Political Economy · Monetary Policy · Costa Rica
Central Bank of Costa Rica, Exchange Rate, and Income Distribution
Reflections on the crawling peg, export competitiveness, inflation, and Costa Rica’s transition toward inflation targeting.
Central banks, in their overwhelming majority, have historically promoted a “market” economy. They have done so, they continue to do so, and they will continue doing so until the final days of their institutional existence. Moderation—that is, the establishment of prudential limits on capital’s perpetually insatiable pursuit of profit—goes hand in hand with avoiding the creation of explicit rents derived from specific policies, since doing precisely the opposite violates the freedom of the market that political thought on the right claims to defend.
The principle guiding the central bank is that the institution has no reason to help one particular group generate profits at the expense of others—that is, to redistribute income to the detriment of the least advantaged. The Central Bank of Costa Rica (BCCR) understands that, by definition, no policy is neutral. What the BCCR seeks to avoid is being directly accused of reallocating wealth. If matters are instead left “to the market,” the situation appears different because “the market” becomes the agent supposedly responsible for that redistribution.
In a certain sense, this relieves the BCCR’s employees of the moral burden that such a situation could otherwise create: “they are not responsible; the market is responsible,” and everyone can sleep peacefully.
Yet, amid all this, the BCCR is at least meeting its established inflation target. Without entering here into the possible consequences for economic growth when a particular set of conditions is not satisfied—or the practical implications of using defective theoretical frameworks in public policy—this achievement helps keep under control a kind of silent and highly regressive tax from which capitalists can protect themselves through a variety of economic and institutional mechanisms, while poorer groups possess far fewer defenses: inflation.
The Fork in Exchange-Rate Policy
As time passed and the quality of life of Costa Rican society deteriorated, the Central Bank found itself before a road that divided into two paths.
Maintain artificially favorable competitiveness and profitability for exporters in the hope that they would generate production, exports, and employment. Yet this exchange-rate policy was highly inflationary, while the hoped-for competitiveness of exporters took considerably longer than expected to materialize; indeed, it is still being awaited.
In Costa Rica, capital inflows have under this approach generated some real appreciation—although certainly not an extreme one, as the historical evolution of the nominal exchange rate makes clear. This harms exporters and contributes to explaining part of their difficulties regarding employment and competitiveness, but it simultaneously facilitates inflation control: low inflation no longer erodes the incomes of lower-income groups with the same intensity.
The Central Bank of Costa Rica chose the second path. At the time, this decision generated criticism and pressure from the export-oriented business sector through its political-business organizations—CADEXCO, UCCAEP, and others—without those demands encountering an equally visible counterweight from those parts of society interested in preventing this type of income redistribution through monetary policy.
In other words, there was no “powerful organization defending the interests of the poor.” In Costa Rica, organizations potentially capable of playing that role do not possess sufficient institutional strength or political weight to constitute an effective counterbalance to the political-business organizations mentioned above.
The Crawling Peg as a Temporary Impulse
The implementation of the crawling peg was the idea of the prominent Costa Rican economist Eduardo Lizano, who intended it to be temporary. Lizano understood that the system effectively constituted an exchange-rate “subsidy” that should serve as an initial impulse allowing the export sector’s competitiveness to take off.
But, as tends to happen with subsidies, economic interest groups—or what José Ángel Gurría has called the “de facto powers”—attempted to preserve it. They succeeded in doing so for 28 years.
Eventually, the Central Bank, following an initiative associated with its then chief economist Roger Madrigal, withdrew that subsidy.
Public complaints followed immediately. Beyond those complaints, the BCCR was also subjected to repeated public criticism, which is in itself healthy for a democracy. Some firms even went bankrupt after the exchange-rate subsidy was withdrawn.
Exchange Rates, Rents, and Cost-Push Inflation
The underlying issue is that, without the subsidy that generated inflationary inertia through higher costs, certain firms were no longer profitable. This mechanism involved cost-push inflation associated with the well-known phenomenon of exchange-rate pass-through: the transmission of exchange-rate movements into domestic inflation.
Put differently, the Central Bank maintained an exchange rate that generated rents for particular groups while simultaneously contributing to inflationary inertia, whose burden fell especially heavily on those with the fewest mechanisms available to protect their real income.
The crawling peg, as conceived by Lizano—as an “initial impulse”—appeared, and perhaps still appears, to be a reasonable idea. The problem emerged when an instrument designed to be temporary became an effectively permanent policy.
Over the long run it produced inflationary inertia and, because the exporters benefiting from it wanted the arrangement to continue indefinitely, they fought politically for its preservation through institutional pressure channeled by the organizations already mentioned. The result was a subsidy that survived for decades, until it was finally removed as Costa Rica moved toward an inflation-targeting regime.
Competitiveness Without an Exchange-Rate Subsidy
Losing easy profits obtained without a corresponding effort to become more competitive is naturally painful. The response may take the form of closures, layoffs, and claims that these consequences are the fault of BCCR policies.
The Central Bank, however, is not an enemy of exporters. What it should not do is indefinitely subsidize a lack of competitiveness, still less redistribute wealth from lower-income groups toward exporters merely to make the latter appear artificially more competitive.
José Ángel Gurría, who served for fifteen years as Secretary-General of the OECD, repeatedly argued that competitiveness problems could not simply be blamed on exchange-rate policy. They also reflected insufficient competition: protection afforded to particular producers, monopolistic structures surrounding export products, and other arrangements that weaken the competitive capacity of domestic producers.
This does not mean, of course, that certain exchange-rate advantages cannot be useful as an initial stimulus when they are employed with moderation, prudence, and a clearly defined time horizon—precisely as the policy was originally conceived.
Inflation Targeting and Income Distribution
Under inflation targeting, the Central Bank has moved toward a more passive role in income distribution. Passive, of course, does not mean irrelevant.
Monetary policy continues to have distributive, macroeconomic, and real consequences. The relevant question is under what conditions the pursuit of price stability can coexist with economic growth and under which conditions, by contrast, the design of the monetary regime itself can impose additional constraints on that growth.

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