ANALYSIS OF THE METHODOLOGY APPLIED BY NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF STATISTICS AND CENSUSES IN THE QUALITATIVE CLASSIFICATION OF INCOME LEVEL
This research was developed in the context of defining the appropriate gnoseology and methodology for constructing an analytical survey capable of studying the economic impact on different subgroups of the population according to income level. The problem, however, necessarily leads to a more general question: what it means to measure poverty, what objective reality that measurement seeks to capture, and what conception of the material reproduction of life is incorporated—consciously or unconsciously—into the statistical instrument.
- Introduction
- Fundamental concepts
- Gnoseological and methodological analysis of the definition of the poverty line
- Anti-democratic consequences of gnoseological and methodological deficiencies in the measurement of inequality
- General formulation of gnoseological-methodological alternatives
- Conclusions
- References
I. INTRODUCTION
This research was developed in the context of defining the appropriate gnoseology and methodology for the construction of an analytical survey, i.e., following Cochran (1991, p. 23), a survey in which comparisons are made among several subgroups of a population in order to determine whether certain differences exist among them and to formulate or test hypotheses concerning their causes. Specifically, the applied problem that serves as the point of departure consists in determining the economic effects caused by the economic crisis associated with the COVID-19 pandemic according to some qualitative classification of income level.
The need for such adequacy arises from the fact that only through an appropriate correspondence among object, concept, instrument, and method is it possible to capture data of sufficient quality to optimize decision-making in monetary, fiscal, and social policy in general, from a given logic and a given ethics, as well as the process by which such decisions are implemented. The quality of a datum does not depend only on the recorded value being arithmetically correct: it also depends on the category through which the object was classified retaining a sufficiently adequate relation to the real phenomenon one seeks to know.
This last consideration leads to the general thesis that runs throughout the research. Poverty is an objective material condition, but its transformation into a statistical variable requires prior conceptual operations: determining the unit of analysis, deciding which resources count, establishing which needs are considered indispensable, defining how households of different size and composition are compared, selecting a threshold, and determining what happens to those who lie very near or very far from it. The resulting number may be exact with respect to the calculation rule while, at the same time, the rule may be insufficient with respect to the object.
For this reason, the analysis that follows is not merely a critique of the methodology applied by the National Institute of Statistics and Census of Costa Rica (INEC). INEC is the immediate and concrete object of the research, but the gnoseological object is broader: the administrative reduction of a historical-social category—the effective capacity to reproduce a materially adequate life in a given society—to a scalar monetary threshold which, once institutionalized, may acquire the appearance of a natural fact.
This does not mean that a threshold is useless. It means something different: that no threshold should be confused with the totality of the object measured, and that the criterion determining it must be subjected to empirical, mathematical, historical, methodological, and ethical criticism. It is precisely this examination that will be carried out below.
II. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS
II.I. Consumption basket or total basic basket
National institutes of statistics and censuses commonly construct poverty lines by means of a consumption basket representing a certain level of needs. In the Costa Rican case, INEC establishes that poverty occurs when income is lower than the cost of a basket of goods and services required to maintain a minimum level of subsistence (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos de Costa Rica, 2010, p. 19).
Constructing a measure by means of a basket is not, in itself, an exceptional procedure. What matters is what the basket contains, how it is valued, what unit of welfare it represents, and what conception of material life is implicit in it. Even in industrialized countries, different measures coexist. Aldridge (2017), in describing the Canadian case, distinguishes among the Low Income Cut-Off (LICO), the Low Income Measure (LIM), and the Market Basket Measure (MBM): the first identifies income levels that force a family to devote a proportion far above the average to basic needs; the second establishes a relative threshold with respect to what is typical in society; the third links the threshold to the cost of a specific basket of goods and services intended to represent a basic and modest standard of living. Each illuminates a different dimension, and reading them jointly may be more informative than absolutizing any single one.
The nuances arising from the level of social and productive development are equally fundamental. Being poor in Canada, Switzerland, Norway, or Germany is not identical to being poor in Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, or Haiti. This does not mean that poverty in industrialized countries is fictitious; it means that the material content of deprivation and the social standard against which it is experienced vary historically and across societies. The testimony of poor people in Switzerland collected by Jaccard (2013), for example, shows real deprivations—low-quality food, cramped housing, inability to enjoy leisure, vacations, or cultural consumption—even in a country where the comparable minimum monetary income is far higher than in numerous non-industrialized countries.
Poverty therefore cannot be adequately defined through the mere spatial or temporal transposition of a monetary amount. The standard of social reproduction is conditioned by prices, institutions, infrastructure, socially constituted needs, the development of the productive forces, and concrete forms of access to goods and services.
II.II. Extreme poverty
For Costa Rica, the extreme-poverty line, or indigence line, is estimated with reference to the cost of the basic food basket (CBA). A person or household is classified within this condition when its resources are insufficient even to acquire the food component institutionally defined as the minimum (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos de Costa Rica, 2010, p. 19).
This definition has an immediate descriptive usefulness, but it already contains a normative and material decision: what diet represents minimally adequate nutrition. As will be seen later, this is not a purely accounting question; it involves health, nutrition, habits, food availability, physical activity, demographic composition, and the historical transformations of the food environment.
II.III. Poverty
Monetary poverty, defined by means of a poverty line, is estimated by comparing the income available to the unit of analysis with the value of a total basic basket. The procedure generates a boundary:
\[ y_i < z \Rightarrow i \in \mathcal{P}, \]
where \(y_i\) represents the relevant income or resource of unit \(i\), \(z\) the poverty line, and \(\mathcal{P}\) the set of units classified as poor.
The operational usefulness of this rule is evident, but so is its discontinuity: an arbitrarily small difference around \(z\) changes the category of an observation without necessarily entailing a materially significant change in its life. For that reason, the count of people crossing the threshold should not be confused with a sufficient description of the intensity, depth, severity, or stability of poverty.
II.IV. Income
Household income comprises wages, salaries, profits, interest payments, rents, transfers, and other forms of income received during a given period (Case, Fair & Oster, 2012, p. 54). To use it as a measure of welfare, issues that are far from trivial must also be specified: whether gross or disposable income is used, whether social transfers are included, whether owner-occupied rent is imputed, how negative or irregular incomes are treated, what reference period is adopted, and how income is adjusted for household size and composition.
In internationally comparable relative measurements, a frequent practice is to work with equivalized disposable income. Equivalization is not a statistical ornament: it recognizes that two households with the same nominal income but different composition do not necessarily possess the same material consumption capacity, and that economies of scale exist within the household.
II.V. Interpolation and extrapolation
As Burden and Faires (2010, pp. 105-117) note, interpolation belongs to the family of numerical methods that allow values of a function to be estimated at points lying within the domain covered by the available observations. If observations are known at \(x_1,x_2,\ldots,x_n\), estimating a value between two observed points constitutes interpolation. When the estimate is made outside the observed interval, by contrast, it is extrapolation.
In the classic example of a United States census series with observations through 2010, estimating the population corresponding to 1975 constitutes interpolation, because 1975 lies between available observations; estimating 2020 constitutes extrapolation, because that year lies outside the observed interval. The distinction matters because the second operation requires additional assumptions concerning the persistence of the inferred structure beyond the data.
II.VI. Lorenz curve
Let \(\mathbf{x}=(x_1,x_2,\ldots,x_n)\) be a vector of non-negative incomes and let
\[ x_{(1)}\leq x_{(2)}\leq\cdots\leq x_{(n)} \]
be the incomes ordered from lowest to highest. For \(k=0,1,\ldots,n\), the empirical Lorenz curve is defined at the points \(p=k/n\) by
\[ L\!\left(\frac{k}{n}\right) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k}x_{(i)}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}x_{(i)}}, \]
with \(L(0)=0\) and \(L(1)=1\), linearly interpolating between those points. The first \(k\) households are those with the lowest incomes by ordering, not households defined as poor by means of a poverty line. The Lorenz curve therefore does not depend on first fixing \(z\).
In continuous form, if \(F\) is the income distribution function, \(F^{-1}\) its quantile function, and \(\mu>0\) mean income, it can be written as
\[ L(p)=\frac{1}{\mu}\int_0^p F^{-1}(u)\,du,\qquad 0\leq p\leq1. \]
From an economic perspective, \(L(p)\) expresses the cumulative share of total income appropriated by the proportion \(p\) of the population located at the bottom of the distribution. The diagonal \(L(p)=p\) represents perfect equality. The farther the curve lies from that diagonal, the greater the distributive concentration in the sense captured by this representation.
Two erroneous identifications should be avoided. First, a Lorenz curve is not a P–P plot: it does not compare two cumulative distribution functions in order to assess probabilistic fit. Second, distributive inequality and statistical skewness are not synonyms. A distribution may exhibit a certain skewness without that property exhausting the economic notion of inequality; the Lorenz curve answers a specific distributive question concerning cumulative shares.
II.VII. Gini coefficient
The Gini coefficient is a summary statistic associated with the Lorenz curve. From an economic perspective, it describes the degree of distributive inequality of a non-negative variable—usually income or consumption—within a population during a given period.
Geometrically, if the area between the diagonal of perfect equality and the Lorenz curve is \(A\), and the total area under the diagonal is \(1/2\), then
\[ G=\frac{A}{1/2}=2A. \]
Equivalently,
\[ \boxed{G=1-2\int_0^1L(p)\,dp}. \]
For ordered non-negative incomes, a common sample expression is
\[ G= \frac{2\sum_{i=1}^{n} i\,x_{(i)}}{n\sum_{i=1}^{n}x_{(i)}} – \frac{n+1}{n}. \]
The coefficient summarizes distributive information, but by itself does not identify where changes in the distribution occur. Two distributions with the same Gini may differ substantially in the situation of lower, middle, or upper strata. For that reason, it should be interpreted jointly with the Lorenz curve itself, shares by quantile, and poverty-specific measures.
II.VIII. Gnoseology
Gnoseology is the branch of philosophy that studies the interrelation between subject and object in the process of cognitive activity, the relation of knowledge to reality, the human possibilities of knowing the world, and the criteria for the authenticity and truth of knowledge. Every theory of knowledge proceeds, explicitly or implicitly, from a particular answer concerning the relation between consciousness and matter.
From the standpoint of materialist dialectics, knowledge is not conceived as a collection of self-sufficient logical forms nor as a passive copy of sensory data, but as a historical process of approximation to objective reality mediated by practice. The laws and categories of thought acquire cognitive value insofar as they make it possible to reproduce, with progressively greater adequacy, the relations of the object and are tested, directly or indirectly, in material activity.
This has immediate consequences for the special sciences. The refinement of mathematical, computational, and statistical methods does not eliminate the philosophical problems of the theory of knowledge; on the contrary, it makes them more specific. Variable selection, the meaning of probability, the decision as to what constitutes evidence, the relation between model and object, and the interpretation of an estimator contain problems that are not resolved by formal manipulation alone.
There are numerous examples. The probabilistic interpretation of the wave function associated with Max Born shows that a mathematical formalism requires an interpretation concerning the relation between its symbols and the physical phenomenon. In statistics, Efron (1978) emphasized that controversies among frequentist, Bayesian, and Fisherian schools involve different answers about which averages and which inferential structures are relevant. Feller (1968, pp. 1-3), in discussing probability, likewise insisted on distinguishing and relating logical-formal content, intuitive background, and applications. The general lesson is not to oppose rigor to intuition: it is to understand that robust scientific knowledge requires the interaction of both with practice.
II.IX. Method
From the Greek méthodos, literally “a path toward something,” method is, in its most general sense, an ordered way of attaining an objective. As a means of cognition, it is the form through which thought reproduces the object studied and organizes the operations necessary to investigate it. A method is appropriate insofar as it corresponds to the properties and relations of the object.
The concrete sciences develop special methods because they study specific objects. In the formal and computational sciences, the term may also acquire an operational sense: a detailed procedure, algorithm, or set of rules specifying how an operation is to be carried out. This meaning does not contradict the former; it simply expresses a particular level of methodological concreteness.
II.X. Measurement
Measurement is a cognitive process through which certain properties of objects are expressed quantitatively by comparison with a standard or by means of a defined operational rule. Measurement increases the precision of knowledge, but it does not by itself make the concept being measured adequate. If the correspondence between indicator and object is misspecified, a numerically exact measurement may reproduce with great precision a conceptually insufficient representation.
This consideration is especially important in the social sciences. Measuring length requires the selection of a unit and a procedure; measuring poverty additionally requires a theoretical construction of the content of deprivation. The quantitative operation begins only after a series of qualitative decisions.
II.XI. Instrument
An instrument is a means of knowledge used to observe, record, discriminate, or transform information about an object. In modern scientific knowledge, the instrument mediates between researcher and reality. That mediation can expand cognitive capacity, but it is never neutral in the sense of lacking structure: every instrument selects, classifies, excludes, transforms, and records according to a particular architecture.
A survey is, in this sense, a scientific instrument. So too is the classification that converts heterogeneous responses into categories. The central question, therefore, is not whether instruments should be used—they inevitably must be—but whether the internal logic of the instrument reproduces with sufficient adequacy the object it seeks to measure.
III. GNOSEOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DEFINITION OF THE POVERTY LINE
III.I. The case of the National Institute of Statistics and Census of Costa Rica (INEC)
III.I.I. Definition of the consumption basket adopted by INEC
INEC’s methodological document on the measurement of employment and poverty establishes a poverty-line methodology that remains conceptually linked to the definition according to which poverty exists when income is insufficient to cover the cost of a basket of goods and services required to maintain a minimum level of subsistence (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos de Costa Rica, 2010). Subsequent ENAHO publications make it possible to observe the empirical application of this architecture through differentiated lines for poverty and extreme poverty, with territorial distinctions where appropriate.
The criticism developed here does not begin by asserting that those figures are false. If INEC correctly applies the rule it has itself defined, the result may be statistically correct with respect to that rule. The problem lies at a prior and, at the same time, deeper level: whether the rule adequately captures what society intends to call poverty and whether the basket underpinning it represents a minimally dignified material reproduction in accordance with the historical development of Costa Rican society.
This distinction between internal exactness and external adequacy is cardinal. A rule may be reproducible, transparent, and mathematically consistent, yet correspond insufficiently to the object. The criticism, therefore, need not deny the datum: it must interrogate the conceptual construction of what the datum represents.
III.I.II. On a dignified consumption basket
One of the tables from the 2018 National Household Income and Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) summarizes average monthly expenditure per household and its percentage distribution by expenditure group (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos de Costa Rica, 2019). The principal magnitudes are as follows:
| Expenditure group | Total (millions of colones) | Monthly average per household (colones) | Percentage distribution |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total expenditure | 1 536 845 | 998 792 | 100.0 |
| Current expenditure excluding imputed rent | 1 079 090 | 701 298 | 70.2 |
| Consumption expenditure | 891 138 | 579 148 | 57.9 |
| Food and non-alcoholic beverages | 212 491 | 138 098 | 13.8 |
| Alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics | 4 883 | 3 173 | 0.3 |
| Clothing and footwear | 40 461 | 26 296 | 2.6 |
| Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels | 107 271 | 69 715 | 7.0 |
| Furnishings, household equipment and routine household maintenance | 51 470 | 33 450 | 3.3 |
| Health | 49 514 | 32 179 | 3.2 |
| Transport | 138 784 | 90 195 | 9.0 |
| Communications | 55 498 | 36 068 | 3.6 |
| Recreation and culture | 57 635 | 37 457 | 3.8 |
| Education | 42 737 | 27 775 | 2.8 |
| Restaurants and hotels | 64 274 | 41 771 | 4.2 |
| Miscellaneous goods and services | 66 120 | 42 971 | 4.3 |
| Non-consumption expenditure | 187 952 | 122 149 | 12.3 |
| Social contributions | 88 500 | 57 516 | 5.8 |
| Taxes | 34 094 | 22 157 | 2.2 |
| Transfers in cash | 46 943 | 30 508 | 3.1 |
| Transfers in kind | 15 776 | 10 253 | 1.0 |
| Other non-consumption expenditure | 2 639 | 1 715 | 0.2 |
| Imputed rent | 169 077 | 109 883 | 11.0 |
| Capital expenditure | 288 678 | 187 611 | 18.8 |
| Financial transactions | 230 027 | 149 494 | 15.0 |
| Non-financial transactions | 58 651 | 38 117 | 3.8 |
Source: INEC, ENIGH 2018, household expenditure tables. The average number of household members used as a reference in the analysis of the period was approximately 3.26 persons (Arias Ramírez, 2020, p. 5).
The first fact that must be emphasized is that observed expenditure and the normatively necessary cost of an adequate life are not identical concepts, but it does not follow from this that the former is irrelevant to studying the latter. Observed expenditure contains information about the effective structure of household reproduction; at the same time, it is constrained by income and, consequently, a poor family may spend little precisely because it cannot satisfy needs that continue to exist objectively. No sensible reading should therefore turn average observed expenditure into a “dignified basket” by simple identity.
On the basis of this distinction, a second family of evidence can be properly assessed: cost-of-living sources such as Expatistan, preciosmundi, autocosts, media reports, and sectoral estimates. These sources have heterogeneous methodologies, different units of observation, imperfect geographic coverage, and possible selection biases. They do not constitute a conclusive demonstration of what the poverty line should be. But it would be equally incorrect to conclude that they possess no cognitive value. Used as exploratory triangulation, they allow us to ask whether measurements constructed through independent procedures converge directionally toward the same suspicion.
An imperfect source does not become true merely because it agrees with another imperfect source. But when heterogeneous sources, produced through different procedures, repeatedly point toward similar tensions between the administrative threshold and the effective costs of housing, food, transport, health, communications, and other components, that agreement constitutes exploratory evidence and justifies better-designed confirmatory research. The methodologically correct step is not to discard the exploration, but to use it to construct a stronger measurement: an explicit reference budget, with documented quantities, qualities, prices, and rules.
Food, housing, transport, and other costs: exploratory triangulation
For San José, Expatistan reported prices for food, rent, utilities, clothing, transport, personal care, and entertainment activities which, taken together, displayed a cost structure that is difficult to reconcile intuitively with an extremely austere notion of subsistence. The point is not to turn its collaborative database into an official statistic, but to observe the concrete materiality of the items required by urban life.
In the same exploratory direction, preciosmundi published prices for housing, supermarkets, clothing, transport, and services in Costa Rica. Again, the purpose of presenting them is not to declare that a particular web database represents “the truth” about the cost of living, but to compare orders of magnitude and the composition of consumption with other sources.
Vehicle maintenance provides another example. autocosts used a program to estimate fixed and variable components—depreciation, insurance, inspections, taxes, fuel, maintenance, parking, tolls, and others—and provided a cost structure specific to Costa Rica. The fact that a household does not own a vehicle does not eliminate the general problem of mobility: it transforms it into expenditure on public transport, taxis, travel time, territorial access to employment, and other constraints.
The Programa Estado de la Nación (2018, p. 227), for its part, estimated that costs associated with traffic congestion in the Greater Metropolitan Area amounted to approximately 3.8% of GDP, that the negative externalities of transport represented around USD 3.146 billion annually, and that approximately 33% of the population traveled by private vehicle. The importance of these data does not lie only in their aggregate cost: they show that access to work, education, and services is conditioned by an infrastructure that consumes household time and resources. A basket that treats transport as a residual item may underrepresent a materially decisive dimension of everyday reproduction. In the same direction, Salazar Álvarez (2018), Barría (2019), and other journalistic sources documented perceptions and evidence of a high cost of living; their function here is complementary and exploratory, not to replace a statistical survey.
Housing raises an even more evident problem. FUPROVI reports on the housing deficit show both the persistence of deficient housing and differences between poor and non-poor households in homeownership, overcrowding, and housing quality. For 2016, approximately 42% of poor households were reported not to own their homes, compared with about 25% among non-poor households, equivalent to roughly 315,000 households (Quirós, 2017). At the same time, financing conditions could turn the price of a dwelling worth tens of millions of colones into an extraordinary monthly burden: Cisneros (2020) reported as a reference approximately ₡7,000 for each million colones financed, so that financing ₡65 million could imply a payment of approximately ₡455,000 per month, before insurance and administrative fees were added.
The decline in overcrowding observed during certain periods does not imply that the problem disappears, nor does it by itself permit the inference of a sufficient improvement in quality. FUPROVI itself related part of that reduction to the increase in the number of occupied dwellings and to the decline in average household size. The relevant dimension is not merely how many people sleep under the same roof, but also the quality, location, security, services, financing, and stability of housing.
Consequently, even if some private or journalistic sources are accepted as weak instruments for estimating national parameters, the qualitative convergence of food, housing, transport, services, and expenditure structure constitutes a sufficiently clear indication to justify the central question: does the monetary threshold used to classify poverty adequately reproduce the resources required for a socially normal existence, or merely an administrative minimum of survival?
The rigorous answer to this question should not ultimately rest on Expatistan, preciosmundi, or any similar aggregator. It should be constructed by means of a reference budget that specifies, for household types and relevant regions, the necessary quantities and qualities of healthy food, adequate housing, energy and water, mobility, communications, clothing, health, education, care, social participation, and a small contingency capacity; those components should then be valued using documented prices and updated transparently.
Food and health
For a diet to be nutritious and healthy, satisfying an abstract calorie count is not enough. International dietary recommendations include a diversity of fruits, vegetables, legumes, nuts, and whole grains; sufficient consumption of fruits and vegetables; limits on free sugars, saturated and trans fats, and salt; and a composition compatible with the prevention of chronic disease.
At this point there is particularly important Costa Rican evidence. Hidalgo Víquez et al. (2020), from the School of Nutrition of the University of Costa Rica, analyzed the CBA and proposed modifications aimed at improving its nutritional quality, composition, and cost simultaneously. Their comparison shows concrete divergences between the basket in force and a food composition more compatible with contemporary nutritional recommendations.
The conclusion of these researchers is unequivocal in its essentials: the Costa Rican CBA requires a conceptual and structural reassessment incorporating comprehensive nutritional considerations, because the methodology was conceived in an epidemiological, dietary, and physical-activity context different from the present one. The gnoseological relevance of this observation is notable: even if the basket retains arithmetic coherence, the historical transformation of the object requires revision of the instrument.
Excessive sodium consumption and insufficient potassium intake, for example, are associated with hypertension and cardiovascular risk; a food basket cannot be called materially adequate if it systematically normalizes compositions incompatible with the protection of health. The problem, therefore, is not simply how much it costs to “eat something,” but how much it costs to eat in a way that reproduces health and functional capacity under contemporary conditions.
The nutritional proposal is a necessary action, although still insufficient for the general definition of poverty. A nutritionally adequate CBA resolves the food component; it does not resolve housing, energy, mobility, education, connectivity, care, social participation, or vulnerability. This shows why the concept of material reproduction should not be prematurely compressed into a single item.
III.I.III. The economic logic implicit in INEC’s definition: a historically universal logic
Undoubtedly, within the sciences every measuring instrument is specific to a task or set of tasks; none has universal and absolute application. Every instrument contains a logic that corresponds, to a greater or lesser extent and under particular qualitative dimensions, to the subset of reality it studies. This correspondence may be well or poorly conceived, and it may be conscious or unconscious for the person designing the instrument, but it never ceases to exist.
Therefore, the instruments designed by INEC and the methodology used to classify income contain a particular economic logic. Clarifying it requires an apparently simple question: if INEC’s statistics are not false, how can such a large divergence exist between a classification based on administrative minima and other indications concerning the effective cost of reproducing life? The answer cannot be found solely in the arithmetic of the basket; it requires studying the genealogy of the very concept of the “minimum.”
The exposition that follows is not an erudite digression. Its function is genealogical and structural: to determine the historical genesis of the proposition that labor-power must be reproduced around certain minima and the recurrent structure that makes it possible to understand the persistence of that logic under different social forms. Only in this way can it be established that the content of a “basic need” is not an ahistorical biological constant, but a social determination that changes with the productive forces, the social division of labor, institutions, and relations of production.
Ricardo, the “iron law,” and the problem of minima
According to the classical exposition attributed to David Ricardo, workers’ wages would tend to remain close to the subsistence level. William Baumol (1983) recalled that Marx and Engels rejected the transformation of that historical observation into a universal iron law. The fundamental criticism is that wages are not determined by a natural law mechanically forcing them to remain at a biological minimum; accumulation, productivity, relations of force, class organization, institutions, history, and conflict all intervene.
The gnoseologically interesting part of the Ricardian intuition is therefore not a supposed eternal law, but the observation of a tendency that could indeed become visible under particular historical conditions. At this point it is useful to consider the role of intuition.
Frolov (1984, pp. 233-234) defines intuition, from a materialist perspective, not as a mystical faculty opposed to reason, but as a form of direct knowledge mediated by prior experience, thought, and practice. Behind the apparently “sudden” recognition of a relation lie accumulated knowledge, perceived regularities, and results that are not always fully conscious. Intuition can open the path of an investigation, but its result must be reconstructed, tested, and subjected to practice and logical analysis.
Science would lose an essential part of its creative capacity if it required every hypothesis to be born already demonstrated. Abduction, pattern recognition, reasoning from clues, and questions of the form “what would be strange to observe if this hypothesis were false?” are legitimate precisely because they make it possible to formulate problems that can later be investigated with more formal tools. The error begins when the heuristic or justificatory value of an inference is confused with the degree of public demonstration that has actually been attained.
The evolution of real wages in contemporary capitalist economies confirms that there is no universal law biologically chaining them to subsistence. Historical wage series show long-run increases in different industrialized countries, while Messina and Silva (2019) documented differentiated distributive dynamics in Latin America for 2002-2015: in South America, real wages increased across the distribution and rose much more rapidly at the bottom; in Central America and Mexico they likewise grew faster at the bottom than at the top, although at more moderate rates.
If wages are not subject to an objective “iron law,” a more interesting question arises: why does the logic of minima reappear with such persistence in institutions charged with defining minimum wages, subsistence, minimum baskets, and administrative boundaries of poverty? Answering this requires broadening the historical field.
From the reproduction of the slave to the reproduction of the wage worker
In slave modes of production, the owner had a direct material incentive to sustain enslaved labor-power with the resources necessary for it to continue working and resume the next day’s labor, while simultaneously minimizing the cost of its maintenance. Food, shelter, and clothing thus appeared as costs of reproducing labor-power directly owned.
Feudal relations radically altered the juridical and social form of that reproduction. The serf was not identical to the slave; the serf had different relations to the land, the community, and the product, and property relations were structured through specific forms of domination. The transition from Roman slavery to feudalism was neither linear nor monocausal: it involved crisis of the slave system, political and ideological transformations, the colonato, population movements, invasions, changes in agrarian organization, and the interaction between societies in dissolution and in formation.
The later transition from feudalism to capitalism became the subject of one of the most important historiographical debates in Marxism and economic history, condensed in the Dobb–Sweezy debate and, later, in the Brenner debate. Disagreements concerning the relative weight of trade, agrarian class relations, demography, peasant struggle, and regional differentiation are substantive; nevertheless, the debate as a whole reveals a decisive structural point: the genesis of capitalism involved violent transformations of property relations, the expropriation of direct producers, and the historical creation of land and labor markets.
The Dobb–Sweezy debate includes, among others, Dobb (1946, 1962), Sweezy and Dobb (1950), Hilton (1952), Takahashi (1952), Dobb and Sweezy (1953), Hilton and Hill (1953), Procacci (1955), Lefebvre (1956), Hobsbawm (1962), Merrington (1975), Hilton (ed., 1978), and Sweezy (1986). The Brenner debate includes, among others, Brenner (1976, 1977, 1978, 1982), Postan and Hatcher (1978), Croot and Parker (1978), Wunder (1978), Le Roy Ladurie (1978), Bois (1978), Hilton (1978), Cooper (1978), Klíma (1979), Sweezy (1978), and Fine (1978). The differences among these authors are not erased here; they are invoked precisely because they show that the transition must be understood through concrete historical relations rather than through a unilinear economic narrative.
Labor-power appears superimposed upon the means of production under slavery, related to them and to certain rights of use in a different manner under feudalism, and separated from the means of production under capitalism. The modern wage worker does not receive shelter, food, or clothing directly from the owner: the worker receives a money wage and must procure the material conditions of reproduction independently through the market.
This juridical freedom represents a real historical transformation and should not be confused with the condition of the slave or the serf. Yet it also contains a material contradiction: whoever lacks means of production must sell labor-power in order to acquire on the market what is needed for reproduction. Hence the question of what quantity of the social product is necessary to reproduce labor-power does not disappear with capitalism; it changes form.
The historical point relevant to this research is therefore the following: there is continuity in the question of the cost of reproducing labor-power, even though the material content and institutional forms of that reproduction change radically. The error consists in turning that historical cost into a fixed and ahistorical biological minimum.
Needs are historical
A basket may appear extraordinarily “objective” because it contains grams, kilocalories, liters, kilowatts, fares, and colones. Yet the decisive normative and gnoseological moment occurs before quantities are multiplied by prices: it occurs when one decides what a human being needs in order to reproduce socially as a normal member of a concrete society.
An inhabitant of Costa Rica may biologically survive without an Internet connection, telephone, motorized transport, formal education, certain levels of housing privacy, cultural participation, or regular access to certain services. But that person may be socially incapable of reproducing a normal existence—working, studying, seeking employment, carrying out administrative procedures, caring for others, becoming informed, participating politically, and maintaining social relations—if deprived of some of those means.
Consequently, the social standard of needs changes with the productive forces and with social relations. A need does not cease to be material because it has a historical genesis. Internet access, for example, is not a physiological need of the human organism; it becomes a material condition of reproduction when work, education, banking, public administration, communication, and social life objectively presuppose its availability.
This is the foundation of the criticism of a methodology of frozen minima: the reproduction of life cannot be measured as if society had no history.
IV. ANTI-DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF GNOSEOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL DEFICIENCIES IN THE MEASUREMENT OF INEQUALITY
Defining the poverty line exclusively through minima can become, especially in non-industrialized countries, the implicit establishment of a socially tolerated level of misery: whoever falls below that minimum is declared poor and whoever exceeds it is declared non-poor, even when the material difference between them is negligible and even when the level immediately above the threshold remains incompatible with the dignified reproduction of life.
The problem is not semantic. A statistical classification participates in the allocation of subsidies, the design of taxes, territorial targeting, the estimation of policy success or failure, electoral communication, and the construction of the image that a society has of itself. If the category underestimates material deprivation, the policies built upon it may likewise be undersized.
For this reason, collecting data on quality of life by means of a criterion defined in advance is never a socially empty operation. If the criterion normalizes as “non-poor” a life that barely reproduces labor-power under precarious conditions, the instrument contributes institutionally to normalizing that precariousness. Political freedom is incomplete when the material conditions that make its exercise possible are absent: time, health, food, housing, education, mobility, communication, and security against contingencies.
Official surveys are produced by a social, economic, political, and legal apparatus financed by society. From a humanist and democratic perspective, the logical demand is that this apparatus generate information capable of orienting fiscal, monetary, and social policies toward effective human development. Underestimating poverty weakens that capacity and also opens a margin for favorable administrative results to be presented as social improvements even when the material change is small.
Inequality in the financing of the State itself makes this issue more acute. Reports by the Office of the Comptroller General and data disclosed by the Ministry of Finance—reported, among others, by Madrigal (2018)—showed that numerous large companies repeatedly declared zero profits over several years, while the ordinary tax burden remained distributed across workers, consumers, small and medium-sized firms, and other taxpayers. The existence of evasion, avoidance, tax benefits, and unequal capacities to structure tax obligations means that the discussion of poverty cannot be completely separated from the distribution of economic power.
IV.I. Inference, power, and institutional opacity
At this point it is necessary to specify the standard of knowledge used in political-causal claims. One thing is the degree of rational justification a researcher may have for believing a proposition; another is the degree of public demonstrability available at a given moment. The difference is particularly important when the object of study includes power relations, informal decisions, institutional incentives, corruption, undocumented coordination, or behaviors whose actors possess both the capacity and the interest to reduce their traceability.
The absence of a document may have great evidentiary force when the phenomenon under investigation, if it existed, would necessarily produce exhaustive public documentation. It has much less force when the phenomenon is precisely of the kind that creates incentives to act informally, conceal, destroy records, or fragment responsibility. Epistemology must be adapted to its object: the study of an opaque structure cannot be required to present the same documentary surface as an administrative procedure designed to leave public records.
This does not, however, transform every suspicion into a fact. The difficulty of observing power does not automatically transform an inference into a demonstration. If that rule were accepted, any hypothesis could be indefinitely immunized against falsification by claiming that the absence of evidence is the product of concealment. The most robust criterion is to keep several levels separate: direct evidence, indirect evidence, abductive inference, coherence with incentives and institutional structure, historical experience, and the public demonstration currently available.
Intuition, abduction, pattern recognition, reasoning from clues, and the question “would it be reasonable to observe this if the hypothesis were false?” are legitimate scientific resources. Without them, many hypotheses would never be formulated. But their legitimacy imposes a discipline: their plausibility must rise or fall with the evidence; they must not become mechanisms for immunizing a belief.
Applied to the present problem, political conclusions should not be presented as though they were a mechanical corollary of a statistical formula. They are causal and political-institutional inferences supported by the structure of incentives, the foreseeable effects of classifications, the history of economic policy, the effective distribution of power, and the evidence available. Formulated in this way, they do not lose force; they gain it, because the chain connecting measurement, institution, and consequence becomes explicit.
IV.II. Administrative discontinuity: “crossing” a line is not necessarily escaping poverty
Suppose a country has a poverty line of USD 225 per month and one hundred households are classified as poor. Suppose, furthermore, that the government provides a monthly subsidy of USD 5 to the five households closest to the threshold and that, as a result, they move from USD 225 or less to USD 230.
If the only indicator used is the count of households below the line, the government can claim that poverty fell by 5%. Yet an additional USD 5 per month may produce no materially relevant change in food, housing, health, education, transport, or economic security. The statistical operation is correct within the rule; the social interpretation may be misleading.
Formally, if
\[ H=\frac{q}{N}, \]
where \(q\) is the number of poor persons or households and \(N\) the population, then any observation that crosses \(z\) reduces \(H\) regardless of the distance it has traveled and of the stability of its new position. The indicator is deliberately blind to that information.
It is therefore necessary to distinguish:
\[ \boxed{\text{statistical crossing of the threshold} \neq \text{material emancipation from poverty}.} \]
The distinction does not invalidate the headcount ratio; it delimits what the measure can say.
IV.III. The relative criterion: what the 60% used in Europe actually means
A relative criterion widely used by Eurostat and numerous European countries sets the at-risk-of-poverty threshold at 60% of the national median equivalized disposable income after social transfers. The UNECE guide notes that 60% and 50% of median equivalized disposable income are commonly used fractions, with 60% particularly associated with Eurostat and many European Union countries (UNECE, 2017, paras. 225-227; Eurostat, 2025a).
The expression can be written as
\[ z_R=0.60\times \operatorname{Median}\!\left(Y_{disp,eq}\right). \]
It is not 60% of mean gross income. Nor is it a comparison of unadjusted nominal incomes of households of any size. Income is made disposable—taking into account the relevant fiscal and transfer architecture—and equivalized to account for household size and composition. The median is also used because it is much less sensitive than the mean to extremely high incomes.
This precision makes it illegitimate to calculate an equivalent threshold for Costa Rica simply by taking 60% of average gross current income from the ENIGH. A comparable application of the criterion requires the appropriate microdata, a definition of disposable income, an explicit equivalence scale, and calculation of the median of that equivalized distribution. Therefore, a figure obtained as \(0.60\times\bar{Y}\) should not be presented as “the UNECE criterion.”
The relative criterion should not be confused with a complete ontological definition of poverty either. Eurostat emphasizes that the indicator expresses low income in relation to other residents of the country and does not necessarily imply, by itself, a low absolute standard of living. Precisely for this reason it is useful in combination with absolute measures, material deprivation, and reference budgets.
IV.IV. Poverty, inequality, and growth: from mathematical possibility to historical trajectory
Poverty and inequality are not mathematically the same magnitude. The Gini coefficient may change without the number of people below a fixed line changing, and the headcount may change without the Gini moving in the same direction. This analytical separability is true. But it does not follow that the historical trajectories of the two magnitudes are independent.
The distinction is fundamental:
\[ \boxed{\text{logical possibility}\neq\text{historical regularity}\neq\text{tendential law}.} \]
And, equivalently,
\[ \boxed{\text{mathematical space of possibilities}\neq\text{historically accessible space of trajectories}.} \]
A toy counterexample and its epistemological limit
Consider an imaginary economy of four people with poverty line \(z=2.5\) and distribution
\[ (1,\;2,\;3,\;4). \]
Total income is 10, two people are below \(z\), so \(H=0.50\), and the Gini is \(0.25\). Redistribute the same total income as follows:
\[ (0.1,\;2.6,\;2.7,\;4.6). \]
Now only one person is below \(z\), so the headcount falls to \(H=0.25\), while the Gini rises to approximately \(0.34\) and aggregate income remains 10.
The example is mathematically valid and serves a very precise function: it demonstrates that poverty measured by the headcount and inequality measured by the Gini are not identical by definition. That is the extent of its value.
To use it to answer a different historical-material question—whether real societies exist that have achieved a substantive, durable, and categorical exit from poverty while concentration at the top rises and no material growth occurs—would be a category error. In the second vector, one person is pushed from 1 to 0.1 and two observations merely cross an administrative boundary. The “success” depends precisely on the discontinuity criticized in the preceding section. What clearly declined was \(H\); it has not been shown that any general material emancipation occurred.
Formal thought is indispensable for delimiting what a proposition logically implies. But a logically possible construction does not thereby acquire the same weight as a historically observed trajectory. When the proposition under examination concerns a regularity of real capitalism, the final arbiter is not the imagination of possible distributions but empirical and historical experience.
What real cases show
Comparative evidence allows the problem to be stated more precisely. There are very clear cases in which absolute poverty falls while inequality rises, but the best-known examples are accompanied by strong economic growth.
In China between 1990 and 1998, for example, mean survey incomes grew by approximately 14% per year, the one-dollar-a-day poverty headcount fell from 51% to 33%, and the Gini rose from 34 to 40 (Kraay, 2004). It is an unequivocal case of
\[ \text{poverty}\downarrow,\qquad \text{inequality}\uparrow,\qquad \text{growth}\uparrow. \]
Ghana provides another example. The World Bank reports that national poverty fell from 52.6% in 1991 to 21.4% in 2012 while the consumption Gini rose from 37.5 to 40.8; the reduction in poverty occurred during two decades of sustained growth and structural transformation (World Bank, 2015).
In Central America, Corbacho and Davoodi (2002) found that Honduras was, among the countries with comparable data from the beginning and end of the 1990s, the only case in which poverty declined while inequality increased. The study itself, however, places the episode within a decade of positive growth in all the Central American countries considered. Again, divergence between poverty and inequality does not appear detached from growth of the product.
These cases suggest a simple structure. If the product rises from 100 to 200 and the share of a lower stratum falls from 20% to 15%, then
\[ 100(0.20)=20, \]
while
\[ 200(0.15)=30. \]
The relative share worsens, but the absolute quantity appropriated by the lower stratum increases. Growth creates the material margin that permits this divergence. If the pie does not grow and the share appropriated at the top increases, the space for substantive and persistent improvement at the bottom narrows radically, even though internal redistributions may administratively move some observations across a threshold.
Jamaica: why an apparent counterexample requires looking behind the aggregate
Jamaica deserves particular examination because, at first sight, it seems to offer the kind of case that might call the preceding regularity into question. Moreover, in purely national-unit terms, Jamaica represents a single State among the 193 members of the United Nations plus its two observer States—approximately \(1/195=0.005128\), i.e., 0.513% of that commonly counted universe of 195 States (United Nations, n.d.)—so even a genuinely exceptional national episode would have limited weight in establishing a worldwide regularity by itself. This does not permit its dismissal; it requires that it be studied carefully.
Between 2003 and 2007, Jamaican poverty fell by approximately half in a context of very weak growth. The World Bank’s Country Economic Memorandum reports that between 1997 and 2007 real GDP per capita grew by only about 0.79% per year, while poverty fell from 19.9% to 9.9%. Yet the decomposition of the 2003-2007 episode shows that nearly three quarters of the poverty reduction were associated with growth in mean per capita consumption and approximately one quarter with the reduction in inequality; the Gini fell from 38.3 in 2003 to 36.8 in 2007. Household consumption grew faster than measured GDP, aided by lower relative prices for the basket of the poor and by remittances that came to represent more than 17% of GDP (World Bank, 2011).
Jamaica in 2003-2007 is therefore not a case of
\[ \text{poverty}\downarrow+\text{inequality}\uparrow+\text{zero material growth}. \]
In the published data themselves, it is a case of declining poverty with declining inequality and rising mean consumption even under weak GDP growth.
An earlier episode is even more instructive. Between 1995 and 1999 poverty fell from 27.5% to around 17-19% despite a financial crisis and a small decline in measured GDP. The World Bank explicitly described the result as paradoxical, but identified several mechanisms that break the identification between “measured GDP” and “household material resources”: possible underestimation of output owing to informal and underground activity, a sharp fall in inflation, a decline in the relative price of food, recovery of real wages, and growth in remittances (World Bank, 2003). The available data likewise do not show a clean and persistent trajectory of rising concentration: the Gini was 0.36 in 1995, 0.36 in 1996, jumped to 0.42 in 1997, fell to 0.37 in 1998, and stood at 0.38 in 1999; available assessments therefore describe inequality over the decade as relatively stable, with fluctuations, before its later decline (FAO, 2002; World Bank, 2003). It is thus a valuable case for studying how an economy stagnant in the national accounts can experience improvements in household consumption, but it is not a clean example of sustained increasing concentration at the top combined with mass material exit from poverty and no additional resources.
The recent period again shows the same distributive direction. The World Bank’s October 2025 Poverty & Equity Brief reports that the official poverty rate rose from 11.0% in 2019 to 16.7% in 2021 and subsequently fell to a low of 8.2% in 2023. Between 2021 and 2023 real per capita consumption increased by 12% in the poorest quintile and 16.6% in the second quintile, while the consumption Gini fell from 39.9 to 35.6 (World Bank, 2025). Once again, exit from poverty was accompanied by distributive improvement, not by greater concentration.
All of this permits a more robust answer to a reasonable objection: there is no need to assume that Jamaican statistics are manipulated in order to conclude that Jamaica does not constitute the strong counterexample being sought. Even provisionally accepting the published figures, the best-documented episodes include reduced inequality, consumption growth, remittances, real wages, price changes, or problems in measuring output. If independent reasons existed for doubting statistical quality, they would have to be studied separately; they are not necessary to the present argument.
The borderline Costa Rican episode of 2008-2009
Maximum rigor also requires recording evidence that prevents the regularity from being transformed into a universal impossibility. In the Poverty and Labor Brief on the 2008-2009 crisis, the World Bank placed Costa Rica in the quadrant of declining GDP per capita, rising inequality, and slightly declining poverty. The same document notes that poverty fell only slightly in Costa Rica and Chile during that interval, while other countries undergoing contraction experienced increases in poverty (World Bank, 2010).
This episode matters precisely because it forces the thesis to be stated properly. It shows that the combination
\[ \Delta y_{pc}<0,\qquad \Delta G>0,\qquad \Delta H<0 \]
can be observed over a short interval. It does not, however, demonstrate a prolonged trajectory of substantive material exit from poverty under stagnation and rising concentration. A small variation in an annual headcount may result from transfers, household composition, relative prices, the location of many observations near the threshold, measurement error, or internal distributive changes not located by the aggregate Gini. The case therefore refutes any formulation of logical impossibility, but not the stronger historical hypothesis of interest here.
| Case | Poverty | Inequality | Activity/resources | What it allows us to conclude |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| China, 1990-1998 | 51% → 33% ($1/day) | Gini 34 → 40 | Mean survey income ≈ +14% annually | Poverty-inequality divergence with very strong material expansion. |
| Ghana, 1991-2012 | 52.6% → 21.4% | Gini 37.5 → 40.8 | Strong and sustained growth | Another clear case of declining poverty with rising inequality and growth. |
| Honduras, 1990s | Declines | Rises | Positive growth over the decade | Central American case of divergence, but not under stagnation. |
| Jamaica, 2003-2007 | 21.0% → 9.9% | Gini 38.3 → 36.8 | Real GDP per capita <1% annually; mean consumption rises; remittances >17% of GDP in 2007 | Strong poverty reduction with weak growth, but accompanied by lower inequality and greater consumption resources. |
| Jamaica, 1995-1999 | 27.5% → 16.9% | 0.36 → 0.38, with 0.42 in 1997 | Measured GDP stagnant/declining; real wages, remittances, relative prices, and informality complicate the reading | Important episode against mechanical identifications with GDP, but not a clean trajectory of sustained rising concentration. |
| Costa Rica, 2008-2009 | Declines slightly | Gini rises | GDP per capita declines | Real short-run counterexample to a universal impossibility; does not demonstrate broad and persistent material exit under stagnation. |
Table sources: Kraay (2004); Corbacho and Davoodi (2002); FAO (2002); World Bank (2003, 2010, 2011, 2015, 2025).
The table shows why the discussion cannot be resolved by appealing exclusively to formal identities, nor by selecting a single episode favorable to a thesis. The proper requirement is to compare observed trajectories, their duration, the magnitude of the change, and the material mechanisms that make them possible. A one-year case in which a headcount moves by a few tenths does not have the same historical content as a poverty reduction lasting several decades; nor does a decline in measured GDP automatically amount to a decline in all real household resources.
The comparative regularity
Ravallion and Chen (1997), using household surveys from 67 developing and transition economies over 1981-1994, found that changes in inequality were not mechanically correlated with changes in average living standards and that distribution could improve or worsen during growth. Their conclusion regarding absolute poverty, however, is particularly relevant: poverty almost always fell when average living standards rose and increased during contractions. Kraay (2004), using another decomposition strategy and a broad sample of developing countries, likewise found that over medium and long horizons most of the variation in poverty changes was associated with growth in mean incomes.
The methodological conclusion is not “poverty and inequality are the same thing.” They are not. Nor is it “without growth no poverty indicator can ever fall”; the Costa Rican episode shows that this would be too strong a statement. The empirically defensible proposition is more precise:
That two magnitudes are analytically separable does not imply that their historical trajectories are independent. Broad, sustained, and materially significant reductions in poverty that coexist with rising concentration are typically observed when average resources expand sufficiently; without that margin, the divergence is much harder to sustain, and threshold crossings may represent administrative changes rather than material emancipation.
This formulation transforms an intuition into a falsifiable historical hypothesis: it makes it possible to search for long episodes, define in advance what counts as a “substantive” reduction, distinguish GDP from household consumption and income, and examine whether the share or absolute income of the lower strata improves persistently.
IV.V. Costa Rica’s economic structure and the democratic problem
Costa Rica’s fiscal and productive situation makes the need for more informative measurements more acute. High levels of tax evasion and avoidance, the coexistence of sectors with very different productivity, the weight of transnational corporations in free-trade zones, and the difficulties of the domestic productive apparatus generate a heterogeneous economy in which aggregate growth may not automatically translate into sufficient employment or proportional improvement in low incomes.
Díaz Arias (2019) reconstructs the historical formation of the Costa Rican neoliberal project from the late 1970s onward; Arias Chavarría (2019) analyzes the relationship among the State, neoliberalism, and the business class in the context of CAFTA; Vargas Solís (2016) distinguishes phases of the Historical Neoliberal Project and emphasizes growing transnationalization and a later financial bias. Regardless of interpretive differences among these authors, the historical evidence requires that poverty be studied together with productive structure, fiscal policy, the labor market, and income distribution.
Blanchard and Leigh (2013) showed, in another context, that forecasts associated with fiscal consolidation programs systematically underestimated fiscal multipliers during the European crisis. The example is methodologically relevant: even institutions with great technical capacity may apply models that underestimate social effects when fundamental assumptions do not adequately correspond to the concrete state of the economy. The problem is not the existence of modeling; it is the quality of its correspondence with the object.
Costa Rican and international media have also pointed to the contrast between a modern, high-productivity export sector and a large mass of lower-productivity domestic small and medium-sized firms. Ventas (2018) described this duality as an economy whose external sector modernizes without sufficiently pulling the rest along; Barría (2019) reported similar diagnoses. Under these conditions, aggregate growth may coexist with insufficient employment, low wages at the bottom, and persistent poverty.
A democracy, therefore, should not evaluate its success solely by asking how many observations lie one colón above \(z\). It should ask whether people possess the effective material capacity to reproduce their lives, participate in society, and withstand contingencies without immediately falling below the threshold again.
DEMOCRACY IS IN DANGER!
Not because a statistical formula produces authoritarianism by itself, but because a democracy that naturalizes deprivation through insufficient categories can end up administering as normal what should precisely constitute the object of its transformation.
V. GENERAL FORMULATION OF GNOSEOLOGICAL-METHODOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVES
The two alternatives that arise immediately from the preceding analysis are, on the one hand, to use a properly constructed relative threshold—rather than confusing it with a percentage of gross mean income—together with income quintiles; and, on the other, to re-estimate the material cost of an adequate life using complementary information, likewise accompanied by a distributive classification. Both ideas are useful, but the analysis developed in the preceding sections shows that they should not be treated as mutually exclusive solutions or as complete substitutes for the official line. They are layers of a broader measurement system.
The methodologically most robust alternative is to stop searching for the single true poverty figure and instead construct a structured poverty profile in which each indicator answers a different question. The objective is not to produce an opaque synthetic index that once again compresses the entire phenomenon into a single number, but to preserve information about its fundamental dimensions.
V.I. First component: incidence — how many people are below the threshold?
The simplest indicator is the incidence ratio or headcount ratio:
\[ H=\frac{q}{N}, \]
where \(q\) is the number of units with \(y_i<z\) and \(N\) the total number of units. Its interpretation is direct and it has great communicative usefulness. It should be retained, but always accompanied by information that prevents a marginal crossing of the threshold from being interpreted as a sufficient social transformation.
In an analytical survey, in addition to estimating \(H\), the distribution of observations around \(z\) should be reported: for example, the proportions located within 5%, 10%, and 20% of the threshold above and below it. This makes it possible to identify how much of a change in incidence comes from minimal movements at the boundary.
V.II. Second component: intensity and severity — how poor are the poor?
The Foster–Greer–Thorbecke (FGT) family of measures makes it possible to incorporate distance from the threshold (Foster, Greer & Thorbecke, 1984):
\[ FGT_{\alpha} =\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{q} \left(\frac{z-y_i}{z}\right)^{\alpha}, \qquad \alpha\geq0. \]
For \(\alpha=0\), the headcount is recovered; for \(\alpha=1\), one obtains the normalized poverty gap, which answers how far the poor population lies from the threshold; for \(\alpha=2\), deeper gaps receive greater weight, making the indicator sensitive to severity and to the situation of those who are worst off.
This family directly resolves the problem in the USD 5 example. If five households barely cross \(z\), \(H\) may visibly improve while the gap and severity of the group change very little. If an extremely poor household receives a substantial transfer that is insufficient to cross the threshold, \(H\) remains identical even though material deprivation has been substantively reduced. The system of indicators makes both phenomena visible.
The relative median at-risk-of-poverty gap used by Eurostat can also be added. It compares the median income of those below the line with the threshold itself and answers, in simple terms, how far the typical poor person lies from the statistical boundary (Eurostat, 2025b).
V.III. Third component: distributive position — where is each household located within the social structure of income?
Classification by quintiles or deciles should be retained. If \(Q_1,\ldots,Q_5\) represent quintiles, knowing which group an observation belongs to distinguishes situations that a binary line does not separate and facilitates analysis of how a crisis differentially affects the distribution.
The Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient should accompany this aggregate reading. The curve shows the cumulative structure; the Gini provides a summary; shares by quintile or decile identify in which part of the distribution changes occur. None of these measures should replace the others.
For an analytical survey concerned with causes, it may be particularly useful to estimate rates of change by quantile or growth-incidence curves when the data structure permits. This makes it possible to ask whether the income or consumption of lower strata grows more or less than the mean and avoids inferring the trajectory of the entire distribution from a single coefficient.
V.IV. Fourth component: relative threshold — distance from society’s distributive standard
The criterion of 60% of median equivalized disposable income should be incorporated as a relative indicator, not as a universal substitute for every definition of poverty:
\[ z_R=0.60\times \operatorname{Median}(Y_{disp,eq}). \]
This threshold answers a specific question: which people possess resources so far below the typical level of their society that they face a high risk of economic and social exclusion? Its principal strength is that it changes with the social distribution and avoids freezing the nominal standard of living. Its principal limitation is equally clear: an entire society may become poorer and the median may fall, causing the relative threshold to decline even as absolute material conditions worsen.
For that reason, it should be combined with an absolute-historical material standard, not substituted for it.
V.V. Fifth component: reference budget — what does it cost to materially reproduce a socially adequate life?
The exploratory triangulation of prices should lead to confirmatory measurement. To this end, the construction of a reference budget by household type and, where relevant, geographic region is proposed. The question would not be how much a family spends on average, but what set of goods, services, and material capacities is necessary to sustain a healthy and socially normal life under existing historical conditions.
At a minimum, the budget should include:
- nutritionally adequate food, with quantities and composition compatible with health recommendations;
- safe, non-overcrowded housing with effective access to water, electricity, sanitation, and household energy;
- sufficient transport for work, education, care, administrative procedures, and social participation;
- communications and Internet access at the level materially required by a digitized society;
- adequate clothing and footwear;
- ordinary health and preventive expenditures not provided free of charge by the public system;
- education, materials, and associated indirect costs;
- care of children, older persons, or dependents where applicable;
- personal hygiene and household maintenance;
- minimum cultural and social participation—not as a “luxury,” but as a dimension of belonging to a community;
- replacement of indispensable durable goods;
- a reasonable reserve for contingencies.
Let \(c_j(h,r,t)\) be the cost of component \(j\) for household type \(h\), region \(r\), and time \(t\). The reference budget can then be expressed as
\[ B(h,r,t)=\sum_{j=1}^{J} c_j(h,r,t). \]
The value of \(B\) should not be fixed once and for all. The list of needs, quantities, qualities, and prices should be periodically reviewed because the object changes. This mechanism makes explicit an idea already implicit in the nutritional criticism of Hidalgo Víquez et al.: a standard constructed for a society of decades past does not automatically retain validity merely because it can be updated through prices.
Nor should the reference budget be constructed by isolated experts. A robust methodology would combine nutritional and health evidence, technical standards for housing and services, time-use and mobility surveys, price data, consumption studies, public deliberation, and validation with households from different social conditions. The normative dimension does not disappear by hiding it; it becomes more scientifically controllable when made explicit.
V.VI. Sixth component: material and social deprivation — which concrete needs cannot be satisfied?
A person may lie slightly above a monetary line and nevertheless lack essential conditions. Deprivations should therefore be measured directly. The European experience is illustrative: Eurostat uses a set of thirteen items for severe material and social deprivation, including the capacity to meet unexpected expenses, keep payments up to date, eat protein regularly, keep the dwelling in adequate condition, have access to transport when necessary, replace worn furniture or clothing, have an Internet connection, possess adequate footwear, make a small amount of personal expenditure, participate regularly in leisure activities, and meet socially with others (Eurostat, 2025c).
Costa Rica should not mechanically copy that list. It should construct its own on the basis of its concrete conditions. The principle, however, is valuable: to ask directly which material conditions cannot be sustained because of insufficient resources.
A deprivation vector can be defined as
\[ \mathbf{d}_i=(d_{i1},d_{i2},\ldots,d_{iJ}), \]
with \(d_{ij}=1\) if unit \(i\) suffers deprivation \(j\) because of insufficient resources and \(0\) otherwise. Rather than necessarily collapsing it into a weighted sum, the complete profile and the most frequent combinations of deprivation may be reported.
V.VII. Seventh component: stability and vulnerability — can the position attained be sustained?
A static classification may declare a household with income \(1.03z\) to be “non-poor” even though it has no savings, carries high debt, depends on temporary employment, and could immediately fall below \(z\) because of illness, a reduction in working hours, or an increase in rent. A temporal dimension should therefore be added.
Vulnerability can be investigated through variables such as:
- contractual stability and regularity of income;
- months of savings or liquid assets available to cover essential expenditure;
- debt service relative to disposable income;
- arrears in rent, mortgage, utilities, or loans;
- exposure to unforeseen medical expenses;
- existence of insurance or protection networks;
- dependence on a single income earner;
- recent income volatility;
- estimated probability of falling below \(z_R\) or \(B(h,r,t)\) under plausible shocks.
This dimension makes it possible to distinguish state from trajectory. The objective is not merely to know where the household is today, but whether its position constitutes stable reproduction or a temporary suspension of poverty.
V.VIII. Eighth component: employment, time, and effective access
Material reproduction does not depend solely on monetary income. Two households with the same income may face radically different time burdens. Time lost in commuting, the absence of care services, long working days, informality, partial unemployment, or unequal territorial access to services modify the real capacity to convert income into welfare.
For this reason, a survey oriented toward an economic crisis should include, where possible, hours of paid and unpaid work, transport time, underemployment, informality, access to care, job loss, reductions in working hours, and changes in the cost of essential services. This information does not replace income; it explains why similar incomes may correspond to different material conditions.
V.IX. Integrated architecture for the analytical survey
The proposal can be summarized without turning it into a single index. For each household \(i\), a profile would be constructed:
\[ \mathcal{P}_i= \big(H_i,\;PG_i,\;FGT_{2,i},\;Q_i,\;R_i,\;B_i,\;\mathbf d_i,\;V_i,\;T_i\big), \]
where:
| Component | Question answered |
|---|---|
| \(H\) | Is the unit below the threshold? How many are below it? |
| \(PG\) / \(FGT_1\) | How far below the threshold is it? |
| \(FGT_2\) | How severe is poverty, giving greater weight to deeper gaps? |
| \(Q\) | What position does it occupy within the income distribution? |
| \(G, L(p)\) | How is income or consumption distributed in society? |
| \(R\) | Is it below the relative threshold of equivalized disposable income? |
| \(B\) | Are its resources sufficient for the material-reproduction budget appropriate to its household? |
| \(\mathbf d\) | What concrete material and social deprivations does it experience? |
| \(V\) | How vulnerable is its position to shocks? |
| \(T\) | What costs of time, employment, and access condition everyday reproduction? |
In conceptual terms, it may be written, solely as a reminder of dimensions and not as a proposal for a synthetic index:
\[ \text{Poverty} = f\big( \text{incidence}, \text{gap}, \text{severity}, \text{deprivations}, \text{cost of reproduction}, \text{distributive position}, \text{temporal vulnerability}, \text{time and access} \big). \]
The function \(f\) need not necessarily be estimated to produce a scalar. The objective is to preserve the structured profile.
Levels of reading
The architecture can be organized into four levels:
- Incidence: who crosses or does not cross the relevant thresholds.
- Intensity and severity: what distance exists from those thresholds and how deep poverty is distributed.
- Material reproduction: which concrete goods, services, and capacities can actually be sustained.
- Stability: whether that reproduction can be maintained through time and ordinary shocks.
This sequence avoids confusing administrative improvement with material improvement.
V.X. Relation to the two initial alternatives
Alternative 1, consisting in the use of a UNECE/Eurostat-type relative criterion together with quintiles, retains value provided that the criterion is correctly formulated as a proportion of the median equivalized disposable income. Its strength is comparability and its sensitivity to society’s distributive standard. Its weakness is that it remains relative and may fall when society as a whole becomes poorer.
Alternative 2, consisting in readjusting the poverty standard through complementary information on costs, also retains value, but it must be transformed into a genuine reference budget. Private cost-of-living sources can contribute to the exploratory phase, to identifying expenditure items, and to comparing orders of magnitude; they should not constitute the sole foundation of the final value.
The superior solution is not to choose one and discard the other. It is to integrate them together with FGT measures, quantiles, Lorenz/Gini, direct deprivation, and vulnerability. The result preserves international comparability without sacrificing the historical materiality of needs.
V.XI. Minimum implementation rules
For the proposal not to remain merely a conceptual declaration, a rigorous application should observe at least the following rules:
- Explicit unit of analysis: distinguish person, household, and equivalent adult; report whenever the unit changes.
- Clearly defined income: separate gross income, net/disposable income, transfers, imputed rent, and extraordinary components.
- Documented equivalence scale: use an explicit rule for household size and composition and evaluate sensitivity to alternative scales.
- Regional and temporal prices: avoid allowing a single national or annual cost to conceal important spatial and seasonal differences.
- Uncertainty intervals: poverty rates, gaps, and quantiles are estimated from samples and should be accompanied by standard errors or intervals compatible with the complex survey design.
- Sensitivity analysis: show how results change under reasonable variations in \(z\), the equivalence scale, and the reference budget.
- Panel or retrospective information where feasible: stability requires temporal information; a cross-sectional snapshot does not adequately identify entries into and exits from poverty.
- Separation of description and causality: a survey can describe differences among groups; attributing causes requires additional design, temporality, controls, experimentation, or quasi-experimental strategies according to the problem.
- Transparency of normative decisions: what counts as a need, what minimum quality is adopted, and why should be publicly debatable and technically auditable.
- Do not confuse “not significant” with “nonexistent”: statistical inferences should consider power, measurement error, and sample size.
An income classification constructed in this way ceases to be a simple binary filter and becomes an analytical instrument capable of answering not only who is below, but how far below, along which dimensions, in what distributive position, with what stability, and relative to what historical-material standard.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The research began with an apparently technical problem: how to classify income level qualitatively in order to study the economic effects on different social groups. The analysis showed that the question cannot be adequately resolved through the routine selection of an already available poverty line, because every line contains an implicit theory of what counts as a need and of the material level separating poverty from non-poverty.
The first result is therefore gnoseological. A measurement may be arithmetically correct and conceptually insufficient. The fact that INEC consistently applies a methodology does not make the relation between that methodology and the object it seeks to capture immune from criticism. The instrument must be evaluated by its correspondence with the historical reality of social reproduction.
The second result is empirical and methodological. Heterogeneous cost-of-living sources should not be absolutized or presented as definitive demonstration, but their agreement may constitute valuable exploratory evidence. The scientifically superior procedure is to use those indications to design a confirmatory layer: an explicit, reproducible, and debatable reference budget grounded in nutrition, housing, transport, services, health, education, connectivity, care, social participation, and contingencies.
The third result concerns history. The exposition from slave and feudal forms of reproducing labor-power to capitalist wage labor has no ornamental function. It seeks to establish the genesis of the logic of minima and the recurrent structure that makes it intelligible. The cost of reproducing labor-power is a historical question; the content of that reproduction changes with society. Precisely for that reason, a basket cannot be turned into an anthropological constant updated only through prices.
The fourth result concerns reasoning under structures of power. Science cannot restrict itself to what leaves an easily accessible documentary trace, because some social objects include opacity, incentives to conceal, and informal relations. Intuition, abduction, and reasoning from clues are legitimate. But their legitimacy does not authorize turning every suspicion into a demonstrated fact. Rational justification and public demonstrability are different degrees, and a robust inference should indicate which part rests on direct evidence, which on indirect evidence, which on causal structure, and which remains open to new proof.
The fifth result concerns the relation among poverty, inequality, and growth. Their mathematical separability is indisputable; their historical independence is not. Algebraic counterexamples show what a definition permits, but they do not substitute for the study of real trajectories. China, Ghana, and Honduras show that poverty can fall while inequality rises, but they do so in contexts of growth. Jamaica shows that under very weak growth substantial reductions in poverty can occur, although its best-documented episodes include declining inequality, consumption growth, remittances, real wages, price changes, and/or divergences between real activity and measured GDP. Costa Rica in 2008-2009 shows, in turn, that over a short interval declining GDP per capita, rising Gini, and slightly declining poverty can be observed. The lesson is not to proclaim a universal impossibility, but to distinguish logical possibility, conjunctural episode, and sustained historical regularity.
The empirical hypothesis that emerges is that broad and persistent poverty reductions coexisting with rising concentration normally require sufficient expansion of average resources so that a smaller relative share may nevertheless correspond to a larger absolute quantity. That proposition is historically investigable and, consequently, should be formulated so that it can be refuted by real evidence.
Finally, no single scalar appears sufficient to represent the phenomenon. The headcount answers how many are below; the gap answers how far below; \(FGT_2\) answers how severe deep poverty is; Lorenz, Gini, and quantiles describe distribution; the relative threshold describes distance from the social standard; the reference budget describes the cost of material reproduction; deprivation measures describe concrete deficiencies; and vulnerability indicates whether a position can be sustained.
The scientific objective should not be to replace one absolute number with another absolute number and declare the problem closed. It should be to construct an instrument that preserves the dimensions necessary for reality not to disappear inside the classification.
A society does not cease to have poor people because some of them have administratively crossed a line. The relevant question is whether human beings possess, in a stable manner, the material resources and conditions that the historical development of that very society has made necessary to live, work, learn, care, participate, and realize their existence with dignity.
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Capitalism, socialism, and the State
Why is it said that the technological level for such a matter does not appear to exist (at least not in a generalized form in every society—and that is a detail of vital importance both analytically and practically)? The answer is related to the refutation of another idea widely disseminated throughout the last century and regarded by many unwary people as the irrefutable scientific-technical proof of the impossibility of Communism: namely, that socialist and even communist social relations of production existed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (depending on which “enlightened” person one happens to be speaking with). When capitalist social relations of production are discussed, it is possible to define them well (to situate them within a general and relatively precise theoretical framework—the precision will vary according to the aspect of reality analyzed and/or the theoretical framework employed by the researcher, which is the meaning of “well-defined” in Pure Mathematics). Does the same occur with “socialist” and/or “communist” social relations of production? Let us briefly review the theoretical-historical and empirical-historical evidence.
The work of Marx and Engels centers on a systematic critique (a systematic analysis oriented toward transforming reality) of the capitalist system of political economy, and there are only a very few and very brief passages in which Marx and Engels discuss some future non-capitalist mode of production (considering their mature works, beginning in the temporal neighborhood centered around the publication of The Poverty of Philosophy—the immediately preceding and following publications). In particular, in Volume II of Capital, Marx lays out rudimentary guidelines for an economic policy concerning surpluses and deficits of fixed assets in a society without private ownership of the means of production and without paper money (let no one imagine Tinbergen’s On the Theory of Economic Policy or anything of the sort; it is a paragraph of a few lines). Engels, in Anti-Dühring (a book positively cited in Lewontin and Levins’s The Dialectical Biologist—which contains in its opening pages a dedication to Friedrich Engels that reads, “To Friedrich Engels, who got a lot of things wrong but got what mattered right”—as well as in other works), argues that the law of value initially ceases to govern only labor power (under socialism) and subsequently the other commodities as well (under communism), being replaced in both cases by a new law according to which the value of commodities is determined by the social needs they satisfy; Engels also develops arguments clearly reinforcing this direction concerning the validity of the law of value in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific.
One cannot deny the furious anti-Marxists and anti-communists roaming about (and they are so dangerous because if they do not understand what Marxism is, still less do they understand what Socialism and Communism are) that the central cell—the progressive extinction of the law of value—exists and is defined. Yet surely even they cannot deny not only that it is minimally defined, but also that there is an enormous difference between a minimal cell and an organism functioning as a self-organized system (a phenomenon appearing in complex systems studied in the mathematical theory of complexity and consisting in the configuration of an order resulting from the interaction among the elements of an initially disordered system—the social state resulting from the resolution of crisis and the transition from one mode of production to another). As an example, the amount of time that elapsed before the first cell initiating life on Earth (since statistical simulations probabilistically indicate that this is how it happened) became a biological system as such was certainly not short.
Moreover, what social relations of production were implemented in the Soviet Union? Was labor power remunerated according to the social needs that it satisfied? What scientific-statistical methodology (and here the role of technological level begins to become visible) did they use to quantify those needs—which are not merely material but also spiritual[3], as Marx makes clear in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844? There was no private ownership of the means of production by persons considered as members of civil society, but there was paper money (where instead there should have existed some well-defined system of equivalence among commodities not subject to artificial fluctuations—not subject to price variation, since paper money and speculation do not exist—that faithfully reflected in exchange relations the technical conditions of production of the commodities being exchanged) and there was state private property (because it is a fact that members of the Communist Party did not live in the same way as the people—even so, the people had greater material dignity than under Western capitalism then and now, although the spiritual dimension remained unresolved; and greater material dignity was hardly detrimental to the people). Thus classes existed insofar as the enjoyment of the social product did not belong to those who produced it—this is the fundamental characteristic—but to the Soviet political class, which underwent bourgeoisification and transformed the Soviet State (beginning with Stalin) into what Marx described as political power, namely, “the organized power of one class for oppressing another” (in classless societies the State is merely an administrator; organs of war directed toward political—class—repression such as police and army do not even exist, because without class antagonisms political power also ceases to exist). This was so even though oppression in the material plane was far less forceful and intense than in the West, while ideologically it was less subtle—the West is more elegant in its methods; one need only ask Merkel about the microphones installed in her office by the Government of the United States that produced a diplomatic incident some years ago—and even foreign actors appeared near the collapse of the Soviet Union, for example the bank David Rockefeller opened in Moscow’s Red Square (which does not belong to the set of “conspiracy theories”; it is a well-documented fact that an elementary web search can verify).
Evidently, what existed in the Soviet Union was State Capitalism, a variant of the capitalist mode of production in which, as Borísov et al.’s dictionary of Political Economy states, it “constitutes a means of struggle against foreign capital, uproots the economic roots of its domination, helps strengthen and develop the national economy. The state sector increasingly stimulates the rapid rise of the productive forces and creates the economic premises for those countries to embark upon a non-capitalist path of development. In the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, state capitalism represents a special form of subordinating capitalist enterprises to the dictatorship of the proletariat, established in order to prepare the conditions for the socialist socialization of all production.” It may also be mixed in the sense that foreign private enterprises coexist with it (while their power over national society is limited) and/or in the sense that private ownership of the means of production is shared by the capitalist State together with domestic or foreign private enterprises (the latter is the case of Cuba, for example), while a case combining the types of state capitalism just mentioned is what occurs in Venezuela.
All this without yet mentioning that capitalism underwent an extremely extended process of birth, since its economic development preceded by centuries its political consolidation as the dominant mode of production. Medieval boroughs, commercial expansion, mercantile accumulation, and later manufacture prepared the material conditions of the new society over several centuries (a process traceable from the High Middle Ages and which long before 1789 had reached a degree of development sufficient to distinguish the bourgeoisie clearly as a historically ascending class). Nevertheless, it is reasonable to locate its decisive political crystallization in the French bourgeois revolution of 1789 and, as the emblematic milestone of that process, in the storming of the Bastille on July 14. What occurred there was not capitalism appearing out of nowhere—it had existed for a long time and was already developed and diffused to varying degrees throughout the known world of the time—but rather the great bourgeoisie decisively conquering political power and beginning consciously to transform institutions in accordance with the needs of the new social relations of production, a process subsequently expanded across much of Europe, including through the Napoleonic Wars. The date 1789 therefore expresses the political crystallization of a much longer material transformation, not the instantaneous birth of capitalist relations.
Of course, the advance of the new mode of social production was not linear. It is well known that France subsequently returned for a considerable period to constitutional monarchy because the feudal class temporarily regained power. Nor has it yet been mentioned that the Soviet Union found itself threatened by the West (not merely militarily—the fundamental factor driving it into the arms race—but ideologically as well—one of the factors determining the need to enter the space race), so the planning of its entire economic and social development had to be oriented under these two major constraints. It is no secret among those who knew the Soviet Union that calculations were still being made with abacuses in supermarkets while the country competed on equal footing with the United States in the space and nuclear races (even surpassing it in many respects, obviously at a high cost). In this sense, neither has it been mentioned that there are indications of substantial Soviet financial indebtedness to Western capital during at least the final period of its existence, precisely in order to finance the arms and space races.