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“Is that to say we are against Free Trade? No, we are for Free Trade, because by Free Trade all economical laws, with their most astounding contradictions, will act upon a larger scale, upon the territory of the whole earth; and because from the uniting of all these contradictions in a single group, where they will stand face to face, will result the struggle which will itself eventuate in the emancipation of the proletariat.”

Karl Heinrich Marx · Marx-Engels Collected Works, Vol. VI, p. 290

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Category: Political Science

  • SOME REFLECTIONS ON MARX’S PRICES OF PRODUCTION

    SOME REFLECTIONS ON MARX’S PRICES OF PRODUCTION

    Was Marx Wrong About Prices of Production? — A 260-Page Investigation Says No

    Political Economy • Econometrics • Marx

    Was Marx Wrong About Prices of Production?
    A 260-Page Investigation Says No.

    How one researcher spent years showing that the most famous critique of Marx’s economics rests on a mistake Marx never made.

    Based on: Gómez Julián (2026), “Some Reflections on Marx’s Prices of Production” — Introduction, Conclusions & the Formal-Empirical Chapter · DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21842251

    A Fatal Flaw, or a Fatal Misreading?

    For over a century, a single mathematical argument has been wielded as the definitive proof that Karl Marx’s economics doesn’t work. It goes like this: Marx claimed that the value of goods is determined by the labor that produces them, and that market prices eventually gravitate toward “prices of production” — modified versions of those labor values, adjusted for how capital-intensive each industry is. But when you try to verify this with a system of simultaneous equations, the numbers don’t add up. The sums of values don’t equal the sums of prices. The theory, critics have said since the early 1900s, contains a fatal algebraic error.

    This paper — spanning 260 pages and drawing on philosophy, history, sociology, and statistics — argues that the error was never Marx’s. It was the error of the people who checked his math using a method he never used.

    The Photograph vs. the Movie

    Imagine you’re trying to understand a river. You could take a photograph of it — capturing one frozen moment — or you could film it as a movie, watching how the water flows over time. For over a hundred years, the economists who criticized Marx took a photograph of his theory and then complained that it didn’t look like a movie.

    Here’s the specific issue. Marx described a two-step process: first, a general rate of profit forms across the entire economy; then, each industry’s price deviates from its pure labor value according to how much capital it ties up relative to the average. The standard critique — originating with Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz in 1907 and repeated ever since — takes all of Marx’s accounting identities and solves them simultaneously, as if input prices and output prices were determined at the same instant. Under that framework, Marx’s three aggregate equalities cannot all hold at once.

    The “inconsistency” that has been attributed to Marx for over a century is the inconsistency of the simultaneous-dualist framework that was imposed on him, and it dissolves as soon as time is restored. — Gómez Julián, summarizing the central thesis

    But here’s the catch: solving everything simultaneously is equivalent to assuming that the economy is a photograph — that there is no time. And Marx’s entire framework is built on the opposite premise: that the economy is a process, an unfolding sequence in which the prices that exit one period become the input prices that enter the next. Once you restore that temporal dimension, the “inconsistency” vanishes. The three equalities hold simultaneously — not because Marx was secretly consistent in some miraculous way, but because the contradiction was an artifact of the framework imposed on him, not of his own logic.

    The paper calls the simultaneous approach “Walrasian Marxism” — a phrase that captures the irony: economists imported the logic of Léon Walras’s general equilibrium theory and used it to read Marx, then blamed Marx when the result didn’t work.

    In Plain Language

    Marx was accused for over a century of getting the arithmetic wrong. What actually happened is that someone redid his arithmetic under an assumption he never made — that the prices of things you buy to produce and the prices of things that come out of production are the same prices, set at the same time. If you assume that, Marx’s accounts don’t close. But that assumption is equivalent to saying the economy doesn’t happen in time.

    But Was the Movie Real?

    Pointing out that Marx’s logic works when you read it correctly is necessary but not sufficient. The “temporalist” school has been making this argument for nearly fifty years. But the author noticed a critical gap: nobody in that school had ever taken real-world data and actually estimated the three types of prices Marx described — direct labor values, prices of production, and market prices — and then tested whether market prices actually gravitate toward prices of production as the theory predicts.

    This matters because, as the paper puts it, leaving the correct reading of Marx “in the territory of conceptual argumentation while the incorrect reading occupies alone the territory of measurement” is a strategic vulnerability. If you can’t show that real prices behave the way your theory says they should, your theory remains a philosophical argument, however internally consistent.

    But before presenting any numbers, the paper devotes substantial space to establishing that the process Marx described actually happened in history. This is not an appendix; it’s a foundational part of the argument.

    Before Capitalism

    In pre-capitalist societies, exchange was regulated by labor time — not because someone enforced a theory, but because the material conditions made it so. Barter was dominant, inflation did not exist, and prices could only reflect production costs given available technology. Evidence from anthropology (Malinowski’s Trobriand Islands studies), sociology (Mauss on gift exchange), accounting history (Kula’s analysis of feudal estate records), and even paleogenomics all converge: objects were valued in proportion to the labor they embodied.

    The Transition

    The dissolution of feudal relations, the monetization of exchange, and the destruction of pre-industrial normative frameworks created the conditions for capital to move freely between industries. Thompson’s work on the “moral economy” documents how the new free-market ideology had to be violently imposed, destroying customary protections and creating an unprecedented relationship of exploitation.

    Capitalism Established

    Once barriers to capital movement were destroyed, capital flowed from commerce to industry chasing higher profits, and generalized competition forced a redistribution of total surplus value across sectors. The crisis of 1873 — which destroyed nearly half the blast furnaces in major iron-producing countries — is presented as concrete evidence of the mechanism: firms whose costs were still based on older, individually more labor-intensive methods went bankrupt when they couldn’t compete with prices of production dictated by modern technology.

    In Plain Language

    Prices of production didn’t appear the day someone wrote an equation. They appeared the day capital could freely move from one industry to another chasing the highest profit — which didn’t happen until legal, moral, and political barriers were destroyed. Before that, things were exchanged roughly according to the labor they cost, and there is more than enough evidence — ethnographic, accounting, archaeological, and genetic — to show it.

    What Is a Production Price, Exactly?

    This is where the paper moves into its most technically original territory. The author carefully separates two things that must not be confused:

    What a production price is (the explanandum): it is the expected value, over the distribution of economic perturbations, of the long-run time average of market prices. In plain language: it’s the center of gravity around which actual market prices keep spinning. Not the price they arrive at and stay at (that would be equilibrium), but the average around which they never stop oscillating.

    Key Concept

    The production price is neither an eternal, timeless equilibrium (the error of the simultaneous approach and of Walrasian economics, which takes the law as such for the whole and eliminates time) nor a chaos of prices without law (the error of empiricism, which stays at the level of individual prices and loses the law). It is the law of the whole realizing itself through the contingency of the parts.

    How each step of the process works (the explanans): a rule that determines this year’s market price from last year’s market price and last year’s latent production price, and nothing else. This is modeled as a hierarchical Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process — a three-level cascade in which the production price is itself a latent state with its own dynamic gravitating toward value, and market prices gravitate toward that latent state rather than toward a fixed, noisy index.

    The uncertainty is built into the model explicitly: uncertainty in the average rate of profit, uncertainty in the advanced capital, uncertainty in the disaggregation of national accounts into 37 sectors (handled through multiple imputation with 25 imputations combined by Rubin’s rule), and parametric uncertainty estimated through Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods.

    One crucial point: no magnitude is obtained by solving a simultaneous system. Value is constructed empirically and directly as $V = c + v + p$ (cost plus surplus value), and production price as $\Phi = c + K \cdot G’$ (cost plus capital times the general rate of profit). There is no Leontief inversion, no simultaneous algebra, anywhere in the construction.

    In Plain Language

    Think of a production price as the “gravitational center” of a spinning object. The object (a market price) never stops moving — it wobbles, it swings, it drifts — but over time its average position is pulled toward that center. The math describes both what the center is and how each wobble happens, and it does so while honestly accounting for all the uncertainty in the measurement.

    The Defining Equations: (9) Through (11)

    Here is where the metaphor turns into mathematics. The paper writes the definition of a production price in three successive steps — each one making explicit an assumption the previous step left implicit — numbered (9), (10), and (11) in the original text. None of the three generates a trajectory by itself; together they define the explanandum — what the object is — that the cascade below then generates.

    Equation 9 — What a Production Price Is
    $$ \lim_{t\to\infty} E\!\left[\varphi^i_t\right] \;=\; k^i_t + K^i_t\, E\!\left[G'(t,X)\right] \;=\; \Phi^i_t $$

    Here $\varphi^i_t$ is sector i’s market price at time $t$, $k^i_t$ is its cost price (constant capital consumed plus variable capital), $K^i_t$ is the total capital advanced, and $G'(t,X)$ is the general rate of profit — itself a stochastic process indexed by a perturbation $X$ that bundles the exodus of capital between branches and technological innovation.

    In words: a production price is the long-run limit of the average market price. Not the price itself at any instant — that keeps oscillating forever — but where its time-average settles as the horizon stretches out. Notice the object on the right-hand side, $k + K \cdot E[G’]$: it is the same accounting identity introduced earlier (cost price plus the average profit rate applied to capital advanced), except the profit rate is now written as an expectation, because it fluctuates.

    Equation 10 — Making the Averaging Explicit
    $$ \Phi^i_t = \lim_{t\to\infty} E\!\left[\varphi^i_t\right] = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \!\left(\lim_{t\to\infty} \varphi^i_t(x)\right) f_X(x)\, dx \;=\; k^i_t + K^i_t \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} G'(t,x)\, f_X(x)\, dx $$

    $f_X$ is the probability density of $X$. The equation says the expectation is an average over every possible state $x$ of the system’s turbulence, weighted by how likely that state is.

    Equation (10) earns its keep by making a subtle move legitimate: swapping the order of the limit and the expectation. That looks harmless, but it hides a real question — does the market price $\varphi^i_t$ even converge to anything as $t \to \infty$? The paper’s answer is no: a capitalist system doesn’t settle into a fixed point, it settles into a limit cycle — perpetual oscillation. So the convergence the argument needs isn’t of the instantaneous price, but of its cumulative time-average. That average does converge, for almost every state of the world, precisely because the system is ergodic — the fraction of time the cycle spends in each region of its orbit stabilizes. This is the Birkhoff ergodic theorem doing, in mathematical language, exactly what Marx says in economic language: the production price isn’t the value the market price reaches and stays at, it is the average around which it never stops oscillating. The oscillation isn’t an obstacle to the average — it is the average’s condition of existence.

    Why the Order of Operations Matters

    The paper invokes Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence Theorem to justify swapping “limit of the average” for “average of the limit.” This requires bounding market prices by some integrable envelope — economically, that no price can grow without limit, which technological ceilings and competitive pressure guarantee — and, crucially, it does not require that the convergence be uniform across sectors. Uniform convergence would mean competition equalizes profits instantly and identically everywhere, with no room for a shock to hit one industry harder than another. Marx’s theory says the opposite, and the math is built to allow it.

    Equation 11 — When the Capital Base Is Also Uncertain
    $$ \Phi^i_t = \lim_{t\to\infty} E\!\left[\varphi^i_t\right] = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\!\!\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \left[k^i_t + K^i_t(y)\, G'(t,x)\right] f_{X\mid Y}(x\mid y)\, f_Y(y)\; dx\, dy $$

    Equation (10) still treated the capital base $K^i_t$ as known exactly. Equation (11) drops that simplification: $Y$ is a second random variable carrying the estimation error in $K$, with density $f_Y$, and $f_{X \mid Y}$ lets the profit-rate perturbation depend on which realization of that error occurred. The object is the same double average — only now uncertainty is propagated from two sources instead of one.

    This last equation is not a mathematical flourish; it is the reason the empirical section spends so much effort on multiple imputation. National accounts don’t hand anyone a clean measurement of capital advanced by sector — it has to be reconstructed from incomplete data, and that reconstruction carries its own error. Equation (11) is the license to treat that error as a random variable to be averaged over rather than a nuisance to be ignored. The uncertainty is propagated externally — by a generator outside the statistical model itself — rather than estimated as an internal parameter of the dynamic model: estimating $K$’s error inside the model would confound it with the model’s own measurement-noise term, opening a ridge of non-identification between two magnitudes that the data alone cannot tell apart. Kept external, twenty-five complete reconstructions of the data are generated first, each respecting the Marxian aggregate identities to machine precision, the dynamic model is fit on each, and the twenty-five fits are combined by Rubin’s rule. That is the outer average of equation (11), computed by literally drawing from the distribution of $Y$ instead of assuming it away.

    The Engine: A Three-Level Ornstein–Uhlenbeck Cascade

    Equations (9)–(11) define the target; they don’t generate a path toward it. The explanans — the mechanism that actually produces a year-by-year trajectory consistent with that target — is a hierarchical Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with up to three nested levels, fit as a single Stan program (the same program handles one, two, or three levels, which guarantees that adding levels can never silently break the simpler cases nested inside them). All series enter standardized; time is discretized one year at a time using the Euler–Maruyama scheme.

    Level 1 — The Market Price
    $$ dev_{t,s} = \varphi_{t-1,s} – \Phi_{t-1,s} $$
    $$ \kappa^m_{t,s} = \kappa_{\mathrm{cap}} \cdot \mathrm{invlogit}\!\left(\kappa_s + \beta_1\, z^{TMG}_t\right) $$
    $$ \Delta\varphi_{t,s} = \kappa^m_{t,s}\!\left(-\,dev_{t,s}\right) \;+\; a_{3,s}\, dev_{t,s}^{\,3} \;+\; \gamma\, COM^{std}_{t,s} \;+\; \varepsilon_{t,s} $$

    Subscripts $s$ (sector) and $t$ (year) run throughout. $dev$ is last year’s gap between market price and the latent production price. $\kappa^m$ is the sector’s reversion speed, passed through a logit link that caps it inside $(0, \kappa_{\mathrm{cap}})$ and lets the general rate of profit ($z^{TMG}$) modulate it without ever pushing the system out of the stable region of the discretization. $\varepsilon$ is a fat-tailed (Student-t), stochastic-volatility innovation, so volatility can cluster in time without destabilizing the mean.

    Read the Level 1 line as a spring. The term $-\kappa \cdot dev$ is the restoring force: it pulls the market price back toward the production price with a force proportional to how far it has drifted. The cubic term $a_{3,s} \cdot dev^3$, with $a_{3,s}$ constrained negative by construction — not estimated, imposed — makes that restoring force grow faster than proportionally once the deviation gets large: the further the market strays, the harder it snaps back. This is a declared stability assumption, not a discovery: it guarantees the model can never generate an explosive regime, at the real cost that if such a regime existed in some sector of the actual economy, this particular specification could not detect it.

    Levels 2–3 — Where the Latent Center Itself Reverts
    $$ \mu_{s,t} = m_{0,s} + m_1\, G’_t + m_v\, V_{s,t} $$

    The production price $\Phi$ is not treated as a fixed, observed index; it is itself a latent state that reverts — more slowly, with its own sector speed $\kappa_p$ — toward this mean $\mu$. $m_1$ is the channel running through the general rate of profit; $m_v$ is the coefficient measuring how strongly the production price tracks the directly-constructed value $V_{s,t} = k + p$ (Level 3, and the reason the cascade goes up to three levels rather than stopping at two).

    This is the bridge back to the abstract equations above, term by term. $\mu_{s,t}$ is the estimable stand-in for the right-hand side of (9): $m_{0,s} + m_1 G’_t$ plays the role of $k + K \cdot E[G’]$, and $m_v V_{s,t}$ is the specific functional form chosen for the value-tracking channel that the abstract definition deliberately leaves open (the paper is careful to say that capitalist competition as a function of the value structure is declared at the level of equations 9–11, not derived; giving it the concrete shape $m_v V$ is a modeling choice made at the cascade level, defended by how it performs under validation rather than deduced from the definition). And the expectation of $G’$ from equation (9) has its operational counterpart in the profit rate averaged across the twenty-five multiple imputations — the mechanism equation (11) licenses.

    The coefficient $m_v$ carries real theoretical weight: it is the empirical stand-in for Chapter 9’s claim that prices of production gravitate around values. It is given a neutral prior, $m_v \sim \mathcal{N}(0,\, 0.5)$ — centered at zero, symmetric, assigning equal plausibility to $m_v > 0$ and $m_v < 0$ before seeing any data. That matters for the same reason a fair coin matters in a coin-flip experiment: if the data carried no signal, the posterior would sit wherever the prior put it, hugging zero. It doesn’t. It lands at $m_v \approx 1.0136$ with $P(m_v > 0) = 1$ — evidence that the data moved it there, not the prior. The anchoring to value is found, not assumed into the setup.

    In Plain Language

    The cascade is three springs stacked on top of each other. The market price is tied by a spring to the latent, unobserved production price. The production price is tied by its own, slower spring to a moving target that blends the general rate of profit with the directly-measured labor value. Pull any one spring and let go: it doesn’t snap to a fixed point, it settles into the kind of perpetual, decaying oscillation that equations (9)–(11) describe as an average. The springs are estimated from sixty-one years of real U.S. data, not assumed; the coefficient tying prices of production to values, specifically, could have come back negative or zero — the model gave it every chance to — and it didn’t.

    What the Numbers Say

    The empirical core of the paper is a panel of 37 productive branches of the United States economy over 61 years, from 1960 to 2020. The hypothesis tested encloses three distinct relationships, and the paper is meticulous about not conflating them. Each is stated, tested, and reported separately.

    Market Prices ↔ Prices of Production: The Strongest Link

    This is the relationship with the firmest statistical support, confirmed through six independent lines of evidence:

    Central Finding

    Gravitation exists, and it is slow. The median speed across sectors is $\kappa_m = 0.0770$, equivalent to a half-life of approximately 9 years. Market prices take about a decade to cover half the distance toward their production-price center. This is consistent with Marx’s characterization of gravitation as a tendential, mediated regulation, not an instantaneous fit.

    The number is remarkably stable under stress tests:

    • Removing five of the six productive blocks from the panel barely moves the estimate — it shifts in the third decimal place. The sixth, which gathers 18 of the 37 sectors, does produce a shift (from 9 years to 6 years), and the paper decomposes it: about half the acceleration is the generic effect of halving the panel — removing 18 sectors at random already gives 0.0929 — and not the block itself.
    • Dismantling the value anchor in three different ways — including permuting surplus value across spheres — moves the speed in the third decimal place. This is significant: it means the conclusion about market-to-production gravitation does not depend on the less robust production-to-value link.
    • The market deviation has its own dynamic signature. Compared against a random walk matched in variance, three out of six test statistics separate cleanly (the weighted-sum convergence reaches a tolerance of 0.01 while the null never reaches a tolerance ten times more lenient; recurrence analysis laminarity triples the null; recurrence entropy doubles it). The ones that don’t separate are recurrence-analysis determinism and the two deterministic-chaos invariants — the Lyapunov exponent and the correlation dimension — which the paper never claimed to find.
    • The estimate is invariant to secondary methodological choices. Sweeping the latency regularizer across three values produces life medias of 9 years in all three arms (speeds of 0.0774, 0.0770, 0.0772).
    • The known bias of disaggregation pushes against the result. Splitting a national figure among 37 branches is underdetermined and biases speed estimates downward — meaning the true half-life is probably 7–8 years rather than 9. A bias that works against your conclusion is one you can live with, because the result holds despite it, not thanks to it.

    Prices of Production ↔ Values: The Thinnest Leg

    This is the weakest part of the empirical argument, and the paper states so with complete transparency. The problem is not a defect of the instrument but a property of the object:

    Methodological Transparency

    The coupling coefficient estimated within the dynamic model is $m_v = 1.0136$ with a 95% credible interval of $[1.0096,\; 1.0176]$ — but the same procedure returns 1.0365 when surplus value is permuted across spheres, preserving all annual aggregates. Why? Because production price and value share the cost price, which explains 66.1% of the variance of the former and 72.0% of the latter, and their correlation in levels is 0.9987. The coefficient would land near one even if the law of value didn’t hold at all. The paper therefore reports it as a consistency check, not as evidence.

    The real support for this relationship comes from cross-sectional tests, not from the dynamic coupling. When temporal common trends are removed and analysis is conducted within-year, the slope of the markup on own surplus value is 0.675 with the true data versus 0.090 under permutation, with intervals that don’t come close to overlapping. The sectoral ordering of the wedge between $\Phi$ and $V$ has an inter-annual rank correlation of 0.986 and a 60-year value of 0.558 — highly persistent structure, not noise.

    A collateral finding worth noting: the coefficient of variation of sectoral profit rates is 0.669 — meaning profit rates across industries show considerable and persistent dispersion. Far from contradicting the theory, this dispersion is the condition of existence of the mechanism: if profit rates were already equalized, there would be no differential to drive capital migration, and gravitation would have nothing to operate on. Marx postulates equalization as a tendency, not an accomplished fact.

    Market Prices ↔ Values: Sustained in Form, Adjusted in Existence

    The structural modification across sectors exists and is nonlinear (the nonlinearity step holds comfortably at 6.8 null deviations). But the existence step is adjusted: 44% of its gain is obtained equally with sectoral characteristics unpaired from their spheres, and the gap against the maximum null is on the order of one paired standard error. The coefficients survive a deliberately severe correction for serial dependence (tripling the error).

    The Instrument Behind That Number: A Nested Ladder in gdpar

    That test is a small ladder of nested distributional-regression models, fit with gdpar (Gómez Julián, 2026b), the author’s own R package for generalized distributional parameter regression, published on CRAN on July 15, 2026. The ladder climbs from a bare model — “the market-to-value ratio has no sector-specific correction at all” — through a model where organic composition, wage share, and sector size shift that ratio linearly, up to a model where the correction is a flexible spline rather than a straight line. Two gains matter, measured in units of predictive density: adding the linear correction buys 207.3 units; letting it curve buys another 215.1. Both were checked against a control built to be hard to pass — shuffling which sector gets which characteristics 99 times, refitting each time, with the spline’s knots held fixed across every shuffle so the comparison can’t be won by a better basis alone. The curvature gain clears its null with room to spare (6.8 null standard deviations; the best of 99 shuffles reaches only 114.8 against 215.1 observed). The existence gain is honestly reported as thinner: shuffled sectors still buy about 44% of the real gain merely by having some characteristics to fit — three covariates and an intercept give a model room to accommodate noise even when it is being told nothing true — so the genuine margin over the null sits at about one paired standard error (23.2, against a gap of roughly 24 units). Both numbers are reported together, precisely so the large one isn’t read alone.

    A companion specification, estimated in the same gdpar fit, asks the same question about dispersion rather than location: not where the market-to-value ratio is centered, but how tightly it clusters. Larger sectors and sectors with higher capital composition show systematically less relative dispersion — elasticities of $-0.226$ and $-0.104$ — consistent with equalization operating more effectively where capital is more concentrated. Both effects clear a “breaking factor” (the multiple of the standard error at which the 95% interval would first touch zero) north of six and four respectively, past the 2.94 ceiling reached anywhere else among this paper’s location coefficients, and the finding reproduces under a completely different likelihood family (a gamma distribution on the price ratio) to within 5.2%.

    Three Failures That Confirm the Theory

    One of the most intellectually striking features of this paper is how it handles results that, at first glance, look bad for its thesis. There are three, and the paper reports all of them without softening — then shows deductively why each one was expected if the theory is correct.

    Negative Result No. 1

    The model does not out-of-sample predict better than a random walk. But this was deductively implied by the slow form of the thesis. At a horizon much shorter than the half-life, a mean-reverting process is, to first order, a random walk. If something takes a decade to get halfway back, looking at a single year won’t let you see it return.

    Negative Result No. 2

    The value term is predictively indistinguishable. Again, this follows from the slow coupling between prices of production and values: with half-lives on the order of decades and only 61 years of data, univariate root-unit tests are structurally underpowered.

    Negative Result No. 3

    No univariate test separates the true wedge from its permuted placebos. But this was predicted before measuring, by the persistence of sectoral ordering itself (inter-annual rank correlation of 0.986). A highly persistent time series is hard to distinguish from its permuted version using tests designed for shorter memory.

    Finding these signatures is corroboration of the slow form of the thesis, and not finding them would have been the real problem. — Gómez Julián, on the negative results

    The paper’s stance on this is worth highlighting: “Lejos de refutar la tesis, los tres están deductivamente implicados por su forma lenta” — far from refuting the thesis, all three are deductively implied by its slow form. A single mechanism (slow gravitation) explains both the substantive thesis and all the apparently negative results, and it also survives in the validated posterior. “That a single cause explains the thesis and all the apparently negative results, and that it additionally survives in the validated register, is the opposite of a petitio principii: it is a unified, falsifiable, and internally validated narrative.”

    Temporalism Isn’t a Preference — It’s a Condition of Measurement

    Perhaps the most consequential result in the entire paper is not a number but a statement about what can and cannot be measured. It concerns the “modulator” — the component of Marx’s argument in which the general rate of profit enters into the structural modification of each sphere, meaning the deviation of each sphere is not independent of the reference but generated by it.

    The Identifiability Argument

    When the model was run with a single, fixed general rate of profit for all 61 years (as a simultaneous approach would require), the posterior exhibited a flat ridge: two completely different functional bases (a degree-two polynomial and a spline basis) produced the same pathology to the third decimal place, with an effective sample size of only six draws. The diagnostic got worse with more sampling (R-hat rising from 1.33 to 1.73). This is the unmistakable signature of a direction in parameter space along which the likelihood does not change.

    The cause is theoretical, not computational. With one fixed reference, the modulator can only be identified evaluated at that single point — a single number, not a function over the space of references. You cannot estimate three coefficients from a polynomial if you have one data point.

    When the reference was allowed to vary year by year (61 different general rates of profit), the model converged within minutes, with a large improvement in both time and effective sample size, and zero divergences.

    Named, Not Improvised: Theorems 1A and 1E

    This diagnosis isn’t an ad hoc read of a misbehaving sampler. gdpar (Gómez Julián, 2026b) — the same package behind the nested ladder above — ships a formal identifiability result for exactly this situation. Its Theorem 1A establishes that, with a single fixed reference point, a distributional modulator is identified only at that point: as one number, not as a function over the space of possible references. Theorem 1E is the positive counterpart: letting the reference vary restores identifiability of the modulator as a function. Fitting a degree-two polynomial (three coefficients) or a five-knot spline basis (five coefficients) against one single, unmoving reference asks for more than a single data point in that dimension can support — which is exactly what a flat likelihood ridge looks like from the sampler’s side.

    The figures behind the improvement, precisely: a fixed reference with a degree-two polynomial gives an R-hat of 1.7333, an effective sample size of 6, and 8 divergent transitions in 39 minutes; a one-knot spline basis reproduces the same pathology — R-hat 1.7335, effective sample size 6, 14 divergences, 5.6 hours. Letting the reference vary year by year (61 distinct annual values of the general rate of profit), centering the additive component and raising the sampler’s adaptation parameter to 0.99, gives an R-hat of 1.0035, an effective sample size of 1332, and zero divergent transitions — in 2.9 minutes. That is the 115-fold improvement in time and 222-fold improvement in effective sample size referenced above, and it is a theorem, not a tuning trick: no amount of additional sampling closes that gap under a fixed reference, because the object being asked for — the modulator as a function — simply is not there to find.

    The consequence is stated precisely: with a single fixed general rate of profit obtained by solving the system simultaneously, the claim of Chapter 9 of Volume Three of Capital is unverifiable by construction. It is not that the data are insufficient — the object is not identified, and no amount of data would identify it. The argument does not establish that simultaneism is false as a description of capitalism (that is established by historiography and sociology); it establishes that a simultaneous procedure cannot, even in principle, empirically verify the specific part of Marx’s argument that this work estimates.

    In Plain Language

    Marx says: first a general rate of profit forms, then each industry deviates from it according to how capital-intensive it is. To check whether the deviation depends on the general rate, you need to see what happens to the deviation when the general rate changes. If you calculate one general rate for the entire 61-year span, it never changes, and there is nothing to observe. That is exactly what happened: the model with one fixed rate doesn’t converge — not because of computational limitations, but because it is being asked to measure a relationship with a single observation of one of the two variables. Calculating one rate per year — which is what the temporal reading says you should do — the same model converges in three minutes.

    What This Is, and What It Isn’t

    The paper is careful, almost painstakingly so, about the limits of what it claims. This section matters because a reader coming from the “pro-Marx” or “anti-Marx” side might be tempted to over-read the results. The author doesn’t let you.

    What the evidence authorizes: In the United States between 1960 and 2020, market prices gravitate toward prices of production with a decadal half-life that is sectorially heterogeneous, and this speed survives three independent assaults (removing five of the six productive blocks, destroying the value anchor, varying secondary methodological decisions). This is a measured, calibrated, and falsifiable fact.

    What the evidence does not authorize:

    • It does not claim superior predictive power (the model does not out-predict a random walk, which was expected).
    • It does not claim that univariate root-unit tests confirm gravitation (they are structurally underpowered at this time scale).
    • It does not claim uniqueness or categorical novelty. The contribution is the explicit integration and canonization of a slow gravitation cascade with value anchoring, measured on real data, with propagated uncertainty, validated, and subjected to a diagnostic whose unfavorable results are reported alongside the favorable ones.
    • It does not claim that this statistically demonstrates the law of value, “and not for rhetorical prudence but because it would be false: a price series can show that a magnitude behaves as the law predicts, and cannot explain why that magnitude exists or whether the category with which we name it is the correct one.”

    That last point is the paper’s deepest epistemological commitment. Questions about whether “value” is the right category for what prices ultimately measure are not answerable by any price series, no matter how long. They are answered by history, sociology, and philosophy — and the firm answer is the one obtained when all four disciplines (those three plus statistics) point in the same direction. The four-dimensional convergence is the argument, not any single leg of it.

    The paper also addresses the homology that unifies its seemingly disparate halves — the historiographical-filosofical first chapter and the econometric second chapter. The relationship between necessity and contingency that governs the transition from feudalism to capitalism (where the same demographic shock produced opposite outcomes in different regions of Europe) is structurally identical to the relationship between prices of production and market prices. A law determines the center; circumstances determine each particular outcome. Neither fact negates the other, because they describe different levels of the same reality.

    What It All Adds Up To

    Here is the simplest version of what this 260-page paper establishes:

    Marx was reproached for a century for having done an arithmetic calculation wrong. What happened is that his calculation was redone under an assumption he never made: that the prices of things bought to produce and the prices of things that come out of production are the same prices, fixed at the same time. If you assume that, Marx’s accounts indeed don’t close. But that assumption is equivalent to saying the economy doesn’t happen in time. As soon as you accept that what exits the factory this year is what enters the factory next year, the accounts close without anyone having to fix anything. — Gómez Julián, Summary for the Reader

    But recognizing the conceptual error was only the first half. What had been missing — and what this paper contributes — is doing those accounts with real data instead of with fictitious numerical examples, which is what the school that had the correct conceptual reading had never done.

    The empirical results show that prices in the U.S. economy over six decades do behave as the theory predicts: they gravitate, slowly, toward prices of production calculated with Marx’s theory and no other. This finding survived every attack the author could devise — removing productive sectors, destroying the value anchor, permuting surplus values, varying methodological decisions, and running diagnostics whose unfavorable results are reported in full alongside the favorable ones.

    The part of the argument linking prices of production to labor values is also supported by real evidence, though less firmly, and the paper says exactly where the weak points are and why they are properties of the object, not defects of the instrument.

    And the paper does not claim to have demonstrated the law of value with a series of numbers, because “questions of that kind are not answered with numbers: they are answered with history, with sociology, and with philosophy, and the firm answer is the one obtained when the four things (the previous three, together with statistics) all point in the same place.”

    That convergence doesn’t make the result eternal — better evidence can overturn it tomorrow. But it makes it, for now, “our best possible approximation to the truth.”

    — — —

    “In science as in life, overcoming adversity is what makes us truly strong.”

    This post summarizes the introduction, conclusions, and the formal-empirical chapter (§2.4) of Gómez Julián, J. M. (2026). Some Reflections on Marx’s Prices of Production: Historicity of the Law of Value, Dialectical-Materialist Foundation, and Dynamic Formalization Under Uncertainty. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21842251. The full paper spans approximately 260 pages across two chapters covering philosophy, historiography, mathematical formalization, and empirical econometrics. Equations (9)–(11) and the model specification cited here reproduce that chapter’s notation; gdpar is cited separately as Gómez Julián (2026b).

    Written for the curious. An invitation to read.

  • Is It Scientifically Possible for Central America To Be a Single Country?

    Is It Scientifically Possible for Central America To Be a Single Country?

    Political Science & History

    Science, Youth, and the Rebirth of a Central American Nation

    The Origins of Scientific Unionism in Central America and Its Unavoidable Future

    History is rarely kind to fragmented nations. At the dawn of the 20th century, Central America was a collection of small, vulnerable republics plagued by authoritarian rule, economic volatility, and the looming shadow of international imperialism. Yet, from the cloistered halls of the University of San Carlos in Guatemala, a quiet revolution was brewing. It was led not by generals, but by students. This is the story of how a group of young intellectuals pioneered “Scientific Unionism”—a movement to reunite Central America not through romantic nostalgia, but through the rigorous application of social sciences.

    Based on Margarita Silva Hernández’s illuminating research, this post explores the historical genesis of this movement. Furthermore, it asks a vital question for today’s political scientists and economists: If Scientific Unionism was valid a century ago, is it not an absolute, long-term historical inevitability for Central America’s survival on the global stage today?

    The Catalyst: 1898 and the Shift in Global Power

    To understand the birth of Scientific Unionism, we must look at the pivotal year of 1898. The Spanish-American War resulted in a resounding victory for the United States, establishing it as a first-rank global power with expansionist ambitions in the Caribbean and Central America. For a group of young university students, this was not merely a geopolitical shift; it was an existential threat. They perceived the conflict as a clash between the Anglo-Saxon and Latin worlds, sparking a profound anti-imperialist consciousness.

    Simultaneously, the region was suffering the aftershocks of the 1897 coffee price crash. The liberal economic model, heavily reliant on agricultural exports and foreign capital (like the newly formed United Fruit Company), had left the isthmus vulnerable. The students saw the economic crisis as a symptom of a deeper disease: the fragmentation of Central America. To them, the petty dictators of the region were complicit in this backwardness, suppressing social mobility and selling out national resources.

    The Birth of Scientific Unionism

    On June 18, 1899, a clandestine group of students formed a society called El Derecho (The Law). Led by a young Nicaraguan, Salvador Mendieta, these students—mostly in their late teens and early twenties—originated from across the isthmus. They were the children of provincial merchants and professionals, united by a shared frustration with the lack of political mobility under authoritarian regimes.

    What set El Derecho apart from previous attempts at Central American unity was their methodological approach. They did not want to simply restore the old Federal Republic of the 1820s through military decrees. Instead, they turned to sociology. Influenced by the positivist ideas of Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and John Stuart Mill, they sought to discover the “social laws” governing Central America.

    “They designated their movement ‘scientific unionism’ to evidence the intellectual condition of its founders and the scientific-social bases of their working methods.”

    Their thesis was clear: Central America was a single nation artificially divided. To reunite it, one could not rely on mere political pacts (which had repeatedly failed, such as the brief “Greater Republic” in 1898). Instead, they needed to build a cultural unity. They believed that through civic education, the eradication of localism, and the application of scientific principles to governance, they could forge a strong, unified state capable of resisting foreign intervention and achieving modernization.

    From Theory to Political Action

    The students of El Derecho did not remain in the classroom. They organized five Central American Student Congresses between 1901 and 1911, creating a regional network of young thinkers. They published pamphlets, established night schools for workers, and delivered public conferences. They positioned themselves as the intellectual vanguard destined to replace the old oligarchic guard.

    Naturally, this provoked the wrath of local dictators. Manuel Estrada Cabrera in Guatemala met their denunciations with brutal repression. Students were imprisoned—some, like Marciano Castillo, dying in the penitentiary—and the movement was forced into exile. By 1904, the students had evolved into a formal political entity: the Central American Unionist Party (PUCA). The student movement had matured into a regional political force.

    A Modern Perspective: The Inevitability of Union

    The preceding sections summarize the historical findings of Margarita Silva Hernández. The following section represents the extrapolation of this blog’s author, using the historical foundation of Scientific Unionism to pose contemporary political and economic questions.

    When Salvador Mendieta and his peers looked at Central America in 1899, they applied the scientific method to diagnose a fractured region. If we apply modern political science and economic theory to Central America today, does the scientific case for union remain valid? The data suggests not only that it is valid, but that it has become a historical inevitability.

    Geopolitical Scale and Relevance: In the 19th century, Mendieta feared absorption by the US. Today, the threat is irrelevance in a multipolar world dominated by giants. A united Central America would encompass a territory of approximately 423,000 square kilometers—larger than Germany. This is not merely a trivia fact; it implies a geopolitical footprint capable of negotiating on equal terms with global powers, managing its own maritime routes, and securing a strategic position between two oceans.

    Diversifying the Production Matrix: Historically, the region has suffered from a monoculture export model (coffee then, and various agricultural or low-tier assembly maquilas now). A unified state would possess an unprecedented diversity of microclimates, resources, and cultural demographics. This diversity would allow for a scientifically planned diversification of the production matrix. The agricultural backbone (coffee, bananas, sugarcane, livestock) would not be abandoned, but rather complemented. A single Central American market of over 50 million people provides the necessary domestic consumer base to justify intense, state-sponsored industrialization. It creates a rationale for heavy infrastructure, regional supply chains, and a unified digital economy.

    The Science of Scale: Modern economics validates the original premise of Scientific Unionism. Fragmented states suffer from duplicated bureaucratic costs, border frictions, and an inability to capture economies of scale. A unified Central America would eliminate these inefficiencies. It could pool its scientific and intellectual capital—much like the students of El Derecho envisioned—into a single educational and technological ecosystem.

    Therefore, the question is no longer merely historical. If Central America wishes to be more than a peripheral zone of extraction for larger economies, union is not a romantic dream of the past; it is a scientific, economic, and historical necessity for the future. The students of 1899 understood the math of their era. We must be brave enough to do the math of ours.

    ~ Exploring the past to architect the future ~

  • Fiscal and Monetary Policy Usually Hold Hands

    Fiscal and Monetary Policy Usually Hold Hands

    Fiscal and Monetary Policy Usually Hold Hands: What 60 Years of U.S. Data Reveal About Economic Independence

    Fiscal and Monetary Policy Usually Hold Hands

    What 60 years of U.S. data reveal about the myth of independent economic instruments

    Imagine you are steering a ship with two sets of controls—one for the rudder and one for the engine. Conventional wisdom says these controls work independently: you can adjust the rudder without affecting the engine, and vice versa. For more than seventy years, this is essentially how mainstream economics has treated a country’s fiscal policy (government spending and lending) and its monetary policy (interest rates and central bank operations). Each set of tools was supposed to be independent of the other, allowing policymakers to pursue multiple goals at the same time without interference.

    A new study published in the Revista Cubana de Economía Internacional challenges that assumption head-on. Using six decades of quarterly U.S. data—from January 1960 to October 2022—and a battery of modern Bayesian statistical techniques, economist José Mauricio Gómez Julián finds that American fiscal and monetary instruments are far from independent. They are, in fact, deeply intertwined, both in straightforward linear ways and in more complex, nonlinear patterns. The implications ripple outward from econometric theory into the practical world of how governments manage economies.

    The Rule That Started It All

    The story begins in 1952, when the Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen—who would later share the first Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences—formulated a deceptively simple principle: to achieve n independent policy goals, you need at least n independent policy instruments. Known today as the “Tinbergen Rule,” this idea became a cornerstone of economic policy theory. It told governments that if they wanted to control inflation, unemployment, and growth simultaneously, they needed at least three tools that did not overlap in their effects.

    The American economist James Tobin later sharpened this: instruments are independent when “the effects of any instrument on the targets are not proportional to those of any other, or of any combination of others.” In modern econometrics, this independence assumption has been formalized as super exogeneity—a technical condition saying that the statistical relationships between economic variables remain stable even when policymakers intervene. If super exogeneity holds, a central bank can freely adjust interest rates without worrying that the Treasury’s spending decisions will systematically interfere with those adjustments.

    “If a central bank is free to choose the adjustments to its instruments to pursue its final objectives, it has instrument independence.”

    — Laurence H. Meyer, former Federal Reserve Governor

    The problem? Despite its foundational role in economic theory, nobody had rigorously tested this assumption econometrically for the U.S. case—until now.

    Six Instruments, Six Decades

    The study examines six economic policy instruments, divided into two groups:

    Instruments Studied

    • Fiscal instruments: Federal government current spending (GCGF) and federal government policy lending (GACL)
    • Monetary instruments: The effective federal funds rate (FEFR), the Federal Reserve discount rate (TD), other assets held by the monetary authority (TDFG), and the 3-month Treasury bill secondary market rate (LT3M)

    Data sourced from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database and YCharts, spanning 252 quarterly observations.

    With these variables in hand, the researcher embarked on a two-stage investigation. First, he tested whether each pair of instruments showed any meaningful statistical association. Then, he built a predictive model to see whether one instrument could be reliably forecasted from the others—which would be impossible if they were truly independent.

    Stage One: Mapping the Web of Connections

    The preliminary analysis used three different correlation measures—Pearson, Kendall, and Spearman—in both their classical (frequentist) and Bayesian versions. The results were striking. Eight pairs of instruments showed significant correlations, with partial correlation coefficients at or above 0.5 in absolute value. For context, a Pearson correlation of 0.5 means one variable explains about 25% of the variation in another—a substantial relationship by any standard.

    Some highlights from the correlation analysis:

    1. The 3-month Treasury bill rate and federal policy lending showed a strong positive correlation (Pearson partial correlation of approximately 0.78).
    2. Federal policy lending and the discount rate were also strongly positively correlated (about 0.77).
    3. Federal government spending and federal policy lending were negatively correlated (about −0.69), suggesting that as one rises, the other tends to fall.
    4. Government spending showed negative correlations with all three monetary interest rate instruments (around −0.59 to −0.61).

    The fact that these correlations held across different statistical measures and survived the stationarity adjustments (seasonal corrections applied via the X-13ARIMA-SEATS method) gives them added credibility. The seasonality adjustments also provided strong evidence that the variables follow approximately normal distributions, further validating the correlation analysis.

    Linearity, Quadratics, and Beyond

    Correlation tells you that two variables move together, but not how they move together. Is the relationship a straight line? A curve? Something more exotic? To answer this, the study employed Bayesian linear regression models and RESET tests (a standard diagnostic for detecting nonlinear relationships), both reinforced with Bayesian bootstrapping—a resampling technique that generates thousands of synthetic datasets to test the robustness of results.

    The findings revealed that most instrument pairs have linear relationships, but in two notable cases—the discount rate versus policy lending, and the federal funds rate versus government spending—quadratic (curved) relationships also play a role. This means the effect of one instrument on another is not constant; it changes depending on the level of the variable, adding a layer of complexity that the Tinbergen framework simply does not account for.

    For example, the relationship between the federal funds rate and government spending follows a parabolic pattern: at lower spending levels, the federal funds rate behaves one way, and at higher spending levels, it behaves differently. This kind of interaction is precisely what “independence” was supposed to rule out.

    Stage Two: Building the Model

    Armed with a clear map of which instruments are connected and how, the researcher constructed a Bayesian Generalized Linear Model (BGLM) to predict federal government policy lending (GACL) from the other instruments. This was not an arbitrary choice: among all the instruments studied, GACL emerged as the most consistently dominated—meaning it is explained by other instruments 75% of the time rather than explaining them. It was the natural candidate for the response variable.

    To handle the nonlinear relationships identified in Stage One, the model used natural cubic splines—flexible mathematical curves that can bend to fit complex patterns without requiring the researcher to guess the exact shape in advance. Think of splines as a series of smoothly connected curve segments that together approximate any function, much like a skilled draftsman’s French curve. The model also incorporated the central bank’s asset holdings (TDFG) as a log-normally distributed random variable, based on the best-fitting distribution identified through empirical testing.

    Model Performance at a Glance

    • Average R-squared: 0.908—the model explains about 91% of the variation in federal policy lending
    • Mean Absolute Error: 68.5 (on a variable that ranges from 146 to 1,682)
    • Root Mean Squared Error: 92.8
    • Convergence (R-hat): 1.0—indicating the Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulations ran cleanly
    • Multicollinearity check: Generalized VIF values below 10 for all effective predictors

    In plain terms: a fiscal instrument can be predicted with high accuracy from a combination of fiscal and monetary instruments. If these tools were truly independent, this would be impossible. The model’s strong performance is the mathematical proof that the independence assumption does not hold.

    What Does History Say?

    The econometric findings do not exist in a vacuum. The study enriches its statistical conclusions with historical evidence from American economic policy, and the alignment is remarkable.

    Consider the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), launched during the 2008 financial crisis. As former Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Alan Blinder has written, TARP “was not about cutting taxes, spending money, or lowering interest rates.” It was not purely fiscal policy, nor was it purely monetary policy. It was a hybrid—designed jointly by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, using taxpayer money to purchase potentially depreciating financial assets. It was, in Blinder’s words, “financial stability policy, something the U.S. government had not needed since the Great Depression.”

    “TARP was not about cutting taxes, spending money, or lowering interest rates. Instead, it was about putting taxpayer money at risk by purchasing assets that could decline in value. The program was also jointly designed by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve.”

    — Alan S. Blinder, A Monetary and Fiscal History of the United States, 1961–2021 (2022)

    The same pattern recurred with the bank stress tests announced in February 2009—again a joint product of the Treasury and the Fed, again neither purely fiscal nor purely monetary. And it happened once more in 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic demanded unprecedented coordination between fiscal stimulus checks and the Fed’s asset purchases. Each crisis forced policymakers to blur the lines between fiscal and monetary tools, confirming at the practical level what the data confirm statistically.

    So Which Side Dominates?

    One of the study’s more intriguing findings is a pattern of fiscal dominance. In five out of eight significant instrument pairings, the fiscal instrument is the “dominant” variable—meaning it serves as the predictor rather than the predicted. Federal government spending (GCGF) in particular emerges as a highly dominant instrument, while federal policy lending (GACL) is predominantly the variable being explained.

    However, this is not a clean sweep for fiscal policy. In two cases, monetary instruments dominate fiscal ones, and in one case the direction depends on whether the relationship is modeled linearly or quadratically. The overall picture is one of asymmetric but bidirectional interdependence—fiscal instruments tend to drive the relationship, but monetary instruments are far from passive.

    Why This Matters Beyond the Ivory Tower

    If you are not an economist, you might wonder why the independence of policy instruments matters. The answer is practical and consequential.

    Central bank independence—the idea that monetary authorities should operate free from political pressure—is one of the most widely advocated institutional designs of the past four decades. But this advocacy typically focuses on independence from electoral cycles: the Fed should not cut interest rates simply because an election is approaching. The study’s findings do not challenge that kind of independence. What they challenge is a different, more technical assumption: that the tools themselves operate in separate silos.

    The study concludes that fiscal and monetary authorities in the U.S. are not independent in their instruments—the Treasury’s spending decisions and the Fed’s rate decisions are statistically entangled. This does not mean that central bank independence from political cycles is undesirable or unviable. Quite the opposite: the author suggests that if fiscal and monetary instruments are this deeply intertwined, both fiscal and monetary authorities should perhaps enjoy independence from electoral pressures, not just the central bank.

    Moreover, the finding that fiscal instruments tend to dominate has a subtle but important implication: in complex economic scenarios—financial crises, pandemics, supply shocks—monetary policy alone may be insufficient. The historical record confirms this. The U.S. recovery from the 2008 crisis, which “eventually broke all longevity records,” was driven not by monetary easing alone but by an unprecedented combination of fiscal stimulus and monetary accommodation working in concert.

    Limitations and Open Questions

    The author is admirably transparent about what the study does and does not accomplish:

    1. The analysis is specific to the United States and to the 1960–2022 period. Whether the same patterns hold in other economies remains an open question.
    2. The study examines instrument-to-instrument relationships but does not directly model how these instruments jointly affect policy goals like growth, employment, and price stability—though the author recommends this as a natural next step.
    3. The model presented is robust but not necessarily the best possible model. The goal was to test the independence assumption, not to optimize predictive power, and for that purpose the model is more than adequate.
    4. The strong coordination between U.S. fiscal and monetary authorities may partly explain the findings, but the author argues that the underlying economic dynamics themselves also contribute—the variables are intertwined not just because policymakers coordinate, but because the real economy forces them to.

    The Bottom Line

    For over seven decades, mainstream economic theory has assumed that fiscal and monetary policy instruments are independent of each other. This assumption underpins the Tinbergen Rule, shapes how economic models are built, and influences how central banks are designed. The study by Gómez Julián applies modern Bayesian econometrics to 60 years of American data and finds, with considerable statistical rigor, that this assumption does not hold.

    The instruments of U.S. economic policy are deeply interdependent—in linear ways, in curved ways, and in historically documented, crisis-tested ways. A fiscal instrument can be predicted with over 90% accuracy from a combination of other fiscal and monetary instruments. The Tinbergen Rule’s condition of independent instruments is not just violated; it is violated comprehensively.

    This does not invalidate the Tinbergen framework entirely, but it does suggest that a new paradigm is needed—one that starts from the reality of interdependence rather than the ideal of independence. The economic instruments of the world’s largest economy do not work in isolation. Perhaps it is time our theories stopped assuming they do.

    · · ·

    Reference: Gómez Julián, J. M. (2023). “Análisis econométrico de las relaciones entre los instrumentos de política económica en Estados Unidos.” Revista Cubana de Economía Internacional, 10(2), 72–97. Available at: revistas.uh.cu

    This post is an accessible summary of the original peer-reviewed research article. All quantitative claims and methodological details are drawn directly from the published paper. The interpretations offered here aim to make the findings approachable for a broad audience without distorting the author’s conclusions. Readers seeking the full technical treatment are encouraged to consult the original article.

  • ON THE IMMANENT DIALECTIC IN THE COMMODITY METAMORPHOSIS

    ON THE IMMANENT DIALECTIC IN THE COMMODITY METAMORPHOSIS

    The Hidden Logic Inside Every Price Tag — Reading Marx Through Hegel’s Syllogisms
    Political Economy × Philosophy

    The Hidden Logic Inside Every Price Tag

    How Hegel’s syllogisms reveal the contradictions Marx saw in every commodity — and why those contradictions still matter for understanding capitalism’s future.

    Every time you buy a cup of coffee, two completely different things happen at once. The coffee satisfies a need — warmth, caffeine, pleasure. But it also embodies a social relationship: someone grew the beans, someone roasted them, someone set a price. That double life of every commodity is what Marx called the contradiction between use value and exchange value. An economist recently set out to show that this contradiction follows an exact logical structure — one that Marx sketched but never fully completed.

    Why This Paper Exists

    Karl Marx built his critique of political economy on the logical scaffolding of the German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel. This is not a minor footnote: Hegel’s dialectical logic — the idea that concepts develop through contradiction, moving from thesis to antithesis to synthesis — is the engine room of Capital. Marx famously said he turned Hegel “right side up,” replacing idealism with materialism. But he kept the machinery.

    The problem, as Gómez Julián points out, is that Marx never finished the philosophical job. He used Hegel’s logic to analyze commodities, money, and prices, but he never fully explained how the internal contradictions of the commodity resolve themselves at the level of pure logic. He identified the cycle M–D–M (commodity–money–commodity) and even mapped it onto Hegel’s qualitative syllogism. But then he stopped the philosophical analysis and moved on to economics. This paper tries to pick up where Marx left off.

    “The contradiction between use value and exchange value is one of the most fundamental discoveries of Marxian Economics, a principle without which all the conclusions of the theory of value and money remain dead.”
    — Roman Rosdolsky, cited in the article

    Three Words You Need: Use Value, Exchange Value, Money

    Before going further, let’s make sure the key terms are crystal clear — no economics degree required.

    • Use value is what a thing is good for. A coat keeps you warm. Bread feeds you. This is qualitative — it answers the question “what does it do?”
    • Exchange value is what a thing can be traded for. The coat might be worth three loaves of bread, or $80. This is quantitative — it answers the question “how much is it worth?”
    • Money is the universal translator. It lets every commodity express its exchange value in one common language (dollars, euros, colones). But money also separates buying from selling, creating new contradictions.

    The central tension is this: a commodity is both a useful object and a bearer of abstract social value. These two identities don’t sit comfortably together. The article’s claim is that this tension follows a precise logical structure that Hegel’s system can decode.

    Hegel’s Toolkit: Concept, Judgment, Syllogism

    Hegel’s Science of Logic develops in three stages that mirror how we think. Gómez Julián draws on all three:

    The Concept (Begriff) has three “moments”: universality (what something shares with everything in its class), particularity (what distinguishes it within that class), and singularity (the concrete, individual thing that unites both). Think of it this way: “fruit” is universal; “citrus” is particular; “this orange in my hand” is singular.

    The Judgment (Urteil) is what happens when those moments are set against each other — when we say something is this but also is not that. It’s the moment of contradiction.

    The Syllogism (Schluss) is the resolution. It’s the logical form in which the contradiction finds its movement — not by disappearing, but by developing into something richer. A syllogism has a major term (universal), a minor term (particular), and a middle term (singular) that mediates between them.

    Everyday Analogy Imagine a job market. Workers (particular individuals) want wages (universal standard). The job interview is the singular mediation — the concrete encounter where “this worker” meets “the market price for labor.” The contradiction between what a worker needs and what the market offers doesn’t vanish; it plays out in the negotiation. Hegel’s syllogism captures the logical skeleton of exactly this kind of process.

    Syllogism No. 1 — The Act of Buying and Selling

    The first syllogism Gómez Julián develops is what Hegel calls the syllogism of reflection in its exclusive form. It addresses the most basic question: how can a commodity and money — two fundamentally different things — be exchanged at all?

    Consider the act of selling (M → D). The seller has a particular commodity — say, a specific handmade chair. Money plays the role of the universal: it’s the general equivalent against which all commodities measure themselves. What bridges the two? The social nexus — the web of production relations, market norms, and shared conventions that make exchange possible in the first place.

    In the act of buying (D → M), the logic mirrors itself: money (now universal) is exchanged for a particular commodity, again mediated by the social nexus. The syllogism looks like this:

    Selling: M → D Particular (commodity) — Singular (social nexus) — Universal (money)

    Buying: D → M Universal (money) — Singular (social nexus) — Particular (commodity)

    The key insight is that the social nexus is not an add-on — it is the logical middle term. Without it, the contradiction between a chair and a stack of bills would be irreducible. Marx himself recognized this when he wrote that “a relation of social production appears as something existing outside individuals.” The chair doesn’t inherently “know” it’s worth $200. That knowledge is embedded in social practice.

    Syllogism No. 2 — Price vs. Value

    The second syllogism tackles a subtler problem. Even after an exchange happens, there’s a gap: the price of a commodity almost never equals its value (the socially necessary labor time embedded in it). Prices fluctuate with supply, demand, speculation, season, mood. Marx acknowledged this explicitly:

    “The price-form … allows for the possibility of a quantitative incongruity between price and the magnitude of value — that is, a deviation of the former from the latter.”

    Gómez Julián uses Hegel’s syllogism of analogy to model this. In this syllogism, the middle term is a singularity taken in its essential universality — a particular thing considered not just as itself but as representative of its genus. Here’s how it maps:

    Price–Value Relation: S — U — P Singular: exchange value (the real labor time, which never appears directly on the market — it enters the “capricious volatility of competition”)
    Universal: price (the monetary expression, which carries value inside it but also differs from it — “value in-itself and also value distinct from itself”)
    Particular: exchange value over the long run (the average around which supply and demand oscillate)

    The punchline is elegant: price and value are never identical at a single point in time, but value is always the gravitational center around which prices orbit. This is not a failure of the system — it’s the way the contradiction moves. As Marx wrote, echoing Hegel: identity here is “the identity of negation.”

    Think of It Like This A stock’s price on any given day can be wildly off from its “intrinsic value” (however you measure it). But over time, market forces push the price back toward something like fair value. The deviation is not noise — it’s how the market processes information. Gómez Julián is arguing that this pattern is not just an empirical regularity but a logical necessity embedded in the structure of commodities.

    Syllogism No. 3 — The Big One Marx Identified But Didn’t Complete

    Marx himself noticed that the cycle M–D–M (commodity–money–commodity) can be mapped onto Hegel’s qualitative syllogism P–U–S (particular–universal–singular). The two M’s in the cycle play different roles:

    The first M is particular — it’s a specific commodity I own and want to get rid of (say, the chair I made). The D (money) is universal — it can buy anything. The second M is singular — it’s the concrete commodity I actually need (say, groceries). The money mediates, translating my particular surplus into the particular thing I lack.

    But here’s where the article makes its most original contribution. Marx only named the syllogism and stopped. Gómez Julián argues that the full Hegelian development reveals something Marx left implicit: the commodity embodies both social labor (exchange value) and private labor (use value). Money — as the “universal equivalent” — is the form in which these two kinds of labor temporarily reconcile. But reconciliation is not resolution. The contradiction persists and drives the system forward.

    “The development of the commodity does not suppress this contradiction: rather, it creates the forms in which it can move.”
    — Marx, cited in the article

    Marx compared this to planetary motion: a body is constantly falling toward the sun and constantly being flung away. The orbit is not a resolution of gravity vs. inertia — it is the contradiction in motion. Commodity circulation works the same way.

    From Logic to Collapse: The Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall

    The paper doesn’t stop at philosophy. It follows the thread all the way to what Marx considered the long-run fate of capitalism: the tendency of the average rate of profit to fall.

    The logic runs as follows. The average rate of profit is the weighted average of profit rates across all sectors of the economy:

    Average Rate of Profit g'M = Σ wᵢ · g'ᵢ

    where g'M = average profit rate, wᵢ = weight of sector i‘s capital in total social capital, g'ᵢ = profit rate in sector i.

    As capitalism develops, technological innovation replaces living labor (variable capital) with machinery and materials (constant capital). This raises productivity — each worker produces more. But it also means each commodity contains less total labor time and therefore less surplus labor time (the source of profit). Even though the proportion of surplus time within each commodity may rise (higher exploitation rate), the absolute mass of surplus per unit falls.

    To compensate, capitalists must produce at exponentially larger scales — what Marx called the “faux frais” (overhead costs) of production and circulation. Meanwhile, technological unemployment grows, wages are pressured downward, and social tensions mount. The article presents this as the logical terminus of the contradictions embedded in the commodity itself.

    For Non-Economists Imagine a bakery that replaces bakers with machines. Each loaf now costs less labor to make, so the profit per loaf shrinks. The bakery compensates by selling far more loaves — and by cutting the remaining workers’ wages. Scale this across the whole economy, and you get Marx’s picture: profits per unit fall, production must explode, workers are squeezed, and the system becomes increasingly fragile. That’s the “falling rate of profit” thesis.

    Why Does This Matter?

    You don’t have to agree with Marx’s conclusions to appreciate what this paper accomplishes. It demonstrates three things:

    • Hegel’s logic is not decorative. The syllogistic structures are not metaphors — they are the formal architecture that makes Marx’s economic categories cohere. Ignoring them leaves Capital half-read.
    • Contradictions are not bugs — they’re features. The gap between use value and exchange value, between price and value, between private labor and social labor, is not a flaw in capitalism. It’s the mechanism that keeps it moving. Understanding this changes how you think about crises: they’re not accidents but structural expressions of unresolved logical tensions.
    • The long-run trajectory matters. Whether or not capitalism “collapses” in the dramatic sense Marx envisioned, the falling-rate-of-profit framework offers a structural explanation for secular stagnation, financialization, and the persistent pressure to expand into new markets — themes that remain urgently relevant.
    · · ·

    At its heart, Gómez Julián’s paper is an invitation to read Marx the way Marx read Hegel — not as a collection of slogans, but as a living logical system where every economic category carries a philosophical skeleton inside it. The commodity is not just a thing with a price. It is a logical knot tying together private desire, social labor, monetary abstraction, and historical trajectory. Untying that knot — or at least seeing its shape — is the first step toward understanding why economies work the way they do, and why they sometimes don’t.

    Original article: Gómez Julián, J. M. (2017). “Sobre la dialéctica inmanente en la metamorfosis mercantil.” Revista de Filosofía, Universidad de Costa Rica, 56(145), 45–53. ISSN 0034-8252.

    About the original author: José Mauricio Gómez Julián holds a B.A. in Economics from Universidad Latina de Costa Rica. The paper was received in April 2016 and approved in June 2016.

    This blog post is an explanatory summary, not a peer review. For the full mathematical derivations and primary-source quotations, consult the original article.

  • HOW TO CONDUCT ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE PRESENCE OF A FIXED CAPITAL SURPLUS OR DEFICIT WITHOUT RESORTING TO PAPER MONEY?

    HOW TO CONDUCT ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE PRESENCE OF A FIXED CAPITAL SURPLUS OR DEFICIT WITHOUT RESORTING TO PAPER MONEY?

    Can We Manage Fixed Capital Surpluses Without Money? — A Marxian Thought Experiment
    A Blog for the Curious Economist — and Everyone Else
    The Capital Question
    Marxian Political Economy Economic Policy 8 min read

    Can We Manage Fixed Capital Surpluses Without Money?

    An economist revisits a passage Marx left half-finished and asks: what if a post-capitalist society had to balance its machines, factories, and tools—without printing a single banknote?

    MG
    Based on the work of José Mauricio Gómez Julián
    Originally published • Revista Académica Contribuciones a la Economía • January 2016

    Most of us think of money as the universal lubricant of an economy—the thing that lets a shoe factory buy steel, and the steel mill pay its workers. But what happens when an economy decides it no longer needs money? Can it still keep its machines, buildings, and equipment in balance? That is the question José Mauricio Gómez Julián tackles in a compact, ambitious paper that draws directly on Karl Marx’s Capital, Volume II.

    Why Fixed Capital Matters

    Before diving in, let’s clarify what “fixed capital” means. In economics—especially in the Marxian tradition—a factory’s resources are split into two broad categories. Circulating capital is the stuff that gets used up quickly in production: raw materials, intermediate goods, energy. Fixed capital is the durable stuff—machinery, buildings, infrastructure—that transfers its value to the product gradually, over many production cycles, through wear and tear (what economists call “depreciation”).

    In any economy, these two types of capital need to exist in the right proportion. Too much fixed capital relative to circulating capital, and the machines sit idle for lack of materials. Too little, and the raw materials pile up with nothing to process them. Getting this ratio wrong creates either a surplus (overproduction of fixed capital) or a deficit (underproduction of fixed capital).

    The core insight is deceptively simple: even without money, an economy still needs a mechanism to absorb the shocks that come from uneven wear on its machines.

    The Two Scenarios: Surplus and Deficit

    Gómez Julián works through two thought experiments, both grounded in Marx’s two-sector model of reproduction (Sector I produces means of production—factories, machines; Sector II produces consumer goods). The logic is dense, but the intuition is elegant.

    1

    Scenario One

    Suppose the fixed capital used by the consumer-goods sector (Sector II) depreciates faster than expected in a given year. More machines need replacing now. Sector I sends more fixed-capital goods to Sector II, but its overall output for Sector II remains the same. The result: Sector I now produces more fixed capital than Sector II can absorb, while simultaneously Sector II needs less circulating capital (raw materials) because it is replacing machines rather than running them.

    Outcome → SURPLUS in fixed capital production
    2

    Scenario Two

    Now imagine the opposite: a smaller portion of Sector II’s fixed capital needs to be physically replaced this year (because less has worn out completely). That means less demand for new fixed-capital goods from Sector I. Meanwhile, the circulating capital flows remain unchanged. Sector I simply produces fewer fixed-capital items.

    Outcome → DEFICIT in fixed capital production

    In a capitalist economy, these imbalances ripple outward. The surplus scenario pushes more money into Sector I (as depreciation funds accumulate), but the actual exchange of goods shrinks. Money becomes a one-sided “means of purchase” rather than a smooth intermediary. In the deficit scenario, production contracts. Both situations, if left unmanaged, can trigger commercial crises—and in capitalism, those crises are cyclical, not one-off events.

    The Money Question

    Here is where the paper gets provocative. In a capitalist system, managing these imbalances requires monetary policy—central banks adjusting interest rates, governments running deficits, currencies being devalued. The entire toolkit of modern macroeconomics is, in one way or another, about using money to smooth out the frictions between production and exchange.

    But Gómez Julián asks: what if you remove money from the equation entirely? What if a post-capitalist society—one that has moved beyond the commodity form—tries to manage fixed capital imbalances without any monetary instrument at all?

    His answer is a policy of continuous relative overproduction: produce slightly more fixed capital and slightly more circulating capital than strictly necessary, and accumulate the excess as a strategic reserve.

    The logic works like this. If fixed capital wears out unevenly from year to year (sometimes more, sometimes less), a well-organized post-capitalist economy could buffer those fluctuations by maintaining reserve stocks of both fixed-capital goods and circulating-capital goods. When a year of heavy depreciation hits, the reserve steps in. When a year of light depreciation comes, the reserve grows. The goal is not maximum efficiency at every moment, but stability over time—a kind of industrial shock absorber.

    Why This Is Harder Than It Sounds

    The author is careful to note that this approach would be catastrophic in a capitalist economy. Continuous relative overproduction, without the discipline of a planned system, would generate commercial crises—overproduction in capitalism is not a “reserve strategy” but a trigger for collapse. The same policy looks entirely different depending on whether production is coordinated through market exchange or through conscious social planning.

    This is the key theoretical distinction: in a planned economy, overproduction is relative (producing more than immediate need, but deliberately) and continuous (a permanent buffer). In capitalism, overproduction is absolute (goods that cannot find buyers) and cyclical (recurring crises). Same material fact, radically different systemic consequences.

    A Critique the Author Couldn’t Ignore

    The paper ends with a sharp jab at Soviet Marxist economics. Gómez Julián points out that the standard Soviet reference text—the Dictionary of Marxist Political Economy by Borisov, Zhamin, and Makárova (1965)—never develops, or even mentions, this particular theoretical problem. The analysis is absent from the entries on “Fixed Capital,” “Simple Reproduction,” and “Extended Reproduction.” Marx himself only sketched it in embryonic form (Volume II, pp. 414–417), yet the author argues it is a “vital” issue for any theory of post-capitalist construction.

    His verdict on Soviet scholarship is unsparing: the Soviet economists, he suggests, never truly understood many of the theoretical foundations they claimed to be building on—a failure that history confirmed on November 9, 1989.

    • • •

    Why This Paper Deserves Your Attention

    You do not have to be a Marxist to find this paper interesting. At its heart, it is about a problem that any complex economy faces: how do you keep the right balance between durable infrastructure and the materials that flow through it? Modern economies answer this with monetary policy, fiscal stimulus, and market signals. Gómez Julián asks whether a fundamentally different kind of society could answer it with strategic reserves and conscious planning instead.

    Whether or not you find his vision persuasive, the thought experiment sharpens something important: our reliance on money as an economic management tool is not a law of nature—it is a feature of a particular system. And understanding why that system needs money is the first step toward imagining alternatives, or toward improving what we already have.

    This post is a summary and interpretation of the original research article. For the full theoretical development, including Marx’s formal apparatus, readers are encouraged to consult the paper directly: Gómez Julián, J. M. (2016), “¿Cómo Realizar Política Económica ante Superávit o Déficit de Capital Fijo sin Recurrir al Papel Moneda?”, Contribuciones a la Economía, ISSN 1696-8360.
    Original Article Gómez Julián, José Mauricio. “¿Cómo Realizar Política Económica ante Superávit o Déficit de Capital Fijo sin Recurrir al Papel Moneda?” Contribuciones a la Economía, January 2016, ISSN 1696-8360.
    Read the full paper here: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=9041512

    The Capital Question — Explaining the economics that shape our world, one paper at a time.

  • ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE VS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL COMPARISON

    ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE VS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL COMPARISON

    Trade Theory · Econometrics · Policy

    What If David Ricardo Was Wrong?
    A New Econometric Challenge to Comparative Advantage

    Based on: Gómez Julián, J. M. (2025). “Teorías del comercio internacional versus resultados de los tratados comerciales.” Revista Cubana de Economía Internacional, 12(1), 36–57. Read the original paper (Spanish)

    Most people who have taken an introductory economics course have encountered a deceptively simple idea: countries should specialise in what they do relatively best, even if another country is better at producing everything. This is the doctrine of comparative advantage, largely attributed to David Ricardo’s early-nineteenth-century work on trade between England and Portugal. It has become one of the most cited justifications for free trade and for the architecture of modern trade agreements.

    A 2025 paper by Juan Manuel Gómez Julián, published in the Revista Cubana de Economía Internacional, asks a provocative question: does the actual data from trade agreements support comparative advantage — or does it point back to the older, simpler idea of absolute advantage? His answer, reached through a combination of historical analysis, mathematical reasoning, and modern econometric modelling, is likely to unsettle a good deal of conventional trade-policy thinking.

    The Two Competing Ideas, in Plain Language

    Before diving into the paper’s contribution, it helps to be absolutely clear about what is at stake. Imagine two countries:

    • Country A can produce both wheat and steel more efficiently (faster, cheaper, with fewer resources) than Country B.
    • Country B is less efficient at producing both goods.

    Absolute advantage (Adam Smith, 1776) says: Country A is simply better at both. Country B has no obvious reason to compete head-to-head, and trade between them will be shaped by the sheer gap in productive capability.

    Comparative advantage (David Ricardo, 1817) says: hold on — even though Country A is better at both, it is proportionally better at steel than at wheat. Country B, while worse at everything, is relatively less terrible at wheat. So if Country A focuses on steel and Country B focuses on wheat, and they trade, both end up better off. Absolute superiority does not matter; what matters is the ratio of efficiencies within each country.

    This idea is elegant. It is also, as Gómez Julián argues, surprisingly fragile when tested against real-world data.

    What the Paper Actually Does

    Gómez Julián approaches the question from three complementary angles, which gives the paper unusual methodological breadth.

    1. Mathematical Generalisation

    First, he examines how well each theory holds up when you push it mathematically — that is, when you ask whether the logic remains sound under more general and realistic assumptions than the original two-country, two-good textbook models. Comparative advantage, he finds, depends on a narrow set of assumptions (identical technologies in certain respects, constant costs, no transport costs, full employment) that tend to collapse when the model is made more realistic. Absolute advantage, by contrast, remains coherent under a wider range of conditions.

    2. Historical Context

    Second, the paper traces the intellectual history. Ricardo developed comparative advantage in a world where the nature of production was fundamentally different from today’s globalised, technology-intensive economy. The author argues that the theory was a product of its time — useful as a thought experiment, but not a reliable guide for modern trade policy, especially when the technological gap between trading partners is vast.

    3. Econometric Evidence

    This is where the paper makes its most distinctive contribution. Gómez Julián uses two families of statistical models to test which theory better explains the actual outcomes of trade agreements:

    • Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models — large-scale simulation models that attempt to represent the entire economy, sector by sector, and then simulate what happens when a trade agreement changes tariffs, quotas, or market access. These are widely used by institutions like the World Bank and the WTO.
    • Objective Bayesian Generalised Linear Models (GLMs) — a modern statistical approach that uses Bayesian inference (updating beliefs with data) with minimal subjective assumptions (“objective” priors). This allows the researcher to let the data speak more freely, without imposing strong preconceptions about what the answer “should” be.

    The combined results point in the same direction: trade outcomes between countries with significant technological asymmetries are better explained by absolute advantage than by comparative advantage.

    What Does This Mean in Practice?

    The practical implications are significant, and they run against the grain of mainstream trade-policy advice for the past several decades.

    If comparative advantage is the correct lens, then free trade between any two countries — rich or poor, technologically advanced or not — is mutually beneficial almost by definition. The policy prescription is straightforward: liberalise, sign agreements, reduce barriers.

    But if absolute advantage is the better model, then the structure of the agreement matters enormously. A trade deal between a highly industrialised country and a predominantly agricultural one is not inherently win-win. It may lock the less-developed country into low-value-added exports while flooding its markets with manufactured goods that undercut local industry. The technological and wage asymmetries between the signatories become the central concern, not an afterthought.

    In other words, Gómez Julián’s findings suggest that trade agreements should be designed with deliberate attention to the power imbalances and productive capacities of the parties involved — not simply signed on the assumption that any trade is good trade.

    Why This Matters Beyond Economics

    If you are a political scientist, a policy analyst, or simply someone who follows geopolitics, this debate is far from academic. Trade agreements are among the most consequential instruments of foreign policy and domestic economic strategy. They shape industrial policy, labour markets, migration patterns, and even geopolitical alliances.

    The question of whether a trade deal is “fair” or “beneficial” depends on which economic theory you use to evaluate it. If the dominant theory is wrong — or at least incomplete — then decades of trade policy advice may have systematically underestimated the risks of liberalisation between unequal partners.

    This does not mean protectionism is the answer. But it does mean that the terms of engagement matter. A trade agreement that accounts for technological gaps, includes provisions for technology transfer, and builds in adjustment mechanisms is a very different instrument from one that simply eliminates tariffs between unequal economies and calls it a day.

    Reference: Gómez Julián, J. M. (2025). Teorías del comercio internacional versus resultados de los tratados comerciales: ¿ventaja absoluta o comparativa? Revista Cubana de Economía Internacional, 12(1), 36–57. https://revistas.uh.cu/rcei/article/view/11142

  • Inflation Is (Not) Always And Everywhere A Monetary Phenomenon

    Inflation Is (Not) Always And Everywhere A Monetary Phenomenon

    Beyond the Phillips Curve — A Marxist Reinterpretation of Inflation
    Political Economy July 2025 · 8 min read

    Beyond the Phillips Curve

    A new study argues that inflation isn’t just about too much money chasing too few goods — it’s about how the capitalist class converts technological advantage into permanent profit.

    Most of us were taught a tidy story: when unemployment falls, inflation rises, and vice versa. This trade-off — called the Phillips Curve — has anchored central bank policy for decades. But what if that story is not just incomplete, but fundamentally misleading?

    A recent paper published in Realidad Económica by José Mauricio Gómez Julián argues exactly that. Using over fifty years of U.S. data (1968–2021), the study finds no significant long-run relationship between inflation and unemployment. Instead, it identifies a surprising positive link between technological change and inflation — and uses that finding to build a Marxist reinterpretation of what inflation actually does inside a capitalist economy.

    It’s a paper that challenges both mainstream economics and the popular imagination. Let me walk you through it.

    The Phillips Curve: A Love Story with Complications

    In 1958, New Zealand economist A.W. Phillips noticed an elegant regularity in British data: wages tended to rise faster when unemployment was low. Later economists generalized this into a policy menu: want less unemployment? Accept a bit more inflation. Want to tame prices? Brace for a recession.

    This trade-off became gospel in the 1960s. Central bankers thought they could fine-tune the economy like a thermostat — dial inflation up or down by adjusting demand. But the 1970s shattered that confidence. The U.S. experienced stagflation: high inflation and high unemployment at the same time, something the Phillips Curve said shouldn’t happen.

    Since then, economists have debated whether the Phillips Curve is dead, dormant, or merely sleeping. Gómez Julián sides with a more radical verdict: the long-run Phillips Curve doesn’t just flatten — it was never there to begin with.

    What does “long run” mean here? Mainstream economists already accept that the long-run Phillips Curve is vertical (meaning no permanent trade-off). But Gómez Julián goes further: he finds that even in shorter cycles, the supposed inverse relationship is statistically fragile — easily dissolved once you account for other variables, especially technological change.

    The Data, the Tools, and What They Found

    The study uses three complementary statistical approaches — each chosen for a reason:

    Bayesian Correlations

    Unlike classical statistics, which gives you a yes-or-no answer (“significant at 5%”), Bayesian analysis lets you say something more nuanced: “Given the data, here is the probability that this relationship is positive, negative, or nonexistent.” Applied to U.S. inflation and unemployment, the Bayesian results show no consistent inverse relationship. The data simply doesn’t support the Phillips Curve story with any confidence.

    Granger Causality

    This is a standard econometric test that asks: does knowing today’s unemployment help you predict tomorrow’s inflation (or vice versa)? If the Phillips Curve were real, the answer should be yes. Gómez Julián finds that the answer is generally no. Unemployment does not Granger-cause inflation in the U.S. data. What does show predictive power? Research and development spending.

    Error Correction Models (ECM)

    These models examine whether variables that drift apart over time eventually pull back together — like two dancers who briefly separate but remain on the same floor. The ECM results confirm that inflation and unemployment do not share a stable long-run equilibrium. They are, statistically speaking, dancing to different music.

    · · ·

    The Surprising Link: Technology Drives Inflation

    Here is the paper’s most provocative finding: R&D expenditure and inflation move together positively. When firms invest more in technology, inflation tends to rise — not fall, as you might expect from a productivity-enhancement standpoint.

    Why would better technology lead to higher prices? To answer this, Gómez Julián turns to Marx — specifically, to the distinction between two types of surplus value.

    Capitalist innovates
    (new machinery, process)
    Extraordinary surplus value
    (temporary advantage)
    Rivals adopt technology
    Inflation absorbs the gap
    Relative surplus value
    (permanent for the class)
    Fig. 1 — The mechanism proposed by Gómez Julián, simplified.

    Two Kinds of Surplus Value: A Quick Primer

    If you’re not steeped in Marxist theory, don’t worry — the distinction is intuitive.

    Absolute surplus value is what a capitalist gets by making workers work longer or harder for the same pay. It’s the old-fashioned squeeze. Relative surplus value, by contrast, comes from making production cheaper — through technology, efficiency, better organization — so that the value of labor-power (i.e., the cost of maintaining a worker) falls, even if wages don’t.

    Now imagine a single firm introduces a breakthrough technology. It can produce goods faster and cheaper than its competitors. For a while, it earns extraordinary surplus value — a premium profit that exists only because it’s ahead of the pack. But here’s the catch: once competitors adopt the same technology, that advantage vanishes. The extraordinary surplus value disappears.

    Gómez Julián’s argument is that inflation is the mechanism through which this temporary advantage gets converted into a permanent one. How? As the innovating firm’s higher productivity drives down unit costs, prices don’t fall proportionally — instead, the general price level adjusts upward. The gap between the old cost structure and the new one gets absorbed by inflation. What was a one-time windfall for the innovator becomes a structural shift in profitability for the entire capitalist class.

    Inflation, in this reading, is not a policy error or a monetary accident. It is a functional mechanism of capitalist accumulation — one that converts technological advantage into lasting class-wide profit.

    What This Means for Policy

    If the paper is right, the implications are significant:

    For central bankers: If inflation isn’t primarily a monetary phenomenon — if it’s rooted in the structural dynamics of production and profit — then raising interest rates to fight inflation is treating the symptom, not the disease. You might cool the economy, but you’re not addressing the engine that generates inflation in the first place.

    For mainstream economists: The Phillips Curve may be less a stable empirical law and more a historical coincidence — a relationship that appeared to hold in a particular postwar context and has been propped up by theoretical convenience ever since. The paper adds to a growing body of evidence that the curve has become unreliable as a guide to policy.

    For non-economists: This paper reframes inflation as a political question, not just a technical one. If inflation systematically benefits capital at the expense of labor — by preserving the gains of innovation for the capitalist class while workers’ purchasing power erodes — then debates about inflation are, at their core, debates about distribution and power.

    A note of caution The paper uses R&D spending as a proxy for technological change. This is standard in the literature, but it’s not a direct measure of innovation. R&D spending can reflect many things — tax incentives, defense contracts, speculative bubbles in tech. The correlation Gómez Julián finds is suggestive and theoretically grounded, but it warrants further investigation with additional proxies and across different economies.
    · · ·

    A Challenge to Orthodoxy

    What makes this paper worth reading — whether you agree with it or not — is that it does something many economists avoid: it takes a heterodox theoretical framework seriously and tests it empirically. This isn’t armchair Marxism. It’s Bayesian statistics, Granger causality, and error correction models applied to five decades of data. The methodology is conventional; the interpretation is not.

    The mainstream view treats inflation as essentially a monetary phenomenon — too much money, not enough stuff. Milton Friedman’s famous dictum that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon” still echoes through central banks worldwide. Gómez Julián doesn’t deny that money supply matters. But he argues it’s not the whole story — and may not even be the most important part.

    In his framework, the relationship between technology, surplus value, and prices is structural. It doesn’t depend on whether a central bank is dovish or hawkish. It’s embedded in the logic of capitalist production itself.

    So, Is the Phillips Curve Dead?

    Probably not entirely. There are short-run contexts where demand pressures do push prices up, and the Phillips Curve captures something real about those moments. But the paper pushes us to ask harder questions: What determines the baseline around which those fluctuations occur? Why has inflation behaved the way it has over half a century, regardless of the unemployment rate?

    Gómez Julián offers a provocative answer: inflation is the economy’s way of metabolizing technological progress into profit. It’s not a bug in the system. It’s a feature.

    Whether you find that convincing depends, in part, on your theoretical priors. But the data doesn’t lie about what it doesn’t show: a reliable Phillips Curve. And that, at minimum, should give everyone — mainstream, heterodox, and curious layperson alike — something to think about.

  • Unearthing the Truth: Genetics, Archaeology, and the Palestinian Descent from Ancient Judeans

    Unearthing the Truth: Genetics, Archaeology, and the Palestinian Descent from Ancient Judeans

    Unearthing the Truth: Genetics, Archaeology, and the Palestinian Descent from Ancient Judeans

    A deep dive into José Mauricio Gómez Julián’s recent monograph challenging the biblical exile narrative through the lens of modern science and critical historiography.
    At the intersection of history, genetics, and modern geopolitics lies a question that profoundly unsettles established narratives: Who are the true descendants of the ancient Judeans?

    In a groundbreaking recent monograph, researcher José Mauricio Gómez Julián tackles this question head-on. His paper, “The Ancient Judeans of Judea as Direct Ancestors of Contemporary Palestinians,” synthesizes three decades of converging evidence from archaeology, paleogenomics, historiography, and linguistics. The conclusion he reaches is as scientifically robust as it is politically provocative: contemporary Palestinians are the direct demographic heirs of the ancient inhabitants of the southern Levant, while modern Jewish populations represent a broader mosaic shaped heavily by religious conversions and migrations.

    The Myth of the Roman Expulsion

    The foundation of the Zionist “return” narrative rests on a specific historical claim: that the Roman Empire expelled the Jewish people en masse from Judea following the revolts of 70 CE and 135 CE, leaving the land empty for two millennia.

    However, Gómez Julián points out that modern historiography—including the work of Israeli historians like Seth Schwartz, Martin Goodman, and Shlomo Sand—has thoroughly dismantled this myth. Following the revolts, the Romans destroyed Jewish institutions (the Temple, the priesthood, and the Sanhedrin) and banned Jews from entering Jerusalem. Still, there is no historical or archaeological evidence of a mass deportation of the general population.

    The rural Judean population remained in situ (in place). Over the next millennium, these communities gradually converted to Christianity during the Byzantine period, and later to Islam following the Arab conquest. They changed their religion and their language, but they never left their soil. Astonishingly, early Zionists like David Ben-Gurion and Yitzhak Ben-Zvi explicitly acknowledged the Jewish ancestry of the Palestinian fellahin (peasants) in writings published between 1905 and 1929, before the political realities of the 1920s forced a strategic ideological shift.

    Archaeology: The Canaanite Roots of Israel

    To understand the population of ancient Judea, we must look at its origins. The traditional biblical narrative of an Exodus from Egypt and a military conquest of Canaan lacks archaeological support. Instead, the “minimalist school” of biblical archaeology—featuring scholars like Israel Finkelstein, Thomas L. Thompson, and William Dever—has established that the earliest Israelites were actually autochthonous Canaanites.

    Around 1200 BCE, approximately 250 small, unwalled villages emerged in the central highlands of Palestine. The pottery, architecture, and lack of destruction layers show continuous cultural evolution from the Late Bronze Age Canaanite substrate. The ancient Israelites did not invade from the outside; they emerged from within the local population.

    Science does not ground territorial rights, but when a fictitious genealogy is weaponized to dispossess a people with deeper roots, science has an obligation to speak.

    The Genetic Evidence: Whose DNA Matches the Land?

    Perhaps the most compelling section of Gómez Julián’s monograph relies on paleogenomics—the study of ancient DNA. If the biblical exile and return narrative were true, modern Jews would share the closest genetic profile with the ancient Levantine populations. The data, however, tells a different story.

    • Palestinians: Contemporary Palestinians possess between 81% and 87% ancestry derived from Bronze Age Levantine populations. They act as a direct genetic bridge to the ancient Canaanites and Judeans.
    • Ashkenazi Jews: Modern Ashkenazi Jews trace their ancestry to a severe genetic bottleneck of roughly 350 individuals about 600 to 800 years ago. Genetically, they are an admixed population, carrying about 40% to 55% European ancestry (primarily from Southern Europe/Italy), alongside their Middle Eastern component.
    • Y Chromosomes: Studies show that about 70% of Jewish Y chromosomes and 82% of Palestinian Y chromosomes belong to the same ancient Levantine gene pool. Both populations share a biological origin, but Palestinians retained a closer genetic continuity to the land because they remained there, while diaspora populations intermixed with Europeans.

    While the author notes with epistemic honesty that Mizrahi (Middle Eastern) Jews retain Levantine ancestry comparable to Palestinians, the overall genomic data refutes the idea that modern Ashkenazi Jews are the exclusive, pure-blooded heirs of ancient Judea.

    Language and Toponymy: The Archive of the Land

    Genetics tells only part of the story; language tells the rest. The linguistic trajectory of the southern Levant—Canaanite → Hebrew → Aramaic → Arabic—demonstrates language shifts without population replacement. Just as the Irish adopted English without being replaced by the English, the native Levantine population adopted Aramaic, and later Arabic, under successive empires.

    Furthermore, the toponymy (place names) of Palestine serves as an unbroken archive of continuity. Palestinian villages retained ancient Hebrew and Canaanite names for millennia. Beit Lahm (Bethlehem), Beisan (Beth-shean), and Bir as-Saba (Be’er Sheva) are not Arab impostures; they are the living pronunciations of the land’s ancient names by the people who never left it. Even Palestinian agricultural customs retained pre-Islamic terms, such as calling rain-dependent farmland ard ba’liyyeh (“land of Baal”), unknowingly invoking the ancient Canaanite storm deity.

    The Diaspora as a Mosaic of Conversions

    If the Romans didn’t expel millions of Jews, how did the Jewish diaspora spread across three continents? Gómez Julián argues that Judaism transformed from a geographic ethnicity into an expansive religion. In the mid-second century BCE, the Hasmonean dynasty began forcing conversions on neighboring Idumeans and Itureans.

    During the Greco-Roman period, Judaism was an active proselytizing religion. The Jewish population exploded from an estimated 150,000 in the 6th century BCE to between 4 and 8 million by the 1st century CE. This demographic explosion is mathematically impossible through natural birth alone. From the Himyarite kingdom in Yemen to the Berber tribes of North Africa, and later the Khazars and European populations, the diaspora was formed through a complex mosaic of voluntary and forced conversions.

    Conclusion: When Science Speaks to Power

    Scientific evidence cannot dictate political rights, nor should genetics determine who deserves human dignity and self-determination. However, as Gómez Julián concludes, when a fictitious genealogical narrative is weaponized to justify the dispossession, displacement, and systemic violence against a population that possesses a deeper genetic and historical continuity to the land, science has an obligation to speak.

    The convergence of archaeology, DNA, and linguistics tells a clear story: the Palestinians are not foreign Arab invaders. They are the descendants of the ancient Judeans who changed their faith and tongue over the centuries but never abandoned their homeland. Acknowledging this reality is not just an academic exercise; it is a prerequisite for any honest historical reckoning in the Middle East.

  • Marx, Adam Smith, and the Law of Large Numbers

    Marx, Adam Smith, and the Law of Large Numbers

    A new research uses probability theory — and sixty years of U.S. economic data — to test one of the most consequential (and most overlooked) assumptions in political economy.


    The Assumption Hiding in Plain Sight

    If you’ve ever read a Marxist analysis of how profits equalize across industries, you’ve probably encountered something called the average rate of profit. The idea is straightforward: competition between capitalists drives different rates of profit in different sectors toward a common, system-wide average. This is one of the pillars of Marx’s theory of value in Capital, Volume III.

    But there’s a quieter assumption underneath this one — so quiet that most discussions never mention it explicitly. To arrive at a uniform profit rate, Marx first assumes a uniform rate of surplus value across all productive sectors. In plainer terms: he assumes that the degree to which workers are exploited — the ratio of unpaid labor to paid labor — is roughly the same everywhere, whether you work in steel manufacturing, food processing, or textiles.

    Adam Smith proposed this idea before Marx. Smith argued that if one job were obviously more exploitative (in the sense of yielding far more unpaid surplus per dollar of wages paid), workers and capital would flow toward or away from it until the differences vanished. Marx adopted this observation and, as scholar Jonathan Cogliano notes, elevated it to “the status of a central economic law” within his framework.

    Yet the assumption has been challenged from multiple directions — Marxist and non-Marxist alike. Is it actually justified? Or is it a convenient simplification that distorts our understanding of how capitalism works?

    José Mauricio Gómez Julián, of the Universidad Latina de Costa Rica, decided to approach the question from an unexpected angle: probability theory. His paper, published in Ciencia Económica (2022), asks whether the mathematical law that would need to hold for this assumption to be valid actually does hold — and then checks the answer against six decades of real-world data from the United States.


    The Mathematical Backbone: The Law of Large Numbers

    If you’ve taken any statistics course, you’ve likely met the Law of Large Numbers (LLN). It tells us that as you observe more and more instances of something random — coin flips, dice rolls, stock returns — the average of those observations settles down toward the true expected value.

    There are two versions:

    • The Weak Law (WLLN): With enough observations, the sample average is probably close to the expected value.
    • The Strong Law (SLLN): With enough observations, the sample average is almost certainly equal to the expected value — a much stronger guarantee.

    Gómez Julián’s insight is this: if you think of each productive sector of the economy as a random variable representing that sector’s rate of surplus value, then the LLN tells you what happens to the average across sectors as the number of sectors grows large. In mathematical language:

    • Strong Law: The probability that the average surplus-value rate across sectors equals the global expected value, in the limit, is exactly 1.
    • Weak Law: The probability that the average deviates from the global expected value by more than any tiny amount shrinks to zero.

    If either version holds, you get the result Marx needs: across a sufficiently large number of sectors, the rates of surplus value converge to a common value — uniformity, or at least a powerful tendency toward it.


    The Catch: Independence and Identical Distributions

    Here’s where things get interesting — and where the classical LLN hits a wall.

    The textbook version of the LLN requires two conditions:

    1. Independence: The random variables (sectoral surplus-value rates) must be statistically independent of each other.
    2. Identical distribution: Each variable must follow the same probability distribution.

    Neither condition holds for the real economy. And Gómez Julián is admirably upfront about this. Sectors are deeply intertwined — the steel industry depends on mining, manufacturing depends on steel, services depend on consumer spending powered by manufacturing wages. The idea that one sector’s surplus-value rate has no relationship to another’s is economically unrealistic. Furthermore, different industries have different cost structures, different labor intensities, and different technologies. There is no reason their surplus-value rates should follow the same statistical distribution.

    So does this kill the argument? Not at all. In fact, it’s the most intellectually interesting part of the paper.


    Non-Classical Varieties: When the Rules Relax

    Over the past several decades, mathematicians and econometricians have developed non-classical versions of the LLN that weaken or entirely drop the independence and identical-distribution requirements. Gómez Julián surveys several of these:

    • Li, Rao, and Wang (1995) showed the LLN holds for random variables arranged on a lattice structure under certain conditions — a structure that, as it happens, economic data naturally exhibits.
    • Adler and Rosalsky (1987) proved the law for weighted sums of independent, identically distributed random variables belonging to a normalized sum, generalizing the classical case.
    • Chen and Sung (2016) extended those results further: the variables no longer need to be identically distributed. They only need to be “stochastically dominated” by a single random variable, with certain weighting conditions.
    • Sung (2011) showed that the strong law can hold even when variables are dependent on each other, provided their probability moments (roughly, their averages and variability) satisfy certain finiteness conditions.

    The crucial point: these results collectively tell us that the LLN’s convergence conclusion can survive even when the classical assumptions are substantially violated — which is exactly the situation with sectoral surplus-value rates.

    Gómez Julián argues that the economic dynamics described by Smith — workers and capital moving between sectors in response to unequal advantages — are precisely the kind of compensatory dependence mechanism that these non-classical versions accommodate. The variables aren’t independent, but their dependence is structured in a way that still drives convergence.


    What the Data Actually Shows

    The theoretical argument is compelling, but Gómez Julián doesn’t stop there. He turns to sixty years of U.S. data (1960–2020), sourced from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), to see what the empirical evidence says.

    He calculates sectoral surplus-value rates using macroeconomic data on gross operating surplus (representing surplus labor time) and employee compensation (representing necessary labor time), following a standard operationalization of Marx’s categories. After carefully determining which sectors qualify as “productive” in the Marxist sense — a nontrivial task, since the service sector includes activities with very different relationships to surplus-value production — he arrives at 36 productive sectors.

    Here’s what the statistical analysis found:

    Finding 1: No Identical Distributions

    A probability distribution fitting exercise (using the Bayesian Information Criterion) revealed that the 36 sectors’ surplus-value rates follow a patchwork of different distributions — Log-Normal, Cauchy, Uniform, Weibull, and Logistic — with none following a normal distribution. The identical-distribution requirement of the classical LLN is not met.

    Finding 2: No Statistical Independence

    A Pearson correlation analysis across all 630 possible sector pairs yielded a mean correlation of about 0.08 and a median of about 0.14. While these may look small, a deeper cut reveals that roughly 40% of sector pairs have correlations of 0.3 or above — a level that’s practically meaningful. The sectors are not independent. This makes intuitive sense: industries are connected through supply chains, labor markets, and shared macroeconomic conditions.

    Finding 3: Differences Tend Toward Zero

    This is the key finding. When Gómez Julián computed the differences between each sector’s surplus-value rate and the global average (both the mean and the median), he found that these differences exhibit a strong tendency toward reciprocal nullification — positive differences roughly cancel out negative ones. The sum of all differences relative to the global mean was essentially zero (on the order of 10⁻¹⁴). The mean of differences relative to the global median was 0.0012 — vanishingly small.

    Distributional fitting on these differences revealed they follow a Cauchy distribution (when measured against the global mean) or a uniform distribution (against the global median), with the medians of these distributions sitting very close to zero.

    In plain language: sectors deviate from the average in different directions, and those deviations largely cancel each other out.


    Why This Matters

    Gómez Julián’s paper makes two types of contributions that are worth distinguishing:

    For Marxist political economy: If the uniformity assumption holds — even approximately, even as a tendency rather than an iron law — then a large body of research on the long-run behavior of the average rate of profit, both within countries and across the global economy, is on sounder footing than critics have suggested. Researchers studying the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (or not) can continue to work without needing to explicitly model sector-by-sector differences in exploitation rates, at least for aggregate, long-run analyses.

    For probability theory and economics: The paper demonstrates a productive intersection between a specific question in political economy and the deep mathematics of convergence theorems. It shows that the non-classical LLN theorems aren’t just abstract curiosities — they have direct relevance to understanding real economic phenomena. The structured dependence between economic sectors isn’t a bug that invalidates the mathematical framework; it’s a feature that the right version of the framework already accounts for.


    A Few Honest Caveats — And Why They No Longer Apply

    The original 2022 paper was unusually transparent about its limitations, and that transparency is one of its strengths. Rather than forcing the data into inappropriate statistical procedures, it openly acknowledged where the available inferential tools broke down.

    At the time, three important caveats remained.

    First, formal hypothesis testing had to be abandoned.

    The reason was purely statistical rather than economic. Classical inferential procedures—Student’s t tests, Wilcoxon tests, and most conventional non-parametric alternatives—are built on assumptions that the data simply did not satisfy. Sectoral surplus-value rates are neither independent nor identically distributed. They are linked through supply chains, technological change, capital mobility, and macroeconomic shocks. Even bootstrap procedures could not fully solve the problem because ordinary resampling may weaken dependence between resamples while leaving the internal dependence structure fundamentally unchanged. Consequently, the 2022 paper relied primarily on descriptive statistics together with probability-theoretic arguments instead of formal significance testing.

    Second, the classification of productive sectors inevitably involved theoretical judgment.

    Although the paper carefully justified the inclusion and exclusion of economic activities using Marxian categories and modern national accounting, reasonable scholars could still debate where certain services belong within the circuit of capital.

    Third, the empirical evidence came exclusively from the United States.

    The descriptive regularities were remarkably strong, but demonstrating that the same convergence mechanism operates under different institutional settings naturally remained an empirical question.

    Those were genuine limitations in 2022.

    Today, however, the first—and arguably the most important—of them has largely been overcome.

    A much more comprehensive methodological paper (Gómez Julián, 2026; SSRN 5172185) develops an entirely new inferential framework specifically designed for exactly the type of data that made the original analysis difficult: dependent, heterogeneous, and unbalanced observations. Instead of trying to force classical statistical tests to work outside the assumptions under which they were derived, the newer paper constructs hypothesis testing from the ground up for this class of problems.

    The key innovation is recognizing that the convergence of sectoral surplus-value rates is fundamentally a law-of-large-numbers problem under dependence, not an independent-samples problem. The framework therefore combines three complementary asymptotic structures—triangular arrays (TAC), correlation-weighted sums (WSC), and mixingale processes (MPC)—which respectively model hierarchical dependence, contemporaneous intersectoral dependence, and temporal dependence. Rather than treating these as competing approaches, the paper proves conditions under which they become metrically equivalent and therefore support the same inferential conclusions.

    The inferential consequences are substantial.

    Instead of abandoning significance testing because dependence invalidates classical procedures, the new framework explicitly extends the Neyman-Pearson paradigm to dependent observations, derives dependence-aware confidence regions, establishes rigorous Type I error control under strong-mixing assumptions, and integrates Bayesian and frequentist inference into a single coherent architecture. Robust procedures—including fixed-b heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-robust inference, block bootstrap techniques that preserve dependence, adaptive conformal inference, composite and Whittle likelihoods, and hierarchical Bayesian estimation—serve as mutually reinforcing validation mechanisms rather than isolated alternatives.

    In other words, what had been acknowledged as a methodological limitation in the 2022 paper became the central research question of the later work.

    Rather than concluding that inference was impossible under dependence, the subsequent research asks a more fundamental question: what should hypothesis testing look like when dependence is the normal state of the data rather than an exception? The result is a unified inferential framework specifically intended for datasets that violate the assumptions of classical statistics—precisely the situation encountered with sectoral surplus-value rates.

    The other caveats remain, although they are considerably less problematic than before. The classification of productive sectors continues to depend on theoretical interpretation, because that issue belongs to political economy rather than statistics. Likewise, expanding the empirical analysis to additional countries remains a desirable avenue for future research. Yet the principal statistical objection—that no valid inferential procedure existed for dependent sectoral data—has now been directly addressed through a purpose-built mathematical framework.

    Looking back, the 2022 paper can therefore be read as identifying an important statistical obstacle, while the later work attempts to remove it. Together, the two papers form a coherent research program: first demonstrating that the convergence hypothesis is theoretically plausible and descriptively supported, and then developing the inferential machinery required to test that hypothesis rigorously without relying on unrealistic assumptions of independence or identical distributions.


    Gómez Julián, J.M. (2022). Sobre la validez del supuesto de uniformidad en las tasas de plusvalía sectorial desde la teoría de las probabilidades. Ciencia Económica, 11(17). DOI: 10.22201/fe.24484962e.2022.11.17.2

    Gómez Julián, J.M. (2026). Hypothesis Testing for Dependent Variables with Unbalanced Data: A Unified Framework: Theory, Robustness, and Software. SSRN Electronic Journal. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.5172185.