt and securitizations by the small ones, and warned that “the increasing use of leverage to finance investments in an emerging technology carries risk” (Cook, 2026); J.P. Morgan estimates hyperscaler investment at $697 billion in 2026 alone and acknowledges that this spending has “in many cases, outpaced monetization” (J.P. Morgan, 2026). A hyperscaler is a company that operates computing clouds at planetary scale, such as Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon, Meta or Oracle.
The withdrawal is also visible at the core. As early as June, OpenAI was leaning toward pushing back its stock market debut to 2027, as the New York Times reported (Ma, 2026b), and the letter of intent with which Nvidia had announced a $100 billion investment stalled in January over “internal doubts about the size and structure of the transaction and questions about OpenAI’s business discipline” (Duprey, 2026), ending up, in the February round, as $30 billion (Brandom, 2026). Part of that financing is, moreover, circular: Nvidia invests in OpenAI, OpenAI commits to buying computing from Oracle and CoreWeave, and those companies buy chips from Nvidia, a circuit that critics described as “moving money in circles” (Jadhav, 2025); likewise, in November 2025 Nvidia and Microsoft committed up to $10 billion and $5 billion to Anthropic in exchange for Anthropic’s purchase of $30 billion of Microsoft cloud capacity (Microsoft, 2025). What must be acknowledged is that the withdrawal is still partial and uneven: OpenAI closed in March a $122 billion round at a valuation of $852 billion, with $50 billion from Amazon, $30 billion from Nvidia and $30 billion from SoftBank (Brandom, 2026; Bellan, 2026b); Anthropic raised $65 billion in May at $965 billion (Bellan, 2026a) and filed confidentially in June to go public (Korosec, 2026); venture capital to foundational laboratories in the first quarter of 2026 was double that of all of 2025 (Azevedo, 2026). Financing, in short, is bifurcating: it remains abundant at the core and grows more expensive on the leveraged periphery. The direction of change is what matters, and the direction is that of capital demanding more guarantees, more conditions and more return for every new dollar.
4. The Brake as a Way of Managing Capital
The frontier companies keep up that frantic pace of development in order to finally make artificial intelligence as profitable as they promised. The promise has a name: artificial general intelligence, a system capable of performing autonomously, and better than an average human, every digitizable task. Such a system would be highly profitable, and it is the only promise that justifies current valuations; OpenAI’s charter defined it in 2018 as highly autonomous systems that outperform humans at most economically valuable work (OpenAI, 2018). The thesis of this article is that, without public financing for computing, since investment is paid for with private capital, debt and the companies’ own profits, and with private capital withdrawing little by little, the most sensible option for those companies is to brake while invoking a concern for humanity rather than declare that the goal is still very far away. The brake reduces what has to be financed, because training less and building fewer data centers costs less; it is presented as prudence; and it calms markets in comparison with the alternative, which would be to admit that the promise is distant and would trigger a massive flight of capital from the industry. That political backing is at its maximum does not change the calculation: the White House action plan orders the government to “dismantle unnecessary regulatory barriers,” sums up its infrastructure policy as “Build, Baby, Build!” and asks that federal funds not be directed to states “with burdensome AI regulations” (The White House, 2025b), and Executive Order 14365 creates a litigation task force “to challenge State AI laws” (The White House, 2025a); but a government that removes obstacles does not put in money, and money is what is lacking.
Three features of the safety discourse confirm that it functions as an instrument for managing capital. The first is that the regulation the companies ask for is an alibi and a moat, not a cost. In March 2023 OpenAI’s chief executive did not sign the letter calling for a six-month pause in the training of systems more powerful than GPT-4 (Future of Life Institute, 2023; Fung, 2023), but in May he asked the Senate for an agency that could “issue licenses and can take them away” (Goldman, 2023), signed the statement according to which mitigating the risk of extinction from artificial intelligence should be a global priority (Center for AI Safety, 2023), and kept accelerating: venture capital to artificial intelligence companies approached $50 billion that year (Metinko, 2024). Not even a plain admission of a bubble scared capital away: when the same executive said in August 2025 that investors were “overexcited,” the Nasdaq fell 1.4% in a day and the money kept coming in (Shibu, 2025; Nusca, 2025). In 2025 Anthropic endorsed California’s SB 53, which requires publishing risk frameworks and limits nothing, and declared that it prefers a federal standard (Anthropic, 2025). Disclosure-based regulation is easily paid for by the incumbent and cannot be paid for by the entrant or the open-weight model. The second feature is that the discourse of danger does not declare the goal distant: it declares it so near that it must be paced. Lee Vinsel called “criti-hype” the kind of criticism that “both feeds and feeds on hype,” because it retains the picture of extraordinary change and merely flips its sign (Vinsel, 2026). Anthropic’s chief executive wrote in January that a powerful artificial intelligence could be “as little as 1–2 years away” (Amodei, 2026a) and in September that within “6–12 months” a swarm of agents could take over the entire internet (Ma, 2026a). That nearness is what sustains the valuation while monetization is re-dated. The third feature is the most revealing: the company with the worst finances released the brake rather than pressing it when it needed capital most. In April 2026 OpenAI rewrote its principles, and the new version omits the 2018 commitment to “stop competing with and start assisting” an aligned project that came close to the goal first (OpenAI, 2018; Goel, 2026).
The premise that artificial general intelligence is far away cannot be verified today, and that does not make it illegitimate: it implies a risky forecast that makes it falsifiable over time. If the promised capabilities arrive within the timeframes their own promoters announce, the thesis loses; if the brake “for safety” is prolonged or renewed while the promise does not arrive and valuations are not validated by profits, the thesis wins.
What happened between June and September 2026 is the test case. In June, OpenAI was leaning toward postponing its stock market debut (Ma, 2026b). Between late June and mid-July, during internal cybersecurity evaluations, some 1,200 OpenAI agents improvised a message board, exchanged more than 70,000 messages, and about 700 of them compromised Hugging Face infrastructure, according to the independent investigation by METR, which describes “genuine goal-directed autonomy” and attempts to falsify their own records (METR, 2026); OpenAI acknowledged that “it should be assumed that such attacks are a credible near-term threat” (Reuters, 2026). In late July, OpenAI’s chief executive said that “We may have to pace the rate of AI development” (Fernholz, 2026), more than a thousand laboratory workers asked for “the option to buy time,” and a reporter observed that, despite the statements, “OpenAI has not actually slowed down the pace” (Cerullo, 2026). On September 12, Anthropic’s essay called on the industry to “slow the pace at which we improve the capabilities of AI models,” clarified that pacing “does not mean halting model training or technical progress,” and promised to do so “without sacrificing commercial advantage or the United States’ lead in AI” (Amodei, 2026b); the same day, OpenAI’s chief executive declared that, “given everything happening with safety, right now would be an ‘ill-advised moment’ to go public” and that the listing would not happen in 2026 (Ma, 2026b; Shontell, 2026); Elon Musk replied “Dario is right,” and the chief executive of Google DeepMind, Demis Hassabis, that “The direction is correct” (Mowshowitz, 2026). On Monday the 14th, the S&P 500 fell 0.5% and the Nasdaq 0.56%, but the fall was concentrated in chipmakers, with the Philadelphia semiconductor index down 6%, while Alphabet rose 2%, Microsoft 1.6% and Meta 1.4% (O’Donnell et al., 2026; Roytburg, 2026). One analyst put it bluntly: “They’ll just all stop building data centers and just digest what they have” (Roytburg, 2026).
“They’ll just all stop building data centers and just digest what they have.”Gil Luria, Wall Street analyst, quoted in Roytburg (2026)
That reaction is the signature of the mechanism. Those who sell fixed capital fell and those who stop buying it rose: the market read the brake as a coordinated restraint of investment, and a restraint of investment reduces what has to be financed. The postponement of OpenAI’s stock market debut, decided before the incident and narrated afterward as safety, is the mechanism with a date on it. That the narrative rests on a real incident makes it more effective, not less of a narrative. And Anthropic’s listing remains on track for October, at a valuation the Financial Times puts at $2 trillion (Stanciuc, 2026): whoever can show revenue does not brake its capitalization, and whoever cannot postpones it in the vocabulary of prudence. One contractual detail serves as a thermometer: $35 billion of Amazon’s investment in OpenAI was conditioned on the company either going public or achieving artificial general intelligence by the end of the year (Brandom, 2026); if that condition is renegotiated at no cost, the brake costs no one any capital.
It helps to name the mechanism by its classical category. The rate of profit is the profit obtained in a period divided by the capital advanced to obtain it, that is, how much each invested dollar yields, and it is the variable that governs accumulation: capital flows to where that rate rises and withdraws from where it falls. The artificial intelligence buildout inflates the denominator at an unprecedented speed, with hyperscaler investment that J.P. Morgan estimates at $697 billion in 2026 alone on equipment that depreciates within a few years (J.P. Morgan, 2026), while the numerator grows more slowly and, in the model layer, is squeezed by the Chinese competition described in the first section. That combination is a fall in the rate of profit on the capital invested in artificial intelligence, and when the rate falls, accumulation slows, whether by coordinated decision of the large capitals or by the withdrawal of credit. To stop enlarging the denominator and to exploit what is already installed is, literally, to “digest what they have.” The apocalypse that OpenAI, Anthropic and Musk are warning about is the form in which that defense of the rate of profit presents itself to the public.
Two objections deserve an answer. The first is that the brake might be sincere. It might be, and the thesis does not deny it: it claims that its economic function is the one described, whatever the conviction of the person announcing it. Other readers have offered kindred or harsher readings: Ben Thompson considers it “an unrealistic proposal that seems mostly geared to political control of AI” (Thompson, 2026), and Zvi Mowshowitz catalogs the readings of regulatory capture, stock market timing and computing limits, even though he dismisses them (Mowshowitz, 2026). The second objection is Chinese competition: a real brake would hand the lead to DeepSeek and Qwen, which, for the reasons given in the first section, have no reason to brake, and the coordination with China that the essay proposes is, under present conditions, unattainable. The answer is that, to be consistent with that competition, the brake has to be a paper brake, that is, external evaluators and alignment timelines without any measurable limit on the pace of training. A paper brake with maximum narrative effect is exactly what the thesis predicts, and it can be checked by reading the pact when it is signed.
5. What to Watch in the Coming Weeks
A thesis is worth what its risks of refutation are worth. Five observable facts in the coming weeks put it to the test.
Anthropic’s public prospectus. If it describes the pacing commitment as immaterial to its revenue, the brake does not touch the till.
Amazon’s conditional tranche in OpenAI. If the $35 billion is released or renegotiated without a listing or an artificial general intelligence, the brake costs no capital.
The capital expenditure guidance of Alphabet, Microsoft, Meta and Amazon in their third-quarter results at the end of October. A coordinated cut would confirm the reading of investment restraint.
The credit default swaps of CoreWeave and Oracle. If they keep widening while the hyperscalers rise, the devaluation begins on the leveraged periphery.
The content of the pact among laboratories. If it sets evaluators rather than verifiable limits on pace, the brake is form without substance.
6. Conclusion
What happened this weekend is best understood as an agreement among those who buy chips to run a little slower, expressed in the language of safety: it improves their cash position, it worsens the sales of those who sell chips, and the market read it that way in a single day. The part of the argument that the evidence confirms most strongly is that the discourse of danger sustains the valuation rather than sinking it, because it asserts that the goal is near. The part that remains open is the part that ought to remain open: if artificial general intelligence arrives within the timeframes its promoters announce, this article will have been wrong; if the brake is renewed while the promise recedes, it will not have been a brake for humanity but a defense of the rate of profit, that is, a way of managing capital in retreat.
Commodity money, monetary reserves, gold standards, and the geopolitical
economy of gold from the end of convertibility to the early twenty-first century.
As Astarita (2006) points out, official dollar-to-gold convertibility continued to exist under the Bretton Woods system at least until 1968. The international monetary system therefore still operated as a form of gold-exchange standard. This raises a problem for theories claiming that money had already become fully “dematerialized”: why did runs into gold emerge from the late 1960s onward, why did the official gold price remain politically important, and why did gold reserves continue to occupy such a central place until the final crisis of Bretton Woods?
From this perspective, the claim that central-bank money had become completely detached from gold can be sustained only by restricting monetary validation to the national sphere and abstracting from the international conditions under which money itself is validated.
If gold had entirely lost its monetary function, one would still have to explain why governments, central banks, and private investors continued to immobilize enormous quantities of wealth in it.
Astarita further argues that the dematerialization thesis introduces a false historical break and has difficulty explaining why gold continues to operate as both a reserve asset and a means of hoarding.
Gold, Reserves, and Hoarding
After nearly three decades of formal inconvertibility, official gold reserves still exceeded 30,000 metric tons, approximately one quarter of all the gold historically extracted.
Special Drawing Rights never developed into an international fiduciary currency capable of replacing gold as an ultimate reference of value.
In 1994, gold represented 61.6% of official reserves in the United States, 55.4% in France, 30.6% in Germany, 44.2% in Italy, 49.5% in Switzerland, 29% in Austria, and 41% in Belgium.
In 1995, the IMF reaffirmed gold’s monetary role and argued against mobilizing its holdings in ways that could weaken its global financial position, emphasizing the credibility and room for maneuver provided by those reserves.
When the European Central Bank was created, 15% of its reserves were designated to be held in gold.
Between September 1999 and March 2005, gold rose from roughly $265 to $425 per ounce without a comparable increase across metals in general and without an equivalent industrial-demand explanation.
By the mid-1990s, private gold stocks were estimated at roughly 60,000 metric tons in jewelry and another 24,000 tons in bars and coins.
Gold was traded extensively through specialized bullion banks, which operated their own refining, trading, and price-formation mechanisms.
Annual trading volumes in physical gold and gold contracts were estimated at more than 300,000 metric tons—over one hundred times annual production and more than twice the estimated global stock.
For Astarita, such movements are difficult to explain if gold is treated simply as an ordinary metal devoid of monetary functions. The crucial point is that the reserve function is itself one of the classical functions of money.
Drawing on Lipietz and Marx, hoarding is understood as one of the moments in which money appears as the embodiment of value and social power. Even if gold no longer functions as an ordinary means of everyday payment, it continues to perform a hoarding and reserve function within the international monetary system.
In hoarding, money is preserved as an embodiment of value, wealth, and social power: gold is “retained as money.”
On this interpretation, gold is not demanded merely as an industrial metal but as a general equivalent and a store of value. Nor must it appear as nationally minted coin: it can function internationally as a direct embodiment of preserved value.
The issue therefore points toward a broader question: what ultimately stands behind the dollar, the euro, or other fiduciary currencies? One recurring justification offered by monetary authorities for holding gold is precisely that it represents an asset that is not simultaneously someone else’s governmental or institutional liability.
Greenspan and Gold as a Monetary Reference
The monetary importance attributed to gold also appears in a number of statements by Alan Greenspan. In a 2017 interview, Greenspan described gold as the world’s principal currency and emphasized that, unlike credit instruments and fiduciary money, it does not depend upon the creditworthiness of a counterparty.
Greenspan associated the high point of the gold standard with the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a period he characterized by strong productivity growth and relatively low inflation. In his interpretation, the subsequent problems of the gold standard did not necessarily prove that the mechanism itself had failed; rather, they reflected major policy errors.
His central example was Britain’s 1925 return to gold at the pre-First World War parity of $4.86 per pound sterling. Greenspan regarded Winston Churchill’s decision as a monumental error because it imposed an exchange-rate parity that no longer corresponded to Britain’s postwar economic conditions and contributed to the severe deflation of the late 1920s.
From this standpoint, the difficulty did not lie in the monetary mechanism in the abstract, but in the attempt to restore prewar exchange-rate parities despite radically different degrees of wartime destruction and economic transformation across countries.
“Fiat money, in extremis, is accepted by nobody. Gold is always accepted.”
Greenspan had also argued in 1999 that discretionary monetary policy found it difficult to anchor the price level through time in the same manner that, in his view, the gold standard had done during the nineteenth century.
He later stated that, during his own chairmanship of the Federal Reserve, U.S. monetary policy attempted to follow signals resembling those that a gold standard might have generated, even while operating formally within a fiat-money regime.
· · ·
A Geopolitical Timeline of Gold
The following chronology brings together events, public debates, and statements concerning the economic and geopolitical role of gold after the formal collapse of Bretton Woods, with particular emphasis on developments after 1999.
July 10, 2014
Nathan Lewis, writing in Forbes, revisited comments by Paul Volcker, who had served as U.S. Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Monetary Affairs from 1969 to 1974. Volcker argued that the absence of an official, rules-based, cooperatively administered international monetary system could hardly be considered a great success in light of the frequency and destructiveness of international financial crises.
April 14, 2015
Discussions emerged over whether gold could be incorporated into the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights. Meghnad Desai, associated with the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum, argued that some gold content might help stabilize the synthetic reserve instrument.
June 17, 2015
Texas approved the creation of a state precious-metals depository. The initiative sought to repatriate assets and reduce dependence on out-of-state storage facilities, while simultaneously stimulating political debate about financial autonomy and monetary sovereignty.
July 21, 2015
Gold fell to its lowest price in roughly five years. Explanations discussed at the time included a reduced demand for inflation protection, lower demand for defensive assets, and developments in Chinese gold demand.
August 31, 2015
Debate resurfaced over the transparency and auditing of U.S. gold reserves amid expectations of a possible change in the federal funds rate.
September 1, 2015
Some analysts interpreted gold accumulation by Russia and China as part of a broader BRICS strategy aimed at reducing dependence on the U.S. dollar.
September 6, 2015
A substantial decline was reported in gold held by foreign institutions at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where a significant share of stored bullion belonged to foreign central banks and governments.
September 8, 2015
Strong demand for physical gold was interpreted as a response to international financial uncertainty. Gold continued to function as a classic defensive asset during periods of financial and geopolitical stress.
September 14, 2015
Reports described intense physical-gold demand from China and India, accompanied by declining available inventories in certain international trading centers.
September 15, 2015
Foreign central banks had reportedly withdrawn around 246 metric tons of gold from the New York Federal Reserve since 2014. These repatriations were interpreted as attempts to strengthen direct control over liquid and strategically important reserve assets.
September 19, 2015
Gold purchases by BRICS countries were portrayed as part of a broader search for greater monetary autonomy from the dollar amid rising geopolitical tensions.
September 30, 2015
Renewed debate over financial speculation and monetary fragility reinforced the perception of gold as protection against international instability.
October 2, 2015
RBC Capital Markets analysts linked part of the increase in gold prices to the Federal Reserve’s decision not to raise the federal funds rate, while warning that future rate increases could place downward pressure on the metal.
October 17, 2015
Gold reached a four-month high as large investors increased positions amid expectations that the Federal Reserve might postpone rate increases.
November 12, 2015
Chinese geologists reported the discovery of a major underwater gold deposit in the East China Sea following several years of exploration.
November 13, 2015
Rumors of stock-market declines contributed to increased demand for gold. The World Gold Council also reported that central banks had purchased another 175 metric tons, partly for reserve diversification.
December 18, 2015
Jim Rogers argued that, in the event of a dollar bubble, he would consider selling dollar positions and moving funds into gold, silver, and other precious metals.
December 22, 2015
The Bank of Russia increased its gold reserves by roughly 186 metric tons between January and November 2015, exceeding its purchases during all of 2014.
December 23, 2015
Despite a major preceding decline in prices, several commentators continued to describe gold as a central element of the monetary universe because of its persistent reserve demand.
January 5, 2016
GoldCore research director Mark O’Byrne discussed the gradual shift of the center of gravity of the gold market toward China and speculation concerning a possible gold-backed yuan.
July 10, 2016
Business Insider revisited Alan Greenspan’s historical support for the gold standard, including his 1966 argument that abandoning gold had enabled credit expansion to become less constrained by tangible assets.
February 21, 2017
The Mises Institute reported Greenspan’s claim that U.S. monetary policy under his Federal Reserve chairmanship had attempted to imitate signals that might have been generated under a gold standard.
November 16, 2018
Nathan Lewis argued in Forbes that although the gold standard formally disappeared in 1971, the gold price continued to function informally as an important monetary reference during several later periods.
May 30, 2019
Serbia and the Philippines increased official gold reserves, a development interpreted by some observers as part of a wider diversification away from the U.S. dollar.
July 9, 2019
Chinese savers and investors showed growing interest in gold as protection against yuan depreciation and economic slowdown. China combined its status as a major global producer with exceptionally strong domestic demand.
August 8, 2019
Nathan Lewis argued that after Paul Volcker abandoned the early-1980s monetarist experiment, gold and other commodities were used flexibly as references for stabilizing the dollar. Lewis connected this interpretation with the 1985 Plaza Accord and the 1987 Louvre Accord.
May 6, 2020
José Luis Cava discussed gold accumulation by China and Russia in the context of strategies to reduce international dependence on the dollar, debates over central-bank digital currencies, and possible changes in the international monetary architecture.
June 18, 2020
The BBC reported on the dispute between the Central Bank of Venezuela and the Bank of England over 31 metric tons of Venezuelan gold, then valued at approximately one billion U.S. dollars.
July 2, 2020
A British court denied Nicolás Maduro’s government access to Venezuelan gold held at the Bank of England amid the political and legal dispute associated with the United Kingdom’s recognition of Juan Guaidó.
September 7, 2020
Further debate over Peter Schiff’s forecasts regarding gold, the dollar, and cryptocurrencies illustrated the continued use of gold as a benchmark in discussions of monetary stability and safe-haven assets.
May 22, 2021
TD Securities global strategy head Richard Kelly expressed a favorable view of gold, arguing that the metal remained relatively inexpensive and retained recovery potential.
May 26, 2021
Dollar weakness and declining bitcoin prices coincided with gold reaching its highest level since January of that year.
May 29, 2021
Another sharp decline in bitcoin coincided with increased demand for gold as a defensive asset.
May 31, 2021
Robert Kiyosaki recommended gold as protection against dollar depreciation and ranked it above bitcoin in his defensive preferences because of its greater perceived stability.
June 1, 2021
JP Morgan strategist Nikolaos Panigirtzoglou argued that bitcoin’s high volatility represented an obstacle to broader institutional adoption and reduced its relative attractiveness compared with traditional gold in institutional portfolios.
June 3, 2021
Russia announced that it would remove the U.S. dollar from its National Wealth Fund reserves and replace a substantial share of those positions with gold and other currencies in order to reduce exposure to U.S. sanctions.
· · ·
References
Astarita, R. (2006). Concepciones sobre el dinero, el rol del oro y cuestiones monetarias. Instituto Argentino para el Desarrollo Económico.
Barba, G. (December 4, 2015). Compraré oro antes de que estalle la burbuja del dólar: Jim Rogers. Forbes México.
BBC News Mundo. (July 2, 2020). Oro de Venezuela: tribunal británico niega al gobierno de Maduro acceso al oro depositado en el Banco de Inglaterra por considerar a Guaidó el presidente.
Becedas, M., & Nieves, V. (June 1, 2021). JP Morgan avisa de que el crash del bitcoin no ha terminado y supone un revés para su adopción institucional. El Economista.
Business Insider. (July 10, 2016). Alan Greenspan Wants the US to Go Back on the Gold Standard.
Cava, J. L. (May 6, 2020). ¿Por qué están acumulando cautelosamente oro China y Rusia? Estrategias de Inversión.
CMI Gold & Silver. (December 19, 2019). The New Alan Greenspan on Gold.
Greenspan, A. (February 23, 1999). Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan. The Federal Reserve’s Semiannual Report on Monetary Policy. U.S. Federal Reserve.
Lewis, N. (July 10, 2014). Paul Volcker Dreams of a “New Bretton Woods.” But What Would That Look Like? Forbes.
Lewis, N. (November 16, 2018). The Gold Standard Didn’t Disappear in 1971, It Just Went Underground. Forbes.
Lewis, N. (August 8, 2019). We Just Tested the Gold Standard — It Still Works. Forbes.
Mises Institute. (February 21, 2017). Alan Greenspan Admits Ron Paul Was Right About Gold.
Mora Lleonart, M. (May 30, 2019). Serbia y Filipinas se unen a la tendencia mundial de comprar oro y se alejan más del estándar del dólar. Banco Central de Cuba.
Palotai, D., & Veres, I. (November 1, 2020). New Golden Age. Building up Gold Reserves. Hungary Central / LBMA.
Pedraza, J. Á. (July 9, 2019). Los chinos recurren al oro para proteger sus ahorros ante la devaluación del yuan. Oroinformación.
Pichel, M. (June 18, 2020). Oro de Venezuela: por qué el Banco de Inglaterra retiene 31 toneladas de lingotes del país sudamericano. BBC News Mundo.
RT en Español. Multiple articles published between 2015 and 2021 on gold reserves, central banks, BRICS, Russia, China, bitcoin, and international financial markets, as listed in the original bibliography.
Notes
Note 1 · Alan Greenspan
Alan Greenspan, born in New York in 1926, served as Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006. He earned his academic degrees in economics from New York University.
Note 2 · Jim Rogers
James B. Rogers Jr. is an American investor and financial commentator. Together with George Soros, he co-founded the Quantum Fund and participated in the creation of Soros Fund Management. He also developed the Rogers International Commodity Index (RICI).
Central Bank of Costa Rica, Exchange Rate, and Income Distribution
Reflections on the crawling peg, export competitiveness,
inflation, and Costa Rica’s transition toward inflation targeting.
Central banks, in their overwhelming majority, have historically promoted a “market” economy. They have done so, they continue to do so, and they will continue doing so until the final days of their institutional existence. Moderation—that is, the establishment of prudential limits on capital’s perpetually insatiable pursuit of profit—goes hand in hand with avoiding the creation of explicit rents derived from specific policies, since doing precisely the opposite violates the freedom of the market that political thought on the right claims to defend.
The principle guiding the central bank is that the institution has no reason to help one particular group generate profits at the expense of others—that is, to redistribute income to the detriment of the least advantaged. The Central Bank of Costa Rica (BCCR) understands that, by definition, no policy is neutral. What the BCCR seeks to avoid is being directly accused of reallocating wealth. If matters are instead left “to the market,” the situation appears different because “the market” becomes the agent supposedly responsible for that redistribution.
In a certain sense, this relieves the BCCR’s employees of the moral burden that such a situation could otherwise create: “they are not responsible; the market is responsible,” and everyone can sleep peacefully.
No economic policy is neutral; part of the difference lies in who appears institutionally responsible for its distributive consequences.
Yet, amid all this, the BCCR is at least meeting its established inflation target. Without entering here into the possible consequences for economic growth when a particular set of conditions is not satisfied—or the practical implications of using defective theoretical frameworks in public policy—this achievement helps keep under control a kind of silent and highly regressive tax from which capitalists can protect themselves through a variety of economic and institutional mechanisms, while poorer groups possess far fewer defenses: inflation.
The Fork in Exchange-Rate Policy
As time passed and the quality of life of Costa Rican society deteriorated, the Central Bank found itself before a road that divided into two paths.
Path 01Crawling peg — an adjustable fixed exchange rate
Maintain artificially favorable competitiveness and profitability for exporters in the hope that they would generate production, exports, and employment. Yet this exchange-rate policy was highly inflationary, while the hoped-for competitiveness of exporters took considerably longer than expected to materialize; indeed, it is still being awaited.
Path 02Leave the exchange rate to market forces
In Costa Rica, capital inflows have under this approach generated some real appreciation—although certainly not an extreme one, as the historical evolution of the nominal exchange rate makes clear. This harms exporters and contributes to explaining part of their difficulties regarding employment and competitiveness, but it simultaneously facilitates inflation control: low inflation no longer erodes the incomes of lower-income groups with the same intensity.
The Central Bank of Costa Rica chose the second path. At the time, this decision generated criticism and pressure from the export-oriented business sector through its political-business organizations—CADEXCO, UCCAEP, and others—without those demands encountering an equally visible counterweight from those parts of society interested in preventing this type of income redistribution through monetary policy.
In other words, there was no “powerful organization defending the interests of the poor.” In Costa Rica, organizations potentially capable of playing that role do not possess sufficient institutional strength or political weight to constitute an effective counterbalance to the political-business organizations mentioned above.
· · ·
The Crawling Peg as a Temporary Impulse
The implementation of the crawling peg was the idea of the prominent Costa Rican economist Eduardo Lizano, who intended it to be temporary. Lizano understood that the system effectively constituted an exchange-rate “subsidy” that should serve as an initial impulse allowing the export sector’s competitiveness to take off.
But, as tends to happen with subsidies, economic interest groups—or what José Ángel Gurría has called the “de facto powers”—attempted to preserve it. They succeeded in doing so for 28 years.
Eventually, the Central Bank, following an initiative associated with its then chief economist Roger Madrigal, withdrew that subsidy.
Public complaints followed immediately. Beyond those complaints, the BCCR was also subjected to repeated public criticism, which is in itself healthy for a democracy. Some firms even went bankrupt after the exchange-rate subsidy was withdrawn.
If a firm is profitable only under an exchange-rate mechanism that permanently generates a specific rent, it is reasonable to ask how much of that “competitiveness” is genuinely competitive.
Exchange Rates, Rents, and Cost-Push Inflation
The underlying issue is that, without the subsidy that generated inflationary inertia through higher costs, certain firms were no longer profitable. This mechanism involved cost-push inflation associated with the well-known phenomenon of exchange-rate pass-through: the transmission of exchange-rate movements into domestic inflation.
Put differently, the Central Bank maintained an exchange rate that generated rents for particular groups while simultaneously contributing to inflationary inertia, whose burden fell especially heavily on those with the fewest mechanisms available to protect their real income.
The crawling peg, as conceived by Lizano—as an “initial impulse”—appeared, and perhaps still appears, to be a reasonable idea. The problem emerged when an instrument designed to be temporary became an effectively permanent policy.
Over the long run it produced inflationary inertia and, because the exporters benefiting from it wanted the arrangement to continue indefinitely, they fought politically for its preservation through institutional pressure channeled by the organizations already mentioned. The result was a subsidy that survived for decades, until it was finally removed as Costa Rica moved toward an inflation-targeting regime.
Competitiveness Without an Exchange-Rate Subsidy
Losing easy profits obtained without a corresponding effort to become more competitive is naturally painful. The response may take the form of closures, layoffs, and claims that these consequences are the fault of BCCR policies.
The Central Bank, however, is not an enemy of exporters. What it should not do is indefinitely subsidize a lack of competitiveness, still less redistribute wealth from lower-income groups toward exporters merely to make the latter appear artificially more competitive.
José Ángel Gurría, who served for fifteen years as Secretary-General of the OECD, repeatedly argued that competitiveness problems could not simply be blamed on exchange-rate policy. They also reflected insufficient competition: protection afforded to particular producers, monopolistic structures surrounding export products, and other arrangements that weaken the competitive capacity of domestic producers.
This does not mean, of course, that certain exchange-rate advantages cannot be useful as an initial stimulus when they are employed with moderation, prudence, and a clearly defined time horizon—precisely as the policy was originally conceived.
· · ·
Inflation Targeting and Income Distribution
Under inflation targeting, the Central Bank has moved toward a more passive role in income distribution. Passive, of course, does not mean irrelevant.
Monetary policy continues to have distributive, macroeconomic, and real consequences. The relevant question is under what conditions the pursuit of price stability can coexist with economic growth and under which conditions, by contrast, the design of the monetary regime itself can impose additional constraints on that growth.
Related Reading
For a specific analysis of the conditions under which an inflation-targeting regime can limit economic growth within the theoretical and logical framework of the neoclassical synthesis, see the article linked below.
Monetary Policy, Inflation Targeting, the Current Account, and Economic Growth
A reflection on the relationships among the exchange rate, interest rates,
foreign saving, investment, and macroeconomic vulnerability.
An essay on monetary economics and open-economy macroeconomics
Monetary policy does not operate in isolation. In an open economy, decisions
intended to preserve low and stable inflation interact with the exchange rate,
international capital movements, the current account, investment financing,
public finances, and ultimately the economy’s capacity for growth.
1. Monetary and Exchange-Rate Policy
Monetary policy consists of a set of actions carried out by the monetary authority
with the aim of maintaining low and stable inflation.
The monetary-policy framework adopted by each country depends on the characteristics
and circumstances of its economy. The chosen framework must take into account its
interaction with other economic variables, including major economy-wide prices
such as the interest rate and the exchange rate, as well as economic growth,
the utilization of productive resources, the state of public finances, and
other relevant variables.
Exchange-rate policy forms part of monetary policy and comprises the actions
undertaken by a central bank to ensure that the behavior of the nominal exchange
rate remains consistent with prevailing conditions in the foreign-exchange market
and with the evolution of the variables determining this macroeconomic price
over the long run.
In particular, an inflation-targeting regime in an economy open to international
capital flows requires the monetary authority to shift its principal focus away
from the exchange rate and toward the variables that affect the general price level.
The exchange rate nevertheless remains a highly important variable, especially
in an economy characterized by substantial commercial and financial openness.
For this reason, many countries adopt managed-floating exchange-rate regimes,
preserving the central bank’s ability to intervene when exchange-rate variability
threatens stability or even the inflation objective itself.
In an open economy, stabilizing domestic prices does not eliminate the interaction
among monetary policy, the exchange rate, and international capital movements.
· · ·
2. The Current Account, Foreign Saving, and Inflation
A current-account imbalance may be the expression of a greater need for foreign
saving. When skilled labor is underemployed and an economy seeks to use that
productive capacity to achieve higher economic growth, greater investment is
required. That investment, in turn, must be financed through either domestic
or foreign saving.
In a middle-income society, increasing domestic saving can be difficult, so the
economy may instead complement it with foreign saving. The expression of this
need for external saving is a deficit in the real side of the balance of payments.
From this perspective, such deficits are not necessarily a problem in themselves;
they may arise from the financing needs of a developing economy.
Under these circumstances, persistent dissaving may be reflected, for example,
in a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Through imported goods, services,
and raw materials, such a movement may be transmitted to the general price level.
If imports exceed exports, additional foreign currency is required, raising net
demand for dollars in the domestic market. This may increase the nominal price
of the dollar relative to the domestic currency and generate inflationary pressure.
Under an inflation-targeting regime, the monetary authority will attempt to contain
that pressure through contractionary monetary policy.
The interest rate is the principal monetary-policy instrument under an
inflation-targeting framework because of its influence on agents’ intertemporal
consumption and saving decisions and therefore on aggregate demand.
In the argument developed here, monetary tightening operates through an increase
in the interest rates relevant to the monetary-transmission mechanism1.
Higher financing costs discourage the borrowing of money-capital for investment,
thereby slowing economic activity in subsequent periods.
Analytical sequence
External deficit → greater net demand for foreign currency → nominal depreciation →
pressure on domestic prices → contractionary monetary response →
higher interest rates → weaker subsequent investment and aggregate demand.
· · ·
3. Interest Rates, Capital Flows, and Appreciation
Contractionary monetary policy has another effect, however. An interest-rate
differential favorable to the domestic economy may attract lenders of
money-capital and encourage capital inflows from abroad.
This differential can generate a greater supply of dollars as foreign lenders
exchange their foreign currency for domestic currency. The relative demand for
the domestic currency therefore increases, potentially leading to an appreciation
of the nominal exchange rate. That nominal appreciation may, in turn, be reflected
in an appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Real exchange rate
[The corresponding mathematical expression is not present in the supplied source text.]
Real appreciation may increase the vulnerability of the national economy through
a relative contraction of exports vis-à-vis imports. A real appreciation reduces
price competitiveness2: imports become relatively cheaper, while
domestic production becomes more expensive relative to foreign counterparts
and may therefore lose demand in international markets.
Under such circumstances, the current-account deficit may increase not because
of an original need for foreign saving, but because relative prices in the
domestic economy have changed with respect to the rest of the world.
The same instrument used to contain inflationary pressure can alter incentives
governing capital flows and thereby affect both the exchange rate and the
external position.
· · ·
4. Debt, Investment, and Macroeconomic Vulnerability
The subsequent appreciation may weaken the external sector while simultaneously
interacting with the fiscal position. Contractionary monetary policy implies
higher interest rates, meaning that government debt issuance and access to
domestic financing occur at a higher cost.
The composition of creditors also matters. When a larger proportion of public
indebtedness is held by residents, the structure of risk differs from that
prevailing when debt is primarily held by non-residents, since the consequences
of financial deterioration fall directly upon agents within the domestic economy.
Transmission mechanism
Inflation → monetary policy → interest rates → cost and dynamics of external debt.
The result may be a public sector facing a larger imbalance and an external sector
providing less financing for investment needs, particularly when a growing share
of available financing is redirected toward the government.
Resources may consequently become insufficient to finance the investment required
for economic growth. The point is not simply that “saving is invested,” but rather
that achieving a given rate of economic expansion requires minimum levels of
investment. If those investment requirements are not met, the desired growth
cannot be generated, especially when the objective is to achieve growth rates
exceeding population growth.
Identity mentioned in the source
[The equality introduced in the source document is not present in the supplied file.]
GDP cannot grow in subsequent periods unless the necessary investment takes place.
In its most basic sense, investment consists of producing goods and services that
are not directly consumed but are instead employed in the production of additional
goods and services, thereby creating the capacity for future production to exceed
present production. In other words, the objective is to secure capital accumulation.
The risk of an unsustainable debt dynamic
Over the long run, the persistence and expansion of the deficit could generate
a situation in which the national economy becomes insolvent because of the
accumulated level of debt. This may result in the closure of credit and other
financing channels, including sovereign bond issuance, refinancing arrangements,
and interbank financing.
Banks holding a significant share of the securities issued by a government that
becomes unable to meet its obligations may see those assets become uncollectible
or lose value following a deterioration in the sovereign credit rating. The
deterioration of bank assets can, in turn, reduce the willingness of other
financial institutions to lend to those banks, amplifying financial fragility.
A balance-of-payments crisis could also lead to a sharp devaluation. When a
central bank uses international reserves to defend a particular exchange-rate
level, its ability to intervene diminishes as those reserves are depleted.
A very large increase in the exchange rate may intensify the pass-through to
domestic prices, making it progressively more difficult to sustain the nominal
value of the currency through intervention.
An increase in the risk premium requires greater compensation through interest
rates, while higher exchange-rate risk may also induce foreign investors to demand
additional compensation in terms of expected foreign-currency returns.
Depreciation or expectations of devaluation also increase the risk faced by
borrowers whose liabilities are denominated in foreign currency while their
incomes are received in domestic currency. A deterioration in their solvency
may be transmitted to the banks that extended credit to them, reinforcing the
fragility of the financial system.
A characteristic of a debtor country is its need for a continuous flow of credit
to honor its obligations. If payments cease, sources of credit may close. Under
such circumstances, central banks may use their reserves to defend the prevailing
exchange rate and provide the foreign currency required for the functioning of
the economy, progressively depleting those reserves.
This dynamic becomes particularly delicate when exchange-rate defense takes place
alongside a progressive contraction in sources of financing. Foreign direct
investment flows, like other sources of capital, are sensitive to conditions
that raise uncertainty or threaten the free movement of capital.
· · ·
5. Saving, Investment, and External Financing
In the Keynesian saving-investment identity, total saving comprises both domestic
and foreign saving. Domestic saving, in turn, consists of public saving and private
saving, while foreign saving is associated with the current-account balance.
Decomposition of saving
[The formal expression introduced in the source document is not present in the supplied file.]
It is therefore useful to ask how much saving can be generated by an economy with
a low level of income. In the argument developed here, its capacity for domestic
saving is limited. It consequently depends on foreign saving to finance the
investment required to sustain future growth, with the expectation that higher
income levels will eventually make it possible to finance an increasing share
of investment through domestic saving.
Government Saving
A government running a deficit is a government that is dissaving.
Non-Financial Private-Sector Saving
It is positive but limited because the economy has a low level of income.
The marginal propensity to save is not constant with respect to income and
varies as income changes. Moreover, domestic saving is not only scarce:
a substantial part of it may be absorbed by the government because of its
financing requirements. Under these conditions, the rest of the world plays
a central role in financing investment.
Financial-System Saving
It is fed by the saving of economic agents that generate small surpluses.
Neither the financial system nor the non-financial private sector can
necessarily offset government dissaving and independently generate enough
domestic saving to finance required investment. This is why foreign saving
becomes particularly important for a small economy.
When is a current-account deficit healthy?
A current-account deficit is more sustainable when the financial flows used to
finance it consist of long-term capital, especially foreign direct investment.
Direct investment is long term and can generate the resources required for its
own repayment through its contribution to production, employment, and, in many
cases, exports, thereby producing additional foreign-exchange earnings.
Under these circumstances, export revenues help finance the profits remitted by
foreign firms operating in the country, while part of the domestic expenditure
undertaken by those firms —including intermediate consumption and compensation
of labor— remains within the domestic economy. An additional benefit may arise
through spill-over effects when technological transfer occurs.
Composition of financing
From this perspective, a current-account deficit is better financed when it is
sustained through direct investment; it is more problematic when financed
through borrowing and particularly vulnerable when it depends on short-term
capital, whose high mobility allows funds to leave the economy rapidly.
· · ·
6. Inflation Targeting and Economic Growth
Inflation targeting tends to allow the exchange rate to operate as a major
adjustment price. A nominal depreciation, insofar as it affects the real exchange
rate, may stimulate exports and discourage imports.
When a country requires external financing, however, depreciation reduces the
foreign-currency value of income earned in domestic currency by an investor who
subsequently converts those earnings back into foreign currency. Compensating for
this effect may require higher interest rates, creating an additional tension
between external adjustment and the financing of investment.
Further depreciation may reinforce the stimulus to exports and the contraction
of imports, thereby helping to correct the current-account imbalance. At the same
time, however, tighter financial conditions may limit the resources available
for investment and therefore restrict the future expansion of productive capacity.
Inflation targeting does not necessarily aggravate the external imbalance;
under certain conditions, however, it may deepen an existing situation of
low economic growth.
Complementary Notes
International value of deposits
The expression “international value of deposits” refers here to the total
amount of deposits held by non-residents in the domestic economy.
Exchange-rate bands and market movements
When the price of a currency is said to have moved outside established margins
as a consequence of foreign-exchange market pressure against it, this may refer
to massive sales of the currency, which lower its relative price and generate
a nominal depreciation, placing its relative value below the established
lower margin.
Conversely, massive purchases of the currency raise its relative price and
generate a nominal appreciation, potentially pushing its relative value above
the established upper margin.
1
Monetary policy operates through the rates relevant to the transmission mechanism,
particularly the monetary policy rate. This rate subsequently affects the cost
at which financial intermediaries obtain funding and, later, the lending rates
at which the broader economy is financed.
2
The loss of competitiveness is not caused directly by nominal appreciation but
by the real appreciation that may result from it. Real appreciation raises the
relative price of domestic goods compared with their foreign counterparts and
therefore alters the relative prices faced by exporters.
The totality of the means of production and of the human beings who employ them to produce material goods. The material part of the productive forces, above all the means of labor, constitutes the material and technical base of society. In our epoch, science becomes a directly productive force. The principal productive force is made up of the workers, who create the instruments of production, set them in motion, and possess experience and habits of labor. The productive forces express the relation that exists between man and the objects and forces of nature, the degree to which he masters them. In the process of producing material goods, men develop and perfect the instruments of labor, create new machines, learn to exploit natural riches, broaden their knowledge, and progressively master the laws that govern the development of society and of nature. This leads to an unceasing growth of the productive forces. Under the influence of this growth and, above all, of the perfecting of the instruments of production, the relations of production change, and the mode of production is modified as well. To a determinate level of the productive forces there correspond determinate relations of production, into which men enter in the process of production. “What distinguishes one economic epoch from another is not what is made, but how it is made, with what instruments of labor it is made. The instruments of labor are not only the barometer that indicates the development of man’s labor power, but also the index of the social conditions under which labor is carried on” (K. Marx). At a determinate stage of their development, the productive forces of society come into contradiction with the existing relations of production. In the antagonistic economic-social formations —slave, feudal and capitalist— this contradiction becomes an insoluble conflict, since the relations of production, from being a form of development of the productive forces, turn into a brake upon them, into their fetters. Social revolution is the form in which this conflict is expressed and resolved (see Law of the correspondence between the relations of production and the character of the productive forces). Capitalism, after having developed the productive forces on a gigantic scale, became an enormous obstacle to social progress.
The totality of the economic relations that are established among men, independently of their consciousness and of their will, in the process of the production, exchange, distribution and consumption of material goods. The relations of production constitute a necessary part of any mode of production. Social production can take place only when men unite in order to act in common, in order to establish an interchange of activities. The basis of the relations of production lies in the relations of property over the means of production. The character of the relations of production depends on who the owners of the means of production are, and on how the union of those means with the producers is brought about. History knows two fundamental types of property: private and social. Private property expresses relations of domination and subordination, since the owners of the means of production have the possibility of exploiting men who lack property. Along its ascending development, the relations of production based on the exploitation of labor appear under the slave, feudal and capitalist forms. Social property eliminates the relations of exploitation and gives rise to collaboration in bonds of comradeship and to mutual aid among men. Under the primitive-communal regime it existed in the form of collective gentile and tribal property. Besides the types of relations of production indicated, there exist transitional relations of production, which combine elements of the various types of economic relations during the period of transition from one economic-social formation to another. The relations of production develop in direct connection with, and in reciprocal dependence on, the productive forces of society, and act as the form of existence and development of the latter. The relations between the one and the other are determined by the law of the correspondence between the relations of production and the character of the productive forces. Within the framework of a concrete economic-social formation, the relations of production are modified under the influence of the growth of the productive forces, yet their essence remains invariable. This is owing to the interests of the ruling classes, which seek to consolidate and preserve the existing relations of property. At a determinate stage in the development of society, the relations of production sustained by private property become a brake upon the unobstructed advance of the productive forces; a conflict arises between the two, resolved by means of a social revolution that overthrows the reactionary ruling class and institutes new relations of production. The suppression of capitalist property and the establishment of socialist social property eliminate the antagonistic contradictions between the productive forces and the relations of production, and an unlimited horizon is opened to their development.
The way of obtaining the material goods necessary to man for productive and personal consumption. The mode of production constitutes the unity of the productive forces and the relations of production. A change in the mode of production gives rise to changes in the social order, and serves as the basis for the development of the productive forces and of the relations of production, of the whole of social production. Thanks to the knowledge they acquire, to experience and to habits of labor, men produce material goods and develop the productive forces, which show the degree to which man masters nature. The level of development attained by the productive forces determines the character of the relations of production. The relations of production, or economic relations —that is, those established among men in the process of producing material goods— in their turn actively influence the productive forces, facilitating or obstructing their development. If the relations of production correspond to the level of development of the productive forces, as occurs, for example, under socialism, the latter develop without obstacles. When, on the contrary, the relations of production cease to correspond to the level of the productive forces, as is the case in contemporary capitalism, they hold back the progress of those forces, become a fetter, and it becomes necessary to replace the outworn mode of production with a new one corresponding to the higher level of the productive forces. This replacement of one mode of production by another is effected by revolutionary means. The economic foundation of social revolutions is laid bare thanks to a general economic law: the law of the correspondence between the relations of production and the character of the productive forces, discovered by Marx. Within the system of the material conditions of the life of society, the decisive role belongs to the mode of production of material goods. As the mode of production is, so in essentials will society itself be — its ideas, its theories, its conceptions and its political institutions. The replacement of an old mode of production by a new one is the inevitable result of the sharpening of the contradictions between the developing productive forces and the lagging relations of production. Such contradictions, where private property over the means of production prevails, possess an antagonistic character and manifest themselves in the class struggle. In this struggle victory is attained by the part of society bound to the more advanced and progressive mode of production. Under socialism, the contradictions in the development of the mode of production do not present an antagonistic character, and society overcomes them by consciously perfecting the relations of production, adjusting them to the level of the productive forces. From the mode of production one must distinguish the economic base of society, which is the totality of the relations of production dominant in this or that human society. The unity of the mode of production and of the ideological and political superstructure corresponding to the base of a given society constitutes an economic-social formation.
Human society at a determinate phase of its historical development, characterized by the mode of production and by the political and juridical superstructure, and by the forms of social consciousness — all of them determined by that mode of production. The concept of economic-social formation is owed to Marxism and constitutes the cornerstone of the materialist conception of history; it provides the key for explaining the course and development of the social relations among men in the process of the production, distribution and consumption of material goods. In the history of humanity five economic-social formations are known, which have succeeded one another consecutively: the primitive-communal, the slave, the feudal, the capitalist and the communist. Each economic-social formation possesses its own economic laws governing its appearance and development. At the same time, general laws operate in each formation, linking all the formations into the single process of the world history of humanity. The mode of production of material goods, the base of each concrete economic-social formation, constitutes the unity of the productive forces and the relations of production. The development of a given economic-social formation is expressed in the passage from one of its stages or phases to another and higher one (for example, from pre-monopoly capitalism to imperialism, from socialism to communism). At a determinate stage, as a consequence of the conflict between the productive forces and the relations of production, it becomes necessary to change the old mode of production for a new and more progressive one, whose establishment brings about the transformation of all the other aspects of the life of society as well. In the antagonistic economic-social formations that preceded socialism, the new mode of production was established as a result of the class struggle and of the social revolution carried out under the leadership of the advanced class. Capitalism is the last economic-social formation based on the exploitation of man by man. The socialist revolution and the construction of socialism imprint a radical change on the character of the development of society. The communist mode of production is free of antagonistic contradictions, and those that arise in its unfolding between the productive forces and the relations of production are resolved by perfecting the latter. In Soviet society, socialism —the first phase of the communist economic-social formation— has triumphed fully and definitively. The material and technical base of communism is being created, the relations of production are being perfected, and the cultural and technical level of the workers is being raised.
The time required to produce a commodity under socially normal conditions of production. In a commodity economy based on private property, the magnitude of the socially necessary labor time for producing a product is established spontaneously in the course of competition among commodity producers. Socially necessary labor time determines the magnitude of the value of the commodity. Capitalists in whose enterprises individual labor time is less than the socially necessary time receive, in addition to the customary profit, an extraordinary surplus value. Manufacturers who produce a commodity on the basis of an individual labor time greater than the socially necessary one suffer losses and are compelled to improve the technique of production and to raise the productivity of labor. Otherwise they are ruined. It turns out, then, that under capitalism the contradiction between individual labor time and socially necessary labor time presents an irreconcilable, antagonistic character.”
THE LAW OF VALUE
The economic law of commodity production, the law of the equivalent exchange of commodities, whereby the production and exchange of commodities are carried out in accordance with the socially necessary labor invested in them. In a commodity economy based on private property, the law of value spontaneously regulates the distribution of the means of production and of labor among the different branches of the national economy. Under the regime of simple capitalist commodity production, that law operates under the sway of competitive struggle and the anarchy of production, through the mechanism of the deviation of prices from value. The law of value, “in the fortuitous and ceaselessly fluctuating proportions of exchange of their products, imposes itself always as a regulating natural law, in the way the law of gravity imposes itself when a house collapses upon one’s head” (K. Marx). The spontaneous fluctuations of prices around value oblige commodity producers to increase or reduce the production of this or that commodity, to move toward the branches in which the prices of commodities, under the influence of growing demand, are above value, and to abandon the branches in which the prices of commodities, as a consequence of falling demand, are below it. The spontaneous action of the law of value conditions the development of the productive forces and the perfecting of production. Whoever produces commodities whose individual value exceeds their social value fails, on selling them, to cover his costs and is ruined. Whoever applies new techniques and invests less labor in producing the commodity, compared with socially necessary costs, grows rich. This spurs other commodity producers to raise the yield of labor by means of new technical procedures, better organization of production and reduction of costs. In this way the law of value operates by accentuating economic inequality and competitive struggle among commodity producers, and leads to their differentiation into strata. Most of them are ruined and go to swell the ranks of the wage workers; a minority grow rich, increase the volume of production and become capitalists. Through the action of the law of value, the simple commodity economy is transformed into a capitalist commodity economy. In developed capitalist commodity production, the law of value manifests itself under the form of the average (general) rate of profit (see), of the price of production. Under imperialism, the action of the law of value becomes more complex and its destructive force intensifies as a consequence of the domination of the monopolies, of the appearance of monopoly price and of high monopoly profit. Inasmuch as commodity production exists in socialist society, the law of value operates there too.” (Borisov & Zhamin, 2009, pp. 142-143).
Production based on private property over the means of production and on the personal labor of the producers, who make articles destined for sale on the market. The most typical representatives of simple commodity production are small peasants and artisans who do not exploit the labor of others. This type of production constitutes an economic regime that has existed in various economic-social formations. By its nature, simple commodity production possesses a twofold character. Inasmuch as it is based on private property over the means of production, the small peasant or the artisan is a proprietor, and this brings him close to the capitalist. On the other hand, simple commodity production has its root in personal labor: the producer is a worker, and this brings him close to the proletariat. Simple commodity production and capitalist production differ from one another in the source from which private property over the means of production springs. In the first case, that property is based on the personal labor of the producer; in the second, it is based on the exploitation of wage workers. In a simple commodity economy only the products of human labor are commodities, whereas in the capitalist economy man’s own labor power becomes a commodity. Simple commodity production develops under the action of the law of value, a law which, through the fluctuation of commodity prices and competition in the market, spontaneously regulates the distribution of the means of production and of labor power among the different branches of production. In simple commodity production, the action of this law leads to the spontaneous development of the productive forces. The magnitude of the value of the commodity is determined by socially necessary labor. Producers who use a higher technique and organize production better produce their commodities at less than socially necessary cost. The sale of commodities, however, is effected at prices corresponding to socially necessary labor. This means that the producer obtains a surplus of money and grows rich, which induces the other producers to introduce more perfected methods of production. Simple commodity production is unstable. The spontaneous action of the law of value, the fluctuations of prices and competition cause the simple commodity economy to decompose and the producers to differentiate: some (the minority) grow rich, others (the majority) are ruined. Under determinate historical conditions —specifically, where private property over the means of production exists and labor power becomes a commodity— the process of the differentiation of the producers gives rise to the bourgeoisie and to the proletariat, engenders capitalism, and constitutes the initial basis for the birth of the capitalist mode of production. But this does not imply the absolute disappearance of simple commodity production.
The mode of production of material goods based on feudal property over the land and on partial property over the workers —serf peasants— as well as on the exploitation of the latter by the feudal lords. Feudalism arose as a result of the decomposition of the slave regime and, in some countries, of the primitive-communal regime. In characterizing the feudal mode of production, Lenin highlights the following fundamental features: 1) the predominance of natural economy; 2) the granting of means of production and of land to the direct producer, and in particular the binding of the peasant to the land; 3) the personal dependence of the peasant on the landowner (extra-economic coercion); 4) the extraordinarily low and routine state of technique. Under the conditions of the feudal mode of production, the ruling class is that of the landowners in the person of the nobility and the clergy. Property over the land was the basis for obtaining unremunerated labor or products. The additional unremunerated labor of the direct producer (the serf peasant), or the product obtained by means of that labor and appropriated by the owners of the land through extra-economic coercion, is called feudal ground rent (see). Artisanal production and trade were concentrated in the towns and were organized in the form of craft guilds and merchant corporations. Under the feudal regime there existed two principal classes: the feudal lords and the peasants. A great role fell to the Church, which was a great feudal landowner and exercised an appreciable influence over the whole social order of feudalism. Throughout the entire feudal epoch there existed a class struggle between exploiters and exploited. This struggle was reflected, in particular, in the peasant risings: that of Wat Tyler in England (1381), the Jacquerie in France (1358), the peasant war in Germany (1524-1525), the wars led by I. Bolotnikov (1606-1607), S. Razin (1670-1671) and E. Pugachov (1773-1775) in Russia, and others. The development of the productive forces within the womb of feudalism constituted the material basis for the formation of capitalist relations and their consolidation. The process of the primitive accumulation of capital accelerated the preparation of the material conditions for the victory of capitalist relations of production. The feudal mode of production was suppressed as a result of the bourgeois revolutions, which dealt it a shattering blow. In Russia, the reform of 1861 abolished serfdom but did not eliminate important remnants of feudalism. The existence of feudal survivals in the shape of great landed property, the system of personal service, and so on, is today singularly characteristic of several countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America.
The historical process that preceded the formation of large-scale capitalist production and separated the producer from the means of production. The primitive accumulation of capital is accompanied: 1) by the mass ruin of commodity producers (above all peasants) and their transformation into dispossessed individuals, juridically free, lacking means of subsistence and therefore obliged to sell their labor power to the capitalists; 2) by the accumulation of monetary wealth in the hands of particular persons, wealth necessary for setting up capitalist enterprises. “The process, therefore, that engenders capitalism can be only one: the process of the dissociation of the worker from property in the conditions of his labor, a process which on the one hand converts the social means of life and of production into capital, while on the other hand it converts the direct producers into wage workers. So-called primitive accumulation is thus nothing but the historical process of the dissociation of the producer from the means of production.” (K. Marx). In England, the process of the primitive accumulation of capital involved the violent expropriation of the peasants, whose lands were seized by the great proprietors, who turned them into sheep pastures. The peasants dispossessed of their lands were reduced to the condition of persons without property and, in the last instance, found themselves obliged to submit to capitalist slavery. The feudal government of England enacted inhuman laws against the helpless persons who, without means of subsistence, wandered throughout the country; it drove them toward capitalist enterprises and bent them to the barrack-room discipline of capitalist labor. The plunder of the colonies, state loans, the tax system and protectionist policy contributed in no small measure to the gathering of great capitals in the hands of particular persons, above all merchants. The State promulgated draconian laws against the expropriated, limited workers’ wages and established a prolonged working day. The process of the primitive accumulation of capital did not occur simultaneously in the various countries, and in each of them it presents specific features. In England, Holland and France it took place in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; in the economically backward countries it occurred even in the nineteenth century. In Russia the process extends across the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries and culminates in the peasant reform of 1861, which ruined the peasants en masse, left them landless and turned a great number of them into proletarians. But everywhere the primitive accumulation of capital involved the violent expropriation, by cruel methods, of the direct producers.
An economic-social formation, the second form of class-divided society, preceded by the slave regime and followed by capitalism, the last social formation based on the exploitation of man by man. The classics of Marxism-Leninism sometimes employ the term “serfdom” as a synonym for “feudalism”.
Compared with the productive forces of capitalism, those of feudal society appear little developed and stagnant; but in relation to those of antiquity they constitute a great step forward (the perfecting of the smelting and working of iron, the generalized use of the plow and of other iron implements, as well as of the water-driven mill). At a determinate degree of the development of feudal society, the division of labor between agriculture and the crafts is sharply accentuated, while the artisanal production of the town grows with its differentiated manual technique. Finally, at the higher degree of feudalism, manufacture arises. Before the appearance of manufacture, the feudal relations of production corresponded to the character of the productive forces, whose development they favored. The feudal relations of production could play that role above all thanks to the partial liberation of the immediate producer. Since the serf could not be killed —although he could be bought and sold— and since he possessed a holding and a family, he showed himself somewhat interested in his labor and gave evidence of a certain initiative necessary to the new productive forms. The feudal relations of production have agricultural production as their foundation, while the workers are the dispossessed. What also characterizes the feudal form of property over the means of production is that the feudal lord is the partial proprietor of the worker (economic coercion), while the workers (peasants and artisans) are proprietors of a part of the means of production, as a result of their personal labor. The relations between lords and peasants —the fundamental classes of feudal society— and their role in production derive from the feudal form of property. Under one form or another, the lords grant lands to the peasants and oblige them to work for them, appropriating a part of their labor or of their products (feudal rent or tribute). Peasants and artisans belong, in a broad sense of the word, to one and the same class of feudal society, and their relations are not antagonistic. Under feudalism, the classes and social groups constitute estates. The form of distribution of the products depends entirely on the situation of the social groups in production and on their relations. The beginnings of feudalism are characterized by the absolute predominance of natural economy. With the development of the crafts, commodity production acquires an ever greater importance both in the town and in the countryside. Although feudal commodity production prepared certain conditions for capitalist production, it must not be confused with capitalist commodity production.
The principal system of exploitation under feudalism is feudal rent, which increases as one passes from one form to the next: the corvée (unpaid labor on the lord’s land), tribute in kind and tribute in money. The corvée system proper to feudalism in the countries of Eastern Europe does not constitute a simple return to the first form, but carries within it the germs of the third: production for the market. With the appearance of manufacture (sixteenth century), there begins to manifest itself within the womb of feudal society the ever deeper contradiction between the new character of the productive forces and the feudal relations of production, which become a brake on the development of those forces. What is called primitive accumulation prepares the advent of the class of wage workers and of the class of capitalists.
Owing to the antagonistic character of its economy, the whole life of feudal society is shaken by the class struggle. Above the feudal base there rises the superstructure that corresponds to it: the State, the Church, ideology — a superstructure that zealously serves the ruling class and helps it to repress the workers’ struggle against feudal exploitation. As a rule, the feudal State passes through a series of stages: from political fragmentation (the fief is a “little State”) to absolute monarchy, by way of feudal monarchy. The predominant ideological form under feudalism is religion.
The class struggle, as it sharpens, offers the young bourgeoisie the possibility of placing itself at the head of the insurrection of the peasants and of the plebeian elements of the towns, of seizing power and destroying the feudal social relations of production. The bourgeois revolutions of the seventeenth century in England and of the eighteenth century in France secured the domination of the bourgeois class (which was at that time an advanced class) and brought the relations of production into conformity with the character of the productive forces.
At present the imperialist bourgeoisie sustains and reinforces the vestiges of feudalism, numerous in many capitalist countries. In the countries of people’s democracy (see), those survivals were liquidated by means of democratic agrarian reforms. The peoples of the colonial and dependent countries fight at once against feudalism and imperialism: every blow dealt to feudalism is a blow dealt to imperialism.
An economic-social formation established as a result of the decomposition and collapse of the slave regime or of the primitive-communal regime; it has existed in almost all countries. The principal classes of feudal society are those constituted by the feudal lords and by the peasants. The ruling and exploiting class of the lords embraced the nobility and the high clergy. Within the ruling class there existed a hierarchical division into estates, a subordination of the lesser feudal lords to those of greater power. The Church was a great feudal power. The exploited peasants lacked political and juridical rights. In the towns, the main mass of the population consisted of masters, journeymen, apprentices and unskilled workers. The basis of the relations of production dominant under feudalism was the feudal lord’s property over the means of production, in the first place over the land, and his incomplete property over the worker, which was expressed in various types of personal dependence of the peasant upon his lord. Under feudalism the productive forces could develop only on the basis of the labor of dependent peasants, who possessed their own holding and insignificant instruments of labor and felt themselves somewhat materially interested in their work. The feudal mode of production was characterized by the succession of three types of ground rent: unpaid labor on the lord’s land (corvée), rent in kind and rent in money. Ground rent constituted the specific form of exploitation in feudal society, and very often rent was not only the product of the supplementary labor of the serf peasants but also a part of the product of their necessary labor. The feudal regime is characterized by natural economy and by the low and routine level of technique. The superstructure of feudal society is distinguished by several features: the feudal State commonly appeared under the aspect of an estate or absolute monarchy; in the spiritual life of society, religious ideology prevailed. Social thought, in its fundamental lines, developed under a religious form. The whole history of feudal society is saturated with the class struggle. The peasant risings, although in most cases carried out under a religious banner, shook the feudal regime and hastened its collapse. Feudalism was succeeded by capitalism.
FEUDALISM AS THE CENTRAL AXIS OF THE MIDDLE AGES[11]
Feudalism was the prevailing regime until the twelfth century, when the first towns of the epoch appeared.
Feudalism was the political system prevailing in Western Europe in the Middle Ages. It rests on the decentralization of power: at the summit of power stood the emperor or the king, and at the base the peasants, who were subordinated to the nobles, who occupied the intermediate position in society and exercised power with autonomy and independence.
After an age of continual wars and in a climate of insecurity and instability, the free man had no option left but to subordinate himself to the noble who dominated the lands on which he lived, and thus to establish a relation of vassalage. The vassal received a small portion of land to cultivate and support himself, and had to pay rents to the lord who possessed those lands. The lord, in exchange, offered him military protection. This reciprocal relation was of great advantage to the lord who, besides placing himself above the vassal, also exercised a socially accepted coercion.
The life of the peasants in the Middle Ages was very hard. The population lived by agriculture, and more than 90% of it was cereal cultivation. It was a very unadvanced agriculture, aimed at the most immediate provisioning: the nobility owned the land and was very averse to novelties, so that new agricultural techniques and the cultivation of new foodstuffs took a long time to come about, around the end of the eleventh century. Triennial rotation was introduced: the surface to be cultivated was divided into three and the crops were rotated. One year wheat, the next another cereal, and in the third the plot was left to rest. By alternating crops the land was not overworked and produced more and better harvests.
The serfs worked to maintain the clergy and the nobility, since in feudal society theirs was the lowest estate. Although they were the overwhelming majority of the population in the Middle Ages, it fell to them to maintain the other estates —clergy and nobility— since these were socially considered superior. Not until there was an improvement in agriculture throughout Europe could the situation change: in the twelfth century the villages multiplied, the population grew and so did production. The first great concentrations of population arose: the origin of the towns.
Most of the Roman towns became centers of ecclesiastical administration and lay within the territorial lordship of the feudal lord. They had very little population, but from the twelfth century onward a great change took place: a larger population came in the wake of the agricultural advance, which also brought economic development. The old Roman towns or former burgs were repopulated and the medieval town appeared. In the thirteenth century some cities such as Paris and Florence reached 100,000 inhabitants.
In the Middle Ages agriculture underwent many changes. The nobles and the clergy were considered the most important members of feudal society. They were never the majority, however: in the Middle Ages, almost everyone was a peasant.
Not all peasants had the same rank and social condition. Many of them were free men. Among these, some were small proprietors who lived off their own lands, while others, the coloni, rented from the feudal lord a small plot of land called a mansus.
Other peasants, by contrast, were regarded as little short of slaves: the serfs. The serfs were the only ones who worked to maintain the clergy and the nobility and who paid taxes.
Thanks to an improvement in the climate and to a series of technological advances, agriculture prospered toward the end of the eleventh century. The population then grew and the villages multiplied.
An agrarian economy
From the beginning of the Middle Ages, commercial and urban life had stagnated considerably. For that reason the land became almost the only source of wealth: more than 90 per cent of the feudal population lived above all by the cultivation of cereals. Agriculture, however, was very little developed, since the nobility, which owned the land, was averse to novelties and spent its money on weapons and luxury objects instead of devoting it to the introduction of new agricultural techniques or to the improvement of those that already existed. This situation began to change at the end of the eleventh century.
The serfs
Many peasants in the Middle Ages were serfs. The serfs were descended, for the most part, from the former slaves.
Serfdom was hereditary: a serf belonged by birth to the patrimony of his lord and could never leave his fief. They were treated as a thing, and their master disposed of their body, their labor and their goods.
For this reason the lord who had serfs could sell them or give them away and, if he considered it necessary, punish them. These punishments were cruel: they were whipped, branded with hot iron or had their ears cut off, among other torments.
Some serfs performed domestic work: the ministerial serfs. These were generally maintained in their master’s dwelling or on one of his farms.
Other serfs, by contrast, cultivated the lord’s lands: the serfs of the glebe. These lands were called servile mansi. The serfs of the glebe had their own house, subsisted on the product of their own labor and, when necessary, could sell whatever was left over from their harvest. Their maintenance therefore did not depend directly on their master.
The free peasants
Free men, or Franks, were classified into coloni and villeins. The coloni rented a plot of land from the lord: the free mansi. These mansi were inherited from generation to generation by means of a contract.
The villeins, by contrast, were small proprietors who lived in villages off the fruit of their own lands, outside the reach of any lord. The lands they worked were called allods. In many places in Europe —for example, in Italy and in some parts of France— the villeins were the majority.
Obligations of the serfs
The feudal lords had the obligation to defend the persons who lived off their lands and to give them refuge in times of war.
In exchange they received from them an annual rent in money, in agricultural products or in animals, the cens; a contribution if they married; and part of their inheritance. Among these obligations the following were also included:
– To work for a determinate number of days on the lord’s own lands: the corvée.
– To pay a due called a banality for the use of the castle’s monopolies: the mill, the wine press, the oven and the bridges, among other things.
– To contribute an unspecified sum of money whenever the lord required it: the taille.
Taxes
The taille
Of all the obligations contracted with the feudal lord, the most hated was the taille. The taille began as a duty of every subordinate to aid his lord. At first it was an exceptional gift to which the lord had recourse only in an emergency. In time, the taille came to be demanded by the feudal lords with ever greater frequency. The problem with this tax was that the sum of money to be handed over was not fixed by any law. This made the taille a wholly unjust burden, dependent on the lord’s will. For that reason many members of the Church opposed it, and the taille was the cause of bloody peasant revolts.
The banalities and the ban
The authority of the feudal lord was reinforced by his possession of the power, or ban, that had earlier belonged to the king. Thanks to the ban, the lord’s power within his domains was almost total. Among the burdens imposed on the peasants, the most characteristic were those that derived from this power: the banalities.
The banalities were monopolies that the feudal lords arrogated to themselves to the detriment of the cultivators. Sometimes they reserved to themselves the sale of wine or of beer; at others they assumed the exclusive right to provide the bull needed for the reproduction of the herds. More frequently, they obliged the peasants to grind their grain in the lord’s mill, to bake their bread in his oven and to press their grapes in his press.
Living conditions
The living conditions of the peasants were very diverse. During feudalism, the proportion of serfs to free men varied greatly according to the century and the region. Moreover, within these two categories there were many differences, both in the laws that governed them and in the degree of prosperity.
Despite these differences, the majority of peasants lived in a situation of poverty, exploitation and dependence. The longing of many serfs to obtain their freedom, and the repeated efforts of the free peasantry to obtain some benefit, were the cause of frequent revolts.
A very simple life
The life of the peasants was very rustic. Almost everything they needed they made themselves: their houses, their clothes, their utensils and their furniture, among other things.
A peasant family’s hut generally consisted of a single room with a table, a few benches and some straw mattresses. The windows were closed with boards or cloth, since glass was scarce and expensive. Animals also slept in the huts, separated from the people by a wooden partition.
The peasant family
Cutaway of a peasant house. Labels in the original, in Spanish: dormitorio (bedroom), establo (stable), arcón (chest), puntales (posts), cocina/comedor (kitchen and dining room), mesa (table).
The extended peasant family to which a peasant belonged was made up of his relatives in the male and female line and their spouses. All of them were bound together by their relations with the head of the group: the father (or, failing him, the mother) of the oldest branch of the family. This kinship group was often recognized as holding a peasant tenancy, which could not be rescinded so long as the group existed. Such a family, sharing the same “cauldron, fire and bed”, working the same undivided fields, and rooted in the identical stretch of land for generations, constituted a social unit of great cohesion.
Man and disease
Hunger was the great enemy of the medieval peasants. This was due, on the one hand, to the fact that a large part of their harvest fell into the hands of the feudal lord and, on the other, to the fact that the harvests were not abundant and that there was no capacity to store them.
For this reason the peasants were usually very poorly fed: the peasant diet was based on bread, pulses, wine and beer. Meat was reserved for the great feasts alone, and fish was eaten very rarely.
Owing to poor nutrition, the peasants were easy prey to epidemics such as smallpox and measles. Since in that age there were not many physicians or medicines, the sick died readily and people died very young.
Leisure and festivals
The only moments when the peasants forgot their hardships were the times of festival. The principal festivals were religious, and among them Christmas and Easter stood out, dates on which beautiful processions were held.
The carnivals were also very important. On those dates people put on costumes, sang and danced. Festivals were also held to celebrate the harvest and the slaughter of livestock.
Sometimes travelling performers arrived in the village who recited poems and put on games, juggling and animal acts.
Carnival in the Middle Ages
Agricultural expansion
Toward the end of the eleventh century, agricultural production began to rise. This phenomenon was due in large part to a warming of the climate and to a lower humidity that favored agricultural activity.
In addition, a series of important technological advances in the work of the fields took place, which contributed to an increase in yields. In the thirteenth century, the process of agricultural expansion reached its high point.
New techniques
The technical advances sought to increase the harvests in regions that lacked virgin land. There were three principal innovations made in that epoch:
The use of the wheeled plow in place of the Roman plow, which had no wheels. The fundamental difference between the two instruments lay in the share, which allowed the wheeled plow not only to open furrows but also to turn the earth over. This operation was made easier by the use of the moldboard, which aerated the ground better.
The substitution of the horse for the ox in plowing the fields. Although the horse was more expensive and sometimes incapable of working on difficult terrain such as mountainous regions, this animal plowed more quickly and aired the soil better.
The introduction of triennial rotation, which consisted in alternating different crops in each of the three plots into which a field of cultivation was divided: in the first year wheat was sown; in the second year, another cereal or a legume; and in the third year the field was left to rest.
By alternating the crops, the soils were not exhausted. This system replaced biennial rotation, which consisted in interposing the rest of a field between two years of harvest.
Smithies and tools
A very special innovation at the end of the eleventh century was the spread of smithies in the villages: this allowed the villagers to forge their own implements without depending on the feudal lord’s workshops. Its repercussion on agricultural technique was nevertheless very limited. Iron implements remained very expensive. Only the richest could therefore acquire them and, in general, work continued to be done with wooden tools. Behind the plow, for example, men broke up the clods with wooden mallets.
More people and new lands
With the increase in agricultural production, nutrition improved and famines and diseases diminished. The population then grew.
The growth of the population made it necessary to seek new agricultural lands. The great movements of land clearance then began. Many trees were felled and, in this way, wooded territories were put to agricultural use.
Land was also gained by draining marshes or areas near the sea and by building networks of drainage canals, whose maintenance required constant attention. The clearances changed the landscapes of Western Europe.
As a consequence of the development of agriculture, there were also surpluses in the countryside. In this way, trade was revitalized.
Likewise, the clearances brought about the founding of new villages, to which peasants came from distant lands.
Cultivating new ground
When the population grew, it became necessary to cultivate new ground. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century, the conquest of new lands was one of the most important phenomena in European history. Fire, felling and the plow pushed the forests back until they were sometimes reduced to scattered patches that had to be defended against the cultivators, since there was a risk of running out of timber. Land was also won from the marshes and coastal areas. Many of these conquests were the work of isolated peasants. To these peasant undertakings were added the clearances directed by the feudal lords, both lay and religious, who settled woodcutters and clearers within their domains.
Urban life in the Middle Ages in Europe was practically non-existent. Most of the Roman towns were reduced to mere centers of ecclesiastical administration and became part of the territorial lordship of a feudal lord, lay or religious. Very few people lived in them.
From the twelfth century onward, however, this situation changed. As a consequence of demographic growth, of economic development and of the merchants’ need to settle in a fixed place, the towns recovered their importance.
The old Roman towns or former burgs were then repopulated, and beside them new burgs appeared: out of the fusion between the old and the new burgs the medieval town was born. The inhabitants of the medieval towns were called burghers.
This great urban development reached its highest splendor in the thirteenth century, when some cities —Paris, Milan, Venice and Florence, for example— reached 100,000 inhabitants.
The birth of the towns: urban life in the Middle Ages
The different stimuli
“Towns born of the commercial awakening, but also of the agricultural progress of the West, which was beginning to feed the urban centers better in victuals and in men. There is no other recourse than to attribute the birth and progress of the medieval towns to a complex set of stimuli and, in particular, to diverse social groups (…) The most heavily urbanized regions of the medieval West (…) are regions upon which great commercial routes converge: northern Italy (…); northern Germany and Flanders (…). But those regions are at the same time the ones that possess the richest plains, the ones that enjoy the surest advances of triennial rotation, the ones that make the most extensive use of the plow and the draft horse.”
J. Le Goff, La civilización del Occidente medieval
The urban population
Medieval towns were for the most part small: few exceeded 10,000 inhabitants and not many had more than 5,000. In the smaller towns the agricultural production of the surrounding area was concentrated and then distributed. The larger towns covered a greater territory: they served several small ones, or a whole country. Thus, for example, London, with 40,000 inhabitants by the thirteenth century, was the principal point of confluence for English products and the distributor of the imports that arrived in England from other countries.
Merchant of the Middle Ages
The medieval town
With the commercial revival, the towns became a center of attraction for many people of different social and economic condition.
An attractive place
The medieval towns attracted an enormous number of merchants who settled in them and who, in time, came to dominate them. Most of the towns were situated near a river, the sea or an important road. This fact turned them into commercial centers.
The towns also became centers of attraction for peasants seeking better opportunities. Some serfs arrived in them fleeing from the feudal lords. Free peasants came drawn by the growing artisanal and commercial activity.
These peasants thereby became artisans. They came to be the labor force of an industry intended, on the one hand, to satisfy the needs of an ever larger urban population and, on the other, to generate articles that could be traded abroad.
Finally, in some cases —for example, in many towns of southern France and in most Italian cities— the feudal lords abandoned their castles to reside in the towns, likewise devoting themselves to trade.
The towns then became centers of consumption, of artisanal production and, at the same time, of redistribution.
Pedraza de Segovia, a medieval town
A distinctive appearance
Although each medieval town had features of its own, most of them shared certain characteristics.
They were walled enclosures, which secured their peace. Since the old burgs also had walls, it was very common for towns to have two walls: the old and the new. Their gates were closed at night and opened again in the morning.
Inside, the houses almost always had three floors: the first, built of stone, served as workshop and shop; the second and third, by contrast, were used as dwelling and were of wood. The use of this material in dwellings caused frequent fires in the towns.
Among the urban buildings, the churches, the episcopal palace and, later, the communal palace stood out, the last being the administrative seat of the town. In the center of the town, or near one of its gates, there was usually the market square, where commercial activity took place.
The streets were narrow and therefore dark. There were no sewerage systems, so that towns tended to smell foul. People drew their water from wells and canals.
With the passage of time the towns lost their walls, the quarters specialized according to the trade of their inhabitants, and they began to grow in a disorderly way.
Industry and merchants
The revival of the crafts
The attraction that the medieval towns exercised over the peasants released from the countryside, from the twelfth century onward, a certain quantity of labor power that worked in urban industry. In the Middle Ages industry had no great machinery and its production was limited — that is, it was of an artisanal kind. The workers were therefore called artisans. The medieval artisans of the twelfth century returned to the old forgotten techniques and learned at the same time from the artisans of Islam and of Byzantium. Unlike Western Europe, these regions had a highly developed industry throughout the whole of the Middle Ages.
Goldsmithing in the Middle Ages
A migratory phenomenon
“The principal role of the town in the Late Middle Ages consisted in the attraction it exercised on the outside world. The force of this attraction varied in direct proportion to the importance of the town. The horizon of the great cities was international, that of the small ones simply regional. But it is important to note that the zone of attraction of the great majority of medieval towns was limited to the surrounding territory (…) C. E. Perrin, studying the town of Metz in the thirteenth century, calculates that most of the immigrants who arrived there came from distances of less than 40 km; P. Wolff observed a similar phenomenon in Toulouse.”
J. Le Goff, La civilización del Occidente medieval
The merchants in the towns
The economic power of the merchants was closely bound to the development of the towns, which were their centers of business. In the thirteenth century, the towns were dominated by them.
The great merchants, whom the nobles sometimes joined, occupied the posts of government and constituted an urban patriciate, which controlled municipal life and met no violent opposition until the crisis of the fourteenth century.
This patriciate also monopolized the economic direction of the towns.
Merchant in the Middle Ages
Burghers and bourgeoisie
The leading role in the development of the towns fell to their inhabitants: the burghers. Under this name there came to be designated all those persons whose wealth was based on money and not on land.
Growing rich through money and not devoting themselves to rural activities distinguished the burghers from the peasants and from the feudal nobility. They therefore formed a new social class: the bourgeoisie.
The appearance of the bourgeoisie broke the rigid scheme of the feudal society of estates. Most of the burghers belonged to none of the estates. They were merchants and artisans specialized in various trades: bakers, blacksmiths and carpenters, among other occupations.
Urban and bourgeois liberties
Some towns took in the feudal lords. In those cases the nobility invested its wealth in trade, devoted itself personally to business and monopolized the political offices of the town. In this way the nobility became bourgeoisified.
In other towns, by contrast, the plebeian merchants seized power and, in doing so, sought to free themselves from the control that the nobility exercised over them. Their towns lay on the lands of some feudal lord. To resolve this problem, some merchants chose to ally themselves with the nobles by marrying them or by buying their titles of nobility. In those cases it was the burghers who became ennobled.
Generally, however, the burghers freed themselves from feudal domination by undertaking risings and hiring mercenaries who forced the nobility to renounce its rights.
In other cases they had recourse to the support of the kings, who had an interest in subduing the nobility.
In exchange for financial support, the towns received from the monarchs charters of liberties that placed them directly under royal authority —removing them from the control of the lords—, authorized them to administer justice themselves and granted personal freedom to their inhabitants.
They also obtained from the monarchs the right to govern themselves, which made possible the formation of communal governments that received various names: town council, lordship or commune. The privileges granted to the towns weakened the feudal schemes.
The Church did not look kindly on the rapid rise of the bourgeoisie. Their occupations, directed toward accumulating easy money, were considered by the clergy to be symptoms of avarice. They therefore came to form part of a list of dishonorable trades. On the other hand, the interest that some merchants charged on their loans was branded usury.
With time, however, the Church became more tolerant of the burghers, who were very religious, and agreed that they were necessary to society.
Medieval town hall of Bamberg, Germany
The crisis of the feudal order
With trade and the slow change from a rural to an urban society, social relations were transformed and the feudal system entered into crisis. As the economy became every day more oriented toward money, land began to lose the value it had held within the feudal regime. A new notion of wealth then arose: commercial wealth, which consisted of money or of marketable products assessable in money.
Since the feudal class was very conservative, most of it remained on the margins of this economic development. On the other hand, the liberties granted to the towns also eroded the feudal system.
Life in the town
Medieval towns were very active. Contrary to what happened in the countryside, the division of tasks characterized urban economic life, and cultural life recovered its importance.
Work and the guilds
The inhabitants of the town specialized in a trade and bought in the market what they did not produce. The artisans of a single trade and the merchants grouped themselves into guilds.
The guilds fixed the procedures of manufacture, the rules of work, the hours of labor and the wages. They also guaranteed skill in the trade: the rank of journeyman was reached after an apprenticeship of ten years at the very least in a master’s workshop.
In this way products were alike in quality and in price. No one could practice a trade unless he belonged to the corresponding guild. The guilds were very powerful and frequently clashed violently over control of the town.
Construction of a medieval town
Social differences
At first there was equality in the town: urban society contrasted with feudal hierarchy. In time the differences between rich and poor grew sharper and the concept of citizenship was born: to be a citizen and obtain the urban advantages one had to have the resources to pay a special tax to the commune and to own a house in the town.
Citizens were the most prosperous: those who devoted themselves to the textile industry, the most important in the Middle Ages, and the dealers in cloth and luxury objects. At the lowest level were the marginalized workers, who had no access to citizenship and were excluded from the guilds.
Cultural life
Since urban activities required new kinds of knowledge —keeping account books, writing letters or drawing up inventories, for example— the burghers founded the first lay schools. Intellectual activity thus ceased to be the exclusive preserve of the clergy.
The first universities were also founded, which introduced into the ancient system of teaching the study of law and of theology and other disciplines such as medicine.
A new spirituality
From the religious point of view, the contrast between rich and poor gave rise to a need for reform. In this way there arose in the thirteenth century the mendicant orders: Franciscans and Dominicans.
Both adopted a morality based on austerity and settled in the towns, engaging with their problems. Their principal occupations were preaching and teaching.
More work and new aspirations
The rules of work
“No one may be a weaver of wool unless he has first bought the trade from the King (…) each one may have in his dwelling two looms (…) and each son of a master weaver may have two in his father’s house so long as he is unmarried and if he knows how to work with his hands. Each master may have in his house one apprentice, no more (…) and no one shall begin work before sunrise, on pain of a fine of twelve deniers for the master and six for the journeyman. Journeymen must cease work as soon as the first stroke of vespers has sounded, but they must put their things in order after those vespers.”
E. Boileau
Saint Francis of Assisi
The members of the Franciscan order obeyed the preaching of Saint Francis, son of a rich Italian merchant of the town of Assisi, who in 1206 had abandoned his family, renouncing all his goods. Saint Francis, who led a life of poverty and begged for his daily sustenance, soon had many followers. For this reason, in 1210 Pope Innocent III approved his rule, which required living in accordance with the principle of evangelical poverty. In this way the Franciscan order was born, which devoted itself entirely to the spiritual conquest of men. In 1228, two years after his death, Francis of Assisi was canonized by Pope Gregory IX.
From the twelfth century onward, profound changes took place in Europe,in trade in the Middle Ages: the rural, closed economy proper to the feudal age was gradually transformed into an open, commercial economy.
Industry, markets and money then recovered their importance. This commercial revival, which reached its height in the thirteenth century, was due fundamentally to the following causes:
The increase in agricultural production, since it generated a surplus of products that had to be sold outside their own area.
Peace in Europe, which offered security on the roads and at sea after several centuries of conflict.
Population growth, owing to the decline of wars and the improvement of nutritional conditions, which created the need to satisfy the requirements of ever more people.
The Crusades, which opened new commercial routes by sea and by land and revitalized trade between East and West.
The population and its needs
Demographic growth
Despite the scarce sources we have for calculating the size of the population in the Middle Ages, it is known —from approximations based fundamentally on the extent of cultivation— that from the twelfth century onward there was a great demographic increase in Europe. Historians hold that by the year 1100 the European population was around 48 million inhabitants; by 1200 it had risen to 61 million and in 1300 it exceeded 73 million. This demographic increase, which demanded greater economic development, at the same time made a larger supply of labor available.
Population growth in the Middle Ages
Three basic needs
The commercial and industrial activity of the Middle Ages was directed principally to satisfying the basic needs of the population: food, clothing and housing. The food industry was the one that developed most, despite the fact that most producers worked on a small scale and that almost all this trade in the Middle Ages was carried on over the short distance between countryside and town. There were always, however, certain foodstuffs that could be obtained only from more distant places, and some areas —Flanders and Norway, for example— were obliged to import even their essential foods from far away. Among the foodstuffs most traded were cereals, dairy products, salt and beer.
A new figure: the merchant
Merchant of the Middle Ages
As trade in the Middle Ages grew stronger, there was formed in Europe a class of professional traders, or merchants, who by their profession relegated agrarian activity to a secondary role. These merchants created a mentality of their own, a very particular one.
Most of the merchants were of rural origin: people who had been forced to leave the countryside by population growth and the lack of land, and who opted for a wandering and hazardous way of life. Out of this mass of uprooted men and adventurers the first traders were formed.
The first traders covered only short distances to sell their products, since the roads were bad and bandits frequently attacked them. Moreover, every time they crossed a fief, the feudal lord obliged them to pay a toll or confiscated their goods.
These traders sold their products retail. Their wares were principally articles of prime necessity such as salt, beer, honey, wool and cereals.
At the end of the twelfth century, by contrast, the merchants became itinerant. They moved with their wares from place to place and sold their products at fairs held on established dates and in established places. They were therefore called dusty feet.
The dusty feet used pack animals —horses in particular— to transport their wares. Another vehicle much used by these first traders was the four-wheeled cart, drawn by horses or by oxen.
To compensate for the difficulties, the dangers and the cost of the journey, the dusty feet sold not only goods of prime necessity but also luxury products such as perfumes, spices and dyes, which left them a wide margin of profit. They also used the river and sea routes.
From the fourteenth century onward the merchants became sedentary, since the growing volume of their wares made it difficult to move them from fair to fair. They then began to settle in particular towns and to sell wholesale.
Local trade
The first kind of trade in the Middle Ages that acquired importance was local trade, that is, the trade carried on from the countryside to the town. Through this trade, free peasants and feudal lords sold their surpluses to the town: agrarian products, timber, leather and wool chiefly.
Then, with the earnings obtained from their sales, they bought in the towns more elaborate goods that they did not have in the countryside — cloth and tools, for example.
Local trade never disappeared. It was long-distance or international trade, however, that characterized the economic revival of the Middle Ages.
The merchants and the countryside
A new social class
From the beginning of the twelfth century, overpopulation, hunger and wars had cast adrift a considerable number of wandering individuals, deprived of everything, who came to swell the already existing multitude of beggars and pilgrims. Some of them then took up small businesses (…) They tried a new fortune that had nothing in common with the traditional activities. One may therefore suppose that these merchants created a mentality of their own, a very particular one. These people, who made a clean sweep of their former ties, threw themselves into adventure (…) seeking above all a rapid enrichment. The chroniclers of the age speak of upstarts, of men without faith and without law, without scruples, who by their customs and manners differ from other men.
J. Heers, Historia de la Edad Media
Merchant of the Middle Ages
From the countryside to the town
Most medieval towns of the twelfth century were small centers where the inhabitants of the surrounding countryside offered a surplus of their production in exchange for objects made in the town —shoes, for example— or for articles that reached it from other regions. The towns gathered the surplus of their own area and passed it on to other regions and, at the same time, received part of the surplus of other regions and distributed it within their territory. To concentrate these movements of buying and selling, the towns organized fairs held once a week.
International trade and its centers
The revival of trade in the Middle Ages made itself felt throughout Europe, but there were two great focal points where it was concentrated: northern Italy and Flanders. Both were very populous areas devoted to the manufacture of textiles, metal objects and ceramics.
Italy
Italy benefited from international trade, since it stood at the center of an ancient Roman road network and in the middle of the Mediterranean. For this reason, and as a consequence of the Crusades, its cities controlled trade with the East. The ports that benefited most were Venice, Genoa and Pisa.
Across the Mediterranean, Italy sold to the East products of its own and articles brought from northern Europe. From the East, Italian traders carried spices, silks and perfumes to Europe.
Flanders
Another commercial area that enjoyed a strategic position was Flanders, which lay facing the North Sea and into which several European rivers flowed, such as the Rhine and the Meuse.
The region of Flanders belonged to an important commercial league, the Hanseatic League, which German merchants had organized with the cities of Hamburg, Lübeck, Rostock and Stettin at its head. This league monopolized the exports of northern Europe, from Novgorod in present-day Russia as far as London.
In this way the Hanseatic League consolidated an important traffic in wheat, timber and furs which, in Flanders, was gathered in the town of Bruges, its principal port of storage and redistribution.
Flanders exported the products of these regions to the rest of Europe in exchange for articles from central and southern Europe and objects from the East. It also exported its own textiles.
Routes and transport
For long-distance trade, medieval traders had three routes at their disposal: land, river and sea. Although land transport made it possible to reach inland areas without rivers, it was always the most expensive and the most arduous, since the roads were bad and unsafe and a great number of tolls had to be paid.
For safety, merchants preferred river transport. The most important river networks were those of the Po, the Rhône, the lattice of rivers of the Flanders area, the Rhine and the Danube. The river route, however, was also subject to tolls.
The cheapest means of transport was by sea, and it was therefore the preferred one, despite the risks of shipwreck and piracy, the small capacity of the vessels and the slowness of the voyage. Moreover, a single ship could carry the cargoes of several traders at once.
Commercial routes of the Middle Ages
Commercial organizations in the trade of the Middle Ages
The Hanseatic League
In the northern seas, German merchants organized a network of trading houses that bought and sold products from England to Russia. This commercial network formed a corporation, the Hanseatic League, whose seat was at Lübeck. The league came to include 200 towns. Hanseatic vessels carried a great variety of articles: honey and furs from Russia, fish from Scandinavia and wool from England, among other products.
The fairs
Commercial activity established itself throughout Europe in the course of the thirteenth century. Within an atmosphere of economic plenty, the fairs attained great importance: great markets situated in the zones of contact between Mediterranean and Nordic trade, to which merchants came from all parts of Europe.
The fairs were not permanent markets, since they were held only at certain periods of the year. Each one lasted several days. To these commercial gatherings there also came puppeteers and minstrels, who added a festive character to the occasion.
Of all the fairs held in the Middle Ages, the ones that attained the greatest renown were the fairs of Champagne, which were set up on the French plain of that name, halfway between Venice and Bruges. The fairs of Champagne were therefore meeting places between Flemish and Italian traders.
Commercial fairs and European trading leagues
Other instruments of trade in the Middle Ages
Parallel to the development of long-distance trade, a monetary development took place through which minting and monetary circulation increased.
The first coins that acquired an international value and that were therefore current in several countries were struck at the end of the twelfth century in Venice: the silver matapans. Afterwards France, Flanders and England also minted international silver coins.
The minting of gold, by contrast, was proper to the thirteenth century. From then on, most European countries adopted monetary bimetallism: the use of silver and gold coins.
To speed up commercial transactions the first banks were formed and bankers appeared, who specialized in recognizing the different coins, their weight and their equivalences.
In time, the bankers became lenders who charged interest on the loans they made, agreed to safeguard savings, opened account books and carried out monetary transfers for their clients.
Since travelling with large sums of money was as inconvenient as it was dangerous, most trade began to be carried on in the form of credit transactions.
Bills of exchange were also used: an agreement between a lender and his debtor in which the money lent could be returned some time later, in a place different from that of the loan and in a currency different from the one lent.
In this way an Italian merchant who wished to buy textiles in Flanders, for example, could ask for a bill of exchange in that region, buy what he needed and, some time later, pay for it in Italy. Bills of exchange were used not only by traders but also by other travellers, for the same purpose as modern traveller’s cheques.
Fairs and banks
The fairs of Champagne
Although fairs were held in every European country, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries all of them were eclipsed by the fairs of Champagne: six fairs held throughout the year — once in the village of Lagny, another at Bar-sur-Aube, twice at Provins and three times at Troyes. These fairs stood out above all the others because the counts of Champagne protected them, exempting from tolls the traders who attended. They also stood out for their geographical situation, which made them the principal meeting place of the merchants. In that age, therefore, the most important destination of any trader was the fairs of Champagne. The fairs declined in the fourteenth century, when the traders became sedentary.
The appearance of the banks
At first the merchants carried their money with them. In time, commercial operations became difficult on account of the diversity of currencies and values in existence. In order to effect exchanges of money and to speed up transactions, the first money-changers appeared, who placed a bench (banco) in front of their shop, on which they set out the different coins. Another instrument important to their activity was the scale: the weight of the coins made it possible to establish the quantity of precious metal they contained and thereby to fix their value. Very soon the money-changers received people’s savings and invested them in lucrative undertakings and in loans. In this way the banks were born.
Banker of the Middle Ages
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REFERENCES
Borisov, E. F., & Zhamin, V. A. (2009). Diccionario de Economía Política. (L. H. Juárez, Ed.) Nueva Guatemala de la Asunción, Guatemala: Tratados y Manuales Grijalbo.
Compiled from the Diccionario de Economía Política of Borisov and Zhamin, the Diccionario Filosófico of Rosental and Iudin, and from Luján and Historia Universal.