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“Is that to say we are against Free Trade? No, we are for Free Trade, because by Free Trade all economical laws, with their most astounding contradictions, will act upon a larger scale, upon the territory of the whole earth; and because from the uniting of all these contradictions in a single group, where they will stand face to face, will result the struggle which will itself eventuate in the emancipation of the proletariat.”

Karl Heinrich Marx · Marx-Engels Collected Works, Vol. VI, p. 290

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  • DOLLARIZATION AND DE-DOLLARIZATION: A TECHNICAL, HISTORICAL AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS, PART III

    DOLLARIZATION AND DE-DOLLARIZATION: A TECHNICAL, HISTORICAL AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS, PART III

    Marxist Philosophy of Science · Political economy

    Dollarization and de-dollarization · Part III

    Dollarization and De-dollarization: A Technical, Historical, and International Analysis

    Part III · The Ecuadorian Case

    From financial liberalization and the 1999 bank holiday to the adoption of the dollar: historical background, price stability, monetary sovereignty, and proposals to reorganize payments and foreign exchange outflows.

    I. Historical Background

    The bank holiday and deposit freeze in the crisis of Ecuador’s neoliberal model

    Ecuador’s replacement of its currency with the US dollar is a case of full dollarization: the official adoption of the US currency as the unit of account, means of payment, and store of value, replacing the sucre. As discussed by Roura (2020), the technical arguments advanced by the Ecuadorian government and intellectual supporters of this monetary replacement—regardless of their validity—gained popular acceptance in the context of the economic events known as the bank holiday, which lasted five days, and the legally mandated freeze on bank accounts for one year, intended to prevent mass withdrawals and avert hyperinflation. Together, these events marked the most acute phase of what was then the worst economic crisis in Ecuador’s history, as M. C. Hernández (2020) notes. It is therefore necessary first to examine the factors that led to the bank holiday of March 8, 1999, and the subsequent deposit freeze.

    As Basantes (2020) explains, a decisive financial precedent was established in 1994, when the government of Sixto Durán-Ballén approved the General Law on Financial Institutions. It permitted related-party lending: bank loans to companies, shareholders, and managers linked to the bank itself. Diego Borja, interviewed by Basantes, argues that reduced oversight facilitated the abuse of these operations. These financial factors, combined with structural economic conditions and external shocks, contributed to the outbreak of the 1999 crisis.

    From both a fiscal perspective (Banco Central del Ecuador [BCE], n.d.-b, p. 1) and a monetary perspective (BCE, n.d.-a, p. 1), Ecuador’s official institutions identify the effects of El Niño on domestic production during 1997 and 1998 as a fundamental trigger of the 1999 economic crisis.1 A crisis’s outbreak should not be confused with its origins: the former is the acute manifestation of the latter. Agriculture on Ecuador’s coast was particularly affected by the destruction of much of its productive infrastructure and road network. According to these accounts, the disruption altered the business cycle and aggravated latent negative trends in inflation, financial-system solvency, and macroeconomic stability—in other words, pre-existing structural weaknesses in the Ecuadorian economy.

    External agricultural disruptions acted as triggers, but distinguishing a trigger from the conditions that enable its effects to spread is essential. The BCE’s own report (n.d.-a, p. 1) connects the climatic event with earlier vulnerabilities: inflation, financial fragility, and macroeconomic instability. From the political economy perspective developed here, the natural shock alone cannot explain the depth of the crisis. Comparison with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020–2021 illustrates this distinction between an immediate disturbance and the economic structure through which it operates.

    Several issues nevertheless require clarification concerning the condition of Ecuador’s agricultural sector before the climatic event that precipitated its crisis, El Niño.

    An exclusive reading of the BCE and other official accounts might suggest that the agricultural sector had no underlying vulnerabilities before El Niño. That interpretation would be far removed from the historical reality.

    As Bravo (2008, pp. 7–8) notes, various studies document the use of food aid as an instrument of US foreign policy.2

    Ecuador received food aid through the Food for Progress program, which supplies commodities3 to countries undertaking “market-oriented”—that is, neoliberal—economic or agricultural reforms. The Ecuadorian and US governments agreed on these reforms in 1991, as set out in the document entitled “Food for Progress Program in Ecuador.”

    What specific commitments did the Ecuadorian government undertake? They included eliminating tariffs on sensitive products such as maize, rice, and soybeans; changing the Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Agropecuarias (INIAP); and supporting two foundations, the Instituto de Estrategias Agropecuarias (IDEA) and the Fundación para el Desarrollo Agropecuario (FUNDAGRO), to promote changes in economic policy. NGOs have never been, and will never be, detached from politics. Assuming their neutrality can introduce systematic, suboptimal biases into the analysis of social phenomena in which they play a significant role.

    More specifically, the program provided for removing prior licensing requirements that restricted imports and exports of maize, sorghum, soybeans, and soybean meal, and for eliminating quotas on imports and exports of vegetable oils and tallow. To provide some protection for domestic production, the importing country’s government could consider retaining certain tariffs, ranging from 15% to 25% ad valorem, distinguishing between raw materials and domestically processed products. For maize, the tariff was reduced from 65% to approximately 5%, as it was for sorghum imports.

    The program also proposed granting INIAP institutional autonomy and providing sufficient budgetary support for agricultural research—after its independence had been established, a point worth emphasizing. The importing country’s government, Ecuador, would process and enact a new law governing INIAP, including an increase in the research budget4 and the creation of an endowment fund.

    By the time El Niño struck in 1998, the neoliberal model in agriculture had been taking shape in practice since the 1980s and had received formal expression seven years earlier, in 1991. These developments form part of the structural weaknesses discussed above with reference to the Banco Central del Ecuador.

    The underlying dynamics referred to above are those of a capitalist political economy. A full examination lies beyond the scope of this study, but their general outlines were developed by Marx and can be observed across Latin America and the global capitalist system as a whole. This research focuses particularly on Latin America, where the monetary replacement processes—specifically dollarization—examined here occurred. Their fundamental structure can nevertheless be presented in outline.

    As Martín-Mayoral (2009, p. 120) shows, fundamentalist free-market policies emerged in Ecuador during the 1980s. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States promoted this economic outlook more systematically and formally worldwide during the 1990s. John Williamson’s 1989 document “What Washington Means by Policy Reform” became associated with what is commonly known as the Washington Consensus (WC). This policy environment helped establish the conditions for the crisis that erupted in 1999, following the agricultural damage caused by El Niño.

    As Ecuador en Vivo (2020) reports, external factors also contributed to the conditions underlying the crisis: the Asian crisis of 1997, financial tensions in Brazil in 1998–1999, the collapse of oil prices to very low levels per barrel, and tighter credit from international lenders amid a severe external debt burden that reached 100% of GDP.

    The misuse of bank funds by senior executives—encouraged by the substantial commissions shareholders offer for maximizing profitability—combines with corruption arising from politicians’ abuse of bureaucratic power. The inefficiency of public officials unqualified for their duties, itself a form of corruption in this interpretation, also complements the economic and public policy framework outlined by Williamson in the document cited above.

    Robalino (2021) traces the origins of this financial crisis to the government of Sixto Durán-Ballén and Alberto Dahik, promoters of neoliberalism in Ecuador. In 1994, they introduced the Financial Institutions Law, which liberalized interest rates, allowed capital to circulate freely, and enabled related-party lending to expand without effective control. This situation generated speculation, capital flight, and bank failures. The policies of the subsequent president, Jamil Mahuad, intensified the crisis.

    According to Robalino (2021), financial power became particularly visible in 1998. Bankers such as Fernando Aspiazu financed Mahuad’s campaign, while others joined his cabinet. “Bank rescue” policies channeled millions in loans to banks through public institutions. In the National Congress, the coalition known as the “steamroller,” formed by the Partido Social Cristiano and Democracia Popular, created laws and institutions, including the Agencia de Garantía de Depósitos (AGD), through which the state assumed private banks’ liabilities. Mesías (2002, pp. 127–131) additionally reports the following:

    1. Financial information was of uneven quality, with manipulated balance sheets and practices that concealed the actual condition of the institutions examined. This points to inadequate financial supervision by Ecuador’s Superintendencia de Bancos, referred to below as the SB.
    2. Interventions by the SB were late and inadequate.
    3. The SB implemented neither preventive nor corrective measures, and did not even provide adequate monitoring.
    4. In its supervision, the SB failed to distinguish the risks of banks placed under intervention from those of the rest of the banking system. This impaired its preventive response to the collapse of the banking system and, consequently, the broader financial system.
    5. Analysis of depositors’ behavior indicates that more than half of the banks subsequently placed under intervention tended to attract more deposits before intervention than other banks. Customers therefore tended to choose riskier institutions because the signals issued by the SB—monthly balance sheets and financial indicators—did not allow them to recognize individual banks’ actual condition.
    6. The business conduct of banks, executives, and shareholders was also problematic. Private banks did not inform customers that they were under intervention; instead, they used marketing strategies and deposit interest rates across different maturities to attract potential customers. During the period examined, 1993–1999, the researcher reports a significant positive relationship of 78.32% between total deposits and interest rates on deposits with maturities of 84 to 91 days.

    Oleas (2020) distinguishes the bank holiday from the subsequent deposit freeze:

    The bank holiday ordered by the Superintendent of Banks on March 8, 1999, was not initially intended to prepare a freeze on customers’ deposits in Ecuador’s financial system. The sequence of events during that week, which also included a national strike against other government economic measures on March 10–11, and especially the declaration mobilizing the financial system and its customers—the basis for the deposit freeze—indicate that the government reacted as events unfolded during that unusual week. The available information shows that the bank holiday was not designed to prepare the deposit freeze. Nevertheless, both events formed part of Ecuador’s financial crisis, which culminated in the dollarization of its economy. This crisis, in turn, belonged to the period of monetary and financial instability that began in 1982 on the periphery of capitalism with Mexico’s external debt crisis.

    (Oleas, 2020, p. 64; translated from Spanish)

    The author places the suspension of operations within a sequence of interventions and rescues:

    The bank holiday was one of five milestones in the financial crisis at the end of the last century. The first occurred in early 1996 when, by granting subordinated credit to Banco Continental, the economic authorities began a prolonged period of moral hazard that ended in 2000, after the BCE had lost its lender-of-last-resort functions. The second took place between September and November 1998, when the BCE’s board approved several liquidity loans to Filanbanco, yielding to political pressure from government authorities. The passage of the Reorganization Law in December 1998 deepened the crisis by creating incentives to avoid financial services and encouraging exchange-rate speculation, thereby draining bank liquidity. The fourth milestone was the bank holiday, which sought to prevent, or at least delay, the collapse of Banco del Progreso. These events demonstrate the importance of political connections in the management of the crisis.

    (Oleas, 2020, p. 64; translated from Spanish)

    On the deposit freeze and its institutional context, the author adds:

    The fifth and final milestone was the freezing of customers’ deposits in the financial system. This arbitrary decision, effective from March 15, 1999, was declared unconstitutional on December 24 of that year. By then, the damage to the domestic currency’s function as a means of payment was irreversible. Decisions taken in the preceding four episodes favored specific banks with strong political connections: Banco Continental, linked to the conservative government of Sixto Durán-Ballén; Filanbanco, linked to legislators from the PSC and PRE; and Banco del Progreso, linked to the DP government and legislators from that party and the PSC. Ultimately, all these banks failed, causing severe losses to customers throughout the country. The bank holiday occurred in the late 1990s, when neoliberal structural adjustment and reforms had already become established across practically all Latin American countries. In Ecuador, this process did not follow the Washington Consensus as a faithful transcription of its economic policy principles. In the financial sector, implementation was slow and intermittent and, unlike in other countries, was not directed by a hegemonic leadership committed to the purported advantages of the WC. This distinctive adoption of WC principles did not displace the corporatist practices of Ecuadorian elites, as shown by the different procedures applied to banks facing similar insolvency problems. The AGD’s restructuring processes remained faithful to this tradition. The Reorganization Law in Economic Matters in the Tax-Financial Area was the immediate precursor of the bank holiday. Its tax provisions encouraged economic agents to exchange sucres for dollars and avoid financial services, reducing liquidity throughout the system. Although all institutions were affected, the Superintendent of Banks’ decision clearly enabled Banco del Progreso at least to postpone its final closure.

    (Oleas, 2020, pp. 64–65; translated from Spanish)

    The bank holiday also had other consequences. By extending through the week of March 8–12, it reduced the political risk associated with the national strike of March 10–11. The IMF mission that had arrived to negotiate a new letter of intent left the country after four of the five BCE board members resigned, leaving it without negotiating counterparts. When it became public that part of Jamil Mahuad’s presidential campaign funding had come from the banking system, the last vestiges of support for the Democracia Popular government disappeared (Oleas, 2020, p. 65). In April 1999, the executive submitted a bill to Congress to restore income tax and modify other taxes. The legislature, however, made the capital circulation tax (ICC) deductible from income tax, preserving the financial-market distortion introduced by the Reorganization Law. The market for reschedulable deposit certificates (CDRs),5 which partly offset the liquidity shortage caused by that law and Executive Decree No. 685, deepened mistrust. Together with the dollarization of economic agents’ portfolios, this stripped the sucre of much of its economic functionality and pushed the country toward adopting the dollar as compulsory legal tender. Dollarization was presented as a lifeline against imminent hyperinflation—price increases exceeding 50% per month—which threatened to render the domestic currency worthless. In just one year, from January 1999 to January 2000, the dollar’s price in sucres rose by more than 250%, according to Ecuador en Vivo (2020).

    An increase in the dollar’s price in sucres and the percentage loss in the sucre’s value are different magnitudes. If the exchange rate rises from E to 3.5E, the dollar becomes 250% more expensive, while the sucre’s external value falls by approximately 71.4%. High annual inflation must likewise be distinguished from the monthly threshold commonly used to characterize hyperinflation.

    Table 1Reschedulable deposit certificates: sequence and effects
    PeriodMeasure or processFinancial effect
    March 1999Deposits are frozen and reschedulable deposit certificates (CDRs) are delivered to savers.A claim to repayment replaces immediate access to the deposit.
    1999Certificates are traded and used to settle obligations.Selling at a discount provides liquidity in exchange for losing part of the face value. The historical account of CDRs reports discounts of 40% to 60% in certain transactions.
    November 1999Provisions require the Corporación Financiera Nacional (CFN) to accept certificates at face value.Accepting securities at 100% contrasts with their discounted trading value and transfers risks to the receiving institution.
    1999–2000CDR use differs according to the issuing institution and its customers’ circumstances.Research by León Cercado and Triana Villanueva finds differences between customers of operating banks and those of institutions undergoing restructuring.
    2007 and subsequent debatesReports and controversies concerning losses incurred by the CFN.The historical account reports allegations of losses of at least USD 1,178 million. This figure is attributed to those reports; it is neither an independent estimate nor a judicial finding.
    Note. Summary of “Certificado de depósito reprogramable” (n.d.) and León Cercado and Triana Villanueva (n.d., pp. 1–2). The mechanisms are distinguished from allegations of individual responsibility. The chronology of constitutional decisions should not automatically be equated with the dates of individual decrees.

    II. Dollarization, Stability, and the Productive Structure

    Dollarization was initially presented as a technically valid response to the economic and financial catastrophe that erupted in Ecuador after March 8, 1999. It was later also defended as the best option for a country said to have a tradition of economic and fiscal indiscipline.

    Regarding the second argument, one might reasonably prefer correcting indiscipline to relinquishing monetary policy. The first argument, however, appears harder to dismiss given the scale of the agricultural disruption: according to the Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería, Acuacultura y Pesca (2016, p. 98), agriculture’s average annual share of total GDP during the 1990s was 21%.

    Agricultural liberalization, the consequences of El Niño, and the failure of twenty banks intensified the urgency of stabilizing prices.6 Financial concentration also increased: three institutions—two based in Quito and one in Guayaquil—held more than 52% of the surviving banks’ assets, while three of the ten largest banks were foreign-owned (Oleas, 2020, p. 65).

    The risk of accelerating inflation must be distinguished from stagflation, which combines inflation with stagnation or recession and does not require preceding hyperinflation. The choice of stabilization instruments is not socially neutral either. From this essay’s perspective, the protection of major financial interests restricted the range of policies considered; a different economic project would have required a change in that balance of power.

    Under the supervision of the Agencia de Garantía de Depósitos (AGD),7 failed banks were grouped as banks undergoing restructuring. They represented 53.4% of the banking system’s pre-crisis assets and 60.9% of its liabilities. These figures show why financial reorganization and its fiscal costs are inseparable from the analysis of dollarization (Oleas, 2020, p. 65).

    Oleas (2020, p. 65) notes that, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the AGD held 90.2% of the entire financial system’s overdue loans, while the country no longer had an institution able to act as lender of last resort.

    M. C. Hernández (2020) recalls that Jamil Mahuad announced dollarization on January 9, 2000, and that his government was overthrown twelve days later. His close ties with banking interests form part of the process’s political context. In this essay’s political economy interpretation, the management and resolution of the crisis favored groups wielding financial power. This distributive conclusion does not establish that every event had been planned in advance.

    Nevertheless, according to M. C. Hernández (2020), monetary stability was one of dollarization’s advantages when viewed twenty years later. Previously, under the sucre, devaluation, inflation, and monetary issuance without a corresponding productive expansion made the currency’s value volatile. This impoverished the middle class because real wages, ceteris paribus, were more vulnerable to erosion than under a robust dollar such as the US currency was at the time, roughly a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

    Table 2Inflation in Ecuador, 1990–2018
    YearAnnual inflation (%)Magnitude · 0–100% scale
    199048.52
    199148.72
    199254.61
    199344.96
    199427.31
    199522.93
    199624.41
    199730.66
    199836.10
    199952.24
    200096.10
    200137.68
    200212.48
    20037.93
    20042.74
    20052.17
    20063.30
    20072.28
    20088.40
    20095.16
    20103.55
    20114.47
    20125.10
    20132.72
    20143.59
    20153.97
    20161.73
    20170.42
    2018-0.22
    Note. Annual percentage change in consumer prices; values rounded to two decimal places. Data from the World Bank (n.d.), indicator FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG, accessed November 4, 2026. Dollarization was announced on January 9, 2000; 96.10% is the rate for the whole of 2000, not the announcement date. The 2018 observation is negative, indicating deflation. The time trend alone does not identify the exclusive causal effect of the currency change.

    The sustained decline in inflation after the transition is one of the strongest arguments advanced by dollarization’s supporters. Monetary stability and productive transformation are nevertheless different dimensions: more stable prices do not, by themselves, eliminate dependence on primary exports, employment problems, or inequality.

    As Westreicher (2019) explains, the expression dinero inorgánico—loosely, unbacked monetary issuance—is commonly used to describe monetary expansion without a corresponding increase in output. In a dollarized economy, the government and central bank cannot issue US dollars to finance the deficit. Fiat money, however, is not mechanically backed by a fixed quantity of goods or gold. The effect of monetary expansion on prices also depends on money demand, productive capacity, and financial conditions. Debt monetization means financing public obligations through money creation; it does not, by definition, imply unlimited borrowing.

    Pablo Dávalos, interviewed by Roura (2020), emphasizes the other side of a strong dollar: the greater attractiveness of imports can weaken domestic production and encourage deindustrialization and a renewed concentration on primary production. In his interpretation, the absence of productive policies makes it cheaper to buy fruit from Peru or vegetables from Colombia than to produce them in Ecuador. The regime’s external sustainability requires attention to exports, imports, and the financing of imbalances.

    George Selgin offers a different interpretation in M. C. Hernández’s (2020) report. He attributes many difficulties to dependence on oil and argues that oil-price fluctuations would affect Ecuador under other monetary regimes as well. He also considers high tariffs a factor behind price differences with neighboring countries and proposes lowering them before altering dollarization.

    Dávalos’s and Selgin’s interpretations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A poorly diversified productive structure exposes a country to external shocks, while relinquishing an independent exchange-rate policy changes the instruments available to address them. From this essay’s perspective, dependence on external financing can strengthen the bargaining power of creditors and international institutions. Borrowing is one possible response to a foreign exchange constraint, but others include changes in exports, remittances, investment, imports, and capital flows.8

    An economic system shaped by the Washington Consensus—in practice from 1980 and formally from 1991—would, in this interpretation, have considerable difficulty functioning adequately, as suggested by experience in Latin America and Europe.9 This contributed to a sequence of political crises10 beginning in 1996 and continuing until Rafael Correa took office in 2007. His arrival coincided with a systematic dismantling of the neoliberal model and the “Citizens’ Revolution,” situated within the Latin American political movement known as “Twenty-First-Century Socialism.”

    Table 3Political instability and presidential succession, 1996–2007
    PresidencyFromTo
    Abdalá Bucaram Ortiz19961997
    Fabián Alarcón Rivera · first interim presidency19971997
    Rosalía Arteaga Serrano · provisional presidency19971997
    Fabián Alarcón Rivera · second interim presidency19971998
    Jamil Mahuad Witt19982000
    Gustavo Noboa Bejarano20002003
    Lucio Gutiérrez Borbúa20032005
    Alfredo Palacio González20052007
    Rafael Correa Delgado20072017
    Note. The final row shows the presidential term beginning at the end of the period examined. A succession dispute in February 1997 included Arteaga’s provisional presidency between Alarcón’s two interim presidencies; the table does not list the juntas lasting less than a day in January 2000. Sources: CIDOB (n.d.-a, n.d.-b, n.d.-c, n.d.-d, n.d.-e, n.d.-f).

    III. Correa: Criticism and the Continuation of Dollarization

    Why, then, did Rafael Correa retain dollarization during his presidency despite his academic criticism of the regime? In 2004, he argued for recovering sovereign instruments of development:

    As Fander Falconí also rightly noted, the debate on dollarization truly concerns our countries’ economic and social future. It means moving beyond simplistic ideas such as the “dogma of stability,” whose most extreme expression is undoubtedly Ecuadorian dollarization. An irreversible fixed exchange rate in a small, open economy with low productivity is clearly a technical absurdity: it may eventually control inflation, but probably by bankrupting the real sector of the economy. As Alberto Acosta, Carlos Parodi, and Carlos Larrea point out, it means rethinking the concept and strategy of development, recovering sovereign economic policies in the service of genuine national projects, and preventing economies and the common good from being subjected to the whims of the market abstraction. As Emilia Ferraro reminds us, it also means addressing people’s dissatisfaction with a worn-out state and national identity—in other words, recovering our social capital, shattered by absurd economic policies.

    (Correa, 2004, p. 89; translated from Spanish)

    His recorded interventions explain the distinction between judging the adoption of a regime undesirable and considering its abandonment costly once it is established (IOL Inversiones, n.d.; JuanK, n.d.). They present the arguments developed below.

    Correa maintains that an abrupt exit could generate economic and social disruption whose costs would fall on workers. The decision therefore involves more than listing the advantages of having a national currency: it must consider contracts, deposits, wages, debts, and expectations already expressed in dollars. In his interpretation, the combination of social desperation and pressure from powerful interest groups helps explain the regime’s initial adoption.

    Electronic means of payment should not automatically be confused with a new monetary unit. They can facilitate transactions and reduce the need for cash while retaining dollar-denominated accounting. Their liquidity effects depend on their design: a transfer system, a fully backed balance, and an instrument that expands credit do not necessarily produce the same result.

    Correa’s constitutional objection concerns the monetary rule in force in 1998. Article 264 assigned currency issuance to the central bank and established the sucre as the monetary unit (Constitución Política de la República del Ecuador, 1998, art. 264). This is the relevant historical text for examining the argument; legal assessment of the change requires distinguishing the executive announcement, the implementing legislation, and constitutional controversies.

    Optimum currency area theory provides a framework for examining the costs of sharing a currency or adopting another country’s currency. Correa highlights two elements: synchronized business cycles and labor mobility as an adjustment mechanism.11

    1. Shared business cycles, leading to compatible economic policy objectives.
    2. Where that condition is absent, perfect labor mobility.

    The main problems arising when these conditions are not met occur when the dollar—or the foreign currency replacing the domestic currency—moves in the opposite direction to the dollarizing country’s economic policy needs.

    A two-condition summary does not exhaust the theory: price and wage flexibility, financial integration, productive diversification, and the possibility of fiscal transfers also matter. The central point here is that the same movement in the dollar may be appropriate for the United States and harmful to Ecuador’s economy.

    Finally, Correa argues that keeping dollarization in a relatively healthy condition requires the following measures:

    1. Improving systemic competitiveness12 internationally through investment in research, development, and innovation, as well as transport infrastructure such as roads, ports, and airports. Ecuador pursued such improvements through public investment. Better positioning domestic products in world markets can increase exporters’ sales and, consequently, dollar inflows into the dollarized country—in this case, Ecuador.
    2. Policies to maximize public-sector efficiency and reduce costs. Such savings can support systemic competitiveness, including the public sector’s own performance, while avoiding cuts to social programs that guarantee decent living standards.

    IV. Andrés Araúz’s Proposal

    1. Two meanings of de-dollarization

    Correa retained dollarization throughout his government, from 2007 to 2017. In April 2020, Andrés Araúz—later the correísta political movement’s presidential candidate in 2021—published a distinction between “bad” and “good” de-dollarization. The proposal combines a distributive argument with instruments for managing payments and foreign exchange; it does not, by itself, constitute a complete monetary transition program (Araúz, 2020).

    2. “Bad” de-dollarization

    For Araúz (2020), a regressive exit would have two main effects: facilitating capital flight and reducing real wages. Higher-income groups’ surpluses could remain in dollars outside Ecuador, through financial circuits in Panama, Miami, and New York, while workers would receive income in a lower-value domestic currency.

    The distributive dimension is decisive. If wages and public-sector remuneration are converted into a depreciating currency while foreign assets remain dollar-denominated, the adjustment burden is distributed unequally. Araúz links this possibility to pressures to reduce labor costs and to constitutional restrictions on rolling back rights.

    The author illustrates a decline in purchasing power from the equivalent of USD 400 to USD 250. The exact reduction is 37.5%, leaving 62.5% of the initial level; references to 37% and 60% are approximations. This is an illustrative scenario of the distributive mechanism, not an inevitable outcome of every monetary reform (Araúz, 2020).

    Araúz also advances a political hypothesis: faced with social and legislative resistance, such a transition might be imposed through executive decisions and constraints on democratic deliberation. His references to the National Assembly and the laws then under discussion belong to the circumstances of April 2020; they do not describe an already implemented reform.

    3. “Good” de-dollarization

    The alternative Araúz (2020) calls “good” retains the dollar as the monetary unit while seeking to expand domestic means of payment and raise the cost of certain external uses of foreign exchange. The quotation marks therefore have conceptual significance: the proposal does not amount to replacing the dollar fully with a national currency.

    Its instruments include domestic payment systems for internal transactions, dematerialized securities usable through mobile phones, mechanisms for expanding liquidity, and territorial and sectoral clearinghouses. The stated purpose is to sustain domestic circulation without reducing workers’ nominal remuneration; higher import costs can nevertheless affect their purchasing power over foreign goods.

    The timbre cambiario, or foreign exchange transfer permit, would be a tradable right to transfer foreign currency abroad. The state would establish an adjustable quota, and the central bank would sell the permits to importers and others seeking outward transfers. Araúz approximates the initial cost at 27 cents per dollar: a higher transfer cost accompanied by a quantitative restriction. The design thus combines price and quantity.

    Politically and legally, Araúz argued that the instrument could rely on existing powers or on legislation capable of securing parliamentary support. This was his assessment in the context of 2020; determining legal feasibility requires examining the powers and procedures applicable to each instrument.

    4. Figures and internal consistency

    The proposal uses 2019 figures and crisis assumptions for 2020. It reports private outflows of USD 28,418 million, a negative net contribution to reserves of USD 2,105 million, and private foreign assets of USD 27,000 million. These are not 2026 data: they define Araúz’s (2020) historical exercise.

    The initial objective was to reduce gross private outflows and repatriate USD 12,000 million over four years, equivalent to a net annual target of USD 3,000 million. The author illustrates an increase in official reserves to USD 15,000 million and a reduction in private foreign assets to USD 15,000 million. This comparison approximates orders of magnitude; actual reserve changes depend on all balance-of-payments components.

    Table 4Reconstructing Araúz’s scenario for 2020
    ItemCalculation or assumptionUSD millions
    Reference private inflowsBase used in the projection26,658
    Projected inflows26,658 × 0.70 ≈ 18,66818,668
    Projected outflows without a quota28,418 × 0.70 ≈ 19,89319,893
    Autonomous deficit19,893 − 18,6681,225
    Annual repatriation target12,000 ÷ 43,000
    Required restriction1,225 + 3,0004,225
    Available outflow quota19,893 − 4,22515,668
    Note. Based on Araúz (2020), retaining the scenario’s rounding. Reference outflows of 28,418 and inflows of 26,658 yield a balance of −1,760, which differs from the −2,105 contribution to reserves cited in the text. The two magnitudes should not be equated without reconciling their coverage and accounting adjustments.

    The proposal’s substantive distinction lies in asking which monetary relationships change, for whom they change, and who bears the adjustment costs. Retaining the dollar as the unit of account, expanding domestic payments, and regulating capital outflows are different decisions from redenominating wages, deposits, and contracts. Policy assessment must address financial consistency, distributive effects, and institutional conditions together.

    V. Notes

    1. Basantes (2020) describes flooding, damage to roads and bridges, agricultural and fishing losses, and falling oil prices as part of the context of 1998. Monetary estimates reported in the press depend on the categories of damage included.

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    2. Bravo (2008, pp. 7–8) refers, among others, to studies by Oxfam, Noah Zerbe, Wilma Salgado, and Frédéric Mousseau on food aid, trade, and sovereignty. Those works are mentioned here as sources cited by Bravo; they are not presented as documents directly consulted.

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    3. The term commodities refers to relatively standardized goods traded in broad markets, such as cereals, oil, and metals. It does not imply that they literally lack added value; the relevant feature is their relative commercial homogeneity.

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    4. The INIAP budget increase discussed in this passage is expressed as an approximate amount equivalent to 2% of agricultural GDP, according to Bravo’s (2008) account.

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    5. Reschedulable deposit certificates represented claims on frozen funds. The ability to sell them or use them to settle certain obligations was not equivalent to recovering the deposit in cash at face value. See Table 1 and the study by León Cercado and Triana Villanueva (n.d.).

      Back to text ↑
    6. Oleas (2020, p. 65) reports bank losses of USD 1,520 million and the closure of twenty banks during the crisis. The concentration of surviving banks’ assets and the scale of banks undergoing restructuring describe different dimensions of the reorganization.

      Back to text ↑
    7. The Agencia de Garantía de Depósitos (AGD) played a central role in guaranteeing and restructuring bank deposits. The transfer of private obligations to the state is one of the distributive mechanisms examined by Oleas (2020).

      Back to text ↑
    8. The argument concerns economic power associated with the need for external financing, sovereign risk, and primary exporters’ exposure to international prices. It does not imply that every credit operation is speculative or that every dollar inflow creates debt.

      Back to text ↑
    9. For advanced economies during the crisis, Blanchard and Leigh (2013, pp. 4–6, 19) find a relationship between planned fiscal consolidation and growth below forecast, consistent with fiscal multipliers larger than those assumed. Ostry et al. (2016) examine the distributive costs of capital-account liberalization and austerity, as well as their possible effects on growth. These findings have a specific scope; by themselves, they do not establish a universal conclusion about every country or policy. From this essay’s critical perspective, they reinforce the need to examine adjustment programs in their concrete social conditions.

      Back to text ↑
    10. The instability of 1996–2007 included interrupted presidencies, vice-presidential successions, and interim administrations. Table 3 distinguishes these episodes and separates the 2006 presidential election from the beginning of Correa’s government in January 2007.

      Back to text ↑
    11. In optimum currency area theory, the loss of exchange-rate adjustment may be less costly when business cycles are synchronized or other mechanisms can absorb asymmetric shocks. Labor mobility, flexibility, integration, and transfers are complementary dimensions; a short list should not be read as a necessary and sufficient criterion for every case.

      Back to text ↑
    12. R. A. Hernández (2001, p. 5) distinguishes four levels of systemic competitiveness: micro—the capabilities of firms and plants; meso—infrastructure, institutions, factor markets, and targeted policies; macro—fiscal, monetary, trade, and exchange-rate policies; and meta—strategic orientation, political structure, and development agreements. The concept avoids reducing competitiveness to wages or the exchange rate.

      Back to text ↑

    VI. References

    The dates attached to the BCE reports identify the period examined; “n.d.” is used where the publication date has not been verified. Videos are attributed to the accounts that published them, rather than to the interviewee. Bravo’s document retains the available bibliographic details; its historical link may be inactive. A document’s upload date does not replace the date of its printed journal issue. Spanish-language reference titles are retained in their original language; translated passages are identified as such.

    Araúz, A. (2020, April 20). Desdolarización mala y “desdolarización” buena. Observatorio de la Dolarización. https://dolarizacionec.wordpress.com/2020/04/20/desdolarizacion-mala-y-desdolarizacion-buena/

    Banco Central del Ecuador. (n.d.-a). La economía ecuatoriana en 1999 [Chapter II, 1999 annual report]. https://contenido.bce.fin.ec/documentos/PublicacionesNotas/Catalogo/Memoria/1999/cap2.pdf

    Banco Central del Ecuador. (n.d.-b). Política fiscal [1998 annual report]. https://contenido.bce.fin.ec/documentos/PublicacionesNotas/Catalogo/Memoria/1998/cap6int.pdf

    World Bank. (n.d.). Inflation, consumer prices (annual %): Ecuador [Data set; indicator FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG]. World Development Indicators. Retrieved November 4, 2026, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=EC

    Basantes, A. C. (2020, January 9). El feriado bancario en Ecuador: ¿Por qué pasó? GK. https://gk.city/2020/01/09/feriado-bancario-ecuador/

    Blanchard, O. J., & Leigh, D. (2013). Growth forecast errors and fiscal multipliers (IMF Working Paper No. 13/1). Fondo Monetario Internacional. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781475576443.001

    Bravo, A. L. (2008). Políticas neoliberales y soberanía alimentaria en el Ecuador. Heifer Ecuador. http://www.heifer-ecuador.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/8.-Poli%CC%81ticas-neoliberales-y-SA-Ecuador.pdf

    Certificado de depósito reprogramable. (n.d.). In Wikipedia. Retrieved November 4, 2026, from https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificado_de_dep%C3%B3sito_reprogramable

    CIDOB. (n.d.-a). Abdalá Bucaram Ortiz [Political biography]. https://www.cidob.org/lider-politico/abdala-bucaram-ortiz

    CIDOB. (n.d.-b). Alfredo Palacio González [Political biography]. https://www.cidob.org/lider-politico/alfredo-palacio-gonzalez

    CIDOB. (n.d.-c). Fabián Alarcón Rivera [Political biography]. https://www.cidob.org/lider-politico/fabian-alarcon-rivera

    CIDOB. (n.d.-d). Gustavo Noboa Bejarano [Political biography]. https://www.cidob.org/lider-politico/gustavo-noboa-bejarano

    CIDOB. (n.d.-e). Lucio Gutiérrez Borbúa [Political biography]. https://www.cidob.org/lider-politico/lucio-gutierrez-borbua

    CIDOB. (n.d.-f). Rafael Correa Delgado [Political biography]. https://www.cidob.org/lider-politico/rafael-correa-delgado

    Constitución Política de la República del Ecuador [Const.]. Art. 264. 1998 (Ecuador). https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2002/0061.pdf

    Correa, R. (2004). Dolarización y desdolarización: Más elementos para el debate. Comentarios al dossier de Íconos 19. Íconos. Revista de Ciencias Sociales, (20), 84–89. https://iconos.flacsoandes.edu.ec/index.php/iconos/article/download/48/45/

    Ecuador en Vivo. (2020, January 4). La dolarización salvó a Ecuador de la hiperinflación [Reprint from La Hora de Quito]. http://www.ecuadorenvivo.com/economia/23-economia/112764-la-dolarizacion-salvo-a-ecuador-de-la-hiperinflacion-la-hora-de-quito.html

    Hernández, M. C. (2020, January 24). Los pros y los contras de la dolarización en Ecuador, 20 años después. France 24. https://www.france24.com/es/20200124-dolarizacion-ecuador-pros-contras-20-a%C3%B1os

    Hernández, R. A. (2001). Elementos de competitividad sistémica de las pequeñas y medianas empresas (PYME) del Istmo Centroamericano (Estudios y Perspectivas series, No. 5). Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe. https://repositorio.cepal.org/items/d0dda9dd-010d-4070-b8a2-df2058c167a5

    IOL Inversiones. (n.d.). Rafael Correa responde si Ecuador dejará de lado la dolarización [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UOWk26gBf3A

    JuanK. (n.d.). Rafael Correa: Porque no es tan fácil desmontar la dolarización [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJsbqmEpEuE

    León Cercado, A., & Triana Villanueva, M. (n.d.). Efecto e influencia de los certificados de depósitos reprogramados (CDR’s) durante 1999–2000 en el mercado ecuatoriano [Thesis article]. Escuela Superior Politécnica del Litoral. https://www.dspace.espol.edu.ec/bitstream/123456789/2188/1/4302.pdf

    Martín-Mayoral, F. (2009). Desde los años 50 hasta el gobierno de Rafael Correa. Nueva Sociedad, (221), 120–136. https://static.nuso.org/media/articles/downloads/3613_1.pdf

    Mesías, A. (2002). La crisis bancaria de 1999: Un análisis a partir de la teoría de información asimétrica. Cuestiones Económicas, 18(2), 69–171. https://estudioseconomicos.bce.fin.ec/index.php/RevistaCE/article/view/222

    Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería, Acuacultura y Pesca. (2016). La política agropecuaria ecuatoriana: Hacia el desarrollo territorial rural sostenible 2015–2025 (Part I). http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/ecu183434.pdf

    Oleas, J. (2020). Ecuador: La economía política del feriado bancario (8–12 de marzo de 1999). Revista Uruguaya de Historia Económica, (17), 49–67. https://www.audhe.org.uy/images/stories/upload/Revista/Revista_17/Oleas.pdf

    Ostry, J. D., Loungani, P., & Furceri, D. (2016). Neoliberalism: Oversold? Finance & Development, 53(2), 38–41. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2016/06/ostry.htm

    Robalino, J. (2021, March 8). A 22 años del congelamiento de depósitos y salvataje bancario: El atraco del siglo. Pichincha Comunicaciones. https://www.pichinchacomunicaciones.com.ec/a-22-anos-del-congelamiento-de-depositos-y-salvataje-bancario-el-atraco-del-siglo/

    Roura, A. M. (2020, January 9). 20 años de la dolarización en Ecuador: ¿Por qué es tan popular la dolarización entre los ecuatorianos? (y cuál es su lado oscuro). BBC News Mundo. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50916554

    Westreicher, G. (2019, April 10). Diferencia entre dinero orgánico e inorgánico. Economipedia. https://economipedia.com/definiciones/diferencia-entre-dinero-organico-e-inorganico.html

  • DOLLARIZATION AND DE-DOLLARIZATION: A TECHNICAL, HISTORICAL AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS, PART II

    DOLLARIZATION AND DE-DOLLARIZATION: A TECHNICAL, HISTORICAL AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS, PART II

    Marxist Philosophy of Science

    Political economy · Monetary history · Part II

    Dollarization and dedollarization

    A Technical, Historical, and International Analysis · Part II

    The Oriental Republic of Uruguay: crisis, financial vulnerability, and the rebuilding of peso markets

    Originally published: December 2, 2021
    Revised: November 4, 2026

    I. Structural conditions and monetary crisis

    1.1. Overview

    As Aboal et al. (2006, p. 8) explain, following the devaluation experienced by Uruguay at the beginning of this century, the government needed to define a monetary anchor that could no longer be the exchange rate. This process took several months and culminated in late 2002 with the adoption of the monetary base as the system’s anchor. As expected, the period following devaluation and the move to a floating exchange rate brought substantial exchange rate volatility. This reflected both the transition from a relatively fixed to a flexible rate and market uncertainty while the future course of monetary policy remained unclear (see Figure 2).

    The figures below illustrate these developments. BM denotes the monetary base, and MI denotes the inflation target, retaining the abbreviations used in the Spanish source.

    Figure 1
    The evolution of de jure monetary and exchange rate policy, 1990–2005
    1. Exchange rate bands
    2. Floating exchange rate
    3. Point target for the monetary base
    4. Monetary base target range and inflation target
    5. Inflation targeting?

    Note. BM = monetary base; MI = inflation target, using the Spanish abbreviations. The question mark in the final milestone is retained from the published diagram. Adapted from Aboal et al. (2006, p. 8).

    Figure 2
    Interbank buying exchange rate: daily percentage change, 1999–2005
    Daily exchange rate volatilityVolatility is concentrated around 2002; the chart is truncated at plus and minus five percent. The visible trace is reconstructed without recovering exact daily observations.5%4%3%2%1%0%-1%-2%-3%-4%-5%1999200020012002200320042005

    Note. Approximate vector reconstruction of the published trace; the underlying daily numerical series was not recovered. Annual labels are indicative. The source truncates the largest fluctuations so that the remaining changes remain visible; on some days the change exceeded 10%. Adapted from Aboal et al. (2006, p. 9), using BCU data.

    The period after 2002 is the starting point for Labat and Licandro’s (2021) examination of monetary policy, rather than the beginning of dollarization in Uruguay. Dollarization was an earlier, unofficial process whose origins Licandro and Mello (2018, p. 368) trace to the 1950s. It is therefore necessary to distinguish the conditions that produced and consolidated dollarization from the reforms undertaken after the 2002 crisis to reduce its vulnerabilities.

    1.2. Inflation

    As Labat and Licandro (2021) explain, Uruguay began conducting monetary policy under a freely floating exchange rate only after the 2002 crisis, shifting its nominal objective toward inflation. Uruguay’s history had been marked by successive forms of fixed exchange rate arrangements, interrupted by short and disorderly episodes of floating, until the abandonment of the exchange rate band in June 2002.

    During the crisis, the Central Bank chose to manage the monetary base. Its authorities considered it important to commit to an attainable short-term target in order to build credibility over time. From September 2002, the Bank announced quarterly monetary base targets, initially without referring to an inflation target. After the debt exchange was completed in the first half of 2003, the Bank began introducing an explicit numerical reference for inflation.

    Policy commitments gradually shifted first toward monetary aggregates and then toward inflation. By early 2005, Uruguay operated under what could be described as an inflation targeting regime, using monetary aggregates as the policy instrument. The Ministry of Economy and Finance initially set the midpoint of the target range at 5.5%; this was reduced to 5% in early 2005 and remained there until August 2020. The band was initially set at ±2 percentage points, temporarily narrowed to ±1 percentage point in 2009, and restored to its earlier design in 2013.

    The initial monetary policy instrument under inflation targeting was M1′. In July 2007, the Banco Central del Uruguay switched to the overnight interbank interest rate, before returning to monetary aggregate management in July 2013.

    According to Labat and Licandro’s (2021) assessment, the Central Bank’s new charter was approved in 2008. Although the law gave the financial services regulator greater autonomy, its initial intention to improve the monetary policy framework was not fulfilled. The draft sent by the Central Bank to the Ministry of Economy and Finance was aligned with established principles of central bank institutional design and proposed several improvements that were absent from the final text. These included prioritizing inflation as the principal objective, introducing overlapping eight-year terms for board members, and strengthening accountability. Such proposals failed during the parliamentary process, as similar initiatives had in the 1995 discussions.

    None of these proposals was ultimately adopted. Instead, the creation of a Macroeconomic Coordination Committee (CCM), with an ambiguous mandate and a clear predominance of the Ministry of Economy and Finance over the Central Bank, reduced the latter’s independence; see Licandro and Licandro (2010, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021). The new charter also described the Bank’s objectives ambiguously, leaving considerable room for different interpretations of how policy should be conducted.

    In Labat and Licandro’s (2021) interpretation, monetary policy practice did not remedy the institutional design. The Central Bank maintained close institutional coordination with the Ministry of Economy and Finance. After the CCM was established, its quarterly meetings were held the day before, or even on the same day as, Monetary Policy Committee meetings, immediately before the COPOM sessions. This remained the usual coordination practice until early 2020. The authors also characterize the period as one of persistent and visible conflict among the Central Bank’s objectives.

    The Central Bank highlighted this conflict in its public communication through images presenting monetary policy as a balancing exercise, an imperfect discipline, and an activity requiring flexibility in the use of instruments. This reflected an interpretation of its statutory mandate in which the conflict between economic activity and inflation was permanent. In practice, inflation became the priority when it approached 10%, while activity took precedence when inflation approached its target.

    Alegre (2008, p. 148) describes the evolution of inflation and real wages as follows (English translation):

    As inflation declined progressively to single digits by the late 1990s—from 81% in 1991 to slightly above 8% in 1998—real wages increased much more moderately over the same period, by approximately 7.5% cumulatively between 1991 and 1998 (INE, 2003).

    The reference to the INE’s 2003 data appears within Alegre’s discussion and is therefore used here as an indirect citation.

    1.3. External debt

    Alegre (2008, p. 148) describes the implications of the Brady Plan as follows (English translation):

    The refinancing of Uruguay’s external debt through the Brady Plan involved debt reductions for Uruguay and other participating countries in the region, in exchange for commitments to accelerate reforms in areas such as public enterprises, trade, and the labor market. The renegotiation also redirected exchange rate policy away from achieving external balance and toward an anti-inflationary role, since maintaining a high exchange rate to generate trade surpluses for debt payments was no longer necessary (Rodríguez, Cozzano, & Mazzuchi, 2001).

    Rodríguez et al. (2001) are cited within Alegre’s passage and are used here through that secondary source.

    To reconstruct the external debt background, the research conducted on June 7, 2021 used a copy of the Banco Central del Uruguay report preserved by the Internet Archive, because of the access difficulties encountered at the time. Within the initial period of interest, 1990–2003, the recovered material covers 1999–2003. The reproduced report also contains subsequent annual figures and quarterly observations through December 2015, all of which are retained in the tables below. Difficulties encountered in that consultation do not imply that institutional portals currently lack relevant data.

    Table 1. Gross external debt by debtorMillions of US dollars · end-of-period balances
    PeriodTotalCentral governmentLocal governmentsPublic enterprisesBCUPublic banksPrivate banksPrivate nonbank sector
    199913,3824,120835308583787,413N/A
    200014,6074,6971054997913468,169N/A
    200115,9674,5861284946216819,458N/A
    200212,8767,1611364405623404,237N/A
    200313,2418,2001474407703433,340N/A
    200414,0828,6281513921,0353173,559N/A
    200513,7178,7671504178423223,218N/A
    200612,9778,582148532503263,340N/A
    200714,8649,9281388951053183,480N/A
    200815,4259,5331289191553294,361N/A
    200917,96910,6401181,3926193484,853N/A
    201018,42510,5931081,2838383615,243N/A
    201118,34511,3191411,7848143793,909N/A
    I.1220,95911,7621451,8377533963,7792,287
    II.1221,31211,3371451,9909933933,9192,534
    III.1222,23011,5811531,9951,2374204,0812,762
    201224,03012,9021571,9391,2484174,3243,044
    I.1323,56812,9561591,2701,2114314,3673,174
    II.1324,51613,1271681,3011,3864594,6483,427
    III.1325,79513,8391681,4331,5684654,7183,605
    201326,51814,2551731,5461,5864854,6403,833
    I.1426,68613,7961721,7071,7135154,6364,147
    II.1428,55315,0101661,7361,7445154,8694,514
    III.1428,40514,7561651,6871,5965284,8984,775
    201428,10014,9041711,8171,5135454,9614,188
    I.15 *29,51315,7751711,8771,4027575,3224,209
    II.15 *29,46415,4671641,9731,5557735,2044,327
    III.15 *28,10514,9761641,4111,1788155,2024,359
    2015 *28,67815,4911581,3731,0438735,1644,576
    Note. Source: Banco Central del Uruguay (n.d.), report containing data through December 2015. Commas separate thousands; N/A means data are not available. I, II, and III identify quarters; full-year labels refer to December closing balances. The source’s asterisk for 2015 is retained; its meaning is not specified in the reproduced extract.
    Composition by debtor · December 2015
    Central government
    54.0%
    Local governments
    0.6%
    Public enterprises
    4.8%
    BCU
    3.6%
    Public banks
    3.0%
    Private banks
    18.0%
    Private nonbank sector
    16.0%

    Percentages calculated from the balances in Table 1. These replace the pie chart and may differ from its whole-number percentages because of rounding.

    Table 2. Gross external debt by instrumentMillions of US dollars · end-of-period balances
    PeriodTotalDebt securitiesBrady bondsInternational loansTrade creditsDepositsOther
    199913,3822,3986442,4964936,633718
    200014,6072,8485932,6034747,237853
    200115,9672,7194312,6254788,760953
    200212,8762,9554104,8814833,489658
    200313,2413,5671565,7095542,818437
    200414,0823,9761435,9505633,018432
    200513,7174,383265,5646252,686433
    200612,9776,30632,7177052,814432
    200714,8647,70202,7221,0592,949433
    200815,4256,98003,2718983,845431
    200917,9697,18804,7171,2704,361433
    201018,4257,80204,1381,2864,415784
    201118,3458,81304,1761,4713,8814
    I.1220,9599,33606,6751,2573,569122
    II.1221,3129,19007,0271,3633,610121
    III.1222,2309,68507,3661,2593,796124
    201224,03011,05607,7631,1943,890127
    I.1323,56811,62807,4465273,853114
    II.1324,51611,98607,8465154,069100
    III.1325,79512,88008,0166394,17388
    201326,51813,28008,3815814,20274
    I.1426,68612,91608,6337844,232122
    II.1428,55314,14208,9318704,479130
    III.1428,40513,78209,2707144,431208
    201428,10013,86608,7098654,428232
    I.15 *29,51314,69509,1588504,564247
    II.15 *29,46414,50809,1739594,566257
    III.15 *28,10513,64509,0943674,728270
    2015 *28,67813,99609,2024614,741278
    Note. Source: Banco Central del Uruguay (n.d.), report containing data through December 2015. Commas separate thousands; N/A means data are not available. I, II, and III identify quarters; full-year labels refer to December closing balances. The source’s asterisk for 2015 is retained; its meaning is not specified in the reproduced extract.
    Composition by instrument · December 2015
    Debt securities
    48.8%
    Brady bonds
    0.0%
    International loans
    32.1%
    Trade credits
    1.6%
    Deposits
    16.5%
    Other
    1.0%

    Percentages calculated from the balances in Table 2, replacing the source’s pie chart.

    Table 3. Gross external debt by contractual maturity and currencyMillions of US dollars · end-of-period balances
    PeriodTotalUp to one yearOver one yearPesosUS dollarsYenEurosSDRsOther
    199913,3827,3885,994612,6061447157462
    200014,6078,0996,508513,713133176149431
    200115,9679,7296,238714,932324345143216
    200212,8763,6519,225210,2672944621,79457
    200313,2412,96610,2752109,8642514352,41664
    200414,0823,37110,71144710,1332624742,68381
    200513,7173,03610,68140510,0462296652,31163
    200612,9773,1579,82054211,531221626751
    200714,8643,55311,3101,77411,943472632835
    200815,4254,22111,2041,51712,829556488728
    200917,9694,99612,9731,22515,21153849746533
    201018,4255,17713,2481,78115,16854445545819
    201118,3454,07114,2743,20213,99352814645620
    I.1220,9595,04915,9093,74516,09149114946120
    II.1221,3125,29916,0123,60416,56150716945119
    III.1222,2305,42116,8094,15816,92151915345920
    201224,0305,56218,4685,45817,49847012845720
    I.1323,5685,62017,9486,28416,26642812644420
    II.1324,5165,89518,6216,66416,86340611644719
    III.1325,7955,87319,9226,44318,36841010045519
    201326,5185,81520,7037,02018,52938311045719
    I.1426,6866,00920,6776,64519,06838910645820
    II.1428,5536,29322,2606,77420,8053969945820
    III.1428,4056,37922,0266,41321,0753669443919
    201428,1006,34721,7536,54520,34858617442918
    I.15 *29,5136,47323,0406,43021,92158415440816
    II.15 *29,4646,39923,0646,28422,01657216041616
    III.15 *28,1056,39121,7145,53421,38858417141514
    2015 *28,6786,31822,3605,07922,43158016441013
    Note. SDRs = special drawing rights. Source: Banco Central del Uruguay (n.d.), report containing data through December 2015. Commas separate thousands; N/A means data are not available. I, II, and III identify quarters; full-year labels refer to December closing balances. The source’s asterisk for 2015 is retained; its meaning is not specified in the reproduced extract.
    Composition by maturity · December 2015
    Up to one year
    22.0%
    Over one year
    78.0%

    Percentages calculated from Table 3.

    Composition by currency · December 2015
    Pesos
    17.7%
    US dollars
    78.2%
    Yen
    2.0%
    Euros
    0.6%
    SDRs
    1.4%
    Other
    0.0%

    Percentages calculated from Table 3. External debt is defined by the creditor’s residence and may therefore include liabilities denominated in pesos.

    Table 4A. External assets: total and public sectorsMillions of US dollars · end-of-period balances
    PeriodTotal assetsNFPS · shortNFPS · longBCU · shortBCU · longPublic banks · shortPublic banks · long
    1999-10,5020-62-2,606-255-648-43
    2000-11,2370-95-2,742-258-561-67
    2001-12,8980-85-3,099-263-638-70
    2002-5,682-505-127-777-282-296-20
    2003-6,932-230-184-2,088-256-866-58
    2004-7,877-20-103-2,514-332-1,154-328
    2005-8,956-52-148-3,398-288-1,384-313
    2006-8,815-67-151-3,091-291-1,094-810
    2007-11,239-251-231-5,016-273-1,839-402
    2008-13,233-94-183-6,659-548-1,611-295
    2009-16,630-245-283-8,210-609-1,307-1,082
    2010-18,270-144-29-7,940-622-2,134-1,441
    2011-19,568-76-4-10,314-752-1,491-2,391
    I.12-31,254-136-27-11,296-708-2,915-969
    II.12-32,568-107-5-12,101-705-2,979-967
    III.12-31,945-69-22-12,817-733-2,999-980
    2012-31,879-64-28-13,567-731-2,752-1,127
    I.13-32,521-100-16-13,478-733-2,779-1,142
    II.13-34,409-112-24-14,863-729-2,952-1,120
    III.13-35,830-11-32-15,861-760-3,022-1,167
    2013-35,565-93-26-16,275-765-2,923-1,180
    I.14-36,472-101-38-16,504-785-2,748-1,262
    II.14-38,291-174-26-18,603-796-2,828-1,330
    III.14-39,318-115-27-17,757-831-2,979-1,521
    2014-37,420-42-40-17,555-818-2,750-1,561
    I.15 *-39,599-65-33-18,584-816-2,843-1,536
    II.15 *-39,962-95-44-18,324-820-3,050-1,572
    III.15 *-38,018-54-39-16,424-855-3,348-1,901
    2015 *-37,923-49-40-15,634-861-3,257-2,023
    Note. NFPS = nonfinancial public sector. Assets retain their negative signs because they are deducted from gross debt. Source: Banco Central del Uruguay (n.d.), report containing data through December 2015. Commas separate thousands; N/A means data are not available. I, II, and III identify quarters; full-year labels refer to December closing balances. The source’s asterisk for 2015 is retained; its meaning is not specified in the reproduced extract.
    Table 4B. Private sector external assetsMillions of US dollars · end-of-period balances
    PeriodBanks · shortBanks · longNonbanks · shortNonbanks · long
    1999-3,928-2,960N/AN/A
    2000-4,809-2,705N/AN/A
    2001-4,551-4,192N/AN/A
    2002-2,419-1,256N/AN/A
    2003-1,682-1,568N/AN/A
    2004-2,086-1,340N/AN/A
    2005-2,375-997N/AN/A
    2006-2,336-974N/AN/A
    2007-2,231-996N/AN/A
    2008-2,790-1,053N/AN/A
    2009-3,804-1,091N/AN/A
    2010-4,543-1,417N/AN/A
    2011-3,782-757N/AN/A
    I.12-4,212-975-8,287-1,728
    II.12-4,031-965-8,979-1,728
    III.12-3,687-1,140-7,774-1,726
    2012-3,365-1,200-7,629-1,416
    I.13-3,732-1,127-7,996-1,418
    II.13-3,517-1,214-8,461-1,418
    III.13-4,032-1,067-8,464-1,415
    2013-3,128-990-8,729-1,456
    I.14-3,417-999-9,163-1,455
    II.14-3,159-823-9,095-1,457
    III.14-4,199-799-9,634-1,456
    2014-3,603-782-8,764-1,507
    I.15 *-4,406-807-9,319-1,190
    II.15 *-4,552-862-9,614-1,029
    III.15 *-4,581-892-9,048-876
    2015 *-4,236-1,465-9,378-979
    Note. Continuation of the same external assets table; short and long refer to contractual maturity. Source: Banco Central del Uruguay (n.d.), report containing data through December 2015. Commas separate thousands; N/A means data are not available. I, II, and III identify quarters; full-year labels refer to December closing balances. The source’s asterisk for 2015 is retained; its meaning is not specified in the reproduced extract.
    Table 5A. Net external debt: national total and public sectorMillions of US dollars · end-of-period balances
    PeriodNational totalPublic · totalPublic · short · netPublic · short · grossPublic · short · assetsPublic · long · netPublic · long · grossPublic · long · assets
    19992,8802,668-2,070536-2,6064,7385,055-317
    20003,3702,997-2,117625-2,7425,1145,467-353
    20013,0692,381-2,528571-3,0994,9095,257-348
    20027,1946,608-404878-1,2827,0137,421-409
    20036,3096,800-1,338980-2,3188,1388,577-440
    20046,2057,237-1,3091,225-2,5348,5468,981-435
    20054,7616,290-1,4941,957-3,4507,7838,220-437
    20064,1625,711-2,819339-3,1588,5298,972-443
    20073,6255,295-4,620646-5,2669,91510,419-504
    20082,1923,252-6,243509-6,7529,49510,226-732
    20091,3403,424-7,589866-8,45511,01211,904-892
    20101764,107-6,8351,249-8,08410,94211,593-651
    2011-1,2212,912-9,2911,099-10,39012,20312,960-757
    I.12-10,2952,329-10,2931,138-11,43112,62213,358-736
    II.12-11,2561,548-11,461747-12,20813,00813,718-710
    III.12-9,7131,329-10,8262,060-12,88512,15512,909-755
    2012-7,8481,857-11,5672,064-13,63113,42414,182-759
    I.13-8,9511,270-11,8971,681-13,57813,16813,917-749
    II.13-9,894254-13,2051,770-14,97513,45914,212-752
    III.13-10,034345-14,2311,641-15,87214,57615,367-791
    2013-9,047400-14,8071,562-16,36815,20715,997-791
    I.14-9,785-40-14,7341,871-16,60514,69415,517-823
    II.14-9,737-944-16,8881,890-18,77715,94416,766-822
    III.14-10,913-527-15,9101,962-17,87215,38416,242-858
    2014-9,321-48-14,6322,964-17,59614,58515,442-857
    I.15 *-10,086-274-15,7212,927-18,64915,44816,297-849
    II.15 *-10,498-123-15,5792,840-18,41815,45516,320-864
    III.15 *-9,913357-14,5451,934-16,47914,90115,795-894
    2015 *-9,2451,480-14,3321,352-15,68415,81216,713-902
    Note. Assets are shown with negative signs. Source: Banco Central del Uruguay (n.d.), report containing data through December 2015. Commas separate thousands; N/A means data are not available. I, II, and III identify quarters; full-year labels refer to December closing balances. The source’s asterisk for 2015 is retained; its meaning is not specified in the reproduced extract.
    Table 5B. Private sector net external debtMillions of US dollars · end-of-period balances
    PeriodPrivate · totalShort · netShort · grossShort · assetsLong · netLong · grossLong · assets
    19992123,1537,728-4,576-2,94063-3,003
    20003733,1048,475-5,371-2,73141-2,771
    20016874,90610,096-5,190-4,21943-4,262
    20025861,8234,538-2,715-1,23739-1,276
    2003-4911,1033,651-2,548-1,59433-1,626
    2004-1,033-3862,854-3,241-6461,021-1,668
    2005-1,528-1,1812,578-3,759-347963-1,310
    2006-1,549-7242,707-3,430-825959-1,784
    2007-1,670-1,1962,874-4,070-474924-1,399
    2008-1,059-7083,692-4,401-351997-1,348
    2009-2,083-9254,185-5,110-1,1581,015-2,173
    2010-3,931-2,4174,259-6,676-1,5131,345-2,858
    2011-4,133-1,5263,747-5,273-2,607542-3,148
    I.12-12,625-11,1624,252-15,415-1,4622,210-3,672
    II.12-12,804-11,6614,329-15,990-1,1432,518-3,660
    III.12-11,042-9,9714,488-14,459-1,0712,775-3,846
    2012-9,704-9,0344,712-13,746-6703,073-3,743
    I.13-10,222-9,7494,758-14,507-4733,213-3,686
    II.13-10,148-9,9275,002-14,929-2213,531-3,752
    III.13-10,379-10,4545,063-15,517753,724-3,649
    2013-9,447-9,8264,954-14,7803794,005-3,626
    I.14-9,745-10,2905,038-15,3285454,260-3,716
    II.14-8,794-9,7955,286-15,0821,0014,611-3,610
    III.14-10,387-11,4375,374-16,8111,0514,828-3,777
    2014-9,273-9,6665,451-15,1173934,243-3,850
    I.15 *-9,812-10,7205,848-16,5679074,441-3,533
    II.15 *-10,375-11,4685,747-17,2151,0934,557-3,464
    III.15 *-10,270-11,0985,879-16,9788294,497-3,668
    2015 *-10,725-10,9675,904-16,8712424,709-4,467
    Note. Continuation of Table 5A. Source: Banco Central del Uruguay (n.d.), report containing data through December 2015. Commas separate thousands; N/A means data are not available. I, II, and III identify quarters; full-year labels refer to December closing balances. The source’s asterisk for 2015 is retained; its meaning is not specified in the reproduced extract.

    1.4. Exchange rate

    According to Alegre (2008, pp. 147–149), Uruguay in the 1990s combined an exchange rate anchor with fiscal imbalances sensitive to economic and electoral cycles, and with a financial market vulnerable to international shocks. The Banco Central del Uruguay managed a fluctuation band for the peso against the dollar, buying and selling foreign currency to maintain its limits. An exchange rate band is not identical to every form of managed floating: in this case, explicit boundaries constrained exchange rate movements.

    Alegre (2008, p. 148) links overvaluation and import growth as follows (English translation):

    (…) relief from external indebtedness and access to low-interest credit under an overvalued exchange rate created incentives for imports of final consumption goods, generating import booms that were not matched by increases in economic productivity. This combination created serious difficulties once conditions changed. Regional devaluations weakened our country’s competitiveness.

    Alegre (2008, p. 149) explains that weaker international demand, the loss of export markets, and falling commodity prices contributed to large capital outflows. Higher interest rates increased the cost of credit, while exchange rate overvaluation and persistent borrowing undermined the system’s sustainability. The crisis culminated in the abandonment of the exchange rate band in 2002. Reserve losses and the need to support bank deposits intensified pressure on public finances and increased reliance on international financing.

    The estimate of reserves at approximately one billion dollars in late June 2002 comes from the BCU’s 2002 figures, cited indirectly by Alegre (2008, p. 149).

    II. The historical evolution of dollarization in Uruguay

    In 2021, dedollarization regained prominence in Uruguay’s economic policy debate. El País (2021) reported on the proposal promoted by Diego Labat, then president of the Banco Central del Uruguay, and Gerardo Licandro. Their document Hacia una moneda de calidad [Toward a quality currency] sets out an agenda for stabilization, rebuilding peso markets, and reducing dollarization (Labat & Licandro, 2021).

    Labat and Licandro (2021) argue that a quality currency supports growth, financial stability, and less pronounced economic cycles, and can mitigate certain distributional effects of inflation. Their approach, situated within the neoclassical macroeconomic tradition, draws on research connecting inflation, growth, and financial development: Barro (1995), Sarel (1995), Khan and Senhadji (2001), and Ibarra and Trupkin (2016), all cited in Labat and Licandro (2021). The reference to a threshold near 8% reflects the empirical result of Ibarra and Trupkin discussed by the authors; it is not a universal law applicable to every country, period, and institutional regime.

    Labat and Licandro (2021) propose that chronic inflation erodes financial markets denominated in domestic currency and encourages indexation mechanisms, including dollar denomination. In their account, Rousseau and Wachtel (2002, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021) connect financial depth with growth and show that high inflation can weaken that connection. Financial dollarization—the currency denomination of assets and liabilities—should be distinguished from real or price dollarization—the currency used for invoicing and price setting—even though the two interact.

    High inflation combined with external macroeconomic shocks, in a setting where the domestic currency’s role is progressively shrinking, considerably increases the risk of structural financial failure. Such shocks are common in small, highly open economies such as Uruguay. This configuration made dollarization a critical concern for Uruguay’s monetary authorities and other public institutions (Labat & Licandro, 2021).

    Labat and Licandro (2021) describe a balance sheet vulnerability mechanism: an adverse external shock may raise the real value of the dollar while reducing activity, employment, and real incomes. When a firm or household receives peso income but owes dollar debt, depreciation increases debt service expressed in domestic currency. This can occur even without an increase in the contractual dollar interest rate. Adequate peso financing provides an alternative for reducing that mismatch. When many borrowers are affected, default risk increases and can spread to the financial system and public finances.

    This is a systemic risk conditioned by balance sheets, hedging arrangements, and institutional responses, rather than an inevitable generalized default.

    According to Labat and Licandro (2021), the shortage of peso financing induces corporate responses that affect both balance sheets and production and marketing decisions. Licandro et al. (2014, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021) document lower leverage, faster inventory turnover, input accumulation, and liquidity holdings as substitutes for derivative-based hedging. Mello (2017), Licandro and Mello (2017), and Barón et al. (2017), cited in Labat and Licandro (2021), analyze liquidity accumulation and dollar invoicing as exchange rate hedging strategies used by Uruguayan firms.

    Dollar-denominated prices can deepen real economic cycles because dollar price rigidities shift a greater adjustment burden onto quantities than domestic currency price rigidities. With rigid prices, a negative demand shock affects quantities more strongly than when prices are flexible. Dollar price rigidity can be particularly damaging: when an adverse shock raises the dollar’s value, as in Uruguay, the peso price of the good rises rather than remaining unchanged, as it would under peso price rigidity, producing a steeper decline in output.

    Uruguay’s housing sector provides an example: it responds negatively to shocks that raise the real value of the dollar, in contrast with countries such as Colombia and Chile, where property prices are not conventionally quoted in dollars (Labat & Licandro, 2021).

    Labat and Licandro (2021) also examine distributional effects. When a mortgage has a fixed nominal balance in domestic currency, higher inflation reduces the real value of that balance; the household’s outcome also depends on its income, assets, and interest rate adjustments. This mechanism does not carry over unchanged to indexed or dollar-denominated debt. The authors draw on Coleman et al. (2010) and Lluberas and Odriozola (2014), as cited in Labat and Licandro (2021), to discuss inflation, poverty, inequality, and wealth distribution in Uruguay.

    They consequently present the development of peso markets as a central bank contribution to social welfare. This argument does not imply that monetary expansion necessarily reduces inequality.

    Dollarization in Uruguay was an unofficial historical process: the dollar expanded its roles in saving, credit, and valuation without legally replacing the peso as the national currency. There is therefore no single legal starting date comparable to one that might be identified in an official dollarization process. Licandro and Mello (2018, p. 368) trace its background to the 1950s. Monetary policy after 2002 must be understood within that longer trajectory.

    The 2002 crisis exposed vulnerabilities associated with currency mismatches. Drawing on Licandro and Licandro (2001, 2003, 2010, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021), Labat and Licandro (2021) describe a two-pillar strategy: recognizing through regulation the risks and incentives that favored dollarization, and rebuilding peso markets to provide an alternative to dollar financing.

    The regulatory agenda advanced in several directions. Recognition that the Central Bank cannot provide unlimited lender-of-last-resort support in foreign currency led to a deposit insurance scheme offering greater coverage in pesos than in dollars. Liquidity regulation was reformed, previous subsidies to dollar banking activity were removed, and peso reserve requirements were reduced. To address the exchange rate component of credit risk, access to the highest credit ratings was made conditional on balance sheet resilience under severe exchange rate stress.

    Bank capital regulation was revised to incorporate exchange rate risk. Dollar exposure limits were also reduced for pension funds and insurance companies. Under the second pillar, floating removed the implicit exchange rate guarantee. Public debt management increased the share of peso liabilities, helping to develop a peso yield curve. Indexed instruments offered alternatives to the dollar: the Unidad Indexada (UI), linked to inflation, and the Unidad Previsional (UP), linked to wages. The Central Bank helped develop an exchange rate futures market, and public banks were oriented more strongly toward peso activity.

    These measures illustrate the extensive monetary and financial regulatory reforms intended to reduce dollarization-related vulnerabilities. Regulation and supervision also improved in other areas. Labat and Licandro (2021) argue that charter changes allowed a substantial improvement in regulatory practice, assessed against established international standards. The UI and UP were not created simultaneously: the UP was established in 2018 (Law No. 19,608, 2018).

    This overview combines measures introduced at different stages of the post-2002 agenda (Labat & Licandro, 2021).

    Labat and Licandro (2021) note that the effectiveness of monetary policy has been highly contested in Uruguay. International institutions and domestic analysts have questioned its capacity to manage inflation because dollarization weakens monetary transmission, even though Uruguay’s dollarization is unofficial and does not involve a currency board regime.

    On the positive side, Labat and Licandro (2021) argue that monetary and regulatory reforms substantially corrected currency mismatches and reduced financial fragility. As Figures 3 and 4 indicate, mismatches in corporate balance sheets were greatly reduced, while lower public debt dollarization reduced the public sector’s currency mismatch. Peso operations also increased their share of total transactions, dollarization fell on both sides of bank balance sheets, and evidence of reduced price dollarization appeared in some sectors.

    On the negative side, Uruguay continued to exhibit shortcomings in peso market development and in long-term and risk financing. The authors interpret the reduction in fragility as having coexisted with a small, indexed financial system; this does not imply that all financial risk had disappeared.

    Figure 3
    Short-term foreign exchange positions of Uruguayan firms
    1982
    ≈ 0.32
    1983
    ≈ 0.37
    1984
    ≈ 0.36
    2008
    ≈ -0.25
    2009
    ≈ -0.26

    Note. Approximate heights read from the chart, whose scale runs from −0.4 to 0.6. The reproduced figure does not specify the denominator of the foreign exchange position, so these values should not be interpreted as verified percentages. Adapted from Labat and Licandro (2021, Figure 2).

    Figure 4
    Dollarization in Uruguay: selected indicators, 2002 and 2019

    Common scale: 0–100%. Dark tobacco: 2002 · light copper: 2019.

    Corporate debt
    2002 ≈ 75 %
    2019 ≈ 70 %
    Public debt
    2002 ≈ 96 %
    2019 ≈ 50 %
    Deposits
    2002 ≈ 91 %
    2019 ≈ 74 %
    Loans
    2002 ≈ 88 %
    2019 ≈ 50 %
    AFAP portfolios
    2002 ≈ 90 %
    2019 ≈ 27 %
    Credit transactions
    2002 ≈ 31 %
    2019 ≈ 12 %
    Check transactions
    2002 ≈ 62 %
    2019 ≈ 34 %
    Debit transactions
    2002 ≈ 40 %
    2019 ≈ 8 %

    Note. Approximate values read visually from the published chart; these are not official microdata. AFAP refers to pension savings fund administrators. Adapted from Labat and Licandro (2021, Figure 3), who identify their own calculations based on BCU data.

    Labat and Licandro (2021) conclude that insufficient inflation control and limited peso market development reinforce one another. This interaction creates inefficiencies in production and corporate balance sheet management, making it harder to consolidate an alternative to the dollar.

    III. The dedollarization proposal in Uruguay

    3.1. General framework

    Sustainable dedollarization requires peso markets to offer a credible and functional alternative to dollar financing. Labat and Licandro (2021) organize their proposals around a new monetary policy framework and specific measures to rebuild domestic currency markets.

    3.2. Credibility and expectations

    Labat and Licandro (2021, p. 15) make the following argument (English translation):

    The first and most important problem to correct is the lack of monetary policy credibility. Monetary policy institutions should therefore be reformed, for example by separating board appointments from the political cycle or requiring greater accountability. Although legal change would be desirable, provided fiscal and monetary policies are consistent, considerable room remains to improve the practices of existing monetary institutions.

    Credibility helps economic agents align their expectations, and consequently their actions, with the monetary policy conducted by the central bank. A prerequisite is that agents understand the Bank’s objectives, which requires adequate information. Transparency helps them understand the Bank’s assessment of the economy and the effects of monetary policy, guiding expectations if a crucial condition is met: agents with sufficient economic influence to counteract policy must find those policies sufficiently beneficial to align their behavior with them to some degree.

    This applies insofar as no legal and institutional framework compels those agents to achieve a specified degree of alignment with the policies in question.

    3.3. Independence and accountability

    Labat and Licandro (2021) propose strengthening the central bank’s operational independence and accountability. They identify as a 2020 improvement the separation of Macroeconomic Coordination Committee (CCM) and Monetary Policy Committee (COPOM) meetings, alongside less frequent CCM meetings and more frequent COPOM sessions. The central bank and the Ministry of Economy and Finance must coordinate financial stability, debt policy, and information exchange. The CCM should focus on long-term objectives, while monetary management remains the central bank’s responsibility.

    Accountability should explain how decisions support the achievement of targets and why those targets were missed when deviations occurred.

    3.4. Objectives and transparency

    Labat and Licandro (2021) argue that, to strengthen accountability, the Central Bank’s reports to the executive branch and the public should explain how policy would achieve its objectives and why it had previously failed to do so.

    Transparency is another dimension of Labat and Licandro’s (2021) program. The authors describe changes undertaken through 2021: publishing minutes and forward-looking statements, revising the monetary policy report, and increasing communication with analysts and the press. They also propose disclosing core inflation, forecasts, and explanations of target deviations. In their account, each decision is communicated through a short document followed by minutes, while quarterly information is supplemented with projections and public presentations. These mechanisms make the links between diagnosis, decisions, and results understandable. They further propose gradually lowering the long-term inflation target toward 3% and using the interest rate as the policy instrument.

    The discussion of nominal adjustment space and incentives for carry trade belongs to the program formulated in 2021, rather than describing the targets in force at the time of this revision.

    Policy implementation and market operations should be consistent with these principles. In Uruguay’s proposed framework, a target for headline CPI inflation is set within a range. The overnight money market interest rate is the key policy rate, supported by standing facilities and remuneration of excess reserves aligned with that rate. Smoothing volatility in short-term financial markets, including the foreign exchange market, is also important, provided it does not conflict with monetary policy’s principal objectives or undermine its communication (Labat & Licandro, 2021).

    3.5. Balancing objectives

    Labat and Licandro (2021, p. 15) make the following argument (English translation):

    First, the balance of objectives must be interpreted in light of the discussion at the beginning of this essay. Because the inflation that supports growth and employment is low and stable, the Central Bank should normally ensure an inflation rate consistent with the long-term development of peso markets. There will, of course, be times like the present when clear emergencies require bold action to support the economy. Under normal conditions, however, such action should be permitted only to the extent that inflation expectations remain anchored to the long-term target.

    3.6. The dedollarization program

    Labat and Licandro (2021) explain that, as inflation converges toward a lower long-term target, microeconomic and macroeconomic measures can help reduce dollarization and improve peso markets. The dedollarization initiative has four principal avenues:

    1. Microeconomic reforms within the financial system
    2. Changes in borrowing policy
    3. Addressing price dollarization, particularly for durable goods.
    4. Studying and addressing the causes of dollarization at a more granular level.

    As discussed above, the financial system had already undergone extensive reforms. Despite these changes, Labat and Licandro (2021) note that domestic currency deposits remained small, peso intermediation spreads remained wide, and access to peso financial products was still insufficient. Part of the problem stems from price dollarization, which encourages people to save in dollars to purchase durable goods. Another part reflects financial intermediation costs and the financial sector’s microstructure.

    The authors nevertheless identify further, more granular explanations that require additional research.

    Labat and Licandro (2021) further argue that borrowing policy, together with regulatory changes, has been a major contributor to progress in peso market development and dedollarization, while still leaving an unfinished agenda. Debt instruments denominated in indexed units 1 (UI) and pension units 2 (UP), together with the more recent push toward nominal peso instruments, are among the principal initiatives led by the Debt Management Unit. The Banco Central del Uruguay and that Unit were developing a new approach to coordinating debt issuance to deepen peso markets.

    Expanding nonresident access to peso instruments through Euroclear and concentrating BCU issuance at shorter maturities were two measures under development to support this agenda.

    Price dedollarization adds a further dimension by addressing the peso’s role as the economy’s numeraire. The evidence discussed suggests that price dollarization recedes as inflation declines. The experience of Peru also suggests that changes to consumer protection regulation can help reduce price dollarization. Because progress has nevertheless been slow, it is necessary to understand the underlying obstacles and persuade agents of the need to return to peso pricing.

    Because the choice of numeraire is a coordination equilibrium, returning to peso pricing requires both persuasion and coordination: explaining the externalities that dollarization creates for growth, economic cycles, financial stability, and distribution; and working with stakeholders to identify the reforms needed to change established behavior (Labat & Licandro, 2021).

    Labat and Licandro (2021) propose dialogue among financial institutions, public bodies, and firms to understand the specific mechanisms of dollarization. The aim is to identify regulations, practices, and laws requiring change, coordinate the peso’s return as the dominant numeraire, and use public communication to facilitate the process. Private behavioral alignment depends on the institutional conditions and incentives discussed above.

    Finally, Labat and Licandro (2021) reaffirm that inadequate peso markets, arising from chronic inflation and embedded in government practices, culture, business, and the financial system, generate significant externalities requiring policy action. This points directly to cultural dollarization: the socially entrenched use of the dollar as a unit of account and a reference for value.

    IV. References

    Aboal, D., Lanzilotta, B., & Perera, M. (2006). ¿Flotación de jure y de facto? La política monetaria-cambiaria en el período poscrisis en Uruguay [De jure and de facto floating? Monetary and exchange rate policy in post-crisis Uruguay]. Centro de Investigaciones Económicas. https://www.bcu.gub.uy/Comunicaciones/Jornadas%20de%20Economa/iees03j3070806.pdf

    Alegre, P. (2008). Democracia y reformas en el Uruguay: Un caso de gradualismo perverso [Democracy and reforms in Uruguay: A case of perverse gradualism]. Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política, 17(1), 137–158. https://revistasfcs.edu.uy/index.php/rucp/es/article/view/786

    Banco Central del Uruguay. (n.d.). Deuda externa del Uruguay [Uruguay’s external debt; statistical report with data through December 2015]. https://web.archive.org/web/20160502222455if_/http://bcu.gub.uy/Estadisticas-e-Indicadores/Documents/Finanzas-Publicas/resdeu.pdf

    El País. (2021, April 27). ¿Qué piensa hacer el gobierno para desdolarizar la economía uruguaya? El documento oficial [What does the government intend to do to dedollarize Uruguay’s economy? The official document]. https://www.elpais.com.uy/negocios/noticias/que-piensa-hacer-el-gobierno-para-desdolarizar-la-economia-uruguaya-el-documento-oficial

    Instituto Nacional de Estadística. (n.d.). ¿Qué es la Unidad Indexada? [What is the indexed unit?] https://www.gub.uy/instituto-nacional-estadistica/comunicacion/publicaciones/preguntas-frecuentes/preguntas-frecuentes/es-unidad-indexada

    Labat, D., & Licandro, G. (2021). Hacia una moneda de calidad: Documento de política [Toward a quality currency: Policy document] (Working Paper No. 004-2021). Banco Central del Uruguay. https://www.bcu.gub.uy/Estadisticas-e-Indicadores/Documentos%20de%20Trabajo/4.2021.pdf

    Law No. 19,608, Creación de la Unidad Previsional (UP) [Creation of the pension unit (UP)]. (2018, April 13). Diario Oficial de la República Oriental del Uruguay, April 19, 2018. https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/leyes/19608-2018

    Licandro, G., & Mello, M. (2018). Dolarización cultural y financiera de los hogares uruguayos [Cultural and financial dollarization of Uruguayan households]. In M. J. Roa & D. Mejía (Eds.), Decisiones financieras de los hogares e inclusión financiera: Evidencia para América Latina y el Caribe [Household financial decisions and financial inclusion: Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean] (pp. 365–404). Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos. https://www.cemla.org/PDF/ic/ic-2016/ic-2016-11.pdf

    V. Notes

    1. Indexed unit (Unidad Indexada, UI). A unit of value adjusted according to the CPI. Its value changes daily under the official methodology; indexation incorporates lags and should not be confused with an immediate adjustment to the price of every individual good (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, n.d.). ↩
    2. Pension unit (Unidad Previsional, UP). A unit of value created by Law No. 19,608 of 2018. It changes daily under the methodology linked to the Nominal Average Wage Index, with the lags specified in Article 2. ↩
  • DOLLARIZATION AND DE-DOLLARIZATION: A TECHNICAL, HISTORICAL AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS, PART I

    DOLLARIZATION AND DE-DOLLARIZATION: A TECHNICAL, HISTORICAL AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS, PART I

    Marxist Philosophy of Science · Political Economy

    Dollarization and Dedollarization

    A Technical, Historical, and International Analysis · Part I

    JOSÉ MAURICIO GÓMEZ JULIÁN

    Originally published: December 2, 2021
    English version: November 4, 2026

    I. Foreword

    In the economic crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, some countries are considering redesigning their economies, partially or entirely as circumstances require, to address the challenges that a cyclical crisis of capitalism poses to national economies, especially non-industrialized economies such as those of Latin America. Consequently, countries such as Uruguay and El Salvador are considering reversing the dollarization present in their economies’ channels of circulation.

    The main objective of this research is to establish the general characteristics of dedollarization processes and their effects on economic performance, while also accounting for departures from the general case. The analysis considers both the particular characteristics of the country implementing the process and the abstract, theoretical case that sets those characteristics aside, without thereby being any less real. The purpose is to determine with sufficient rigor whether undertaking this process is advisable for any country, beyond its particular circumstances, without implying that these circumstances are irrelevant or should be disregarded. In other words, the aim is to understand what the outcome depends on and why it takes one form rather than another. This objective is pursued through the following steps.

    First, the research seeks to identify common elements in dollarization across countries worldwide, relatively independently of specific structural and conjunctural macroeconomic conditions. Particular attention will be paid to economic systems with greater structural similarities, such as those of Latin America. This should improve the reliability of the comparisons because the group under analysis is more homogeneous or, more precisely, less heterogeneous.

    Because the package of economic policies promoted worldwide from Washington, imposed through the IMF, and organized around the philosophy that Soros himself has called “free-market fundamentalism,” popularly known as neoliberalism, is broadly the same throughout Latin America, comparability in the sense defined above would appear, in general, to be assured.

    Second, the research seeks to identify, at least in general terms, how the process of dollarization and its effects, as previously defined, differ according to the particular national economic system under analysis. These differences arise from specific sets of characteristics that vary across economic systems. The research also seeks to explain why these differences take the forms they do.

    The aim is therefore to construct a general theory of dollarization and dedollarization, fully grounded in empirical evidence coherently integrated through dialectical-materialist logic[1], to answer the research questions above and understand the geopolitical economy behind monetary replacement processes in Latin America, where monetary replacement takes the form of dollarization.

    Accordingly, this research will comprise eight parts. In addition to the general introduction, the first part presents fundamental theoretical concepts, a discussion of orthodox theories of monetary integration, and historical considerations concerning the international monetary system. The second part examines dollarization in Uruguay; the third, Ecuador; the fourth, El Salvador; the fifth, Argentina; the sixth, Costa Rica; and the seventh, Colombia. Finally, the eighth part develops the general theoretical model from the preceding findings.

    II. Fundamental concepts

    II.I. Money as the universal equivalent of commodities (goods and services)

    As Borisov et al. (2009, pp. 88–89) explain, the universal equivalent is a commodity, understood here as a good or service, that expresses the value of all other commodities and for which they are all exchanged. When different commodities are exchanged for the universal equivalent, the latter’s value appears as the general form of value: the quantity of social labor crystallized in a commodity. The emergence of this equivalent implies a relatively advanced level of commodity production and the existence of regular exchange.

    One commodity enjoying consistently high market demand spontaneously separated itself from the world of commodities. Direct exchange, or barter of one commodity for another, was thereby displaced by commodity circulation, in which transactions occur through an intermediary: the universal equivalent. Exchange began to divide into two connected acts. First, producers exchanged their commodities for the universal equivalent; then they exchanged that equivalent commodity for what they needed. Different peoples, depending on the conditions of production and exchange, adopted different commodities as universal equivalents: livestock, cereals, hides, metals, and so forth.

    As commodity production and international trade developed, precious metals, gold and silver, increasingly came to serve as universal equivalents and became money. Eventually, gold assumed the function of universal equivalent in commercial transactions.

    II.II. Definition and brief history of money

    As Borisov et al. (2009, p. 72) explain, money is the commodity whose specific function is to serve as the universal equivalent of every kind of commodity. Money arose spontaneously in remote antiquity through the development of exchange and the forms of value. In the initial stages of exchange, various commodities served as universal equivalents. Gradually, the monetary function spontaneously became attached to silver and gold because their distinctive physical and chemical properties made these metals particularly suitable for this role. In the twentieth century, the function of the money commodity became restricted exclusively to gold[2]. Money emerged from the development of the commodity’s internal contradiction, between use-value[3] and exchange-value[4][5]. Consequently, the entire world of commodities split into two poles: (1) all commodities as use-values, and (2) money as the general embodiment of value.

    The value of all other commodities is expressed in money’s use-value. The concrete labor[6] contained in money serves as the general form in which abstract labor[7] manifests itself, and the private labor embodied in money appears in a socially recognized form. Money makes possible the social accounting of labor and the measurement of labor contained in commodities. This measurement does not occur directly and immediately in units of labor time, but indirectly, through commodity prices. Unlike other commodities, money can be exchanged directly and universally for any other commodity. The nature and economic role of money manifest themselves in its functions (Borisov et al., 2009).

    II.III. Functions of money

    As Borisov et al. (2009, pp. 109–110) explain, the functions of money are the concrete forms in which its nature as universal equivalent manifests itself. In a developed commodity economy, money performs the following five functions:

    1. Measure of value
    2. Medium of circulation
    3. Means of accumulation or hoarding
    4. Means of payment
    5. World money.

    II.III.I. Measure of value

    Money’s function as a measure of value means that money, in the form of gold, as discussed in the final section, provides the material through which the value of all other commodities is expressed. Every commodity, whatever it may be, expresses its value in money. This makes it possible to compare different commodities quantitatively. Money can perform this function as mentally represented or ideal money because a definite relationship exists between the value of gold and that of the commodity concerned. This relationship rests on the socially necessary labor expended in producing each. The value of a commodity expressed in money is its price (Borisov et al., 2009).

    II.III.II. Medium of circulation

    Money’s function as a medium of circulation consists in mediating the circulation of commodities. Actual money must be available for this purpose. Money performs this function momentarily: once one commodity has been exchanged, it immediately begins to facilitate the realization of another, and so forth. This circumstance allows money in its function as a medium of circulation to be replaced by its representatives: subsidiary coins of less than full intrinsic value and paper money (Borisov et al., 2009).

    II.III.III. Means of accumulation or hoarding

    Money serves as a means of hoarding because, as the universal representative of wealth, it can purchase any commodity and can be held in any quantity. Accumulating wealth and treasure therefore takes the form of accumulating money. As the capitalist commodity economy develops, the power of money, the power of the rich over the poor, intensifies. Money’s social power becomes the power of private individuals. Under these conditions, accumulating money becomes an end in itself. In this account, the function of hoarding can be performed only by money of full value: gold coins, bullion, and gold objects. When gold coins circulated, hoarding played an important role in the spontaneous regulation of monetary circulation in capitalist countries (Borisov et al., 2009).

    II.III.IV. Means of payment

    Money acts as a means of payment when commodities are bought and sold on credit, meaning that payment is deferred. In this case, money enters circulation when payment falls due, serving as a means of payment rather than as a medium of circulation. It performs the same function in lending, tax payments, ground rent, wages, and so forth. Money’s function as a means of payment allows debt obligations to be offset against one another and economizes on cash (Borisov et al., 2009).

    II.III.V. World money

    Money performs its universal function in the world market and in payments between countries. In the world market, money operates in its natural form as precious-metal bullion. The development of money’s functions reflects the development of commodity production and its contradictions. With the emergence and development of capitalism, money’s role changes fundamentally. It becomes capital: a means of exploiting wage labor and appropriating wage workers’ unpaid labor. At the same time, simple commodity producers, such as peasants and artisans, and workers use money in its ordinary functions within capitalist society (Borisov et al., 2009).

    II.IV. Paper money, “inorganic money,” and fiat money

    As Pedrosa (2016) explains, fiat money, also called “inorganic money” in the terminology used here, rests on society’s confidence. In other words, it does not derive its backing from the value of precious metals, but from the general belief that it has value. It is also known as paper money or inconvertible money.

    For much of history, money had intrinsic value: its value corresponded to that of its material composition. Gold and silver were generally the metals most widely used and valued across societies. However, as populations and transactions expanded, this method could not be maintained in the same way. A mixed arrangement subsequently emerged, known as the gold standard, under which coins and banknotes were backed by a quantity of gold. Although a coin did not itself contain gold and its material composition might have little value, its stated denomination entitled the holder to a certain amount of that metal.

    Today, we use a fiat system based on confidence or faith in the valuation of coins and banknotes. For example, the physical material of a €20, €100, or €500 banknote does not itself have that value, nor does the material of a coin necessarily equal its denomination. Nevertheless, the community accepts these denominations as valid for conducting trade.

    People trust the value represented, relatively independently of whether that confidence is sufficiently well founded.

    II.V. Monetary replacement as a broader concept than dollarization

    According to the Banco Central del Ecuador (n.d.), dollarization in a broad sense refers to any process in which foreign money replaces domestic money in any of its domestic functions: unit of account, store of value, means of payment, and medium of exchange. What orthodox economists call a store of value appears in Marxist theory as a means of accumulation or hoarding; what they call a unit of account and medium of exchange appears in the account presented here as a medium of circulation; and means of payment has the same name in Marxist theory. In the Marxist terminology used here, orthodox economic theory contains no corresponding reference to value. The broad concept of dollarization presented by the Central Bank of Ecuador can be termed monetary replacement.

    In this framework, Banco Central del Ecuador (n.d.) presents dollarization as a form of currency substitution in which the US dollar takes over the domestic currency’s functions as a store of value, unit of account, means of payment, and medium of exchange.

    II.VI. Types of dollarization as concrete forms of monetary replacement

    II.VI.I. General considerations

    Types of dollarization are concrete expressions, though not the only possible expressions, of types of monetary replacement. They are concrete because they specify the foreign currency that will replace the national currency, partially or entirely and in a particular manner. As Bulat (2019) explains, monetary replacement can penetrate an economic system’s channels of circulation to different degrees. In other words, dollarization reaches different levels of depth across national economies.

    II.VI.II. Financial dollarization

    This form of dollarization involves replacing local-currency assets and/or liabilities with foreign-currency assets and/or liabilities. Costa Rica is a country with financial dollarization.

    According to Loría and Martínez (2018, p. 16), financial dollarization exists in Costa Rica and has the following principal characteristics in that specific national setting:

    1. For 1997–2017, no evidence was found of hysteresis generated by high inflation: the continuation of financial dollarization despite low inflation rates. The results reported in the cited study and the authors’ methodological criteria are presented below (Loría & Martínez, 2018).
    Figure 1Private financial wealth in foreign currency and lagged inflationCosta Rica · 1997–2017 · left: % of total wealth; right: inflation (%)
    • Foreign-currency wealth
    • Inflation t−12

    Note. Loría and Martínez (2018, p. 9). Inflation is lagged one year; the reference US-dollar buying exchange rate is used. Wealth figures do not exclude exchange-rate effects. The source’s discussion of adjustment at a fixed exchange rate cautions that price stability alone may be insufficient to reduce financial dollarization when expectations remain consistent with higher future inflation.

    Reconstructed in HTML and CSS. Approximate readings from the published figure; these are not the original series and are unsuitable for precise calculations.

    View approximate chart values
    Table 1Approximate values · Private financial wealth in foreign currency and lagged inflation
    PeriodForeign-currency wealthInflation t−12
    199759.814.33
    19985511.25
    19995512.43
    2000559.71
    20015510.45
    20025511.03
    2003559.79
    2004558.76
    20055513.6
    20065513.53
    20075511.4
    2008558.91
    20095515.07
    2010556.56
    2011556.34
    2012555.02
    2013554.95
    2014555.83
    2015553.92
    2016552.23
    201755-0.99
    1. In making investment and borrowing decisions, economic agents respond to volatility in domestic prices and the exchange rate, exchange-rate expectations, and the interest-rate differential between domestic and foreign currencies. It should be added that, over the preceding ten years, Costa Rica’s exchange rate against the US dollar had shown a general and progressive tendency toward depreciation, while inflation had remained stable following the adoption of inflation targeting. The country’s annual target was 3%, with an accepted tolerance of one percentage point. At first sight, this does not appear to constitute rigorous monetary discipline, independently of whether inflation-targeting regimes generate or intensify growth problems when particular structural conditions are absent (Loría & Martínez, 2018).
    2. Administrative measures introduced by regulators to discourage financial dollarization have produced mixed results. They were effective in some periods and less so in others (Loría & Martínez, 2018).
    3. Measures adopted by monetary and regulatory authorities to control inflation, stabilize the exchange rate, and modify economic agents’ behavior reduced dollarization over the preceding two decades. The dollarization of financial savings showed a sustained downward trend. Credit dollarization also declined, although with fluctuations (Loría & Martínez, 2018).

    II.VI.III. Real dollarization

    As Bulat (2019) explains, this form of dollarization involves indexing domestic transactions to the prevailing exchange rate.

    Labat and Licandro (2021, pp. 9–10) explain that dollarization, as a form of indexation, generates inflationary inertia in price formation and raises the cost of stabilizing inflation, a point acknowledged even in orthodox economic literature. Nevertheless, dollarization does not appear to have prevented dollarized economies such as Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Costa Rica from stabilizing inflation. How substantial an obstacle, then, is dollarization in Uruguay? To address this issue, the question is divided into two parts: can monetary policy anchor expectations in Uruguay, and are monetary transmission channels functioning?

    Central banks commonly work with the following model of inflation expectations:

    πeit − π* = αi + μitInflation expectations · firm i, period t

    Here, π denotes the inflation expected by firm i at time t; π* is the central bank’s target; αᵢ is a persistent bias in inflation forecasts, or the amount by which the firm believes the effective target exceeds the central bank’s announced target; and μᵢₜ is a firm-specific error term. If the firm believes the central bank’s target, αᵢ should be zero. If αᵢ is significantly positive, the firm believes the effective target is higher than the announced target (Labat & Licandro, 2021).

    Figure 2Density of bias in firms’ individual inflation forecastsUruguay · 2009–2020 · horizontal axis: α, percentage points; vertical axis: density
    • Density

    Note. Labat and Licandro (2021, p. 11). Curve height represents density, not the probability of an individual point value.

    Reconstructed in HTML and CSS. Approximate readings from the published figure; these are not the original series and are unsuitable for precise calculations.

    View approximate chart values
    Table 2Approximate values · Density of bias in firms’ individual inflation forecasts
    PeriodDensity
    00
    0.50
    10
    1.50.01
    20.05
    2.50.18
    30.38
    3.50.41
    40.33
    4.50.21
    50.15
    5.50.1
    60.06
    6.50.04
    70.02
    7.50.01
    80.01
    8.50.01
    90
    9.50
    100
    10.50
    110
    11.50
    120
    12.50
    130
    13.50
    140
    14.50
    150

    The preceding graph displays the distribution of the amount by which surveyed firms believe the central bank’s target exceeds its announced value. The Central Bank of Uruguay obtains these measurements through its survey of firms’ inflation expectations. The graph provides a basis for three observations (Labat & Licandro, 2021).

    First, inflation expectations measured in this way indicate that economic agents do not have complete confidence in the monetary authority. Second, agents’ inflation expectations were anchored approximately 3–4 percentage points above the central bank’s target. Third, the breadth of the distribution of α indicates uncertainty about the effective inflation target, insofar as agents do not trust the officially announced target (Labat & Licandro, 2021).

    As Labat and Licandro explain, although firms understood that the announced target was not the effective target, the lack of information about the latter generated uncertainty and disagreement about its value. The target signal was consequently noisy, and this affected price formation, partly working against achievement of the announced target. These findings have three significant implications. First, the announced target was clearly not credible. Second, monetary policy was able to anchor inflation expectations, although evidently not in the intended manner. Third, concealing the effective target from the public generates uncertainty that ultimately passes through to inflation, at least in the absence of complementary policies, which may be legal as well as economic, to prevent this outcome. If uncertainty becomes substantial and is managed through generally inadequate complementary policies, it can discourage investment, whatever the precise magnitude of that effect (Labat & Licandro, 2021).

    Labat and Licandro also find clear evidence that monetary policy transmission appears to function despite the small size of peso markets. This should not be surprising, since other countries in the region with similarly underdeveloped local-currency markets and dollarization have been able to conduct independent monetary policy with considerable success; examples include Peru, Bolivia, and Paraguay (Labat & Licandro, 2021).

    Labat and Licandro (2021, pp. 12–13) report that all monetary policy transmission channels appear to function in the data except those operating through asset prices other than the exchange rate. Uruguay’s stock market is scarcely developed, and households lack mechanisms for realizing liquid capital gains on housing through the financial system. This limits monetary policy’s associated wealth effects. Evidence nevertheless supports the operation of the other channels. Basal et al. (2010, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021) show that interest rates affect aggregate demand through both investment and consumption. Bucacos (2017, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021) also finds evidence that financial conditions influence activity through investment. The transmission of monetary policy and policy communication to inflation expectations has been extensively documented by Borraz and Mello (2020, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021), Licandro and Mello (2014, 2015, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021), Mello and Ponce (2020, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021), and Frache and Lluberas (2019, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021). More recently, Cuitiño et al. (2020, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021) and Guenaga and Zacheo (2019, as cited in Labat & Licandro, 2021) have suggested that weak policy credibility may help explain poor monetary policy performance. Overall, the evidence indicates that monetary transmission channels function and that their functioning should improve with greater monetary policy credibility and the development of peso markets.

    II.VI.IV. Transactional or incomplete dollarization

    II.VI.IV.I. General considerations

    According to Alfaro Ramos (2005), transactional dollarization becomes evident when residents make extensive use of the US dollar or another foreign currency alongside or instead of the local currency. Dollarization can take two forms. Unofficial dollarization occurs when individuals hold foreign-currency bank deposits or banknotes to protect themselves against high domestic inflation. Official dollarization occurs when a government adopts a foreign currency as the exclusive or predominant legal tender.

    II.VI.IV.II. Unofficial (de facto) dollarization

    Unofficial dollarization has existed in many countries for years. Although economists have studied it, governments have not always given the process sufficient attention. If its risks are not managed adequately, rapid depreciation can precipitate banking crises with severe consequences. Two arrangements discussed in connection with official monetary commitments are currency boards and full dollarization. Most developing countries, including transition economies adopting market mechanisms, already use some limited, unofficial form of dollarization. Their residents hold foreign cash and foreign-currency deposits in domestic banks to varying degrees. In high-inflation countries, the US dollar or another strong currency is widely used alongside the national currency in everyday transactions. Unofficial dollarization arises in response to economic instability, high inflation, and residents’ desire to diversify and protect their assets against domestic-currency depreciation. This option is available, of course, only to those who can afford it, often a small group whose incomes are denominated in dollars rather than the average resident of a non-dollarized or weakly dollarized economy. Two reasons for capitalists’ demand for foreign-currency assets should be distinguished (Alfaro Ramos, 2005):

    1. Currency substitution.
    2. Asset substitution.

    With currency substitution, foreign assets are used as money, principally as a means of payment and unit of account. This often occurs under high inflation or hyperinflation, when the high cost of using the national currency leads the public to seek alternatives. Once foreign currency becomes accepted in transactions, its use may persist. Dollarization in some Latin American and Asian countries has continued and accelerated even after economic conditions stabilized. Asset substitution, by contrast, reflects considerations of risk and return on domestic and foreign assets. Historically, foreign-currency assets have offered protection against macroeconomic risks, including price instability and prolonged economic downturns in many developing countries. Even during periods of stability, these assets can serve that purpose if residents perceive some probability that inflation will return. Important differences between unofficial and full dollarization create transition problems for governments considering the latter. Under full dollarization, public and private debt is denominated in dollars, and public and private accounts must be converted into US dollars. Countries must therefore establish the exchange rate at which outstanding debts, contracts, and financial assets will be converted. Finally, the stability promised by dollarization is itself relative: the value of the US dollar, like that of any other strong currency adopted by a country, fluctuates against other widely traded currencies. Such fluctuations have sometimes been substantial in the period since Bretton Woods (Alfaro Ramos, 2005).

    II.VI.IV.III. Official dollarization: de facto and formal dimensions

    II.VI.IV.III.I. Currency boards

    As described by Alfaro Ramos (2005), a currency board establishes full convertibility at a fixed exchange rate and commits to issuing domestic currency only against financial assets realizable in the international reserve currency, thereby backing issuance in the selected currency. A currency board of this kind cannot therefore operate as a lender of last resort to the government or commercial banks, nor can it regulate the money supply through open-market operations or rediscounting banks’ domestic financial assets. It otherwise has the characteristics of a fully fixed exchange-rate regime, but with a stronger commitment because changes to the parity generally require legislation by the national congress.

    According to the International Monetary Fund (2000), the principal differences between a currency board and dollarization concern seigniorage and sovereignty. Countries retaining their own currency under a currency board keep seigniorage revenue, whereas dollarization transfers that revenue to the issuer of the anchor currency unless special arrangements are made. Dollarization also represents a more complete surrender of national sovereignty. That the IMF itself speaks of a loss of national sovereignty is, undoubtedly, noteworthy.

    As described in “Caja de conversión” (n.d.), a currency board rests on a legislative commitment to exchange domestic currency for a specified foreign currency at a predetermined rate. The issuing authorities accept restrictions intended to ensure compliance with that legal obligation. Domestic currency is issued only against foreign-currency backing and is fully supported by external assets. This removes traditional central bank functions, including discretionary monetary control and the conventional lender-of-last-resort role, leaving little room for discretionary monetary policy. Some room for maneuver may nevertheless remain, depending on how rigidly the supplementary rules are specified around the core commitments. In brief, the country retains its own currency but backs it fully with another country’s currency to establish monetary policy credibility.

    Enoch and Gulde (1998) list the following countries and regions as having adopted currency board arrangements:

    Table 3Currency boards · historical list published in 1998
    Country or regionYears in operationAnchor currencySpecial features
    Antigua and Barbuda32US dollarMember of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB).
    Argentina6US dollarOne third of coverage may consist of US-dollar-denominated government bonds.
    Bosnia and Herzegovina1German mark—
    Brunei Darussalam30Singapore dollar—
    Bulgaria1German markExcess coverage in the banking department to address banking-sector weaknesses.
    Djibouti48US dollarThe anchor currency changed from the French franc to the US dollar.
    Dominica32US dollarMember of the ECCB.
    Estonia6German markExcess coverage for domestic monetary interventions.
    Grenada32US dollarMember of the ECCB.
    Hong Kong SAR14US dollar—
    Lithuania4US dollarThe central bank has the right to appreciate the exchange rate.
    St. Kitts and Nevis32US dollarMember of the ECCB.
    St. Lucia32US dollarMember of the ECCB.
    St. Vincent and the Grenadines32US dollarMember of the ECCB.
    Source: Enoch and Gulde (1998); underlying table sources: Baliño et al. (1997) and Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (1998). Years in operation and monetary arrangements refer to that historical publication, not to a current classification.

    II.VI.IV.III.II. Full dollarization

    IMF researchers Berg and Borensztein (2000, pp. 2–3) explain that full dollarization consists in a country officially adopting another country’s currency for all financial transactions, with the possible exception of subsidiary coinage.

    II.VI.V. Cultural or ideological dollarization

    Gerardo Licandro and Miguel Mello examine cultural dollarization in Dolarización cultural y financiera de los hogares uruguayos, published by the Center for Latin American Monetary Studies. Their account can be summarized as follows (Licandro & Mello, 2018, p. 366):

    Licandro and Mello (2018, p. 366) distinguish cultural dollarization from financial dollarization. The former occurs when people use the dollar as their numeraire in situations where most countries would use the national currency. In Uruguay, public officials and private individuals commonly express large amounts in dollars to convey their scale. Examples include a minister discussing a budget or a tax-administration director discussing total revenue. The authors regard this practice as unusual internationally and particularly characteristic of Uruguay.

    II.VII. Involuntary dedollarization and its forms

    Arauz (2019) identifies four specific risks of involuntary dedollarization in his analysis of Ecuador’s agreement with the IMF. These concern reserve availability, capital outflows, banking stability, and the social viability of adjustment:

    1. Dedollarization through reserve scarcity: the central bank runs out of net international reserves with which to obtain dollars and consequently cannot maintain the dollar flows required for the economy to function adequately under full dollarization. Reserve scarcity may also lead to dedollarization through default. Here, default refers to a situation in which a lender or group of lenders expects, generally on substantive grounds, that a borrower cannot repay on the agreed terms, leaving debt forgiveness, described here as involuntary restructuring, or renegotiation, described here as voluntary restructuring, as the available alternatives.
    2. Eliminating the foreign-exchange outflow tax, known in Ecuador as the Impuesto a la Salida de Divisas (ISD), may make dollarization unsustainable following a speculative attack. The economy becomes more vulnerable to such attacks as the government removes restrictions on their operation.
    3. A generalized recession, implying dedollarization through a banking crisis: the same forces that brought dollarization about can also drive its reversal.
    4. Internal devaluation, understood here as the risk that dollarization loses its social viability.

    Arauz (2019) does not endorse dollarization, but recognizes its potential to limit speculative attacks and generalized inflationary outbreaks and to provide medium- and long-term certainty for investment. He argues, however, that appreciation and substantial inflation during dollarization’s initial years created an inertial path dependence[8] of continuing real-exchange-rate appreciation. In his account, this left Ecuador exposed to neighboring countries’ devaluations, chronic non-oil current-account deficits with those countries, and large inflows of laundered drug dollars. These are serious observations.

    As Arauz argues, dollarization can help prevent speculative attacks principally because domestic currency speculation no longer exists. Together with capital-account regulations under a creative dollarization arrangement, such as the Tobin-type foreign-exchange outflow tax (ISD), and the limited importance of the equity market, this provides a degree of protection against the most common speculative attacks. In the setting discussed here, Ecuador’s principal vulnerabilities concern speculation in external-debt bond prices, reflected in the familiar “country risk” measure, and the prices of export commodities. The former vulnerability is also common in non-dollarized developing countries (Arauz, 2019).

    Arauz (2019) argues that dollarization, through the Dutch-disease mechanism[9] associated with it, reinforces an economic structure based on primary exports and manufactured imports[10]. He links this structure to environmental depletion and the export of natural resources. Preserving dollarization without intensifying that depletion would, in his view, require substantial productive investment in infrastructure, energy, and especially human capabilities to make the exchange rate less decisive for competitiveness. He envisages a sustained effort of approximately twenty years.

    For Arauz (2019), dollarization is a social contract concerning the unit of account used in transactions, accounting, and records. The other rules commonly associated with it are not inherent necessities: arrangements can be orthodox or creative. Remaining dollarized or dedollarizing is ultimately a political decision, even during crisis. A rigid unit of account can nevertheless cause enough social suffering to break the contract and make dedollarization politically viable. He contrasts Greece, where an enormous crisis did not break the social and political commitment to the euro, with Zimbabwe, where the second crisis did break the commitment to dollarization.

    II.VIII. The Marxian conception of crisis

    According to Borisov et al. (2009, p. 57), an economic crisis of overproduction is the phase of the capitalist cycle characterized by the eruption of the contradictions of the capitalist economy. It manifests itself in commodity overproduction and sharply intensified difficulties in selling output. Enterprises close or substantially reduce production; mass involuntary unemployment increases; workers’ living standards decline markedly; trade is disrupted; monetary and credit relations become unbalanced; and industrial, commercial, and banking firms fail. Under capitalism, commodity overproduction is relative rather than absolute: commodities are excessive only in relation to solvent demand, connected here with Keynes’s concept of effective demand, beyond mere need or desire for a product. The cause of overproduction crises lies in capitalism’s fundamental contradiction between the social character of production and the private capitalist appropriation of its results. This contradiction manifests itself in the anarchy of capitalist production, continually disrupted economic proportions, and contradictions between production and consumption and between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Capitalist reproduction inevitably exposes the antagonism between the aims of capitalist production and the means of achieving them. Seeking to maximize profit, capitalists attempt to expand production without limit, bringing ever more goods to market. This is also related to the tendency of the average rate of profit to fall, identified by Adam Smith and rigorously formulated by Karl Marx, discussed in Gómez Julián (2017) and Part Three of Volume III of Marx’s Capital. At the same time, capitalists intensify workers’ exploitation and reduce their living standards. The population’s solvent demand consequently begins to fall behind productive capacity, creating difficulties in realizing commodities produced by capitalist enterprises. Commodities remain unsold; firms cannot recover their expenditure and cannot continue production. The production process is disrupted within individual enterprises, their industries, and the capitalist economy as a whole.

    The axis around which the elements of this multidisciplinary definition of crisis revolve is therefore the generalized collapse of a pattern of capital accumulation. Because society is organized around that pattern, a collapse of the economic base or social being will, sooner or later, manifest itself in a generalized crisis of the superstructure’s forms: ideology and culture, or social consciousness. These encompass the political, legal, moral, aesthetic, religious, and philosophical conceptions of a particular historical moment, also called forms of social consciousness. This entails a generalized crisis of society’s official institutions at that historical moment.

    Capitalism emerges from crisis by destroying part of the productive forces through enterprise closures, commodity destruction, and other forms of negative expanded reproduction[11], intensifying workers’ exploitation, and renewing fixed capital. Yet because capitalism cannot eliminate the fundamental cause of overproduction crises, these recur, appearing throughout economic life: production, distribution, exchange, and consumption; industry and agriculture; and the capitalist world as a whole. During pre-monopoly capitalism, such crises recurred approximately every ten or eleven years, including 1825, 1836, 1847–1848, 1857, 1866, 1873, 1882, and 1890. The deepest was that of 1873. The replacement of free competition by monopoly domination made crises more frequent and prolonged and shortened periods of expansion. Under the general crisis of capitalism, overproduction crises became much sharper and more destructive. As capitalist contradictions intensified and crises deepened, essential changes also appeared in the capitalist cycle. In the postwar period, the capitalist economy was marked by more uneven national development, more frequent interruptions of reproduction, and new crisis phenomena. The United States illustrates this clearly, experiencing four post-Second World War downturns: 1948–1949, 1953–1954, 1957–1958, and 1960–1961. State monopoly capitalism, economic militarization, and inflation generated further difficulties and contradictions in capitalist reproduction. These intensified production anarchy, uneven development, workers’ exploitation, and the conflict between the volume of production and the population’s limited purchasing power. Economic crises thus demonstrate that capitalism develops by squandering productive forces while condemning millions of workers to near-starvation. They expose the mismatch between bourgeois relations of production and the level and condition of the productive forces, revealing the historically transitory character of the capitalist mode of production (Borisov et al., 2009).

    III. Historical considerations on the international monetary system

    III.I. The gold standard in the twenty-first century

    Astarita (2006) argues that official dollar–gold convertibility under Bretton Woods remained in operation until at least 1968 and that this constituted an international gold-exchange standard. Against the claim that money had already become entirely dematerialized, he asks why runs into gold intensified from the late 1960s and why the official gold price and gold reserves remained central concerns until the system’s breakdown. In his view, the thesis of complete detachment from gold can be sustained only by restricting monetary validation to the national sphere and disregarding the conditions of international validation.

    Besides introducing a historically false division, the dematerialization thesis cannot explain why gold continues to function as a reserve and a means of hoarding. Several facts deserve emphasis (Astarita, 2006):

    1. After almost three decades without convertibility into gold, official reserves still exceeded 30,000 tonnes, approximately one quarter of all gold extracted throughout history.
    2. By contrast, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) did not become an international fiat currency, particularly after losing their gold backing. In other words, SDRs do not establish a ‘pseudo-international validation’ of currency. Neither the dollar nor the euro refers to SDRs as an ultimate reference of value.
    3. Gold as a proportion of official reserves stood at 61.6% in the United States, 55.4% in France, 30.6% in Germany, 44.2% in Italy, 49.5% in Switzerland, 29% in Austria, and 41% in Belgium, according to 1994 data.
    4. In 1995, the IMF affirmed gold’s monetary role and decided that any mobilization of its gold stock that would weaken its overall financial position should be avoided. It maintained that gold holdings provided room for maneuver and added credibility to its balance sheet.
    5. When the European Central Bank was established, it was decided that gold would constitute 15% of its reserves.
    6. The increase in gold’s price from $265 to $425 between September 1999 and March 2005 was not matched by a similar increase in metals generally, nor did it correspond to increased industrial demand for gold.
    7. By the mid-1990s, private gold stocks were estimated at approximately 60,000 tonnes in jewelry, including jewelry held primarily for investment, and a further 24,000 tonnes in bars and coins.
    8. Gold was traded principally through bullion banks, including Credit Suisse, Union Bank of Switzerland, Swiss Bank Corporation, Republic National Bank, and N. M. Rothschild. These banks had their own gold refineries and price-setting mechanisms. This banking mechanism for establishing prices deserves attention and will be revisited.
    9. Annual gold trading, in physical form or contracts, was estimated to exceed 300,000 tonnes: more than one hundred times annual production and more than twice the worldwide stock. By the late 1990s, daily transaction volumes were comparable to the daily trading volume between two major currencies, such as the yen and the German mark.

    Astarita (2006) contends that these developments cannot be explained by treating gold as an ordinary metal without monetary functions. He asks why such substantial value remains immobilized, particularly in official reserves, if gold has lost all monetary significance. He invokes Lipietz’s account of money’s capacity to validate social production without itself requiring validation (Lipietz, 1983, as cited in Astarita, 2006). Although gold does not ordinarily circulate as a means of payment, Astarita interprets its role in international hoarding as a continuing monetary function. He connects this with Marx’s account of money becoming fixed as an embodiment of value, wealth, and social power (Marx, 1999, as cited in Astarita, 2006).

    This implies, first, that gold is demanded not simply as a metal, but as the universal equivalent, through its economic existence as commodity money. Second, it is demanded not as coinage bearing a national form, but as the embodiment of human labor as such, as the worldwide universal equivalent. Its use-value consists in preserving value, directly social labor time. How can this circumstance be overlooked after acknowledging that hoarding is one of the forms of ‘true money,’ the other being means of payment (Astarita, 2006)?

    This raises the question of the ultimate backing of the dollar or euro. Senior central bankers seem to perceive the relationship between banknotes and gold more accurately when they justify holding gold reserves, and buying gold when confidence in banknotes weakens, by observing that gold is the only reserve that is not some government’s liability (Astarita, 2006).

    Astarita’s argument also finds support in Alan Greenspan’s[12] position in a February 2017 interview with Gold Investor, reproduced by Haynes (2019). Greenspan regarded gold as the foremost global currency and emphasized that, like silver, it did not require a counterparty’s signature. Gold had historically been far more valuable per ounce than silver, yet both differed from credit instruments and fiat currency because they did not depend on an issuer’s creditworthiness and were understood to possess intrinsic value. He recalled gold’s longstanding acceptance in settlement and its coinage in Asia Minor around 600 BCE. He associated the gold standard’s late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century peak with global prosperity, productivity growth, and little inflation. In his view, blaming the standard for the interwar failures resembled condemning shoes after wearing the wrong size: political decisions were the central problem. The First World War had disrupted fixed parities, but countries resisted exchange rates against the dollar below their 1913 levels.

    In that interpretation, Britain made a decisive mistake by returning to gold in 1925 at the 1913 rate of $4.86 per pound sterling. Greenspan attributed that decision to Winston Churchill, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, and linked it to severe late-1920s deflation and the suspension of convertibility in 1931. The problem, he argued, lay in restoring prewar parities after a war that had affected national economies very unevenly (Haynes, 2019).

    Greenspan acknowledged that a contemporary return to the gold standard could be perceived as desperation. He nevertheless maintained that keeping the standard would have prevented the monetary situation he was criticizing (Haynes, 2019).

    The Hungarian central bank also cites Greenspan’s statement that fiat money is accepted by no one in extremis, whereas gold is always accepted (Palotai & Veres, 2020).

    Greenspan (1999) related employers’ resistance to wage increases to their reduced pricing power. He acknowledged monetary policy’s contribution to moderating the general price level and inflation expectations during the 1980s and 1990s, but argued that discretionary monetary policy faced difficulties in anchoring prices over time in the manner of the previous century’s gold standard.

    The following is a brief chronology of the geopolitical economy of gold since the end of Bretton Woods, with particular attention to developments from 1999 through the period covered by this essay.

    July 10, 2014. Writing for Forbes in “Paul Volcker Dreams of a ‘New Bretton Woods.’ But What Would That Look Like?”, Lewis reports: Volcker was Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Monetary Affairs from 1969 to 1974. The United States ended the Bretton Woods system’s official link to gold in 1971, and the system finally dissolved in spring 1973. This gave him considerable perspective on subsequent developments. His conclusion was that the absence of an official, rules-based, cooperatively managed monetary system had not been a great success. International financial crises appeared at least as frequent and more destructive in obstructing economic stability and growth (Lewis, 2014).

    April 14, 2015. RT en Español reports that numerous financial analysts were questioning national currencies’ performance as the principal international means of payment and discussing a possible gold-backed currency that might end dollar reserve hegemony. The report suggests that the IMF might also favor gold amid unstable economic conditions. Meghnad Desai, associated with the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF), an independent research and advisory organization, argued that IMF Special Drawing Rights should include some gold to stabilize that synthetic instrument. According to the report, citing Zero Hedge, Desai told a precious-metals conference in Dubai that a little gold would help stabilize SDRs, that gold could be designated as part of them, and that such a development was plausible. He added that it would be easier if China increased its official gold reserves (RT en Español, 2015l).

    June 17, 2015. RT en Español reports that Texas was establishing its own gold depository outside Washington’s control. A law signed by Governor Greg Abbott contemplated bringing approximately $1 billion in holdings back to Texas and creating a depository that would not recognize federal authority over its contents. Abbott described it as the first institution of its kind in the country, intended to strengthen the security of Texas’s gold reserves and eliminate fees paid outside the state. The bill’s sponsor, Republican Giovanni Capriglione, said people worldwide were contacting him about storing gold and other precious materials in Texas because they regarded it as a strong state. The proposal prohibited federal or quasi-federal confiscation of the depository’s contents. The decision prompted speculation that Texas secessionists sought financial autonomy and readiness to issue a currency of their own if federal economic support ended (RT en Español, 2015n).

    August 31, 2015. RT en Español alleges that the United States was concealing the true value of its reserves by refusing a public audit, amid investor expectations of an increase in the benchmark federal funds rate (RT en Español, 2015j).

    September 14, 2015. RT en Español reports that China and India were buying the available physical gold associated in its account with the London Metal Exchange (LME), described as the world’s largest market for options and futures in nonferrous metals. The report claims that little “real” gold remained because China and India had purchased it (RT en Español, 2015d).

    September 15, 2015. RT en Español reports that several European countries would withdraw gold from the United States. Between 2014 and the report’s publication, foreign central banks had withdrawn 246 tonnes from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, a major precious-metals custodian. The report interprets these moves as responses to adverse global economic conditions, emphasizing the liquidity of the assets and the possibility of investing the gold by returning it to circulation (RT en Español, 2015o).

    September 19, 2015. RT en Español reports that BRICS countries were buying gold to reduce dependence on the dollar amid expectations of its possible collapse. Rising gold demand is interpreted as reflecting mounting geopolitical tensions (RT en Español, 2015f).

    July 21, 2015. RT en Español reports a major decline in gold prices to a five-year low. Colin Cieszynski, chief market strategist at CMC Markets, is cited in connection with three factors: reduced demand for inflation protection, with oil then around $50 per barrel; reduced demand for defensive safe havens as uncertainty subsided; and China’s large gold purchases, with its reserves increasing by 60% between 2008 and 2015. These purchases inherently represent increased demand (RT en Español, 2015m).

    September 1, 2015. According to RT en Español, some experts interpreted large Russian and Chinese gold purchases as part of a strategy to create a new BRICS financial instrument (RT en Español, 2015g).

    September 6, 2015. RT en Español reports withdrawals of gold deposited at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. An estimated 90% of the gold stored there before those withdrawals belonged to foreign countries (RT en Español, 2015p).

    September 8, 2015. RT en Español reports a record shortage of available gold associated with global financial instability. Gold is described as the quintessential safe-haven asset to which investors turn during uncertainty. This suggests that investors still perceived structural fragility in the international financial system in 2015, alongside growing geopolitical tensions worldwide. The account also associates this episode with exceptionally high gold prices over the preceding period (RT en Español, 2015a).

    October 2, 2015. RT en Español cites RBC Capital Markets analysts attributing the recent rise in gold prices partly to the Federal Reserve’s decision not to increase the federal funds rate. They nevertheless warned that this favorable influence might end: RBC still expected a December rate increase, which could reduce the gold price (RT en Español, 2015i).

    October 17, 2015. RT en Español reports that gold reached a four-month high as major investors purchased it because they considered a Federal Reserve interest-rate increase during 2015 unlikely (RT en Español, 2015c).

    September 30, 2015. RT en Español reports investors’ concerns about speculative financial developments and their decision to seek protection in gold. These concerns are connected with the consequences of the end of dollar–gold convertibility under Bretton Woods in 1971 (RT en Español, 2015k).

    November 12, 2015. RT en Español reports that Chinese geologists discovered 470 tonnes of gold beneath the East China Sea after three years of exploration. Following the discovery, twelve drilling platforms were established, with approximately one thousand people working at the site (RT en Español, 2015e).

    November 13, 2015. RT en Español reports that rumors of falling stock markets increased gold demand. Citing the World Gold Council, it describes two distinct phases during the third quarter: exchange-traded fund outflows contributed to July’s price decline and stimulated consumer demand worldwide; subsequently, a favorable shift in institutional investor sentiment brought ETF inflows in August and September and pushed prices upward. Central banks reportedly purchased another 175 tonnes in recognition of diversification benefits. Some commentators interpreted large sovereign purchases as part of a strategy to break the dollar’s monopoly. Analyst Mac Slavo argued that aggressive buying signaled an ongoing change in the world reserve currency and invoked the maxim that whoever holds the gold makes the rules. The report also describes Stanley Druckenmiller, a billionaire hedge-fund investor associated with George Soros, purchasing almost three million shares linked to gold after warnings of a possible stock-market decline. The cited commentators interpreted the scale of the purchase as signaling concern about a serious financial collapse (RT en Español, 2015b).

    December 4, 2015. Reporting for Forbes México, Barba describes recommendations by investor Jim Rogers[13], based on his experience, about possible preparations for a collapse of the US currency. Rogers suggested that the dollar could become a bubble while gold, silver, and other precious metals remained under pressure. If that assessment proved correct, he intended to sell dollars at an appropriate moment and move into gold and silver (Barba, 2015).

    December 22, 2015. RT en Español reports that the Bank of Russia increased gold reserves by 186 tonnes between January and November 2015, exceeding its purchases during all of 2014. This accumulation is related to expectations surrounding international financial instability (RT en Español, 2015q).

    December 23, 2015. RT en Español, citing CNBC, reports that despite the sharp decline in gold prices, some experts still described gold as the “sun” of the monetary universe because of persistently strong demand (RT en Español, 2015h).

    January 5, 2016. RT en Español cites Mark O’Byrne, research director at GoldCore Ltd., discussing a shift in gold’s center of gravity toward China. The report speculates about a gold-backed yuan and presents his view that such a currency could severely undermine the dollar (RT en Español, 2016).

    July 10, 2016. Business Insider reports Greenspan’s support for a return to the gold standard, recalling his 1966 argument that the credit an economy can sustain under gold is constrained by tangible assets because credit instruments ultimately represent claims on such assets. His earlier argument maintained that abandoning the gold standard allowed proponents of the welfare state to use the banking system for unlimited credit expansion (Bonner, 2016).

    February 21, 2017. The Mises Institute cites Greenspan recalling his exchanges with US Congressman Ron Paul, a firm advocate of gold. Greenspan explained that US monetary policy had attempted to follow signals resembling those a gold standard would have generated. He regarded this as sound monetary policy even under fiat currency and said that returning to gold would not, in that respect, have changed policy very much (McMaken, 2017).

    November 16, 2018. In Forbes, Lewis argues in “The Gold Standard Didn’t Disappear in 1971, It Just Went Underground” that academic dismissal of gold overlooks its long historical operation across very different societies. His argument is that gold was the formal foundation of the world monetary system until Bretton Woods disintegrated in 1971 and also served, in an approximate and unofficial way, as a reference for much of the period afterward (Lewis, 2018).

    May 30, 2019. Mora Lleonart reports that Serbia and the Philippines were increasing their central banks’ gold reserves, a development interpreted as a movement away from the US dollar standard (Mora Lleonart, 2019).

    July 9, 2019. Pedraza reports Chinese savers turning to gold to protect savings against yuan depreciation. Slowing economic activity was affecting consumers and firms, while failures at several financial institutions increased interest in gold as protection against an emerging crisis. Some customers were withdrawing bank savings and buying gold to preserve wealth. The report places this behavior within China’s longstanding connection to the metal: the country had been the world’s largest producer for more than a decade and was also its largest consumer. Citing the Chinese-American newspaper The Epoch Times, the account describes a substantial decline in the yuan, or renminbi, against the US dollar in early July, reported as a movement of approximately 300–400 points (Pedraza, 2019).

    August 8, 2019. In Forbes, Lewis argues in “We Just Tested the Gold Standard—It Still Works” that monetary policy had often been guided by gold after 1971. In his account, Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker abandoned the monetarist experiment in 1982 and adopted a flexible, ad hoc approach that nevertheless sought to stabilize the dollar relative to gold and other commodities, moderating the swings of the 1970s and early 1980s. International cooperation reinforced this effort: the 1985 Plaza Accord addressed a dollar judged too strong, with gold near $300 per ounce, and the 1987 Louvre Accord addressed a dollar judged too weak, with gold near $400 per ounce. Lewis interprets these actions as guiding the dollar toward an approximate $350-per-ounce band. He argues that Alan Greenspan refined this process after succeeding Volcker in 1987 and later acknowledged its intentional character. Lewis cites Greenspan’s 2004 observation that successful central banks under fiat money had tended to replicate outcomes that would probably have occurred under a general commodity standard (Lewis, 2019).

    Source: Lewis (2019).

    May 6, 2020. Cava discusses Chinese and Russian gold accumulation, interpreting China’s strategy as an attempt to replace the petrodollar. His account also discusses sovereign digital currencies, identifying the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, and India as potential participants. It presents cryptocurrencies as a possible vehicle for a monetary “reset.” According to the report, the People’s Bank of China had confirmed that four major state-owned banks and payments groups Tencent and Ant Financial were testing electronic payments using a digital yuan in four Chinese regions. Nineteen restaurants and retailers, including Starbucks, McDonald’s, and Subway, were said to be involved in pilot programs, with a possible launch connected to the 2022 Winter Olympics under consideration. Cava argued that Chinese consumers’ familiarity with electronic payments would facilitate adoption. He also claimed that a digital currency would preclude quantitative easing and helicopter money. The account describes China’s official preference for replacing the dollar with an IMF-approved currency basket including the dollar, euro, yuan, and yen, while speculating that China might privately prefer another arrangement because US influence would persist in such a basket. The People’s Bank of China had not confirmed gold backing for its digital currency. Cava nevertheless predicted that a gold-backed digital currency would severely destabilize the dollar. He situated this within a strategy beginning around 2000, when China and Russia agreed to reduce dollar use in trade, initially between themselves, and interpreted their gradual gold accumulation accordingly (Cava, 2020).

    July 2, 2020. BBC News Mundo reports that an English court denied Nicolás Maduro’s government access to Venezuelan gold held at the Bank of England, citing the United Kingdom’s recognition of Juan Guaidó as interim president. The High Court’s decision arose from the Maduro government’s attempt to sell gold bars deposited at the Bank of England (BBC News Mundo, 2020).

    June 18, 2020. Reporting for the BBC, Pichel describes the political and legal dispute over 31 tonnes of Venezuelan gold held by the Bank of England. The bars, valued at approximately $1 billion, belonged to Venezuela and were at the center of proceedings involving the Central Bank of Venezuela and the British institution. According to Maduro’s government, Venezuela wanted to sell the gold and use the proceeds to combat the spread of coronavirus (Pichel, 2020).

    September 7, 2020. RT en Español (2020) reports that Peter Schiff acknowledged being wrong in his Bitcoin forecasts. This episode forms part of the debate over the relative performance of gold, cryptocurrencies, and the dollar.

    May 22, 2021. RT en Español reports that Richard Kelly, head of global strategy at TD Securities, told CNBC that he strongly favored investment in gold (RT en Español, 2021b).

    May 26, 2021. RT en Español reports that dollar weakness and falling Bitcoin prices pushed gold to its highest price since January 2021 (RT en Español, 2021c).

    May 29, 2021. RT en Español reports a sharp fall in Bitcoin’s price, which is associated with increased gold demand as a safe-haven asset (RT en Español, 2021a).

    May 31, 2021. According to RT en Español, Robert Kiyosaki recommended gold as protection against dollar depreciation, favoring it even over Bitcoin because of its relative stability (RT en Español, 2021d).

    June 1, 2021. Becedas and Nieves (2021) discuss gold’s lower volatility relative to Bitcoin. They cite JPMorgan strategist and cryptocurrency specialist Nikolaos Panigirtzoglou, who argued that Bitcoin’s failure to move decisively above $60,000 would generate bearish signals and encourage further position unwinding, contributing to the preceding week’s correction. He regarded the recent boom-and-bust dynamics as a setback for institutional adoption, especially for Bitcoin and Ethereum. Greater volatility relative to gold, he argued, reduced the attraction of “digital gold” compared with traditional gold in institutional portfolios.

    June 3, 2021. RT en Español reports that Russia planned to remove the dollar from the reserves of its National Wealth Fund within one month, replacing approximately $40 billion with gold and other currencies to reduce exposure to US sanctions (RT en Español, 2021e).

    There appears to be a substantial divide between academic discourse and central bank practice on this issue. In academia, orthodox or otherwise, the thesis that money has become entirely dematerialized and that gold has no monetary role predominates. Yet years and decades pass without central banks, at least in industrialized countries, disposing of their gold, while monetary policymakers continue to turn to the metal as an ultimate reserve of value. An academic inability to theorize gold’s continuing place in the modern monetary system persists.

    III.II. On optimum currency area theory

    III.II.I. General considerations

    As Brown del Rivero (2018, p. 70) explains, optimum currency area (OCA) theory developed alongside European integration. Although the theory predates the European monetary system, its subsequent development accompanied that experience. Before the euro crisis, two stages could be distinguished: the first examined the conditions appropriate for establishing or joining a monetary union; the second examined its costs and benefits. The euro crisis revealed a third stage, exposing limitations and previously neglected issues. In this stage, a monetary union’s institutional design becomes critical. One major limitation concerns the magnitude and nature of asymmetric shocks and the suitability of the mechanisms proposed to offset them. Unanticipated problems included confidence crises arising from rapidly increasing fiscal burdens and governments’ lack of solvency, aggravated by losing the capacity to issue an autonomous currency. Another neglected issue was the absence of federal-level guarantees for bank deposits in affected countries.

    III.II.II. Optimum currency area theory

    III.II.II.I. Historical and theoretical stages of development

    III.II.II.I.I. First stage

    As Brown del Rivero (2018, pp. 73–75) explains, this stage emerged from the contributions of Mundell (1961, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018), McKinnon (1963, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018), and Kenen (1969, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018). They sought to establish the optimal conditions under which a country or group of countries should fix exchange rates against another currency or participate in a monetary union. International capital mobility was limited in the period under discussion, making the exchange rate a powerful instrument for adjusting external imbalances. The optimal conditions encompass the following dimensions:

    1. Symmetry. The most important requirement for a currency area to function well is the absence of asymmetric shocks and asymmetric responses to external disturbances. For an asymmetric shock, such as an abrupt change in demand, GDP growth, unemployment, or inflation, to create a major problem, it must have a significant national macroeconomic impact. If its effects are concentrated in one industry or in a cross-border region, an exchange-rate adjustment is insufficient. Common policies or coordination among national policies are more effective in such circumstances. National and regional shocks should therefore be distinguished. National shocks presuppose substantial differences between economies and inter-industry trade. Regional shocks instead involve similar conditions and intra-industry trade. Exchange-rate adjustments can help mitigate national shocks, provided they do not produce proportional price movements, but are ineffective against regional shocks affecting two or more countries.
    2. Price and wage flexibility. Once the exchange rate is lost as an adjustment instrument, flexibility in product and labor markets becomes particularly important because both can substitute for exchange-rate adjustment in correcting external imbalances. The more flexible prices and wages are, the faster relative prices realign and the smaller the adverse effects on employment and inflation.
    3. Mobility of factors of production. Highly integrated factor markets, especially labor markets, reduce the need for real-price adjustments. Factor mobility substitutes for the exchange rate as a mechanism of external adjustment. Financial integration was expected to cushion temporary shocks through capital flows and reduce interest-rate differentials in the long run (Mundell, 1961, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018). As discussed below, however, it can also become a source of disturbance.
    4. Fiscal integration. Kenen (1969, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018) emphasized the need for an interstate fiscal transfer system that redistributes resources toward countries or regions adversely affected by asymmetric shocks when exchange rates are unavailable as adjustment instruments. Alongside a common pool of fiscal resources, tax harmonization would be desirable, although it presents a substantial political obstacle.
    5. Financial market integration. According to Ingram (1962, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018), this can reduce the need for exchange-rate adjustments. Capital inflows from surplus regions can temporarily cushion adverse conditions, while foreign assets can be run down as adjustment proceeds. With extensive financial integration, even modest interest-rate changes can balance capital movements among partner countries.
    6. Economic openness. For McKinnon (1963, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018), relinquishing the exchange rate is not a major loss for countries highly open to international trade. The more open an economy, the greater the influence of tradable-goods prices on domestic prices and the less adjustment is required in other variables. Smaller economies tend to be more open and to benefit more from monetary union.
    7. Diversification of production and consumption. Highly diversified production, consumption, exports, and imports reduce the effects of sector-specific disturbances. Diversification provides some insulation against these shocks and reduces the need to adjust the terms of trade through exchange-rate changes (Kenen, 1969, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018).
    8. Similar inflation rates. Many balance-of-payments imbalances arise from differences in national inflation rates. The need to correct external-account imbalances is therefore smaller when inflation resembles that of partner countries. Similar price developments within a monetary union reduce changes in the terms of trade and the need for exchange-rate adjustment (Fleming, 1971, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018).
    9. Political integration. Political will is fundamental to any monetary union. It entails sharing decisions and accepting rules adopted by supranational institutions even when they affect national interests. In Mintz’s (1970, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018) formulation, the principal, and perhaps only, real condition for establishing a monetary union is prospective members’ political willingness to integrate. Bordo and Jonung (1999, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018) and Bordo and James (2008, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018) reached similar conclusions after examining historical monetary unions.
    III.II.II.I.II. Second stage

    As Brown del Rivero (2018, p. 75) explains, OCA theory’s second stage emerged alongside greater international capital mobility after the breakdown of Bretton Woods. Corden (1972, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018), Mundell (1973, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018), and Ishiyama (1975, as cited in Brown del Rivero, 2018) focused on the costs and benefits of monetary union. Thereafter, costs were generally evaluated from a macroeconomic perspective, while benefits were analyzed through a microeconomic approach.

    III.II.II.I.III. Third stage

    As Brown del Rivero (2018) argues, the euro’s creation encouraged many investors to believe that investment risks in some southern European countries had disappeared. Large investments from Germany and other northern European countries into the Mediterranean region generated an economic boom and higher inflation in Spain, Greece, and Portugal than in Germany (Figures 3 and 4).

    Figure 3Foreign direct investment% of GDP
    • Germany
    • Ireland
    • Greece
    • Spain
    • Italy
    • Portugal

    Note. Brown del Rivero (2018, p. 80). Figure 1 in the cited study.

    Reconstructed in HTML and CSS. Approximate readings from the published figure; these are not the original series and are unsuitable for precise calculations.

    View approximate chart values
    Table 4Approximate values · Foreign direct investment
    PeriodGermanyIrelandGreeceSpainItalyPortugal
    20001113212271424
    20011812810291329
    2002181329301233
    20032312510321235
    2004259912311334
    2005268314321432
    2006246615351439
    2007257316371547
    2008257413381641
    20092510413441747
    20102513414451748
    20112713710451750
    2012291689471857
    Figure 4Inflation% per year
    • Germany
    • Greece
    • Spain
    • Portugal

    Note. Brown del Rivero (2018, p. 80). Figure 2 in the cited study.

    Reconstructed in HTML and CSS. Approximate readings from the published figure; these are not the original series and are unsuitable for precise calculations.

    View approximate chart values
    Table 5Approximate values · Inflation
    PeriodGermanyGreeceSpainPortugal
    20001.533.52.9
    200123.82.84.4
    20021.43.93.63.7
    20031.13.53.13.3
    20041.83.132.4
    20051.93.53.52.3
    20061.83.53.63.1
    20072.33.12.82.4
    20082.84.24.12.7
    20090.21.4-0.3-0.8
    20101.14.71.81.4
    20112.53.33.13.6
    20122.11.52.42.8
    20131.6-0.71.50.4
    20140.8-1.3-0.2-0.3
    20150.3-1.1-0.50.5

    These southern European countries accumulated substantial current-account deficits requiring external financing (Figure 5) (Brown del Rivero, 2018).

    Figure 5Current account% of GDP
    • Germany
    • Ireland
    • Greece
    • Spain
    • Italy
    • Portugal

    Note. Brown del Rivero (2018, p. 81). Figure 3 in the cited study.

    Reconstructed in HTML and CSS. Approximate readings from the published figure; these are not the original series and are unsuitable for precise calculations.

    View approximate chart values
    Table 6Approximate values · Current account
    PeriodGermanyIrelandGreeceSpainItalyPortugal
    2000-1.80.50.2-4.10.2-10.7
    2001-0.30.60.6-4.10.5-10.2
    20021.80.1-6.8-3.4-0.1-8.4
    20031.30.5-8.4-3.5-0.3-7.1
    20044.5-0.2-7.5-5.1-0.1-8.1
    20054.6-3.4-8.9-6.8-1-9.8
    20065.6-5.3-11.7-8.8-1.5-10.5
    20076.7-6.6-15.2-9.5-1.4-9.3
    20085.6-6.5-15.1-9.2-2.9-12.1
    20095.7-4.8-12.3-4.3-2-10.3
    20105.6-1.6-11.3-3.6-3.6-10
    20116.1-2.1-10-3.1-3-6.2
    20127-2.4-3.8-0.6-0.3-2
    20136.72.2-2.11.61.30.8
    20147.41.6-1.71.31.80.1
    20158.410.20.31.41.50.4

    Contrary to what often occurs, these current-account deficits did not originate in equivalent public-finance imbalances (Figure 6), but in the volume and composition of incoming foreign direct investment (FDI) (Brown del Rivero, 2018).

    Figure 6Government deficit% of GDP; signed balance
    • Germany
    • Ireland
    • Greece
    • Spain
    • Italy
    • Portugal

    Note. Brown del Rivero (2018, p. 81). Figure 4 in the cited study.

    Reconstructed in HTML and CSS. Approximate readings from the published figure; these are not the original series and are unsuitable for precise calculations.

    View approximate chart values
    Table 7Approximate values · Government deficit
    PeriodGermanyIrelandGreeceSpainItalyPortugal
    20001.55-3.2-1.3-0.8-3.5
    2001-31-4.7-0.8-3.1-4.8
    2002-3.20.1-4.6-0.5-3-3.2
    2003-3.8-0.2-5.6-0.3-3.5-3.7
    2004-3.81.4-7.4-0.4-3.5-4
    2005-3.61.7-5.41.1-4.1-5.8
    2006-1.72.8-62.1-3.5-4.3
    20070.20.1-6.52-1.5-3
    20080-7.2-9.9-4.5-2.7-3.8
    2009-3.1-13.5-15-11-5.3-9.8
    2010-5.1-32-12-9.4-4.3-11.2
    2011-1-13-10.3-9.6-3.6-7.4
    20120.1-8.3-8.7-10.5-3-5.7
    20130-6.1-13.2-7.2-2.8-4.8
    20140.4-3.6-3.6-6-3-7.2
    20150.7-1.8-7.5-5.3-2.6-4.4
    20161-0.7-4-4.5-2.3-2

    Southern countries attracted a greater share of FDI into real estate (Figure 7) than into productive sectors, while the opposite occurred in northern countries. This changed the composition of capital stocks between tradable and nontradable sectors. Northern countries increased tradable-goods production, while southern countries increased nontradables. The former consequently improved their trade balances and current accounts, while the latter experienced deterioration. This is merely the accounting perspective, setting aside the geopolitical economy and the social tragedy that followed (Brown del Rivero, 2018).

    Figure 7Annual change in house prices% per year
    • Germany
    • Ireland
    • Greece
    • Spain
    • Italy
    • Portugal

    Note. Brown del Rivero (2018, p. 82). Figure 5 in the cited study.

    Reconstructed in HTML and CSS. Approximate readings from the published figure; these are not the original series and are unsuitable for precise calculations.

    View approximate chart values
    Table 8Approximate values · Annual change in house prices
    PeriodGermanyIrelandGreeceSpainItalyPortugal
    20000.214.5159.55.25.2
    2001-1.613.24.515.311.60.5
    20020.56.314.117.25.71.2
    2003-1.52.111.41760.6
    20041.29.89.814.17.52.7
    2005-0.510.512.113.36.12.2
    2006-2.31513.310.54.41.7
    20070.73.27.47.33.40.3
    2008-0.9-9-4-2.1-0.54.2
    2009-0.4-19-4.8-6.60-3.5
    20100.6-13.2-5.2-1.71.8-3.7
    2011-2.8-16-10-7.23.4-5.5
    2012-5.4-14.2-11.6-153.4-7.2
    2013-5.73.3-10.4-9.93-0.5
    2014-416.8-7.1-1.23.61.8
    2015-2.39.4-5.23.14.73.9

    Competitiveness diverged between 2000 and 2009. Effective exchange rates based on labor costs deteriorated considerably in Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece, as Figure 8 illustrates, while Germany’s position improved markedly. Divergent wage policies and differences in the implementation of the structural reform agenda agreed under the Lisbon Strategy contributed to this outcome (Brown del Rivero, 2018).

    Figure 8Effective exchange ratesIndex; 2005 = 100
    • Germany
    • Ireland
    • Greece
    • Spain
    • Italy
    • Portugal

    Note. Brown del Rivero (2018, p. 82). Figure 6 in the cited study.

    Reconstructed in HTML and CSS. Approximate readings from the published figure; these are not the original series and are unsuitable for precise calculations.

    View approximate chart values
    Table 9Approximate values · Effective exchange rates
    PeriodGermanyIrelandGreeceSpainItalyPortugal
    19991078688899090
    20001008181878590
    2001978481888692
    2002988689908994
    20031039592969899
    2004103979498100100
    2005100100100100100100
    2006971039810310199
    2007951109910610299
    20089511810111010599
    200999109106109108100
    2010959710410510596
    2011959610310510595
    20129493959710289
    20139797919710591
    20149991899610589
    20159670849310086

    Contrary to Frankel’s expectations, creating the euro thus became an asymmetric shock of unanticipated proportions. Its effects could be financed while private capital continued flowing into southern countries. Once those flows declined, prices and unit labor costs had risen well above those in Germany, the most competitive benchmark. Common policies and the instruments available to the European Central Bank were insufficient to correct the accumulated imbalances. Rather than promoting greater convergence, the euro’s creation produced the opposite result (Figure 9) (Brown del Rivero, 2018).

    Figure 9Unit labor costsAnnual percentage change
    • Germany
    • Ireland
    • Greece
    • Spain
    • Italy
    • Portugal

    Note. Brown del Rivero (2018, p. 83). Figure 7 in the cited study.

    Reconstructed in HTML and CSS. Approximate readings from the published figure; these are not the original series and are unsuitable for precise calculations.

    View approximate chart values
    Table 10Approximate values · Unit labor costs
    PeriodGermanyIrelandGreeceSpainItalyPortugal
    199912.81.83.51.82.8
    20000.31.70.11.41.54.5
    2001-0.11.74.943.44.3
    20020.88.81.43.13.92.1
    20031.124.344.33.3
    2004-0.61.821.72.20.1
    2005-0.58.74.43.52.13.3
    2006-1.8-0.83.23.32.20.9
    2007-0.56.16.23.41.90.8
    200827.87.95.24.33.2
    20096-4.515.24.72.8
    2010-1-9.30.1-1.80.2-1.5
    20110.90.1-1.3-1.40.4-2.2
    20123.2-2.2-2.2-2.11.5-3.4
    20131.8-7-7-0.61.1-0.6
    20141.9-3-2.6-0.60.2-1.4
    20151.6-16.8-2.3-0.20.8-0.6

    III.II.III. The euro’s failure, rather than the ideal of integration

    Consistent with Rafael Correa’s position on Ecuadorian dedollarization, IMF economic stabilization programs in some European Union countries contradict a lesson of practical experience: successful monetary integration requires sufficient fiscal freedom to protect countries against adverse circumstances and deep recessions. The IMF describes its advice as promoting stability, reducing crisis vulnerability, and encouraging sustained growth and high living standards (International Monetary Fund, 2016). Stiglitz[14] argues that rules must nevertheless be flexible enough to accommodate different circumstances, beliefs, and values. Europe recognizes this through subsidiarity, assigning public-policy responsibility to national rather than European institutions wherever possible. The EU budget amounts to only about 1% of its GDP, compared with US federal expenditure exceeding 20% of GDP, leaving direct EU expenditure relatively small. Yet power was centralized in the ECB, established in 1998, in monetary policy, an area crucial to employment and livelihoods. Strict limits on deficit spending denied countries sufficient flexibility over taxation and expenditure to address adverse circumstances and avoid deep recession (Stiglitz, 2016).

    The argument goes further. Stiglitz observes that extensive economic literature asks what is required for countries to share a currency and prosper. Economists broadly agreed that sufficient similarities were necessary, although the relevant similarities remained debatable. What many Europeans, especially Germans, considered indispensable, namely fiscal prudence, low deficits, and low debt, was insufficient and perhaps not even necessary. These fiscal concerns became the “convergence criteria,” yet the euro’s design encouraged divergence. Adverse shocks allowed stronger countries to benefit at weaker countries’ expense, while deficit and debt limits relative to GDP reinforced the divergence. The eurozone’s structure encouraged people, particularly the most talented and educated, and capital to move from poorer, weaker economies to richer, stronger ones. Stronger countries could invest in better schools and infrastructure, while their banks could lend more, enabling entrepreneurship. Meanwhile, EU restrictions prevented lagging countries from implementing some policies that might have helped them catch up. Beyond solidarity rhetoric, Stiglitz describes a more divided Europe with fewer policy options for restoring prosperity (Stiglitz, 2016).

    Monetary integration therefore also requires a common social policy, or at least coordination, and consequently a common budget or coordinated budget execution. These arrangements can help individual countries and the bloc pursue sustained growth and high living standards despite structural asymmetries. The United States is a successful example of monetary integration. As Correa argued, its fifty states either share a business cycle or seek to minimize imbalances through labor mobility. In practice, adjustment also depends on public policies that are generally federal and therefore common or coordinated. The public-policy needs, especially economic-policy needs, of less developed economies such as Portugal, Greece, or Spain differ significantly from those of more developed economies such as France or Germany.

    In the eurozone, monetary policy is conducted by the European Central Bank. Its functions include setting the interest rates at which it lends to commercial banks, managing monetary conditions and inflation, managing foreign-exchange reserves and transactions, supporting the proper supervision of financial institutions and markets, safeguarding payment systems and banking soundness, authorizing euro banknote issuance, monitoring prices, and assessing risks to price stability (European Union, n.d.). Because monetary and fiscal policy are interdependent, controlling nominal variables through monetary policy also requires member countries to coordinate fiscal policies: nominal variables affect real variables in multiple ways. For example, inflation differentials reduced German costs relative to neighboring countries. Combined with technological asymmetries favoring Germany[15], this shifted trade advantages toward high-technology products. Leadership in such production requires the creative destruction discussed by Schumpeter, supported by substantial research and development. Monetary policy’s primary objective is price stability, yet inflation in industrialized economies such as Germany remained lower than in peripheral countries. Paul Krugman[16] suggested reversing this pattern to help save the euro. In economies such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal, limited systemic competitiveness combined with inflation-related competitiveness losses, revealing misaligned monetary-policy requirements, can restrict euro inflows. In an interview conducted by Xavier Sala i Martín[17], Krugman argued that combining higher inflation in the core than in the periphery with ECB intervention as lender of last resort could save the euro (Sala i Martín, 2012).

    This conflict is longstanding. Discussing Greece’s crisis, Stiglitz argued that the debate over Greek public-debt restructuring illustrated Europe’s political crosscurrents, special interests, and shortsighted economic decisions. Germany insisted on substantial restructuring, involving creditor haircuts of at least 50%, while the ECB insisted that debt restructuring be voluntary (Stiglitz, 2012). Germany’s dominant influence within the eurozone is therefore unsurprising; one need only consider where the ECB is headquartered.

    This explains the euro’s “chronicle of a death foretold”: the institutional architecture designed for monetary integration had embedded fundamental weaknesses before an optimum currency area had been established. The euro was born stillborn because of that architecture.

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    RT en Español. (2015n, June 17). ¿Por qué crea Texas su propio depósito de oro fuera de control de Washington? [Why is Texas creating its own gold depository outside Washington’s control?]. https://actualidad.rt.com/economia/177782-texas-deposito-oro-fuera-control-washington

    RT en Español. (2015o, September 15). ¿Por qué los países europeos retiran su oro de EE.UU.? [Why are European countries withdrawing their gold from the United States?]. https://actualidad.rt.com/economia/185961-paises-europeos-retirar-oro-eeuu-razon

    RT en Español. (2015p, September 6). Registran un declive jamás visto en los depósitos de oro del banco de la Fed de Nueva York [Unprecedented decline in gold deposits at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York]. https://actualidad.rt.com/economia/185165-declive-jamas-visto-depositos-oro-eeuu

    RT en Español. (2015q, December 22). Rusia adquiere una cantidad récord de reservas de oro [Russia acquires a record quantity of gold reserves]. https://actualidad.rt.com/economia/194950-rusia-reservas-oro-record-engrosar

    RT en Español. (2016, January 5). ¿Será ‘asesinado’ el dólar con un patrón oro en el 2016? [Will the dollar be killed by a gold standard in 2016?]. https://actualidad.rt.com/economia/196023-china-rusia-golpear-oro-dolar

    RT en Español. (2020, September 7). El economista Peter Schiff admite haberse equivocado en sus pronósticos sobre el bitcóin [Peter Schiff admits he was wrong in his Bitcoin forecasts]. https://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/365791-economista-peter-schiff-admitir-error-bitcoin

    RT en Español. (2021a, May 29). El bitcóin cae a su nivel más bajo de esta semana (y ya ha perdido casi el 40 % de su valor este mes) [Bitcoin falls to its lowest level this week, having lost almost 40% this month]. https://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/393538-bitcoin-caer-semana-perder-valor-mes

    RT en Español. (2021b, May 22). “Es relativamente barato y definitivamente aún tiene potencial de recuperación”: Un inversor explica por qué comprar oro [An investor explains why to buy gold: Relatively inexpensive with recovery potential]. https://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/392902-relativamente-barato-tiene-potencial-inversor-oro

    RT en Español. (2021c, May 26). La debilidad del dólar y la caída del bitcóin impulsan al oro a su nivel máximo desde enero [Dollar weakness and falling Bitcoin prices lift gold to its highest level since January]. https://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/393116-precio-oro-alcanza-nivel-maximo

    RT en Español. (2021d, May 31). ¿Por qué el inversor Robert Kiyosaki considera una buena noticia la caída del bitcóin? [Why Robert Kiyosaki considers Bitcoin’s decline good news]. https://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/393676-caida-bitcoin-inversor-robert-kiyosaki

    RT en Español. (2021e, June 3). Rusia dejará de emplear el dólar en sus reservas del Fondo de Bienestar Nacional dentro un mes [Russia will stop using the dollar in its National Wealth Fund reserves within a month]. https://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/394014-rusia-expulsar-dolar-reservas-fondo-bienestar-nacional

    Sala i Martín, X. (2012, July 8). Xavier Sala i Martín entrevista Paul Krugman [Xavier Sala i Martín interviews Paul Krugman]. Sala-i-Martin.com. https://salaimartin.com/mass-media/newspaper-articles/890-xavier-sala-i-martin-entrevista-paul-krugman.html

    Stiglitz, J. E. (2012, February 6). Capturing the ECB. Project Syndicate. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/capturing-the-ecb

    Stiglitz, J. E. (2016, September 9). Cómo la moneda común amenaza el futuro de Europa [How the common currency threatens Europe’s future]. Ahora. https://www.ahorasemanal.es/como-la-moneda-comun-amenaza-el-futuro-de-europa

    Xavier Sala i Martín. (n.d.). In Wikipedia. Retrieved November 4, 2026, from https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xavier_Sala_i_Mart%C3%ADn

    Bibliographic verification notes

    The dictionary edition cited as 2009 retains the pagination used in the essay. Makarova’s coauthorship has been restored, but the complete copy of that compilation could not be checked. The historical Mora Lleonart (2019) and Pedraza (2019) links did not yield the documents, so their metadata is retained from the available bibliographic information. Banton refers to the consulted 2026 update. The Bujarin passage was checked against the 1972 Spanish translation. The research-and-development figures in Note 15 still lack an identifiable source and reference year.

    Original-language titles are retained, with English translations in brackets where applicable. Passages translated by the author are treated as paraphrases rather than verbatim English quotations; secondary citations identify the work through which an earlier argument was consulted.

    Notes

    [1] For a general understanding of the operational implications, see Nabi (2021).

    [2] Further discussion appears in the section on gold’s role in the contemporary monetary system.

    [3] The usefulness of a thing: its capacity to satisfy a human or social need of any kind.

    [4] Producers’ social labor materialized in commodities.

    [5] See Section XI of Nabi (2021).

    [6] Labor considered as the performance of a specific technical task, producing use-value. For example, a carpenter makes chairs so that people can sit on them.

    [7] Labor considered as the objective crystallization of human physical and mental expenditure, producing exchange-value, whose monetary expression is price.

    [8] As Banton (2026) explains, path dependence describes continued use of a product or practice on the basis of historical preferences or previous use. A firm may retain a product or practice even when newer, more efficient alternatives exist. Continuing along an established path is often easier or more profitable than creating a new one. Scholars discuss path dependence within historical institutionalism in political science: institutions may change less than expected and constrain subsequent development. Legislators make assumptions and consequential decisions and do not necessarily learn from experience. Path dependence may also result from an inability or reluctance to change because of the costs involved. A town built around a factory illustrates the concept. Ideally, the factory might be located at some distance from housing, but factories are often built first, followed by nearby workers’ homes and services. Relocating an established factory can be prohibitively costly even when an outlying location would be preferable for the community. Cultural factors also plainly play an important role.

    [9] Dutch disease refers to adverse economic effects arising from a substantial increase in a country’s foreign-currency income. The term emerged in the 1960s when Dutch foreign-exchange earnings increased following the discovery of large natural-gas deposits at Slochteren near the North Sea. Increased inflows appreciated the guilder and weakened the competitiveness of other exports. The phenomenon need not follow a resource discovery: it can arise from any large foreign-currency inflow, including higher commodity prices, foreign assistance, or foreign direct investment (“Mal neerlandés,” n.d.).

    [10] This means encouraging exports of primary products, such as agricultural goods, and imports of manufactured products. The essay argues that dollar use makes manufactured imports cheaper than under a lower-valued domestic currency, while exports become less competitive because foreign buyers using other currencies face higher prices for goods from the dollarized economy, here Ecuador. Oil is treated separately because it is priced in dollars. The term petrodollars refers to dollar earnings and reserves obtained by oil-producing countries through crude-oil sales.

    [11] Negative expanded reproduction involves the physical destruction and degradation of elements of production, the disruption of their connections, and the reorganization of productive forces toward unproductive consumption. Bujarin (1920/1972, p. 26) characterizes this process as increasing underproduction, distinct from both expanded and simple reproduction.

    [12] Alan Greenspan, born in New York on March 6, 1926, is a US economist who chaired the Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006. He earned a bachelor’s degree in economics in 1948, a master’s degree in 1950, and a doctorate in economics in 1977, all from New York University.

    [13] James B. Rogers Jr. is a US investor and financial commentator who co-founded the Quantum Fund and Soros Fund Management with George Soros. He has also taught at college level, written books, and created the Rogers International Commodity Index (RICI). The biographical account used in the essay places him in Singapore as chairman of Rogers Holdings and Beeland Interests, Inc.

    [14] Joseph Eugene Stiglitz is a US economist and professor. He received the John Bates Clark Medal and the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, commonly called the Nobel Prize in Economics. The economics prize was not established by Alfred Nobel; it was created in 1968 on the initiative of Sweden’s central bank, is administered by the Nobel Foundation, and is awarded by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. Stiglitz has also been associated with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and is a member of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences. He served as World Bank chief economist and senior vice president and chaired the Council of Economic Advisers during the Clinton administration.

    [15] The essay reports research-and-development expenditure of €12,820.756 million in Spain, €1,488.74 million in Greece, and €2,229.134 million in Portugal, compared with €48,107.8 million in France and €83,636.5 million in Germany. The citation attached to these figures is unresolved, and the reference year is not specified.

    [16] Paul Robin Krugman is a US economist. The biographical account used in the essay lists associations with Princeton University, the London School of Economics and Political Science, the Luxembourg Income Study at the CUNY Graduate Center, and The New York Times as an opinion columnist. He received the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, commonly called the Nobel Prize in Economics. This prize was not established by Alfred Nobel; it was created in 1968 on the initiative of Sweden’s central bank, is administered by the Nobel Foundation, and is awarded by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences.

    [17] Xavier Sala i Martín, born in Cabrera de Mar, Barcelona, on June 17, 1962, is a Spanish-born US economist and public commentator associated with Columbia University and known for research on economic growth. He has advanced economic arguments in favor of Catalan independence and has defended globalization. Vicenç Navarro described him as one of the most visible and outspoken representatives of neoliberal thought in Spain (“Xavier Sala i Martín,” n.d.).

  • IMPERIALISM, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: ON THE IIPPE-2021

    IMPERIALISM, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: ON THE IIPPE-2021

    POLITICAL ECONOMY · PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

    Imperialism, China and International Finance

    Debates at IIPPE 2021: value, uneven development and structural determinations of essence

    Original publication: September 30, 2021
    Revised and expanded edition: November 2, 2026

    GDP in constant 2010 dollars
    GDP in constant 2010 dollars Comparison across economies. Source shown in the graph: World Bank and OECD.

    Introduction: a controversy over relations, mechanisms and measurements

    Imperialism poses a problem that cannot be resolved by listing powerful countries. It requires an investigation of how the relations that enable particular capitals to appropriate surplus labour generated in other territories are produced and reproduced. Technology, wages, ownership, credit and state power participate in that reproduction, but their roles cannot be established through a single label.

    IIPPE—the International Initiative for Promoting Political Economy—is a pluralistic forum for critical research. Its name refers to political economy, a field of inquiry, rather than exclusively to economic policy, understood as public intervention. [1]

    Michael Roberts’s review, published in September 2021, provides the documentary starting point. It connects imperialism, China, financialisation and interest, adding a Colombian study that was not presented at the conference. Our purpose is to reconstruct the underlying problems, examine their mediations and clarify the differences between hypotheses, measurements and conclusions. [2]

    Three questions guide the essay: Which social relation is being explained? What mechanism is proposed, and under what conditions? Which observation could test it? Convergent findings can strengthen an interpretation without automatically making the models that generate them equivalent.

    I. Background: from finance capital to unequal exchange

    A genealogy that neither begins nor ends with one author

    Hilferding published Finance Capital in 1910; Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital in 1913. Bukharin investigated the internationalisation of capital and its articulation with states; Lenin wrote Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism in 1916, and the book appeared in 1917. Their contributions constitute a historical controversy, not interchangeable stages of a homogeneous theory. [3, 4, 5, 6]

    To study this controversy, it is useful to distinguish corporate concentration, the articulation of banking and industry, capital exports, problems of reproduction and interstate rivalry. An author can illuminate one relation without providing a complete explanation of all the others. Lenin’s centrality does not require attributing absolute priority to him over every Marxist investigation of the world economy.

    Emmanuel shifted the discussion towards international wage differences and prices of production. His formulations of 1962 must be distinguished from the French book of 1969 and its English edition of 1972. His proposal integrates international exchange into an inquiry into value and the worldwide distribution of surplus. [7]

    Emmanuel: economic assumptions and political implications

    In his characteristic formulation, capital mobility and restrictions on labour mobility make it possible to examine a tendency towards equal profit rates alongside persistent wage differences. The question is how these assumptions affect international prices and the distribution of social labour. [7]

    Evaluating the argument requires making the time horizon, degrees of mobility, wage determination and price formation explicit. Altering an assumption may alter the conclusion. This does not invalidate modelling: it specifies the explanation’s domain.

    The implications for international solidarity deserve their own discussion. A relative distributive advantage for some workers does not automatically turn them into owners of the means of production or eliminate their antagonisms with capital. Conversely, acknowledging exploitation within each country does not require denying international hierarchies. Class position and territorial insertion must be examined together.

    Explaining Emmanuel’s reception exclusively through political convenience would replace investigation with imputation. Both political conflicts and theoretical disagreements are recognised here. Controversial attributions—for example, that an author treats capital as an autonomous source of value—require precise passages and contexts; they do not follow from the use of simultaneous equations.

    II. Value, surplus value and transfers: distinctions that explain

    Production and appropriation are different processes

    In Marx’s theory, value concerns socially necessary abstract labour, rather than any individually clocked expenditure of effort. The formation of a general profit rate and prices of production makes it possible to investigate differences between the surplus produced by a capital and the surplus it ultimately appropriates. [8, 9]

    For an introductory scheme, assume one turnover and that all the constant capital considered is consumed during the period:

    W = c + v + s

    Here c is the value of consumed means of production transferred to the product; v, variable capital advanced for labour power; and s, surplus value. The expression organises theoretical categories. Estimation requires deciding which observations represent each term and how labour magnitudes are translated into monetary magnitudes.

    e = s / v   ·   r = s / (C + V)

    The surplus value rate relates the surplus to variable capital. The profit rate relates a flow of profit per period to the relevant total capital advanced, C + V; this must not be confused without justification with consumed costs, c + v. The rates are comparable only when periods, turnover and valuation conventions are aligned.

    A teaching example of redistribution

    Consider two capitals of 100 units each, with one turnover, full consumption of constant capital and a surplus value rate of 100%. A uses 70 units of constant and 30 of variable capital; B uses 40 and 60. Their surplus values are 30 and 60. Total surplus value is 90, and the hypothetical average profit rate is 90/200 = 45%. If each realises 45 in profit, A appropriates 15 more than it produced and B appropriates 15 less.

    This is a teaching construction, neither a historical estimate nor a universal solution to the transformation problem. Costs are held given to isolate the mechanism; a complete system must also explain input prices. Redistribution does not create the 90 units of surplus value: it changes their appropriation.

    What zero-sum means—and what it does not

    If Tᵢ denotes a net transfer within an accounting universe that is closed and uses the same unit of valuation, then:

    Σᵢ Tᵢ = 0

    This identity concerns the distribution of a given magnitude. It does not imply that every economic interaction or expanded reproduction is zero-sum. Production can generate new value; transfers redistribute its appropriation. If the data do not sum to zero, coverage, valuation and statistical discrepancies must be examined before the residual becomes a theoretical conclusion.

    Material welfare, the quantity of use values and the magnitude of value must also be distinguished. Productivity gains can increase available goods without proportionately increasing value per unit. “Benefiting from trade” and “appropriating a net transfer of value” are different questions.

    III. One concrete essence and multiple structural determinations

    Components, common essence and material totality

    The components of a totality, represented through equations articulated within a system, may share determinations of a common essence that makes their unity and differences intelligible. This essence is expressed through set-theoretic, topological, differentiable, metric, operational, and historical and dynamical determinations: each makes particular constitutive relations available for investigation. When a correspondence preserves the relations of a defined structure, an isomorphism can be established at that level; equivalence in one determination can coexist with differences in others.

    The articulation of components admits an integrodifferential representation when the problem requires rates of change, distributed effects or accumulated memory. Under determinate initial conditions and constraints, interactions constitute an internal structure of a material nature: objective through the efficacy of its relations, dynamic through its reproduction and transformation, and nonlinear where its functional dependencies have that property. The coherence of this articulation includes the compatibility of its relations and equations alongside antagonisms and tensions that can drive its development.

    The totality’s structure, generated through component activity, in turn conditions those components’ possibilities of existence, reproduction and transformation. System composition and structural conditioning form a reciprocal relation: interactions produce organisation, and organisation modifies the conditions under which those interactions continue. Emergent properties are explained through this articulation rather than a simple inventory of isolated components.

    The laws guiding the investigation of this genesis and reproduction acquire a generalised realisation within a totality with new mediations. The unity and struggle of opposites allows investigation of the constitution and transformation of antagonistic relations and their processes of emergence and self-organisation; the transformation of quantity into quality concerns regime changes, which can be formalised through bifurcations in particular models; and the negation of the negation examines reorganisations preserving and transforming previous determinations. Chemical synthesis provides a concrete example of material reorganisation and the emergence of properties. These connections are developed by specifying mechanisms and conditions: a general dialectical law does not by itself impose an identical functional form, a bifurcation or self-organised criticality on every system.

    Integrodifferential composition and reciprocal conditioning

    Representing a component through an equation means selecting variables and relations relevant to the problem. Representing the totality must additionally incorporate couplings between components and the restrictions imposed by their organisation. Integration can capture distributed or accumulated effects; differentiation can describe rates of change. Their articulation expresses a concrete possibility for formalising the thesis.

    In a domain where differentiable evolution is an appropriate description, reciprocal conditioning can be schematised as follows:

    dxi/dt = Fi(x(t), S(t), Ht; θi)
    dS/dt = G(S(t), x(t), Ht; Θ)

    x(t) collects the component states; S(t) represents organisational variables or structural constraints; Ht, the relevant history up to that moment; and θi and Θ, model parameters. The first equation expresses how component behaviour depends on the organised totality. The second expresses how that organisation is reproduced or transformed through component activity. Both must satisfy compatible initial conditions and constraints.

    Where accumulated memory needs representation, an integral contribution can be added:

    mi(t) = ∫0t Ki(t, τ) Qi(x(τ), S(τ)) dτ

    Qi represents the contribution of earlier interactions and Ki their present weighting. This formulation allows investigation of how different histories can modify current possibilities. It is a modelling scheme requiring functions, units and observations to be defined for each application; it does not assert that every system must take this specific form.

    The structure is material and objective insofar as the represented relations are effective in the object and do not depend on the investigator’s will. The objectivity of a relation and the adequacy of its mathematical representation are connected but distinguishable questions. Structural reproduction can constrain particular actions while those same actions contribute to sustaining or altering it.

    Emergence, nonlinearity and generalised lawfulness

    The totality contains relations and capacities that cannot be explained by listing isolated components. Explanation requires investigating their organisation and interactions. A dynamics is nonlinear when its functional dependencies do not satisfy the relevant linearity property; couplings can supply concrete mechanisms for this nonlinearity. Explaining the difference between a totality and the sum of its parts requires identifying these organisational relations.

    Generalised lawfulness retains the relation between the system’s genesis and reproduction conditions. The processes constituting a structure subsequently operate within an organisation that modifies their scale, mediations and effects. Continuity of lawfulness can coexist with a transformation of its concrete form of realisation. Sharing general principles does not require using an identical equation at every scale.

    In the problem of imperialism, capitals participate in general valorisation relations while their worldwide articulation configures production chains, monetary hierarchies and access to technology and credit. These structural relations condition particular capitals’ reproduction, while those capitals reproduce them through investment, production and appropriation. Moving from the national to the international requires investigating this reciprocity and its historical mediations.

    The following layered table specifies the determinations of this articulation; section IV develops the three dialectical laws orienting its interpretation.

    What a layered interpretation contributes

    Essence can be interpreted as the articulation of constitutive relations that makes an object’s identity and reproduction intelligible. Understanding it requires abstractions, but no single abstraction necessarily exhausts that articulation. Mathematics can specify particular relations; the correspondence between formalism and object requires additional justification.

    Interpreting essence as an articulation of structural determinations makes it possible to distinguish the following levels. [10]

    Determination Structural question Possible formalisation and scope
    Set-theoretic Which elements or states are distinguished? A set and correspondences; a bijection preserves cardinality, not every additional relation.
    Topological What continuity, neighbourhood and connectedness exist? A topology; homeomorphisms preserve its structure.
    Differentiable Which smooth variations can be described? A smooth structure; diffeomorphisms compare that structure.
    Metric How are lengths or distances quantified? An appropriate metric; isometries preserve the corresponding geometry.
    Operational Which transformations preserve selected relations? Automorphisms and group actions; Lie groups apply in cases with a compatible smooth structure.
    Historical and dynamical How was the system constituted, and which transitions does it admit? Evolutions, path constraints and categories of transitions; irreversible histories do not reduce to invertible symmetries.

    These layers are articulated determinations of a concrete essence, not six independent substances. Their selection depends on the object. A trade network does not automatically possess a manifold’s topology; an economic inequality does not by itself constitute a mathematical distance. States, relations and observation procedures must be defined in each case.

    Adding structure and preserving structure

    Equipping a set with a topology differs from establishing a homeomorphism between spaces. Transformations should therefore not be drawn as if they independently created the next level’s structure. For a smooth manifold M with Riemannian metric g, transformations of the object satisfy:

    Isom(M, g) ⊆ Diff(M) ⊆ Homeo(M) ⊆ Bij(M)

    Preserving the metric imposes additional conditions beyond preserving only differentiable structure; preserving the latter imposes additional conditions beyond topological equivalence. The inclusions are not asserted to be universally strict. Moreover, not every topology admits a smooth manifold structure, and this chain does not classify all mathematical structures.

    The same underlying space can admit different geometries

    On the upper half-plane U = {(x,y): y > 0}, compare:

    gE = dx² + dy²   ·   gH = (dx² + dy²) / y²

    The set, usual topology and smooth structure coincide. Gaussian curvature differs: K = 0 for gE and K = −1 for gH. No isometry exists between these geometries. Topological equivalence does not decide metric equivalence. [11]

    Curvature does not prevent a global metric from existing. Under the usual assumptions—a smooth, Hausdorff, second-countable manifold—Riemannian metrics can be constructed using partitions of unity. A global metric differs from a global chart, a constant matrix in every coordinate system or a globally Euclidean geometry. [11]

    Invariance, identity and historical transformation

    An invariant is always relative to a class of transformations. Remaining unchanged under coordinate changes, under isometries or during physical evolution are different properties. Knowing an abstract symmetry group is also insufficient to reconstruct uniquely every structure admitting it.

    “Operational essence” can designate the restrictions delimiting particular structurally admissible transformations. This does not identify every change that leaves a system recognisable with an exact symmetry. An organism or an economy can persist through dissipative processes that do not preserve a metric.

    For irreversible transitions, a category or semigroup may be more suitable than a group. A groupoid permits partial composition and multiple objects, but requires invertible morphisms: having additional objects does not itself introduce irreversibility. Noether’s connection between symmetry and conservation requires variational dynamics and the corresponding assumptions. [12]

    From the national to the international scale

    The persistence of wage labour, surplus appropriation and competition between capitals makes common relations across scales a legitimate research question. Currencies, borders, jurisdictions, intellectual property and migration restrictions nevertheless introduce specific mediations. An international structure cannot be obtained merely by multiplying a national structure.

    Establishing an isomorphism would require defining the compared structures and constructing a correspondence that preserves their relations. Many applications instead involve aggregations, projections or partial correspondences. Sharing a general law does not prove that components are mutually isomorphic, or that each is isomorphic to the whole.

    This qualification retains a decisive dialectical insight: general relations are realised under concrete conditions and can acquire new determinations within a more complex totality. Investigating that articulation requires specifying what is preserved, what emerges and what ceases to be equivalent.

    IV. Dialectics, complexity and time: connections with conditions

    The three dialectical laws in the constitution and transformation of the totality

    The constitution and transformation of the totality are examined through three laws: unity and struggle of opposites, transformation of quantity into quality, and negation of the negation. Their function in this essay is to guide a reconstruction of the material totality’s genesis, reproduction and transformation. Each proposed mathematical relation must show which aspect of this reconstruction it expresses.

    1. Unity and struggle of opposites. The terms of a contradictory relation presuppose and condition one another within an organisation, while their tendencies can oppose one another. Inquiry must explain both the reproduction of this unity and the tensions transforming it. In the capital–labour relation, for example, capital’s reproduction presupposes wage labour, but surplus appropriation places participants in antagonistic positions over its distribution and control. The totality is constituted through these relations and imposes conditions on their realisation.

    The reference to emergence and self-organisation opens a positive question: how do interactions produce an order which subsequently regulates its own reproduction conditions? A model can investigate feedback and emergent constraints to address it. If self-organised criticality is additionally proposed, the mechanism and properties warranting that specific concept must be identified. The analysis of reciprocal organisation thus connects philosophical explanation with a defined research requirement.

    2. Transformation of quantity into quality. Accumulated variations can modify a system’s organisation and possibilities until a different regime is constituted. The problem is to investigate what accumulates, which relations mediate that accumulation and when the relevant quality changes. A bifurcation represents this passage when parameter variation changes a dynamics’ qualitative structure. In political economy, a hypothesis about concentration and market power must establish how changes in magnitude reorganise relations between capitals; accumulating figures alone does not demonstrate that change.

    3. Negation of the negation. Transformation can supersede an organisational form through processes which that form itself helped generate. The new organisation preserves determinations of the preceding process while transforming their articulation. This perspective investigates historical continuity within qualitative discontinuity: which relations are displaced, which are preserved and in which new configuration they reappear. It does not assume that every trajectory necessarily advances towards a favourable outcome or repeats an identical cycle.

    Chemical synthesis illustrates material reorganisation and the emergence of a compound’s properties. Extending this to a general dialectical law requires explaining the mediations and meaning of the negations in the investigated process. The connection requires determining which relations and processes warrant generalising from each example.

    The three laws are articulated within the argument: contradictory relations constitute a unity, variations can transform its organisation, and transformation incorporates a history preserving and modifying previous determinations. Integrodifferential modelling and the layers of essence make particular aspects of this articulation available for investigation.

    Scope of the mathematical correspondences

    The unity and struggle of opposites directs attention to antagonistic relations; it does not by itself imply that a model exhibits self-organised criticality. The latter requires a dynamical definition and evidence of its properties. Similarly, emergence and non-additivity are insufficient to demonstrate mathematical nonlinearity: the relevant equations, operations or functional relations must be identified.

    A bifurcation provides one possible formalisation of particular qualitative changes when dynamics change regime as a parameter varies. Not every qualitative change is a bifurcation in the technical sense. Chemical synthesis can illustrate concrete transformations; identifying it with the negation of the negation would require an independent argument.

    Self-similarity likewise does not follow from the existence of relations between parts and a whole. It can be exact, approximate or statistical and must be established through a defined scaling transformation. Dialectical inquiry gains precision when mathematical connections become testable problems.

    Temporality and simultaneity in the transformation problem

    One axis of Marxist debate contrasts simultaneous valuation of inputs and outputs with interpretations that distinguish moments of valuation. It matters, but does not exhaust the classification of schools. Relations between value and price systems, money, reproduction and distributive closure also matter.

    Simultaneous equations can represent conditions within a period or states of a dynamic process; they do not automatically deny time’s existence. A temporal formulation does not become historically adequate merely by introducing a subscript t. It must explain what is inherited, what changes and how periods are connected.

    The MELT—monetary expression of labour time—connects labour and monetary magnitudes under a chosen formulation. Its definition, units and valuation date must be declared. Labour hours and money cannot be added as a homogeneous magnitude without such mediation.

    Differences between models demand more than observing different numerical results. They require comparison with relevant data, explicit closures and assumptions. Not every methodological controversy has an immediate empirical resolution, nor does comparison with other philosophies of statistics settle this debate by itself.

    V. Unequal exchange: theories, indicators and evidence

    A map of mechanisms

    Approach Explanatory focus Question requiring examination
    Emmanuel Wage differences and international price formation under mobility assumptions. How do results change with mobility, wages and model closure?
    Carchedi–Roberts Transfers estimated through capital composition, surplus value and production prices. How are theoretical categories translated into national accounts and export sectors?
    John Smith Super-exploitation and the international organisation of production. How are labour-power reproduction and the location of appropriation observed?
    Andrea Ricci Unequal-exchange measurement and international productive structure. Which monetary conversions and sectoral aggregations make labour comparable?
    Cogliano–Veneziani–Yoshihara International exploitation, endowments and credit markets in a calibrated model. What depends on the index’s definition, and what on mechanisms of persistence?

    This table proposes reading questions; it does not equate different mechanisms. Indicators classifying some countries similarly may differ in their measured object and causal explanation. [7, 13, 14, 15, 16]

    Carchedi–Roberts: measurement and decomposition

    The 2021 presentation estimates trade transfers separately from primary income. Its comparison of methods records $600 billion for 2019, equivalent to 1.3% of reference GDP, and $600 billion in primary income for 2017, equivalent to 1.4%. The graph uses each bloc’s own denominator; it is not a homogeneous time series of one combined sum. [13], slides 16–17

    Unequal exchange as a share of each bloc’s GDP, 1950–2019.
    Figure 1. Unequal exchange as a share of each bloc’s GDP, 1950–2019. Carchedi–Roberts, 2021 presentation. IC-GDP: imperialist bloc; DC-GDP: dominated bloc. Denominators differ. Series expressed as percentages of each bloc’s GDP.

    The positive and negative lines need not have equal percentage magnitudes: the same flow can be divided by different GDPs. Nor should they automatically be equated with the rounded 1.5% in the 2021 account. Reproducing the calculation requires specifying the estimation procedure, year and denominator.

    Relative contributions of OCC and RSV to unequal exchange, 1950–2019.
    Figure 2. Relative contributions of OCC and RSV to unequal exchange, 1950–2019. Carchedi–Roberts. OCC: organic composition of capital; RSV: rate of surplus value. Shares in a model decomposition, not growth rates.

    The decomposition between OCC—organic composition of capital—and RSV—rate of surplus value—belongs to the model. A rising relative contribution does not necessarily mean that the other factor’s absolute contribution is falling. Organic composition is not a direct, universal measure of technological superiority: its relation to productivity depends on techniques, wages, prices and sectoral composition.

    Super-exploitation: production organisation and appropriation

    Smith emphasises working conditions and wages in global production, challenging the identification of where value is generated with where national accounts record its appropriation. His linked study makes it possible to examine the objection without reducing it to terminology. [14]

    The disagreement requires distinguishing criticism of an indicator from denial of all unequal exchange. It also requires avoiding identification of the immediate employer with the sole beneficiary without studying contractual and ownership relations. Subcontracting, commercial control and ownership can articulate successive appropriations. Evaluation must follow the chain and its concrete conditions.

    Ricci: transfers per person and units of comparison

    Annual transfers per person and percentages by period, 1995–2019.
    Figure 3. Annual transfers per person and percentages by period, 1995–2019. Ricci (2022), table 2. Current dollars and period-average percentages; accessible transcription below.

    The figure distinguishes annual amounts per person in current dollars for 1995, 2007 and 2019, and percentage columns for 1995–2019, 1995–2007 and 2007–2019. These percentages must not be presented as growth rates, or the last monetary column mechanically paired with a single annual percentage. [15, 27]

    Transcription of figure 3; checked against Ricci (2022), table 2. Positive signs: inflows; negative signs: outflows. Groupings follow the source.
    RegionUSD/person 1995USD/person 2007USD/person 2019Mean % 95–19Mean % 95–07Mean % 07–19
    North America761196526803.93.74.1
    EMU17204939483610.38.512.2
    West Europe24297531692112.710.614.8
    East Asia1984176625405.85.95.7
    Oceania526262636387.14.59.8
    China−196−810−426−14.1−19.0−10.0
    Russia−767−1108−1850−29.7−40.9−17.2
    East Europe−901−615−1309−14.7−18.9−9.9
    South America−269−472−490−6.1−8.4−3.9
    Central America−471−379−454−11.9−13.6−9.8
    Middle East−1443−1502−950−18.9−24.8−12.8
    South Asia−77−220−351−21.5−20.2−23.0
    Southeast Asia−463−1350−1631−46.8−53.9−40.3
    Central Asia−272−380−924−11.9−13.6−9.8
    North Africa−426−1099−1034−30.7−31.6−30.4
    S. Sahara Africa−65−120−132−10.0−11.6−8.3

    In particular, South Asia must not be renamed India; East Asia is not simply Japan; and South America and Central America are not one regional observation. The table reports regions, not individual findings for each country.

    In Global locational inequality (2022), table 2 shows that percentages are period averages and monetary amounts are nominal dollars. EMU denotes the European monetary union bloc in that classification. Its regions also need not coincide with states: “China” incorporates Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan in this statistical aggregation; “Russia” includes other countries, and “Central America” includes Mexico and the Caribbean. These groupings follow Ricci’s statistical classification. Findings must be interpreted according to that territorial coverage. [27]

    An international index is not the axiomatic article

    Exploiter and exploited countries: basic economy.
    Figure 4. Exploiter and exploited countries: basic economy. Exploitation intensity index and wealth per person. Cogliano–Veneziani–Yoshihara’s international model differs from Yoshihara–Veneziani’s axiomatic foundations.

    Yoshihara and Veneziani’s article (2018) examines exploitation’s axiomatic foundations. The Dynamics of International Exploitation by Cogliano, Veneziani and Yoshihara (2022) develops a model of international exploitation. Its basic economy assigns China an index of 0.9935: just on the exploiting side of the threshold 1, with the authors advising against a definite conclusion. [16, 17]

    The graph relates exploitation classification to wealth per person in a basic economy. An index close to the threshold requires sensitivity analysis. Partial agreement with other studies must not erase classification differences.

    VI. China: three questions that must be distinguished

    Transfers, mode of production and international power

    Roberts’s presentation When did China become capitalist? argues for a trapped transitional economy: it emphasises state direction and planned investment while acknowledging the law of value’s operation. The argument is documented as a position held in 2021, not a classification accepted by all authors. [18]

    Dimension Object of investigation Relevant evidence
    International transfers Net appropriation under an indicator and period. Trade, production, primary income, conversion assumptions and sensitivity.
    Socioeconomic organisation Ownership, control, labour and surplus allocation. Corporate governance, investment decisions, labour discipline, planning and markets.
    Imperialist power International domination and the reproduction of hierarchies. Credit, monopolies, coercion, institutions, foreign policy and military capacity.

    Being a net recipient under an indicator does not by itself establish comprehensive imperialist domination; being a net donor does not exclude relations subordinating third parties. Scale matters: different positions may coexist across sectors, firms, partners and territories.

    Sam King examines monopoly over technologically complex activities as a mechanism reproducing international hierarchy. His 2021 book, Imperialism and the Development Myth, frames the question of productive upgrading and its limits. [19]

    The review also records Walter Daum’s political objection and different positions from Dic Lo and Cheng Enfu. These interventions are acknowledged as disagreements without attributing to them a demonstration that the review does not provide. [2]

    What a growth trajectory cannot decide

    Growth, poverty reduction and the capacity to sustain investment require explanation. They do not by themselves identify a mode of production. Connecting them causally with an ownership form would require mechanisms, comparators, periodisation and external conditions; a favourable outcome is insufficient to identify its cause.

    It would also be circular to declare that every capitalist economy must reproduce precisely one crisis trajectory and exclude any differing case from the category. A theory must specify tendencies, mediations and conditions, and admit observations capable of challenging its scope.

    Dates are decisive. A productivity comparison using aggregate data preceding 2021 does not authorise indefinite descriptions of every Chinese industry as technologically backward. Each conclusion’s scope depends on its period, sectoral disaggregation and supporting sources.

    VII. Financialisation: specify the hypothesis before rejecting it

    One term, several objects

    Research can examine finance’s share of value added, credit expansion, household indebtedness, financial income of nonfinancial firms or shareholder power. Each dimension needs its own indicators. None automatically substitutes for every other dimension.

    Mavroudeas challenges finance’s independence from productive accumulation. Rabinovich specifically examines the financial rentierisation hypothesis for US nonfinancial corporations, finding that asset and income composition require a more differentiated interpretation. These arguments have different scopes. [20, 21]

    Methodologically, a declining sectoral share can coexist with increasing absolute size. An average can conceal corporate concentration. Changes in value added do not directly equal changes in assets, credit or institutional power. Indicator selection must answer a hypothesis defined in advance.

    What the percentages 51.2% and 65.9% measure

    This distinction changes the evidence’s meaning. Counting countries measures how widespread a sign of change is; it does not measure the aggregate magnitude of that change or automatically weight countries by economic size. The chosen time window also matters for detecting earlier expansion.

    Concluding that financialisation explains deindustrialisation requires temporality, mechanisms and alternative variables. An association between sectoral shares does not itself identify causality. Conversely, rejecting an exclusively financial explanation of crises does not eliminate the roles of credit, collateral and liquidity in their transmission.

    VIII. Interest and profitability: structural relations and statistical tests

    Interest as distribution and as a price

    Marx investigates interest as part of profit and examines its division between lender and functioning capitalist. This distributive restriction does not establish a mechanical equality between interest and profit rates at every moment. The analysis itself allows exceptions and distinguishes determinants of fluctuations. [23]

    A concrete explanation must specify whether nominal or real magnitudes, expected or realised rates, and equivalent maturities are being compared. Contractual interest can temporarily exceed realised profitability, resulting in losses or default. Two declining trends are insufficient to identify a unique causal relation.

    Stravelakis: what the “60%” represents

    Nikos Stravelakis’s presentation uses the incremental rate of profit, IROP = ΔPr / I, examining its difference from interest. Slide 7 reports a normalised mutual-information-based measure around 0.606 for 1962–2019. This is not an R² explaining 60% of interest-rate variance, and the statistic alone does not identify causality. [24]

    ΔPr is the change in profit, and I is investment as defined in the study. Their ratio depends on the period and does not by definition coincide with the average rate on the capital stock. A statistic’s economic content depends on the variables it relates and how they were constructed.

    Roberts reports an observation by Karl Beitel concerning profitability trends and bond yields. The association requires examining the series, definitions and estimation procedure before using it as causal evidence. [2]

    IX. Colombia, 1967–2019: evidence with a defined scope

    Growth, profit rate and accumulation in Colombia, 1967–2019.
    Figure 5. Growth, profit rate and accumulation in Colombia, 1967–2019. Duque García (2021), figure 2. Growth and profit rate: left axis. Accumulation rate: right axis. Vertical lines delimit historical periods.

    Carlos Alberto Duque García’s document investigates growth, accumulation and the profit rate using a VAR with generalised impulse responses. It uses 53 annual observations and warns about sample size. Its evidence bears on the Marxian models examined, but does not independently prove a universal law or identify a structural causal effect without further assumptions. [25]

    The graph uses different scales: growth and profitability on the left axis, accumulation on the right. Comparing visual heights without reading the axes can manufacture similarities or differences. Vertical lines delimit historical periods; they do not automatically constitute statistical tests of breaks.

    Evaluation must consider variable definitions, stationarity, lags and stability. Generalised responses’ invariance to variable ordering does not remove the conditions for causal interpretation. Independent replication requires the data and estimation choices, together with an assessment of the findings’ sensitivity.

    World in Crisis, edited by Carchedi and Roberts, brings together profitability studies. Cross-country comparison requires methodological alignment before all its series can be treated as one measurement. [26]

    X. Assessment: investigate the whole without erasing its mediations

    A Marxian perspective can contribute a research programme on surplus production, appropriation and reproduction across scales. Imperialism becomes intelligible through concrete relations between capitals, classes, states and territories, rather than by turning a set of countries into an indivisible subject with homogeneous internal interests.

    The layered interpretation of essence supplies a useful discipline: define which relations constitute the object, which abstraction represents them, which transformations preserve that representation and which history explains its configuration. Formalisation establishes consequences under assumptions; material adequacy requires testing and comparison with alternatives.

    Political action and scientific inquiry can be articulated without replacing one another. Solidarity among workers requires understanding both shared exploitation and the inequalities shaping their reproduction. Specifying these mediations makes the critique of capitalism more demanding and the discussion of its transformation clearer.

    XI. Documentary library

    The library brings together works of conceptual reference, axiomatic foundations, econometric analysis and international political economy. Each entry includes its cover or opening page and access to the document.

    Cover or opening page: Diccionario filosófico

    CONCEPTUAL REFERENCE · PDF

    Diccionario filosófico

    Rosental · Iudin

    Reference dictionary for studying philosophical vocabulary and conceptual relations.

    OPEN / DOWNLOAD PDF
    Cover or opening page: The Theory of Exploitation as the Unequal Exchange of Labour

    AXIOMATIC ARTICLE · PDF

    The Theory of Exploitation as the Unequal Exchange of Labour

    Naoki Yoshihara · Roberto Veneziani · 2018

    Formal foundations of exploitation definitions. Distinct from the later international application.

    OPEN / DOWNLOAD PDF
    Cover or opening page: Economic Growth and the Rate of Profit in Colombia 1967–2019

    WORKING PAPER · PDF

    Economic Growth and the Rate of Profit in Colombia 1967–2019

    Carlos Alberto Duque García · 2021

    VAR analysis of growth, accumulation and profitability, including its warning about 53 annual observations.

    OPEN / DOWNLOAD PDF
    Cover or opening page: World in Crisis

    EDITED VOLUME · PDF

    World in Crisis

    Guglielmo Carchedi · Michael Roberts, eds. · 2018

    Research on the law of profitability in different countries. Methods need comparison before findings are aggregated.

    OPEN / DOWNLOAD PDF
    Cover or opening page: Value and Unequal Exchange in International Trade

    MONOGRAPH · PDF

    Value and Unequal Exchange in International Trade

    Andrea Ricci · 2021

    Study of value, trade and global exploitation, developing the foundations of unequal-exchange measurement.

    OPEN / DOWNLOAD PDF

    XII. References and resources

    1. IIPPE. About IIPPE. ↩
    2. Roberts, Michael (2021-09-30). IIPPE 2021: imperialism, China and finance. ↩
    3. Hilferding, Rudolf (1910). Finance Capital. ↩
    4. Luxemburg, Rosa (1913). The Accumulation of Capital. ↩
    5. Bukharin, Nikolai. Imperialism and World Economy. Written 1915 and 1917. ↩
    6. Lenin, V. I. (written 1916; published 1917). Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. ↩
    7. Emmanuel, Arghiri (1969; English edition 1972). Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade. Monthly Review Press. Bibliographic chronology: Arghiri Emmanuel Association. Publisher record. ↩
    8. Marx, Karl (1867). Capital, vol. I, chapter 1. ↩
    9. Marx, Karl (1894). Capital, vol. III, chapter 9. ↩
    10. Gómez Julián, José Mauricio (2026). Geometría, historia y legalidad: fundamentos dialéctico-materialistas de los espacios con estructura métrica. Manuscrito de investigación / Research manuscript. ↩
    11. Lee, John M. (1997). Riemannian Manifolds: An Introduction to Curvature. Springer. Also: George Voutsadakis, Differential Geometry (2024), chapter 5, construction of Riemannian metrics. Partition-of-unity construction. ↩
    12. Tong, David. Classical Dynamics, section 2.4: Noether’s Theorem and Symmetries. University of Cambridge. ↩
    13. Carchedi, Guglielmo & Michael Roberts (2021). The economics foundations of imperialism. IIPPE presentation; title as printed in the PDF. Slides 16–19 discussed here. ↩
    14. Smith, John. Imperialism in the Twenty-First Century. Study of global production and exploitation. ↩
    15. Ricci, Andrea (2021). Value and Unequal Exchange in International Trade: The Geography of Global Capitalist Exploitation. Routledge. See also reference 27, table 2. ↩
    16. Cogliano, Jonathan F., Roberto Veneziani & Naoki Yoshihara (2022-08-10). The Dynamics of International Exploitation. Working paper, figure 2 and table 1. ↩
    17. Yoshihara, Naoki & Roberto Veneziani (2018). The Theory of Exploitation as the Unequal Exchange of Labour. Economics & Philosophy 34(3), 381–409. DOI: 10.1017/S0266267118000238. ↩
    18. Roberts, Michael (2021). When did China become capitalist? IIPPE presentation. ↩
    19. King, Sam (2021). Imperialism and the Development Myth: How Rich Countries Dominate in the Twenty-First Century. Manchester University Press. ↩
    20. Mavroudeas, Stavros D. (2018). Financialization Hypothesis: A Creative Contribution or a Theoretical Blind Alley? Lecture, Queen Mary University of London, November 22. ↩
    21. Rabinovich, Joel (2017). The financialisation of the nonfinancial corporation: A critique to the financial rentieralization hypothesis. CEPN working paper 2017-22. ↩
    22. Subasat, Turan & Stavros Mavroudeas (2023). Financialization Hypothesis: A Theoretical and Empirical Critique. World Review of Political Economy 14(2), 204–233. DOI: 10.13169/worlrevipoliecon.14.2.0204. Figures 6–7. ↩
    23. Marx, Karl (1894). Capital, vol. III, chapter 22. ↩
    24. Stravelakis, Nikos (2021). A Reconciliation of Marx’s Theory of Interest and the Risk Premium Puzzle. Presentation, PDF, especially slide 7. ↩
    25. Duque García, Carlos Alberto (2021, September). Economic Growth and the Rate of Profit in Colombia 1967–2019: A VAR Time-Series Analysis. Working paper, especially sections 5–6 and the sample-size note. ↩
    26. Carchedi, Guglielmo & Michael Roberts, eds. (2018). World in Crisis: A Global Analysis of Marx’s Law of Profitability. Haymarket Books. ↩
    27. Ricci, Andrea (2022). Global locational inequality: Assessing unequal exchange effects. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 54(7), 1323–1340. DOI: 10.1177/0308518X221107023. Table 2 and appendix 1. ↩

    Reading vocabulary

    Marxian refers to concepts, problems and arguments associated with Marx; Marxist, to traditions and programmes identifying with Marx’s work. Unequal exchange denotes a family of mechanisms and measurements, not one indicator. Super-exploitation requires an explicit definition relative to labour-power reproduction. MELT is a monetary labour relation defined within each interpretation. PPP means purchasing power parity and cannot simply be interchanged with current dollars. OCC and RSV denote organic composition of capital and rate of surplus value. IC and DC name the imperialist and dominated blocs in the Carchedi–Roberts figures.

    Further resources

    The following resources extend the essay’s definitions and debates. Research works, explanatory articles and reference materials serve different documentary functions.

    Explore conceptual and documentary resources
    1. Michael Roberts: IIPPE 2021
    2. Lenin: Spanish PDF
    3. Emmanuel: Unequal Exchange, PDF
    4. Self-similarity: conceptual reference
    5. Totality: systems theory article
    6. Essence and topology: philosophical study
    7. Isomorphism: philosophical dictionary
    8. Law: philosophical dictionary
    9. Matter: philosophical dictionary
    10. Laws: conceptual reference
    11. Induction/generalisation: reference
    12. Unity and struggle of opposites
    13. Emergence: conceptual reference
    14. Self-organisation: reference (not specifically self-organised criticality)
    15. Quantity and quality: philosophical dictionary
    16. Bifurcation theory
    17. Negation of the negation
    18. Chemical synthesis
    19. Author’s paper on Bayes estimators and Gaussian mixtures
    20. Value: archived dictionary entry
    21. Labour movements in the 1960s: thematic search
    22. Mediation: philosophical dictionary
    23. IIPPE: website
    24. Carchedi–Roberts presentation
    25. Lenin: English PDF
    26. John Smith: linked study
    27. Ricci: referenceed research paper
    28. Sam King: publisher record
    29. Sam King: thesis
    30. IIPPE China: YouTube channel
    31. Roberts: China presentation
    32. Roberts on capitalism and China
    33. Roberts on financialisation and profitability
    34. Mavroudeas: theoretical lecture
    35. Rabinovich: empirical paper
    36. Roberts on Austrian business-cycle theory
    37. Roberts on interest and stagflation
    38. Stravelakis: PPTX presentation
    39. Rosental–Iudin: PDF
    40. Yoshihara–Veneziani: PDF
    41. Duque García: PDF
    42. World in Crisis: PDF
    43. Andrea Ricci: book PDF

    JOSÉ MAURICIO GÓMEZ JULIÁN · Marxist Philosophy of Science

    Political economy, dialectical materialism and the investigation of social structures.

    READ MICHAEL ROBERTS’S ARTICLE
  • Braking for Humanity: The Political Economy of Silicon Valley’s Proposed AI Slowdown

    Braking for Humanity: The Political Economy of Silicon Valley’s Proposed AI Slowdown

    Political Economy

    Braking “for Humanity”: The Political Economy of Silicon Valley’s Proposed AI Slowdown

    Abstract. On Saturday, September 12, 2026, the chief executive of Anthropic publicly called for slowing the pace at which the capabilities of artificial intelligence models are improved; the chief executive of OpenAI agreed and, in passing, ruled out taking his company public this year; Elon Musk endorsed the proposal; on the following Monday, chipmakers fell on the stock market while the large companies that buy those chips rose. This article argues that braking “for humanity” is better understood as a way of managing capital, and in particular of defending its rate of profit, than as a technical decision: it reduces what has to be financed at a moment when investors are beginning to withdraw, it is presented as prudence, and it leaves intact the premise that sustains valuations, namely that an artificial general intelligence is near. Every claim carries its source, every technical term is defined when it first appears, and the closing section lists the facts that, in the coming weeks, could refute the thesis.

    · · ·

    1. Who Is Making and Who Is Losing Money Today

    It is best to begin with the accounts, because the whole discussion about bubbles and brakes rests on them. Three terms suffice to read them. Revenue is what a company bills for what it sells. An operating loss is what it loses in its ordinary activity, that is, revenue minus the costs of producing and selling, before interest, taxes and accounting adjustments. A net loss is the final result, which also incorporates those other items; among them there may be non-cash accounting charges, losses recorded in the books without any money leaving the till, for example when the value assigned to certain securities issued by the company changes.

    With those definitions, OpenAI’s situation is as follows. According to its audited financial statements for 2025, obtained by the journalist Ed Zitron and independently verified by the Financial Times, the company billed 13.07 billion, had an operating loss of 20.92 billion and a net loss of 38.53 billion; the gap between the two losses is explained mostly by a non-cash charge of 41.55 billion tied to its restructuring as a for-profit company (Zitron, 2026b; Tolomia, 2026). In plain terms: even without the accounting charge, OpenAI loses more than it bills. Nor was this a surprise to its executives: as early as September 2025, internal projections reported by The Information anticipated burning 115 billion of cash through 2029, with more than 17 billion in 2026, 35 billion in 2027 and 45 billion in 2028 (Reuters, 2025).

    Google’s case requires separating two things that are usually conflated: the model race and the company’s business. In the model race, Google is currently behind. In the Artificial Analysis Intelligence Index, a table that combines dozens of standardized tests, no Gemini model appears in the leading group; in the version of the index published this week the best Gemini ranks twenty-first, with 41 points against 53 for Claude Fable 5.1 and GPT-6 Astra, and in the previous version of the same index the best Gemini ranks eighth, with 50.2 points against 58.9 for GPT-5.6 Sol (Artificial Analysis, n.d.; BenchLM, 2026). The two versions disagree on the order of the leaders, but they agree on what matters here. It is reasonable to suppose that Google’s artificial intelligence unit loses money, although this cannot be asserted with certainty, because Alphabet, the parent company, does not publish that result separately. What it does publish shows that it is not out of business: in 2025 it earned 132.17 billion in net income; in the second quarter of 2026 it had an operating income of 40.8 billion and a net income of 112.1 billion, the latter inflated by 99.0 billion of accounting gains on stakes in other companies; its cloud, which is where it sells Gemini to enterprises, grew 82% in the quarter and yielded 8.8 billion of operating income; the Gemini app went from 750 million to 950 million monthly users between the fourth quarter of 2025 and the second quarter of 2026; and the cloud’s backlog of contracted revenue stood at 240 billion in December (Alphabet Inc., 2026a, 2026b; Pichai, 2026; Cabili, 2026). The consequence for the argument is precise: if Gemini loses money, that loss is paid out of the rents of the search business, where rent means the profit that a dominant position allows a company to charge above cost, and not with outside capital. Google can lag in model quality without depending on external financing, and that puts it in a different position from OpenAI and Anthropic.

    The Chinese bet is of another nature. The main Chinese laboratories publish the open weights of their models, that is, the numerical parameters that result from training and that anyone can download and run, and they charge far less for their use than their American competitors. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission summarizes it thus: Chinese laboratories “charge far less to use high-end products than their global competitors” and do so “backed by sustained state support,” although the Commission itself leaves open whether that strategy “reflects genuine strategic preference or adaptation to necessity” in the face of chip export controls (Luong, 2026). The size of the discount is measured in tokens, the fragments of text in which models count what they read and write: DeepSeek V4-Flash charges 0.14 per million input tokens against 2 for Claude Sonnet 5 (Mann, 2026); in May 2026, Chinese open models accounted for about 61% of the tokens consumed on OpenRouter, an intermediary that routes requests to many models, and Alibaba’s Qwen functions as a customer-acquisition expense for that company’s cloud (Zeoli, 2026). State support includes energy: Nvidia’s chief executive, Jensen Huang, stated in November 2025 that in China “Power is free,” referring to subsidies that cut by up to half the electricity bill of data centers that use domestic chips (Schepkov, 2025; Yildirim, 2025).

    Two clarifications prevent a simplistic reading. The first is that an intention to ruin Silicon Valley is not documented, and the available evidence points to an effect rather than a plan: DeepSeek’s founder, Liang Wenfeng, stated in 2024 that “We didn’t mean to become a catfish” and that his company does not subsidize its prices but sets “just a small profit margin above costs” (ChinaTalk, 2024), and DeepSeek itself published that its inference system would have, at list prices, a theoretical margin of 545% over cost, which speaks of efficiency rather than selling at a loss (DeepSeek-AI, 2025). The second is that Chinese laboratories do care about losing money, because they too depend on capital: Zhipu and MiniMax went public in Hong Kong in January 2026 with net losses of about 330 million and 512 million on revenues of 27 million and 53 million (Lo, 2026), and DeepSeek took its first external funding round in 2026, of 7.4 billion, at a valuation of 52 billion (Caixin Global, 2026). Whether or not they seek to ruin anyone, the effect of their strategy is to destroy the monopoly rent of the model layer, which is precisely where OpenAI and Anthropic live.

    Anthropic is the only frontier company that has begun to show positive numbers, and it must be said exactly which. In the second quarter of 2026 it billed more than 11.5 billion, against 787 million in the same quarter of 2025 and 4.73 billion in the first quarter of 2026, and it recorded for the first time a positive adjusted operating income, according to documents seen by Bloomberg and described as preliminary (Lipschultz & Metz, 2026; Stanciuc, 2026; Park, 2026). “Adjusted” means that the company excludes certain expenses from the calculation, and since Anthropic does not yet report publicly, it is not known which: the Wall Street Journal noted that “it is unclear what accounting methods Anthropic has used to book revenue and costs,” and one critic warns that the cost of rented computing would rise sharply from July onward (Zitron, 2026a). Adjusted operating income is not net income; its cumulative losses remain negative, and its own projections, reported in November 2025, place positive cash flow only in 2028 (Bellan, 2025). Even so, it is the first time a frontier laboratory has shown an operating quarter in the black, and that explains why capital treats it differently.

    Company and periodRevenueResultSource
    OpenAI, 202513.07 billionOperating loss of 20.92 billion; net loss of 38.53 billion, including a non-cash charge of 41.55 billionZitron (2026b); Tolomia (2026)
    Anthropic, second quarter of 2026More than 11.5 billionPositive adjusted operating income, preliminary figureLipschultz and Metz (2026); Stanciuc (2026)
    Alphabet, 2025402.836 billionNet income of 132.17 billionAlphabet Inc. (2026a)
    Alphabet, second quarter of 2026119.8 billionOperating income of 40.8 billion; net income of 112.1 billion, including 99.0 billion of gains on equity stakesAlphabet Inc. (2026b)

    Note. Figures in U.S. dollars.

    2. The Speculative Turn

    There is a major turn of the market toward artificial intelligence, and a significant part of that turn is speculative. To say this precisely, a concept from classical political economy is needed: fictitious capital, the value of securities such as shares or bonds insofar as they capitalize, that is, discount to a present price, future profits that do not yet exist. That value is real as long as the expectation holds and vanishes when the expectation falls. A valuation of 852 billion for OpenAI and 965 billion for Anthropic, companies that lost money in 2025, is fictitious capital in the strictest sense: a price paid today for profits that would only arrive if the technology delivers what was promised (Bellan, 2026a, 2026b).

    On that base a layer of derivatives has been built. A futures contract is an agreement on an organized market by which two parties fix today the price at which an asset will be bought or sold on a future date; the reference assets may be individual stocks, sector indices, which are baskets of stocks, or exchange-traded funds. Such instruments now exist specifically for artificial intelligence: Cboe has listed since December 8, 2025 futures and options on its Magnificent 10 Index, which groups the seven largest technology companies plus AMD, Broadcom and Palantir (Cboe Global Markets, 2025), and CME Group launched on July 27, 2026 seventy-seven single-stock futures contracts, Nvidia and SpaceX included (CME Group, 2026). It is important to understand what they do and do not do. The money in a futures contract does not enter the company: the contract is settled between the two parties and, for one of them, the gain is exactly the other’s loss. What futures do is push the price of the shares, because those who trade them hedge by buying or selling the reference asset, and a high price attracts investment and makes raising capital cheaper. And they amplify in both directions: the same leverage that accelerates the rise accelerates the fall. All of this is extremely speculative in a precise sense: some realize present gains on the expectation that others will obtain much larger future gains, and the chain rests on very high levels of expected profitability, subject to a great many variables that are hard to control.

    The figures give the scale of the risk. The seven largest technology companies account for about one third of the S&P 500 index, with Nvidia alone at 7.7%, and explained about 42% of that index’s total return in 2025 (Greenberg, 2026). The Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England warned in October 2025 that valuations “appear stretched, particularly for technology companies focused on Artificial Intelligence,” that “the risk of a sharp market correction has increased” and that, because of index concentration, “any AI-led price adjustment would have a high level of pass-through into the returns for investors exposed to the aggregate index,” with a cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio comparable to the peak of the dot-com bubble (Bank of England, 2025). On the real side of the economy, investment in computing infrastructure, that is, data centers, chips and networks, stands at about 1.5% of United States gross domestic product, double its historical level (Juniewicz, 2026); it contributes between 0.5 and 0.7 percentage points to growth in 2025 and 2026 (Subran et al., 2026), and it accounted for nearly 92% of growth in the first half of 2025 (Wells, 2026). That is why, if the artificial intelligence sector of the stock market collapses, the whole stock market collapses with it, or at least a part large enough for a crash to occur. The only qualification is one of form: a correction of expectations compresses the multiples of profitable companies and destroys the capital of loss-making ones; for the fall to become a financial crisis and not merely a stock market one, the credit channel is needed, and that is exactly the channel that has grown the most and is seen the least.

    3. Why It Would Collapse: The Patience of Investors

    Investors are growing more impatient waiting for net profits that do not arrive, and financing is not cut off suddenly or by announcement: it withdraws little by little. This is already visible on the indebted periphery of the sector. A credit default swap is an insurance policy that an investor buys against a borrower’s default; its price is measured in basis points, hundredths of a percentage point, and rises when the market sees more risk. The swaps of CoreWeave, a company that rents out computing for artificial intelligence and finances itself with debt, went from 675 basis points in November 2025 to about 855 in July 2026, which implies close to a 50% probability of default over five years; those of Oracle, the largest non-financial borrower in the high-grade bond index, rose from 108 to more than 215 over the same span, with its 2054 bond yielding 7.8% (Roberts, 2025; Moadel, 2026). The 12.5 billion bond with which Meta financed a data center in El Paso was priced in July at a wider spread than a comparable 2025 project, because, as the account puts it, lenders “are still writing checks, but they are demanding more in return” (MarketScale Newsroom, 2026). Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook counted more than 1.5 trillion in data-center plans, financed with bonds by the large players and with private debt and securitizations by the small ones, and warned that “the increasing use of leverage to finance investments in an emerging technology carries risk” (Cook, 2026); J.P. Morgan estimates hyperscaler investment at 697 billion in 2026 alone and acknowledges that this spending has “in many cases, outpaced monetization” (J.P. Morgan, 2026). A hyperscaler is a company that operates computing clouds at planetary scale, such as Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon, Meta or Oracle.

    The withdrawal is also visible at the core. As early as June, OpenAI was leaning toward pushing back its stock market debut to 2027, as the New York Times reported (Ma, 2026b), and the letter of intent with which Nvidia had announced a 100 billion investment stalled in January over “internal doubts about the size and structure of the transaction and questions about OpenAI’s business discipline” (Duprey, 2026), ending up, in the February round, as 30 billion (Brandom, 2026). Part of that financing is, moreover, circular: Nvidia invests in OpenAI, OpenAI commits to buying computing from Oracle and CoreWeave, and those companies buy chips from Nvidia, a circuit that critics described as “moving money in circles” (Jadhav, 2025); likewise, in November 2025 Nvidia and Microsoft committed up to 10 billion and 5 billion to Anthropic in exchange for Anthropic’s purchase of 30 billion of Microsoft cloud capacity (Microsoft, 2025). What must be acknowledged is that the withdrawal is still partial and uneven: OpenAI closed in March a 122 billion round at a valuation of 852 billion, with 50 billion from Amazon, 30 billion from Nvidia and 30 billion from SoftBank (Brandom, 2026; Bellan, 2026b); Anthropic raised 65 billion in May at 965 billion (Bellan, 2026a) and filed confidentially in June to go public (Korosec, 2026); venture capital to foundational laboratories in the first quarter of 2026 was double that of all of 2025 (Azevedo, 2026). Financing, in short, is bifurcating: it remains abundant at the core and grows more expensive on the leveraged periphery. The direction of change is what matters, and the direction is that of capital demanding more guarantees, more conditions and more return for every new dollar.

    4. The Brake as a Way of Managing Capital

    The frontier companies keep up that frantic pace of development in order to finally make artificial intelligence as profitable as they promised. The promise has a name: artificial general intelligence, a system capable of performing autonomously, and better than an average human, every digitizable task. Such a system would be highly profitable, and it is the only promise that justifies current valuations; OpenAI’s charter defined it in 2018 as highly autonomous systems that outperform humans at most economically valuable work (OpenAI, 2018). The thesis of this article is that, without public financing for computing, since investment is paid for with private capital, debt and the companies’ own profits, and with private capital withdrawing little by little, the most sensible option for those companies is to brake while invoking a concern for humanity rather than declare that the goal is still very far away. The brake reduces what has to be financed, because training less and building fewer data centers costs less; it is presented as prudence; and it calms markets in comparison with the alternative, which would be to admit that the promise is distant and would trigger a massive flight of capital from the industry. That political backing is at its maximum does not change the calculation: the White House action plan orders the government to “dismantle unnecessary regulatory barriers,” sums up its infrastructure policy as “Build, Baby, Build!” and asks that federal funds not be directed to states “with burdensome AI regulations” (The White House, 2025b), and Executive Order 14365 creates a litigation task force “to challenge State AI laws” (The White House, 2025a); but a government that removes obstacles does not put in money, and money is what is lacking.

    Three features of the safety discourse confirm that it functions as an instrument for managing capital. The first is that the regulation the companies ask for is an alibi and a moat, not a cost. In March 2023 OpenAI’s chief executive did not sign the letter calling for a six-month pause in the training of systems more powerful than GPT-4 (Future of Life Institute, 2023; Fung, 2023), but in May he asked the Senate for an agency that could “issue licenses and can take them away” (Goldman, 2023), signed the statement according to which mitigating the risk of extinction from artificial intelligence should be a global priority (Center for AI Safety, 2023), and kept accelerating: venture capital to artificial intelligence companies approached 50 billion that year (Metinko, 2024). Not even a plain admission of a bubble scared capital away: when the same executive said in August 2025 that investors were “overexcited,” the Nasdaq fell 1.4% in a day and the money kept coming in (Shibu, 2025; Nusca, 2025). In 2025 Anthropic endorsed California’s SB 53, which requires publishing risk frameworks and limits nothing, and declared that it prefers a federal standard (Anthropic, 2025). Disclosure-based regulation is easily paid for by the incumbent and cannot be paid for by the entrant or the open-weight model. The second feature is that the discourse of danger does not declare the goal distant: it declares it so near that it must be paced. Lee Vinsel called “criti-hype” the kind of criticism that “both feeds and feeds on hype,” because it retains the picture of extraordinary change and merely flips its sign (Vinsel, 2026). Anthropic’s chief executive wrote in January that a powerful artificial intelligence could be “as little as 1–2 years away” (Amodei, 2026a) and in September that within “6–12 months” a swarm of agents could take over the entire internet (Ma, 2026a). That nearness is what sustains the valuation while monetization is re-dated. The third feature is the most revealing: the company with the worst finances released the brake rather than pressing it when it needed capital most. In April 2026 OpenAI rewrote its principles, and the new version omits the 2018 commitment to “stop competing with and start assisting” an aligned project that came close to the goal first (OpenAI, 2018; Goel, 2026).

    The premise that artificial general intelligence is far away cannot be verified today, and that does not make it illegitimate: it implies a risky forecast that makes it falsifiable over time. If the promised capabilities arrive within the timeframes their own promoters announce, the thesis loses; if the brake “for safety” is prolonged or renewed while the promise does not arrive and valuations are not validated by profits, the thesis wins.

    What happened between June and September 2026 is the test case. In June, OpenAI was leaning toward postponing its stock market debut (Ma, 2026b). Between late June and mid-July, during internal cybersecurity evaluations, some 1,200 OpenAI agents improvised a message board, exchanged more than 70,000 messages, and about 700 of them compromised Hugging Face infrastructure, according to the independent investigation by METR, which describes “genuine goal-directed autonomy” and attempts to falsify their own records (METR, 2026); OpenAI acknowledged that “it should be assumed that such attacks are a credible near-term threat” (Reuters, 2026). In late July, OpenAI’s chief executive said that “We may have to pace the rate of AI development” (Fernholz, 2026), more than a thousand laboratory workers asked for “the option to buy time,” and a reporter observed that, despite the statements, “OpenAI has not actually slowed down the pace” (Cerullo, 2026). On September 12, Anthropic’s essay called on the industry to “slow the pace at which we improve the capabilities of AI models,” clarified that pacing “does not mean halting model training or technical progress,” and promised to do so “without sacrificing commercial advantage or the United States’ lead in AI” (Amodei, 2026b); the same day, OpenAI’s chief executive declared that, “given everything happening with safety, right now would be an ‘ill-advised moment’ to go public” and that the listing would not happen in 2026 (Ma, 2026b; Shontell, 2026); Elon Musk replied “Dario is right,” and the chief executive of Google DeepMind, Demis Hassabis, that “The direction is correct” (Mowshowitz, 2026). On Monday the 14th, the S&P 500 fell 0.5% and the Nasdaq 0.56%, but the fall was concentrated in chipmakers, with the Philadelphia semiconductor index down 6%, while Alphabet rose 2%, Microsoft 1.6% and Meta 1.4% (O’Donnell et al., 2026; Roytburg, 2026). One analyst put it bluntly: “They’ll just all stop building data centers and just digest what they have” (Roytburg, 2026).

    “They’ll just all stop building data centers and just digest what they have.”Gil Luria, Wall Street analyst, quoted in Roytburg (2026)

    That reaction is the signature of the mechanism. Those who sell fixed capital fell and those who stop buying it rose: the market read the brake as a coordinated restraint of investment, and a restraint of investment reduces what has to be financed. The postponement of OpenAI’s stock market debut, decided before the incident and narrated afterward as safety, is the mechanism with a date on it. That the narrative rests on a real incident makes it more effective, not less of a narrative. And Anthropic’s listing remains on track for October, at a valuation the Financial Times puts at 2 trillion (Stanciuc, 2026): whoever can show revenue does not brake its capitalization, and whoever cannot postpones it in the vocabulary of prudence. One contractual detail serves as a thermometer: 35 billion of Amazon’s investment in OpenAI was conditioned on the company either going public or achieving artificial general intelligence by the end of the year (Brandom, 2026); if that condition is renegotiated at no cost, the brake costs no one any capital.

    It helps to name the mechanism by its classical category. The rate of profit is the profit obtained in a period divided by the capital advanced to obtain it, that is, how much each invested dollar yields, and it is the variable that governs accumulation: capital flows to where that rate rises and withdraws from where it falls. The artificial intelligence buildout inflates the denominator at an unprecedented speed, with hyperscaler investment that J.P. Morgan estimates at 697 billion in 2026 alone on equipment that depreciates within a few years (J.P. Morgan, 2026), while the numerator grows more slowly and, in the model layer, is squeezed by the Chinese competition described in the first section. That combination is a fall in the rate of profit on the capital invested in artificial intelligence, and when the rate falls, accumulation slows, whether by coordinated decision of the large capitals or by the withdrawal of credit. To stop enlarging the denominator and to exploit what is already installed is, literally, to “digest what they have.” The apocalypse that OpenAI, Anthropic and Musk are warning about is the form in which that defense of the rate of profit presents itself to the public.

    Two objections deserve an answer. The first is that the brake might be sincere. It might be, and the thesis does not deny it: it claims that its economic function is the one described, whatever the conviction of the person announcing it. Other readers have offered kindred or harsher readings: Ben Thompson considers it “an unrealistic proposal that seems mostly geared to political control of AI” (Thompson, 2026), and Zvi Mowshowitz catalogs the readings of regulatory capture, stock market timing and computing limits, even though he dismisses them (Mowshowitz, 2026). The second objection is Chinese competition: a real brake would hand the lead to DeepSeek and Qwen, which, for the reasons given in the first section, have no reason to brake, and the coordination with China that the essay proposes is, under present conditions, unattainable. The answer is that, to be consistent with that competition, the brake has to be a paper brake, that is, external evaluators and alignment timelines without any measurable limit on the pace of training. A paper brake with maximum narrative effect is exactly what the thesis predicts, and it can be checked by reading the pact when it is signed.

    5. What to Watch in the Coming Weeks

    A thesis is worth what its risks of refutation are worth. Five observable facts in the coming weeks put it to the test.

    1. Anthropic’s public prospectus. If it describes the pacing commitment as immaterial to its revenue, the brake does not touch the till.
    2. Amazon’s conditional tranche in OpenAI. If the 35 billion is released or renegotiated without a listing or an artificial general intelligence, the brake costs no capital.
    3. The capital expenditure guidance of Alphabet, Microsoft, Meta and Amazon in their third-quarter results at the end of October. A coordinated cut would confirm the reading of investment restraint.
    4. The credit default swaps of CoreWeave and Oracle. If they keep widening while the hyperscalers rise, the devaluation begins on the leveraged periphery.
    5. The content of the pact among laboratories. If it sets evaluators rather than verifiable limits on pace, the brake is form without substance.

    6. Conclusion

    What happened this weekend is best understood as an agreement among those who buy chips to run a little slower, expressed in the language of safety: it improves their cash position, it worsens the sales of those who sell chips, and the market read it that way in a single day. The part of the argument that the evidence confirms most strongly is that the discourse of danger sustains the valuation rather than sinking it, because it asserts that the goal is near. The part that remains open is the part that ought to remain open: if artificial general intelligence arrives within the timeframes its promoters announce, this article will have been wrong; if the brake is renewed while the promise recedes, it will not have been a brake for humanity but a defense of the rate of profit, that is, a way of managing capital in retreat.

    · · ·

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    Thompson, B. (2026, September 14). Pacing the frontier, AI’s digital limits, AI commissars. Stratechery. https://stratechery.com/2026/pacing-the-frontier-ais-digital-limits-ai-commissars/

    Tolomia, C. (2026, June 16). OpenAI 2025 financials leaked: 38.5B loss ahead of IPO. Quartz (via Yahoo Finance). https://finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/openai-2025-financials-leaked-38-121508294.html

    Vinsel, L. (2026, February 8). You’re doing it wrong: Notes on criticism and technology hype [Repost of a 2021 Medium essay]. Peoples & Things. https://peoples-things.ghost.io/youre-doing-it-wrong-notes-on-criticism-and-technology-hype/

    Wells, M. (2026). Will AI investments pay off? Econ Focus, First/Second Quarter 2026. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/econ_focus/2026/q1-q2_feature2

    Yildirim, E. (2025, November 6). Nvidia CEO says China ‘will win’ the global AI race as the U.S. falls behind in energy. Gizmodo. https://gizmodo.com/nvidia-ceo-says-china-will-win-the-global-ai-race-as-the-u-s-falls-behind-in-energy-2000682396

    Zeoli, C. (2026, June). China’s open-weight takeover. Wing Venture Capital. https://www.wing.vc/content/chinas-open-weight-takeover

    Zitron, E. (2026a, May 21). Anthropic’s “profitability” swindle. Where’s Your Ed At. https://www.wheresyoured.at/anthropics-profitability-swindle/

    Zitron, E. (2026b, June 15). Exclusive: OpenAI losses increased nearly 8X in 2025, with spending hitting 34 billion. Where’s Your Ed At. https://www.wheresyoured.at/exclusive-openai-financials/

    September 14, 2026
  • CHRONOLOGY OF THE GEOPOLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GOLD STANDARD FROM BRETTON WOODS TO THE PRESENT DAY

    Money · Gold · International Monetary System

    Gold After Bretton Woods

    Commodity money, monetary reserves, gold standards, and the geopolitical economy of gold from the end of convertibility to the early twenty-first century.

    The Dematerialization Thesis

    As Astarita (2006) points out, official dollar-to-gold convertibility continued to exist under the Bretton Woods system at least until 1968. The international monetary system therefore still operated as a form of gold-exchange standard. This raises a problem for theories claiming that money had already become fully “dematerialized”: why did runs into gold emerge from the late 1960s onward, why did the official gold price remain politically important, and why did gold reserves continue to occupy such a central place until the final crisis of Bretton Woods?

    From this perspective, the claim that central-bank money had become completely detached from gold can be sustained only by restricting monetary validation to the national sphere and abstracting from the international conditions under which money itself is validated.

    If gold had entirely lost its monetary function, one would still have to explain why governments, central banks, and private investors continued to immobilize enormous quantities of wealth in it.

    Astarita further argues that the dematerialization thesis introduces a false historical break and has difficulty explaining why gold continues to operate as both a reserve asset and a means of hoarding.

    Gold, Reserves, and Hoarding

    • After nearly three decades of formal inconvertibility, official gold reserves still exceeded 30,000 metric tons, approximately one quarter of all the gold historically extracted.
    • Special Drawing Rights never developed into an international fiduciary currency capable of replacing gold as an ultimate reference of value.
    • In 1994, gold represented 61.6% of official reserves in the United States, 55.4% in France, 30.6% in Germany, 44.2% in Italy, 49.5% in Switzerland, 29% in Austria, and 41% in Belgium.
    • In 1995, the IMF reaffirmed gold’s monetary role and argued against mobilizing its holdings in ways that could weaken its global financial position, emphasizing the credibility and room for maneuver provided by those reserves.
    • When the European Central Bank was created, 15% of its reserves were designated to be held in gold.
    • Between September 1999 and March 2005, gold rose from roughly $265 to $425 per ounce without a comparable increase across metals in general and without an equivalent industrial-demand explanation.
    • By the mid-1990s, private gold stocks were estimated at roughly 60,000 metric tons in jewelry and another 24,000 tons in bars and coins.
    • Gold was traded extensively through specialized bullion banks, which operated their own refining, trading, and price-formation mechanisms.
    • Annual trading volumes in physical gold and gold contracts were estimated at more than 300,000 metric tons—over one hundred times annual production and more than twice the estimated global stock.

    For Astarita, such movements are difficult to explain if gold is treated simply as an ordinary metal devoid of monetary functions. The crucial point is that the reserve function is itself one of the classical functions of money.

    Drawing on Lipietz and Marx, hoarding is understood as one of the moments in which money appears as the embodiment of value and social power. Even if gold no longer functions as an ordinary means of everyday payment, it continues to perform a hoarding and reserve function within the international monetary system.

    In hoarding, money is preserved as an embodiment of value, wealth, and social power: gold is “retained as money.”

    On this interpretation, gold is not demanded merely as an industrial metal but as a general equivalent and a store of value. Nor must it appear as nationally minted coin: it can function internationally as a direct embodiment of preserved value.

    The issue therefore points toward a broader question: what ultimately stands behind the dollar, the euro, or other fiduciary currencies? One recurring justification offered by monetary authorities for holding gold is precisely that it represents an asset that is not simultaneously someone else’s governmental or institutional liability.

    Greenspan and Gold as a Monetary Reference

    The monetary importance attributed to gold also appears in a number of statements by Alan Greenspan. In a 2017 interview, Greenspan described gold as the world’s principal currency and emphasized that, unlike credit instruments and fiduciary money, it does not depend upon the creditworthiness of a counterparty.

    Greenspan associated the high point of the gold standard with the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a period he characterized by strong productivity growth and relatively low inflation. In his interpretation, the subsequent problems of the gold standard did not necessarily prove that the mechanism itself had failed; rather, they reflected major policy errors.

    His central example was Britain’s 1925 return to gold at the pre-First World War parity of $4.86 per pound sterling. Greenspan regarded Winston Churchill’s decision as a monumental error because it imposed an exchange-rate parity that no longer corresponded to Britain’s postwar economic conditions and contributed to the severe deflation of the late 1920s.

    From this standpoint, the difficulty did not lie in the monetary mechanism in the abstract, but in the attempt to restore prewar exchange-rate parities despite radically different degrees of wartime destruction and economic transformation across countries.

    “Fiat money, in extremis, is accepted by nobody. Gold is always accepted.”

    Greenspan had also argued in 1999 that discretionary monetary policy found it difficult to anchor the price level through time in the same manner that, in his view, the gold standard had done during the nineteenth century.

    He later stated that, during his own chairmanship of the Federal Reserve, U.S. monetary policy attempted to follow signals resembling those that a gold standard might have generated, even while operating formally within a fiat-money regime.

    · · ·

    A Geopolitical Timeline of Gold

    The following chronology brings together events, public debates, and statements concerning the economic and geopolitical role of gold after the formal collapse of Bretton Woods, with particular emphasis on developments after 1999.

    July 10, 2014

    Nathan Lewis, writing in Forbes, revisited comments by Paul Volcker, who had served as U.S. Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Monetary Affairs from 1969 to 1974. Volcker argued that the absence of an official, rules-based, cooperatively administered international monetary system could hardly be considered a great success in light of the frequency and destructiveness of international financial crises.

    April 14, 2015

    Discussions emerged over whether gold could be incorporated into the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights. Meghnad Desai, associated with the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum, argued that some gold content might help stabilize the synthetic reserve instrument.

    June 17, 2015

    Texas approved the creation of a state precious-metals depository. The initiative sought to repatriate assets and reduce dependence on out-of-state storage facilities, while simultaneously stimulating political debate about financial autonomy and monetary sovereignty.

    July 21, 2015

    Gold fell to its lowest price in roughly five years. Explanations discussed at the time included a reduced demand for inflation protection, lower demand for defensive assets, and developments in Chinese gold demand.

    August 31, 2015

    Debate resurfaced over the transparency and auditing of U.S. gold reserves amid expectations of a possible change in the federal funds rate.

    September 1, 2015

    Some analysts interpreted gold accumulation by Russia and China as part of a broader BRICS strategy aimed at reducing dependence on the U.S. dollar.

    September 6, 2015

    A substantial decline was reported in gold held by foreign institutions at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where a significant share of stored bullion belonged to foreign central banks and governments.

    September 8, 2015

    Strong demand for physical gold was interpreted as a response to international financial uncertainty. Gold continued to function as a classic defensive asset during periods of financial and geopolitical stress.

    September 14, 2015

    Reports described intense physical-gold demand from China and India, accompanied by declining available inventories in certain international trading centers.

    September 15, 2015

    Foreign central banks had reportedly withdrawn around 246 metric tons of gold from the New York Federal Reserve since 2014. These repatriations were interpreted as attempts to strengthen direct control over liquid and strategically important reserve assets.

    September 19, 2015

    Gold purchases by BRICS countries were portrayed as part of a broader search for greater monetary autonomy from the dollar amid rising geopolitical tensions.

    September 30, 2015

    Renewed debate over financial speculation and monetary fragility reinforced the perception of gold as protection against international instability.

    October 2, 2015

    RBC Capital Markets analysts linked part of the increase in gold prices to the Federal Reserve’s decision not to raise the federal funds rate, while warning that future rate increases could place downward pressure on the metal.

    October 17, 2015

    Gold reached a four-month high as large investors increased positions amid expectations that the Federal Reserve might postpone rate increases.

    November 12, 2015

    Chinese geologists reported the discovery of a major underwater gold deposit in the East China Sea following several years of exploration.

    November 13, 2015

    Rumors of stock-market declines contributed to increased demand for gold. The World Gold Council also reported that central banks had purchased another 175 metric tons, partly for reserve diversification.

    December 18, 2015

    Jim Rogers argued that, in the event of a dollar bubble, he would consider selling dollar positions and moving funds into gold, silver, and other precious metals.

    December 22, 2015

    The Bank of Russia increased its gold reserves by roughly 186 metric tons between January and November 2015, exceeding its purchases during all of 2014.

    December 23, 2015

    Despite a major preceding decline in prices, several commentators continued to describe gold as a central element of the monetary universe because of its persistent reserve demand.

    January 5, 2016

    GoldCore research director Mark O’Byrne discussed the gradual shift of the center of gravity of the gold market toward China and speculation concerning a possible gold-backed yuan.

    July 10, 2016

    Business Insider revisited Alan Greenspan’s historical support for the gold standard, including his 1966 argument that abandoning gold had enabled credit expansion to become less constrained by tangible assets.

    February 21, 2017

    The Mises Institute reported Greenspan’s claim that U.S. monetary policy under his Federal Reserve chairmanship had attempted to imitate signals that might have been generated under a gold standard.

    November 16, 2018

    Nathan Lewis argued in Forbes that although the gold standard formally disappeared in 1971, the gold price continued to function informally as an important monetary reference during several later periods.

    May 30, 2019

    Serbia and the Philippines increased official gold reserves, a development interpreted by some observers as part of a wider diversification away from the U.S. dollar.

    July 9, 2019

    Chinese savers and investors showed growing interest in gold as protection against yuan depreciation and economic slowdown. China combined its status as a major global producer with exceptionally strong domestic demand.

    August 8, 2019

    Nathan Lewis argued that after Paul Volcker abandoned the early-1980s monetarist experiment, gold and other commodities were used flexibly as references for stabilizing the dollar. Lewis connected this interpretation with the 1985 Plaza Accord and the 1987 Louvre Accord.

    May 6, 2020

    José Luis Cava discussed gold accumulation by China and Russia in the context of strategies to reduce international dependence on the dollar, debates over central-bank digital currencies, and possible changes in the international monetary architecture.

    June 18, 2020

    The BBC reported on the dispute between the Central Bank of Venezuela and the Bank of England over 31 metric tons of Venezuelan gold, then valued at approximately one billion U.S. dollars.

    July 2, 2020

    A British court denied Nicolás Maduro’s government access to Venezuelan gold held at the Bank of England amid the political and legal dispute associated with the United Kingdom’s recognition of Juan Guaidó.

    September 7, 2020

    Further debate over Peter Schiff’s forecasts regarding gold, the dollar, and cryptocurrencies illustrated the continued use of gold as a benchmark in discussions of monetary stability and safe-haven assets.

    May 22, 2021

    TD Securities global strategy head Richard Kelly expressed a favorable view of gold, arguing that the metal remained relatively inexpensive and retained recovery potential.

    May 26, 2021

    Dollar weakness and declining bitcoin prices coincided with gold reaching its highest level since January of that year.

    May 29, 2021

    Another sharp decline in bitcoin coincided with increased demand for gold as a defensive asset.

    May 31, 2021

    Robert Kiyosaki recommended gold as protection against dollar depreciation and ranked it above bitcoin in his defensive preferences because of its greater perceived stability.

    June 1, 2021

    JP Morgan strategist Nikolaos Panigirtzoglou argued that bitcoin’s high volatility represented an obstacle to broader institutional adoption and reduced its relative attractiveness compared with traditional gold in institutional portfolios.

    June 3, 2021

    Russia announced that it would remove the U.S. dollar from its National Wealth Fund reserves and replace a substantial share of those positions with gold and other currencies in order to reduce exposure to U.S. sanctions.

    · · ·

    References

    1. Astarita, R. (2006). Concepciones sobre el dinero, el rol del oro y cuestiones monetarias. Instituto Argentino para el Desarrollo Económico.
    2. Barba, G. (December 4, 2015). Compraré oro antes de que estalle la burbuja del dólar: Jim Rogers. Forbes México.
    3. BBC News Mundo. (July 2, 2020). Oro de Venezuela: tribunal británico niega al gobierno de Maduro acceso al oro depositado en el Banco de Inglaterra por considerar a Guaidó el presidente.
    4. Becedas, M., & Nieves, V. (June 1, 2021). JP Morgan avisa de que el crash del bitcoin no ha terminado y supone un revés para su adopción institucional. El Economista.
    5. Business Insider. (July 10, 2016). Alan Greenspan Wants the US to Go Back on the Gold Standard.
    6. Cava, J. L. (May 6, 2020). ¿Por qué están acumulando cautelosamente oro China y Rusia? Estrategias de Inversión.
    7. CMI Gold & Silver. (December 19, 2019). The New Alan Greenspan on Gold.
    8. Greenspan, A. (February 23, 1999). Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan. The Federal Reserve’s Semiannual Report on Monetary Policy. U.S. Federal Reserve.
    9. Lewis, N. (July 10, 2014). Paul Volcker Dreams of a “New Bretton Woods.” But What Would That Look Like? Forbes.
    10. Lewis, N. (November 16, 2018). The Gold Standard Didn’t Disappear in 1971, It Just Went Underground. Forbes.
    11. Lewis, N. (August 8, 2019). We Just Tested the Gold Standard — It Still Works. Forbes.
    12. Mises Institute. (February 21, 2017). Alan Greenspan Admits Ron Paul Was Right About Gold.
    13. Mora Lleonart, M. (May 30, 2019). Serbia y Filipinas se unen a la tendencia mundial de comprar oro y se alejan más del estándar del dólar. Banco Central de Cuba.
    14. Palotai, D., & Veres, I. (November 1, 2020). New Golden Age. Building up Gold Reserves. Hungary Central / LBMA.
    15. Pedraza, J. Á. (July 9, 2019). Los chinos recurren al oro para proteger sus ahorros ante la devaluación del yuan. Oroinformación.
    16. Pichel, M. (June 18, 2020). Oro de Venezuela: por qué el Banco de Inglaterra retiene 31 toneladas de lingotes del país sudamericano. BBC News Mundo.
    17. RT en Español. Multiple articles published between 2015 and 2021 on gold reserves, central banks, BRICS, Russia, China, bitcoin, and international financial markets, as listed in the original bibliography.

    Notes

    Note 1 · Alan Greenspan Alan Greenspan, born in New York in 1926, served as Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006. He earned his academic degrees in economics from New York University.
    Note 2 · Jim Rogers James B. Rogers Jr. is an American investor and financial commentator. Together with George Soros, he co-founded the Quantum Fund and participated in the creation of Soros Fund Management. He also developed the Rogers International Commodity Index (RICI).
  • THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF COSTA RICA IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION

    Political Economy · Monetary Policy · Costa Rica

    Central Bank of Costa Rica, Exchange Rate, and Income Distribution

    Reflections on the crawling peg, export competitiveness, inflation, and Costa Rica’s transition toward inflation targeting.

    Central banks, in their overwhelming majority, have historically promoted a “market” economy. They have done so, they continue to do so, and they will continue doing so until the final days of their institutional existence. Moderation—that is, the establishment of prudential limits on capital’s perpetually insatiable pursuit of profit—goes hand in hand with avoiding the creation of explicit rents derived from specific policies, since doing precisely the opposite violates the freedom of the market that political thought on the right claims to defend.

    The principle guiding the central bank is that the institution has no reason to help one particular group generate profits at the expense of others—that is, to redistribute income to the detriment of the least advantaged. The Central Bank of Costa Rica (BCCR) understands that, by definition, no policy is neutral. What the BCCR seeks to avoid is being directly accused of reallocating wealth. If matters are instead left “to the market,” the situation appears different because “the market” becomes the agent supposedly responsible for that redistribution.

    In a certain sense, this relieves the BCCR’s employees of the moral burden that such a situation could otherwise create: “they are not responsible; the market is responsible,” and everyone can sleep peacefully.

    No economic policy is neutral; part of the difference lies in who appears institutionally responsible for its distributive consequences.

    Yet, amid all this, the BCCR is at least meeting its established inflation target. Without entering here into the possible consequences for economic growth when a particular set of conditions is not satisfied—or the practical implications of using defective theoretical frameworks in public policy—this achievement helps keep under control a kind of silent and highly regressive tax from which capitalists can protect themselves through a variety of economic and institutional mechanisms, while poorer groups possess far fewer defenses: inflation.

    The Fork in Exchange-Rate Policy

    As time passed and the quality of life of Costa Rican society deteriorated, the Central Bank found itself before a road that divided into two paths.

    Path 01 Crawling peg — an adjustable fixed exchange rate

    Maintain artificially favorable competitiveness and profitability for exporters in the hope that they would generate production, exports, and employment. Yet this exchange-rate policy was highly inflationary, while the hoped-for competitiveness of exporters took considerably longer than expected to materialize; indeed, it is still being awaited.

    Path 02 Leave the exchange rate to market forces

    In Costa Rica, capital inflows have under this approach generated some real appreciation—although certainly not an extreme one, as the historical evolution of the nominal exchange rate makes clear. This harms exporters and contributes to explaining part of their difficulties regarding employment and competitiveness, but it simultaneously facilitates inflation control: low inflation no longer erodes the incomes of lower-income groups with the same intensity.

    The Central Bank of Costa Rica chose the second path. At the time, this decision generated criticism and pressure from the export-oriented business sector through its political-business organizations—CADEXCO, UCCAEP, and others—without those demands encountering an equally visible counterweight from those parts of society interested in preventing this type of income redistribution through monetary policy.

    In other words, there was no “powerful organization defending the interests of the poor.” In Costa Rica, organizations potentially capable of playing that role do not possess sufficient institutional strength or political weight to constitute an effective counterbalance to the political-business organizations mentioned above.

    · · ·

    The Crawling Peg as a Temporary Impulse

    The implementation of the crawling peg was the idea of the prominent Costa Rican economist Eduardo Lizano, who intended it to be temporary. Lizano understood that the system effectively constituted an exchange-rate “subsidy” that should serve as an initial impulse allowing the export sector’s competitiveness to take off.

    But, as tends to happen with subsidies, economic interest groups—or what José Ángel Gurría has called the “de facto powers”—attempted to preserve it. They succeeded in doing so for 28 years.

    Eventually, the Central Bank, following an initiative associated with its then chief economist Roger Madrigal, withdrew that subsidy.

    Public complaints followed immediately. Beyond those complaints, the BCCR was also subjected to repeated public criticism, which is in itself healthy for a democracy. Some firms even went bankrupt after the exchange-rate subsidy was withdrawn.

    If a firm is profitable only under an exchange-rate mechanism that permanently generates a specific rent, it is reasonable to ask how much of that “competitiveness” is genuinely competitive.

    Exchange Rates, Rents, and Cost-Push Inflation

    The underlying issue is that, without the subsidy that generated inflationary inertia through higher costs, certain firms were no longer profitable. This mechanism involved cost-push inflation associated with the well-known phenomenon of exchange-rate pass-through: the transmission of exchange-rate movements into domestic inflation.

    Put differently, the Central Bank maintained an exchange rate that generated rents for particular groups while simultaneously contributing to inflationary inertia, whose burden fell especially heavily on those with the fewest mechanisms available to protect their real income.

    The crawling peg, as conceived by Lizano—as an “initial impulse”—appeared, and perhaps still appears, to be a reasonable idea. The problem emerged when an instrument designed to be temporary became an effectively permanent policy.

    Over the long run it produced inflationary inertia and, because the exporters benefiting from it wanted the arrangement to continue indefinitely, they fought politically for its preservation through institutional pressure channeled by the organizations already mentioned. The result was a subsidy that survived for decades, until it was finally removed as Costa Rica moved toward an inflation-targeting regime.

    Competitiveness Without an Exchange-Rate Subsidy

    Losing easy profits obtained without a corresponding effort to become more competitive is naturally painful. The response may take the form of closures, layoffs, and claims that these consequences are the fault of BCCR policies.

    The Central Bank, however, is not an enemy of exporters. What it should not do is indefinitely subsidize a lack of competitiveness, still less redistribute wealth from lower-income groups toward exporters merely to make the latter appear artificially more competitive.

    José Ángel Gurría, who served for fifteen years as Secretary-General of the OECD, repeatedly argued that competitiveness problems could not simply be blamed on exchange-rate policy. They also reflected insufficient competition: protection afforded to particular producers, monopolistic structures surrounding export products, and other arrangements that weaken the competitive capacity of domestic producers.

    This does not mean, of course, that certain exchange-rate advantages cannot be useful as an initial stimulus when they are employed with moderation, prudence, and a clearly defined time horizon—precisely as the policy was originally conceived.

    · · ·

    Inflation Targeting and Income Distribution

    Under inflation targeting, the Central Bank has moved toward a more passive role in income distribution. Passive, of course, does not mean irrelevant.

    Monetary policy continues to have distributive, macroeconomic, and real consequences. The relevant question is under what conditions the pursuit of price stability can coexist with economic growth and under which conditions, by contrast, the design of the monetary regime itself can impose additional constraints on that growth.

    Related Reading For a specific analysis of the conditions under which an inflation-targeting regime can limit economic growth within the theoretical and logical framework of the neoclassical synthesis, see the article linked below.