Espartaco

“Is that to say we are against Free Trade? No, we are for Free Trade, because by Free Trade all economical laws, with their most astounding contradictions, will act upon a larger scale, upon the territory of the whole earth; and because from the uniting of all these contradictions in a single group, where they will stand face to face, will result the struggle which will itself eventuate in the emancipation of the proletariat.”

Karl Heinrich Marx · Marx-Engels Collected Works, Vol. VI, p. 290

EnglishEspañol

Tag: Hamiltonian Monte Carlo

  • Marx, Adam Smith, and the Law of Large Numbers

    Marx, Adam Smith, and the Law of Large Numbers

    A new research uses probability theory — and sixty years of U.S. economic data — to test one of the most consequential (and most overlooked) assumptions in political economy.


    The Assumption Hiding in Plain Sight

    If you’ve ever read a Marxist analysis of how profits equalize across industries, you’ve probably encountered something called the average rate of profit. The idea is straightforward: competition between capitalists drives different rates of profit in different sectors toward a common, system-wide average. This is one of the pillars of Marx’s theory of value in Capital, Volume III.

    But there’s a quieter assumption underneath this one — so quiet that most discussions never mention it explicitly. To arrive at a uniform profit rate, Marx first assumes a uniform rate of surplus value across all productive sectors. In plainer terms: he assumes that the degree to which workers are exploited — the ratio of unpaid labor to paid labor — is roughly the same everywhere, whether you work in steel manufacturing, food processing, or textiles.

    Adam Smith proposed this idea before Marx. Smith argued that if one job were obviously more exploitative (in the sense of yielding far more unpaid surplus per dollar of wages paid), workers and capital would flow toward or away from it until the differences vanished. Marx adopted this observation and, as scholar Jonathan Cogliano notes, elevated it to “the status of a central economic law” within his framework.

    Yet the assumption has been challenged from multiple directions — Marxist and non-Marxist alike. Is it actually justified? Or is it a convenient simplification that distorts our understanding of how capitalism works?

    José Mauricio Gómez Julián, of the Universidad Latina de Costa Rica, decided to approach the question from an unexpected angle: probability theory. His paper, published in Ciencia Económica (2022), asks whether the mathematical law that would need to hold for this assumption to be valid actually does hold — and then checks the answer against six decades of real-world data from the United States.


    The Mathematical Backbone: The Law of Large Numbers

    If you’ve taken any statistics course, you’ve likely met the Law of Large Numbers (LLN). It tells us that as you observe more and more instances of something random — coin flips, dice rolls, stock returns — the average of those observations settles down toward the true expected value.

    There are two versions:

    • The Weak Law (WLLN): With enough observations, the sample average is probably close to the expected value.
    • The Strong Law (SLLN): With enough observations, the sample average is almost certainly equal to the expected value — a much stronger guarantee.

    Gómez Julián’s insight is this: if you think of each productive sector of the economy as a random variable representing that sector’s rate of surplus value, then the LLN tells you what happens to the average across sectors as the number of sectors grows large. In mathematical language:

    • Strong Law: The probability that the average surplus-value rate across sectors equals the global expected value, in the limit, is exactly 1.
    • Weak Law: The probability that the average deviates from the global expected value by more than any tiny amount shrinks to zero.

    If either version holds, you get the result Marx needs: across a sufficiently large number of sectors, the rates of surplus value converge to a common value — uniformity, or at least a powerful tendency toward it.


    The Catch: Independence and Identical Distributions

    Here’s where things get interesting — and where the classical LLN hits a wall.

    The textbook version of the LLN requires two conditions:

    1. Independence: The random variables (sectoral surplus-value rates) must be statistically independent of each other.
    2. Identical distribution: Each variable must follow the same probability distribution.

    Neither condition holds for the real economy. And Gómez Julián is admirably upfront about this. Sectors are deeply intertwined — the steel industry depends on mining, manufacturing depends on steel, services depend on consumer spending powered by manufacturing wages. The idea that one sector’s surplus-value rate has no relationship to another’s is economically unrealistic. Furthermore, different industries have different cost structures, different labor intensities, and different technologies. There is no reason their surplus-value rates should follow the same statistical distribution.

    So does this kill the argument? Not at all. In fact, it’s the most intellectually interesting part of the paper.


    Non-Classical Varieties: When the Rules Relax

    Over the past several decades, mathematicians and econometricians have developed non-classical versions of the LLN that weaken or entirely drop the independence and identical-distribution requirements. Gómez Julián surveys several of these:

    • Li, Rao, and Wang (1995) showed the LLN holds for random variables arranged on a lattice structure under certain conditions — a structure that, as it happens, economic data naturally exhibits.
    • Adler and Rosalsky (1987) proved the law for weighted sums of independent, identically distributed random variables belonging to a normalized sum, generalizing the classical case.
    • Chen and Sung (2016) extended those results further: the variables no longer need to be identically distributed. They only need to be “stochastically dominated” by a single random variable, with certain weighting conditions.
    • Sung (2011) showed that the strong law can hold even when variables are dependent on each other, provided their probability moments (roughly, their averages and variability) satisfy certain finiteness conditions.

    The crucial point: these results collectively tell us that the LLN’s convergence conclusion can survive even when the classical assumptions are substantially violated — which is exactly the situation with sectoral surplus-value rates.

    Gómez Julián argues that the economic dynamics described by Smith — workers and capital moving between sectors in response to unequal advantages — are precisely the kind of compensatory dependence mechanism that these non-classical versions accommodate. The variables aren’t independent, but their dependence is structured in a way that still drives convergence.


    What the Data Actually Shows

    The theoretical argument is compelling, but Gómez Julián doesn’t stop there. He turns to sixty years of U.S. data (1960–2020), sourced from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), to see what the empirical evidence says.

    He calculates sectoral surplus-value rates using macroeconomic data on gross operating surplus (representing surplus labor time) and employee compensation (representing necessary labor time), following a standard operationalization of Marx’s categories. After carefully determining which sectors qualify as “productive” in the Marxist sense — a nontrivial task, since the service sector includes activities with very different relationships to surplus-value production — he arrives at 36 productive sectors.

    Here’s what the statistical analysis found:

    Finding 1: No Identical Distributions

    A probability distribution fitting exercise (using the Bayesian Information Criterion) revealed that the 36 sectors’ surplus-value rates follow a patchwork of different distributions — Log-Normal, Cauchy, Uniform, Weibull, and Logistic — with none following a normal distribution. The identical-distribution requirement of the classical LLN is not met.

    Finding 2: No Statistical Independence

    A Pearson correlation analysis across all 630 possible sector pairs yielded a mean correlation of about 0.08 and a median of about 0.14. While these may look small, a deeper cut reveals that roughly 40% of sector pairs have correlations of 0.3 or above — a level that’s practically meaningful. The sectors are not independent. This makes intuitive sense: industries are connected through supply chains, labor markets, and shared macroeconomic conditions.

    Finding 3: Differences Tend Toward Zero

    This is the key finding. When Gómez Julián computed the differences between each sector’s surplus-value rate and the global average (both the mean and the median), he found that these differences exhibit a strong tendency toward reciprocal nullification — positive differences roughly cancel out negative ones. The sum of all differences relative to the global mean was essentially zero (on the order of 10⁻¹⁴). The mean of differences relative to the global median was 0.0012 — vanishingly small.

    Distributional fitting on these differences revealed they follow a Cauchy distribution (when measured against the global mean) or a uniform distribution (against the global median), with the medians of these distributions sitting very close to zero.

    In plain language: sectors deviate from the average in different directions, and those deviations largely cancel each other out.


    Why This Matters

    Gómez Julián’s paper makes two types of contributions that are worth distinguishing:

    For Marxist political economy: If the uniformity assumption holds — even approximately, even as a tendency rather than an iron law — then a large body of research on the long-run behavior of the average rate of profit, both within countries and across the global economy, is on sounder footing than critics have suggested. Researchers studying the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (or not) can continue to work without needing to explicitly model sector-by-sector differences in exploitation rates, at least for aggregate, long-run analyses.

    For probability theory and economics: The paper demonstrates a productive intersection between a specific question in political economy and the deep mathematics of convergence theorems. It shows that the non-classical LLN theorems aren’t just abstract curiosities — they have direct relevance to understanding real economic phenomena. The structured dependence between economic sectors isn’t a bug that invalidates the mathematical framework; it’s a feature that the right version of the framework already accounts for.


    A Few Honest Caveats — And Why They No Longer Apply

    The original 2022 paper was unusually transparent about its limitations, and that transparency is one of its strengths. Rather than forcing the data into inappropriate statistical procedures, it openly acknowledged where the available inferential tools broke down.

    At the time, three important caveats remained.

    First, formal hypothesis testing had to be abandoned.

    The reason was purely statistical rather than economic. Classical inferential procedures—Student’s t tests, Wilcoxon tests, and most conventional non-parametric alternatives—are built on assumptions that the data simply did not satisfy. Sectoral surplus-value rates are neither independent nor identically distributed. They are linked through supply chains, technological change, capital mobility, and macroeconomic shocks. Even bootstrap procedures could not fully solve the problem because ordinary resampling may weaken dependence between resamples while leaving the internal dependence structure fundamentally unchanged. Consequently, the 2022 paper relied primarily on descriptive statistics together with probability-theoretic arguments instead of formal significance testing.

    Second, the classification of productive sectors inevitably involved theoretical judgment.

    Although the paper carefully justified the inclusion and exclusion of economic activities using Marxian categories and modern national accounting, reasonable scholars could still debate where certain services belong within the circuit of capital.

    Third, the empirical evidence came exclusively from the United States.

    The descriptive regularities were remarkably strong, but demonstrating that the same convergence mechanism operates under different institutional settings naturally remained an empirical question.

    Those were genuine limitations in 2022.

    Today, however, the first—and arguably the most important—of them has largely been overcome.

    A much more comprehensive methodological paper (Gómez Julián, 2026; SSRN 5172185) develops an entirely new inferential framework specifically designed for exactly the type of data that made the original analysis difficult: dependent, heterogeneous, and unbalanced observations. Instead of trying to force classical statistical tests to work outside the assumptions under which they were derived, the newer paper constructs hypothesis testing from the ground up for this class of problems.

    The key innovation is recognizing that the convergence of sectoral surplus-value rates is fundamentally a law-of-large-numbers problem under dependence, not an independent-samples problem. The framework therefore combines three complementary asymptotic structures—triangular arrays (TAC), correlation-weighted sums (WSC), and mixingale processes (MPC)—which respectively model hierarchical dependence, contemporaneous intersectoral dependence, and temporal dependence. Rather than treating these as competing approaches, the paper proves conditions under which they become metrically equivalent and therefore support the same inferential conclusions.

    The inferential consequences are substantial.

    Instead of abandoning significance testing because dependence invalidates classical procedures, the new framework explicitly extends the Neyman-Pearson paradigm to dependent observations, derives dependence-aware confidence regions, establishes rigorous Type I error control under strong-mixing assumptions, and integrates Bayesian and frequentist inference into a single coherent architecture. Robust procedures—including fixed-b heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-robust inference, block bootstrap techniques that preserve dependence, adaptive conformal inference, composite and Whittle likelihoods, and hierarchical Bayesian estimation—serve as mutually reinforcing validation mechanisms rather than isolated alternatives.

    In other words, what had been acknowledged as a methodological limitation in the 2022 paper became the central research question of the later work.

    Rather than concluding that inference was impossible under dependence, the subsequent research asks a more fundamental question: what should hypothesis testing look like when dependence is the normal state of the data rather than an exception? The result is a unified inferential framework specifically intended for datasets that violate the assumptions of classical statistics—precisely the situation encountered with sectoral surplus-value rates.

    The other caveats remain, although they are considerably less problematic than before. The classification of productive sectors continues to depend on theoretical interpretation, because that issue belongs to political economy rather than statistics. Likewise, expanding the empirical analysis to additional countries remains a desirable avenue for future research. Yet the principal statistical objection—that no valid inferential procedure existed for dependent sectoral data—has now been directly addressed through a purpose-built mathematical framework.

    Looking back, the 2022 paper can therefore be read as identifying an important statistical obstacle, while the later work attempts to remove it. Together, the two papers form a coherent research program: first demonstrating that the convergence hypothesis is theoretically plausible and descriptively supported, and then developing the inferential machinery required to test that hypothesis rigorously without relying on unrealistic assumptions of independence or identical distributions.


    Gómez Julián, J.M. (2022). Sobre la validez del supuesto de uniformidad en las tasas de plusvalía sectorial desde la teoría de las probabilidades. Ciencia Económica, 11(17). DOI: 10.22201/fe.24484962e.2022.11.17.2

    Gómez Julián, J.M. (2026). Hypothesis Testing for Dependent Variables with Unbalanced Data: A Unified Framework: Theory, Robustness, and Software. SSRN Electronic Journal. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.5172185.

  • When the Whole Is All You See: A Bayesian Way to Recover the Parts with BayesianDisaggregation

    When the Whole Is All You See: A Bayesian Way to Recover the Parts with BayesianDisaggregation

    You can also find this library at CRAN and download it directly from R and RStudio.

    You have a national Consumer Price Index. It is a single number per year. What you actually want is the price index for each sector of the economy — manufacturing, services, agriculture, construction — because those individual paths are what your model, your policy analysis, or your investment thesis really needs. You know how the sectors combine into the whole: the weights are public, or at least knowable. What you do not know is the sectoral numbers themselves. You only ever see their weighted sum.

    This is the disaggregation problem. It sounds like bookkeeping. It is actually a quietly profound statistical question, and the R package BayesianDisaggregation — built by José Mauricio Gómez Julián — tackles it with a degree of intellectual honesty that is rare in software. This post is a deep, plain-language tour of what the package does, why it works the way it does, and what it teaches about building statistical tools that tell the truth.

    If you want to follow along with the code, the project’s wiki has installation instructions, function references, and worked examples. This post deliberately stays code-free so the ideas come through.


    The problem, precisely

    Let’s make it concrete. You observe an aggregate index — call it the CPI — over T years. You also have a matrix of weights W: for each year and each of K sectors, W tells you that sector’s share of the total. The weights sum to one within each year. The aggregate is, up to measurement noise, the weighted sum of the latent sectoral indices:

    CPI at year t ≈ the weighted sum of the K sectoral indices, using that year’s weights.

    The goal: recover the K sectoral indices — call them φ — from the single aggregate series and the known weights.

    Here is the catch, and it is the entire heart of the matter. At every single year, the aggregate pins down one linear combination of the K sectors. The remaining K−1 directions are completely unconstrained by the data. With four sectors, you have one equation and four unknowns per year. The system is, in a precise mathematical sense, under-determined.

    This is not a numerical annoyance you can engineer away. It is structural. Any method that hands you a single, sharp sectoral path from an aggregate alone is, whether it admits it or not, smuggling in assumptions to fill the gap — and most methods do not tell you how much of the answer is data and how much is assumption.

    The question is not can you disaggregate. You always can. The question is: can you do it honestly, showing your work, and carrying the right amount of uncertainty forward?


    The wrong way: a cautionary tale

    The first version of the package — the 0.1.x line — advertised “MCMC-free Bayesian disaggregation.” The pitch was appealing: no slow Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling, just clean closed-form math. The implementation used a family of deterministic update rules — weighted, multiplicative, Dirichlet, adaptive — over the prior weight matrix.

    It did not work. Not in the sense of crashing. In the much more dangerous sense of appearing to work while silently not doing the one thing it claimed to do.

    The package’s own author, in a moment of radical honesty that is worth pausing on, audited the 0.1.x family and catalogued six foundational defects, labeled F1 through F6:

    • F1 — the aggregate never entered the computation. The “posterior” was derived entirely from the prior weight matrix. The actual observed CPI — the one piece of real evidence — was never used. The method was not conditioning on data; it was rearranging priors.
    • F2 — the Dirichlet concentration cancelled on renormalization. A parameter that was supposed to control how concentrated the sectoral estimates were simply vanished in the algebra when weights were normalized to sum to one.
    • F3 — the temporal pattern cancelled too. A component meant to encode smoothness over time also disappeared in the renormalization.
    • F4 — the “efficiency” term was a fixed constant. It looked like a data-dependent quality score; it was actually invariant.
    • F5 — there were no recovery tests. No one had ever generated synthetic data with a known truth and checked whether the method got it back.
    • F6 — a correlation helper cheated. It computed both Pearson and Spearman correlation and reported whichever was larger, a form of silent data-snooping.

    The most damning of these is F1. A Bayesian method that does not condition on data is not a Bayesian method. It is a deterministic transformation dressed in Bayesian vocabulary. And the worst part is that it looked reasonable — it returned numbers, they moved in plausible directions, and nothing crashed.

    The author’s response is, I think, the most important thing about this whole project. Rather than patching the defects one by one — adding the CPI here, fixing the concentration there — the author recognized that the foundational problem (not using the data) cannot be fixed within a deterministic re-weighting framework. The fix is not a patch. The fix is a fundamentally different model: one in which the aggregate enters as genuine evidence.

    So the entire 0.1.x family was deleted. Every function — bayesian_disaggregate(), compute_L_from_P(), spread_likelihood(), the four update rules, the grid search, the save function, the cheating correlation helper — all of it, gone. In its place: two Bayesian engines that actually condition on the data. The package version jumped to 0.2.0, the DESCRIPTION was edited to remove any claim of novelty, and the documentation was rewritten to be explicit about what was removed and why.

    This is what intellectual honesty in software looks like. It is not common. We should notice it when it happens.


    The right idea: the aggregate as evidence

    The conceptual move is simple to state and deep in consequence. Instead of treating the relationship between the aggregate and the sectors as a renormalization identity — a bit of algebra you apply after the fact — treat it as an observation density. The aggregate CPI is data. It is evidence about the latent sectors. The model should condition on it.

    In the package’s canonical engine, this means: the latent sectoral indices φ evolve over time as a random walk with drift, and the observed CPI is generated from the weighted sum of the sectors with some observation noise. The aggregate is not a constraint imposed after estimation; it is the likelihood. The sectors come out the other side as a posterior distribution — not a single number, but a full cloud of plausible values with credible intervals.

    This is the difference between solving an equation and updating beliefs in light of evidence. The first gives you a point. The second gives you a distribution. And as we will see, the distribution is the whole point.


    Two engines, one trade-off

    The package offers two ways to do the Bayesian inference, and the choice between them is a clean, well-explained trade-off between richness and exactness.

    The state-space MCMC engine

    This is the canonical, full-featured model. The sectoral indices live in log space, which guarantees they stay positive — a natural constraint for price indices that a model in raw levels could violate. Each sector’s log-index follows a random walk with its own drift and its own innovation scale (the amount of jitter per period).

    Two layers of hierarchical structure make this more than K independent random walks:

    • Partial pooling on the drift. Each sector has its own drift, but the drifts are drawn from a common distribution. This means sectors share information about their average growth rate without being forced to be identical — the classic shrinkage trade-off.
    • Partial pooling on the innovation scale. Similarly, each sector’s volatility is drawn from a shared distribution. Sectors borrow strength in estimating how jittery they are.

    The initial cross-section — the starting levels of the sectors at the first period — is anchored at the aggregate level with an estimable dispersion parameter. This is a subtle but important point. In the old, broken 0.1.x family, the “concentration” parameter was supposed to control how spread out the sectors were, but it cancelled in the algebra and had no effect. In the new model, the dispersion is a genuine parameter that the data and priors can actually estimate. It does not cancel. It does real work.

    Finally, the observation: the CPI is modeled as coming from a Student-t distribution centered at the weighted sum of the sectors, with an estimable scale. The Student-t (rather than a Gaussian) makes the model robust to outliers in the aggregate — a heavy-tailed observation can be accommodated without wrecking the fit. If you prefer, you can switch to a plain Gaussian observation.

    Because this model is not conjugate — the log transform, the Student-t, and the hierarchical structure break the neat algebra that would allow a closed-form solution — it is fit by Hamiltonian Monte Carlo via Stan (using either the cmdstanr or rstan backend). HMC is the gold standard for this kind of model: it handles the correlated, high-dimensional parameter space efficiently and comes with reliable diagnostics. The package runs four chains by default, checks the R-hat convergence statistic and the number of divergent transitions, and returns posterior draws of every sectoral index at every period.

    The closed-form conjugate engine

    The second engine is the linear-Gaussian counterpart. The sectoral indices evolve as a random walk in levels (not logs), and the aggregate is observed with Gaussian noise. This model is conjugate, which means its exact posterior can be computed in closed form — no MCMC, no sampling, no convergence diagnostics. The tool is the Kalman filter combined with the Rauch-Tung-Striebel smoother: the filter passes forward through time, updating beliefs about the sectors given each new CPI observation, and the smoother passes backward, refining those beliefs using future information.

    If you want joint posterior draws — not just the smoothed means and variances, but actual correlated samples from the full posterior — the package uses the Durbin-Koopman simulation smoother, a elegant technique that produces draws with the correct cross-time and cross-sector covariance structure. These draws are not marginal approximations; they are genuine samples from the joint posterior.

    This engine is the “correct realization of the original MCMC-free posterior idea.” The 0.1.x family wanted a closed-form Bayesian answer; the problem was not that closed-form is un-Bayesian (conjugacy is perfectly Bayesian), but that the old method did not use the data. This engine uses the data — the aggregate enters as the observation equation — and it does so in exact, closed form.

    The trade-off is explicit and documented. The closed-form engine buys you speed and mathematical exactness. It costs you three things: positivity (levels can drift slightly negative, which logs prevent), robustness (Gaussian observations are sensitive to outliers, which the Student-t handles), and the cross-sector hierarchy (there is no partial pooling in the linear-Gaussian model). The MCMC engine buys you all three of those, at the cost of sampling.

    Both engines return the same thing: an array of posterior draws of the sectoral indices, with dimensions [periods × sectors × draws], plus summary tables of medians and 95% credible bands.


    The honesty at the center: weak identification

    Here is where the package earns its deepest respect. It would be tempting, after building a real Bayesian model that conditions on the data, to declare victory and hand users sharp sectoral estimates. The package does not do this. Instead, it is explicit about a fact that most disaggregation methods gloss over: the sectoral split is only weakly identified.

    Remember the under-determination: at each period, the aggregate pins down one linear combination of the K sectors. The remaining K−1 directions are governed by the prior — the cross-sectional dispersion and the temporal smoothness — not by the data. This means the posterior intervals for individual sectors are wide, and they are influenced by the prior. This is not a bug. It is not a limitation to be engineered away. It is the correct representation of what the data can and cannot tell you.

    The package’s own recovery tests — which generate synthetic data from the model’s own data-generating process, where the true sectoral paths are known — confirm this directly. The aggregate is recovered essentially perfectly: the correlation between the fitted aggregate and the true aggregate is above 0.95, often essentially 1.0. The aggregate is strongly identified. But the sectoral coverage — the fraction of times the true sectoral path falls within the 95% credible band — is around 0.84, with the bands being deliberately wide. The test asserts that coverage exceeds 0.70, a conservative threshold, because the package refuses to claim sectoral precision that the data cannot deliver.

    This is “rigour by layers”: assert tightly what is identified, assert conservatively what is not. It would be easy to tune the prior to produce narrower, more impressive-looking bands. The package deliberately does not.


    Why the full posterior matters: propagating uncertainty

    If the sectoral estimates are uncertain — wide bands, prior-influenced — then what good are they? This is where the design of the package reveals its purpose. The sectoral indices are not the final product. They are input to a downstream model. In the author’s research program, they feed a nested Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model of price gravitation. But the principle is general: any time a disaggregated estimate feeds a second-stage analysis, the uncertainty in the first stage should flow into the second.

    The package handles this by multiple imputation, following Rubin’s rules. Each posterior draw of the sectoral indices is treated as one imputation — one plausible version of the truth. The downstream model is fit once per imputation, and the results are combined. The effect is that the weak per-sector identification — the wide bands, the prior influence — is carried forward into the downstream uncertainty intervals rather than being discarded. You do not plug in a point estimate and pretend it is the truth. You plug in the whole cloud and let the cloud’s shape propagate.

    The package’s documentation is candid about a consequence: because disaggregation is under-determined, the random-walk smoother prior dilutes the reversion signal, biasing the downstream reversion speed toward slowness by a modest, quantified amount (roughly 13–26%). Crucially, the direction is conservative — the true gravitation is at least as fast as reported — and the fraction of missing information that is propagated is about 0.4. This is not hidden. It is measured, reported, and flagged as a property of honest under-determination.

    A sharp contrast: an ad-hoc method that simply added noise to a point estimate did not produce proper imputations and gave sub-nominal coverage when routed through Rubin’s rules. The coherent posterior from the conjugate engine — the one that actually conditions on the data — did. The mathematics of multiple imputation demands proper posterior draws; garbage in, garbage out.


    How it is validated

    The package’s validation strategy is worth studying because it embodies a philosophy: test the identified quantity tightly, test the unidentified quantity conservatively, and test the computation itself exactly.

    Three layers, kept deliberately separate:

    Smoke tests run always, on every check. They confirm that both engines compile, sample, and return the correct [periods × sectors × draws] array structure on synthetic data. They catch breakage.

    Recovery tests are gated behind an environment flag because they require actually compiling and sampling the Stan model, which is slow. They generate data from the model’s own data-generating process — the same random walk with drift, the same partial pooling, the same aggregate observation — so the true sectoral paths are known. Then they check: does the aggregate come back essentially perfectly? (Yes, correlation above 0.95.) Do the sectoral bands cover the truth at a reasonable rate? (Yes, above 0.70, honestly wide.) The recovery test is well-posed because the simulator uses the same process as the model. If the model cannot recover its own data, something is wrong with the sampler or the implementation. If it can, you have a meaningful baseline.

    Golden tests run always and are the most stringent. They use Stan’s generate_quantities function — which deterministically recomputes derived quantities from frozen parameter draws, with no random number generation involved — and demand a bit-for-bit match against a frozen reference output. This catches any change to the model’s computed quantities: if someone edits the Stan code and the log-likelihood values shift by even one bit, the test fails. The reference fixture is generated by the same code path, isolating the CSV serialization so the comparison is exact.

    This is not the “does it run?” school of testing. It is the “does it compute the right thing, and does it compute exactly the same thing tomorrow?” school.


    Where it sits among existing methods

    The package is careful — almost unusually careful — about situating itself relative to the existing literature. It makes no claim of being the first or only solution to this problem. The documentation uses the phrase “we did not find” rather than “we are the first,” and the DESCRIPTION file was explicitly edited to remove any “novel/original” claim.

    The adjacent traditions, and what each misses:

    Biproportional balancing (RAS, IPF) iteratively scales a matrix to match new margins. It is deterministic: no posterior, no credible intervals, no treatment of the aggregate as evidence. It is a useful accounting tool, not an inference method.

    Temporal disaggregation (Denton, Chow-Lin, Fernández) distributes a low-frequency aggregate to higher frequency using an indicator series. This is a temporal problem — splitting annual into quarterly — not a cross-sectional one. It assumes you already have the sectoral decomposition and just need finer time resolution.

    Forecast reconciliation (MinT and related methods) projects inconsistent hierarchical forecasts onto a coherent subspace. It is forecast-centric and linear-algebraic: it corrects forecasts that do not add up, rather than recovering latent components from an aggregate by Bayesian updating.

    Compositional or Dirichlet state-space models evolve simplex weights over time. They model how shares move, not how the components themselves are recovered conditioned on their weighted sum.

    Each tradition addresses a real problem. None, as far as the package’s author could find, does exactly this: recover latent cross-sectional components from a single aggregate by conditioning on it as a genuine observation density and returning a posterior that can be propagated downstream. The claim is narrow and checkable, not sweeping.


    The data pipeline

    The package is not just a model; it is a usable tool. It includes hardened readers for the real inputs. A CPI reader pattern-matches on column headers (in English or Spanish — it recognizes “date,” “fecha,” “year,” “año” for the time column and “cpi,” “indice,” “price” for the value column), parses localized number formats (European-style decimals and thousands separators), collapses duplicate years by averaging, and returns a clean, sorted data frame. A weights reader loads a sector-by-year table, normalizes weights to the simplex within each year, and handles missing entries gracefully.

    An alignment function intersects the years covered by the CPI and the weights, ensuring both cover the same periods before either engine runs. A convenience wrapper reads both files and runs the disaggregation in one call. And a simulator generates synthetic data from the model’s own data-generating process — the same random walk with drift, the same partial pooling, the same aggregate observation — so that recovery tests, examples, and exploratory analysis are always well-posed.

    One data note worth flagging, because it is a common error: the model works in index levels, not rates of change. Feeding a percent-change series (inflation rate) instead of a level series (the CPI itself) is a category error — the aggregate would not be on the same scale as the weighted sum of the sectors. The CPI must be a level series, re-indexed to the same base as whatever the sectors will be compared against.


    The bigger lesson

    You could read this package as a technical contribution: a Bayesian state-space model for disaggregation with two engines, honest uncertainty, and a propagation contract. That reading is correct but incomplete.

    The deeper lesson is about how to build statistical software that tells the truth. The 0.1.x family did not fail by crashing. It failed by producing plausible-looking output that did not depend on the data. That is the most dangerous failure mode in statistics, because there is no error message. The numbers look reasonable. The plots look smooth. Nothing warns you that the entire computation is a rearrangement of priors.

    The author caught it — caught it in their own work, which is harder than catching it in someone else’s — by doing the unglamorous thing: generating data with a known truth and checking whether the method recovered it. When it did not, they did not patch. They deleted and rebuilt. And then they documented the deletion, in public, with the defects labeled and explained, so that anyone reading the history would understand not just what changed but why.

    The resulting package has a quality that is hard to name but easy to feel when you read the source: every design choice has a reason, every reason is documented, and the documentation is honest about what the method can and cannot do. The aggregate is strongly identified; the sectors are weakly identified; the uncertainty is wide and prior-influenced; and all of that is surfaced, not hidden, because the whole point is to carry that uncertainty forward rather than fake it away.

    In a field where it is tempting to claim sharp results from sparse data, this is a quiet act of integrity. The package does not solve the under-determination. Nothing can. It does something better: it honors it, by returning the wide, honest, propagatable posterior that the data actually supports.


    The package, its source code, installation instructions, and full function reference are on GitHub, with extended documentation in the wiki. It is MIT-licensed and written in R, with the MCMC engine powered by Stan.

  • When the Textbook Test Fails: How HTDV Brings Rigor to Dependent, Unbalanced Data

    When the Textbook Test Fails: How HTDV Brings Rigor to Dependent, Unbalanced Data

    You can also find this library at CRAN and download it directly from R and RStudio.

    The problem hiding in your data

    Picture a straightforward question: Is the average inflation rate in the United States meaningfully different from zero? You have monthly data going back decades. A classical t-test would seem like the natural tool — and it would be quietly, systematically wrong.

    The reason is that inflation figures do not bounce around independently. January’s number carries information about February’s. This autocorrelation corrupts the standard error that the t-test relies on, inflating the false-positive rate well beyond the nominal 5% you think you are signing up for. The same problem afflicts yield spreads, stock returns, sectoral profitability, regional employment — virtually any real-world time series you might want to compare.

    Now make it harder. The two groups you are comparing have different sample sizes — one sector has twenty years of data, another only five. The data may have heavy tails you cannot rule out. And your sample is finite, which means the asymptotic guarantees printed in your econometrics textbook are promises that may not have been kept yet.

    This is the terrain HTDV was built for. Short for Hypothesis Testing for Dependent Variables with Unbalanced Data, HTDV is an R package that answers a deceptively simple question — do these dependent, possibly unequally-sized samples come from the same population? — under the worst combination of conditions an applied statistician is likely to encounter.

    The central idea: triangulation, not trust

    The most common approach to dependent data is to reach for a single robust method — a heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard error, say, or a block bootstrap — and hope it is calibrated. HTDV takes a structurally different stance: run three independent inferential methods in parallel and expose the disagreement between them as a signal.

    The three layers are:

    1. A hierarchical Bayesian fit via Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC), implemented in Stan. This layer builds a full probability model of the data-generating process, places weakly informative priors on the dependence parameters, and produces a posterior distribution for the quantity of interest.
    2. A fixed-bandwidth HAR Wald test in the frequentist tradition of Kiefer and Vogelsang (2005). Rather than letting the bandwidth grow with the sample in the usual way, it holds the bandwidth at a fixed fraction of the sample size. This produces a non-standard asymptotic distribution that is better calibrated in finite samples than the conventional chi-square approximation.
    3. A stationary block bootstrap (Politis and Romano, 1994) with automatic block-length selection (Patton, Politis, and White, 2009). This resamples the data in blocks long enough to preserve the dependence structure, then constructs confidence intervals from the resampled distribution.

    A fourth, distribution-free layer — adaptive conformal inference (Gibbs and Candès, 2021) — is available for online prediction settings where no parametric assumption is palatable.

    The logic is forensic. Where all three layers agree, your conclusion is robust. Where they disagree, the pattern of disagreement tells you something specific about your data. If the Bayesian interval is dramatically wider than the HAR or bootstrap interval, your series likely has strong temporal persistence, and the asymptotic critical values that HAR and bootstrap rely on are losing their reliability. That gap is not a bug — it is the most informative thing the framework can show you.

    Why a single method is not enough

    It is fair to ask: if the Bayesian layer is the most reliable, why not just use it and discard the others? The answer is that each layer has a regime where it is the appropriate tool, and the framework’s job is to make the regime visible.

    HAR inference is computationally cheap — sub-second on typical data — and well-calibrated when persistence is low to moderate and sample sizes are large enough for asymptotics to bite. The block bootstrap shares those advantages while making fewer distributional assumptions. The Bayesian layer is the most computationally expensive (each fit can take tens of seconds) but is the only one that maintains nominal calibration under strong persistence at finite sample sizes, because it models the dependence explicitly rather than relying on asymptotic corrections.

    The package ships with a pre-registered factorial Monte Carlo study — 1,024 cells crossing sample size, autocorrelation, tail heaviness, imbalance ratio, and location shift, with 500 replications per cell across all three inferential layers — and the results are unambiguous. The Bayesian layer holds nominal size (mean 0.056 against a target of 0.05) and nominal coverage (mean 0.944 against a target of 0.95) across the entire grid. HAR and bootstrap, by contrast, inflate dramatically in the worst corners: under strong persistence and small samples, HAR’s empirical rejection rate under the null reaches 0.60, and its coverage drops to 0.29.

    The narrowness of the HAR and bootstrap intervals in those corners is not a sign of precision. It is a sign of miscalibration — the intervals are confidently wrong.

    The theory that holds it together

    Running three different methods on the same data and comparing the answers is sound practice, but it raises a mathematical question: under what conditions are the three methods even addressing the same inferential target? A Bayesian posterior on a triangular-array likelihood and a HAR-Wald statistic on a mixingale process are, on their face, different objects.

    HTDV’s theoretical backbone is a metric equivalence theorem that resolves this concern. The framework identifies three structurally distinct ways real-world data can violate the independence assumption — each corresponding to a different law-of-large-numbers regime:

    • Triangular Arrays Convergence (TAC): information accumulates through hierarchical aggregation. Think of input-output tables disaggregated into ever-finer sectors, where each “row” of the array adds more observations.
    • Weighted Sums with Correlation (WSC): the observations share a cross-sectional covariance structure. Regional markets that move together, trade flows between linked economies.
    • Mixingale Process Convergence (MPC): temporal memory that decays smoothly over time. Forecast errors, model residuals, prediction intervals that gradually lose contact with the past.

    The theorem proves that, under α-mixing with polynomial decay rate γ > 1 and finite moment conditions, these three regimes induce strictly equivalent metrics on the space of hypothesis-testing problems. The equivalence comes with explicit, computable finite-sample constants — exposed by the function htdv_equivalence_constants() — that tell you the maximum slack when translating a conclusion from one regime to another. For typical parameter values (γ = 2, q = 6, n = 500), the conversion slack is about 18%, a margin that is usually irrelevant for a hypothesis-testing decision.

    This is what makes the three-layer architecture mathematically well-defined rather than merely pragmatic. Without the equivalence theorem, comparing a Bayesian result on a TAC dataset with a HAR result on a WSC dataset would be comparing apples and oranges. The theorem certifies that the metrics are coercible to one another with computable error.

    The dependence assumption, plainly

    The framework assumes that the data are α-mixing with polynomial decay — meaning that the statistical dependence between observations dies off as they get farther apart in time, and it does so fast enough (at a rate faster than 1/k) that the long-range correlations are summable. This is a mild condition satisfied by most stationary time series in econometrics and finance, including ARMA processes, GARCH models, and a broad class of Markov chains.

    It is not satisfied by long-memory processes (where dependence decays more slowly than 1/k) or by unit-root processes (where dependence does not decay at all). The framework is honest about these limitations: it will fit near-unit-root data, but the posterior will widen correspondingly — which is the correct answer. For explicit unit-root testing, the standard ADF or Phillips-Perron tools remain the right choice.

    The Bayesian engine

    The hierarchical Bayesian core fits Stan models via the No-U-Turn Sampler (NUTS), the state-of-the-art Hamiltonian Monte Carlo variant. The models are parameterized around an AR(1) structure — the mean θ, the autocorrelation φ, and the innovation scale σ — with hierarchical priors on the dependence nuisance parameters that are weakly informative enough to respect admissible ranges without overwhelming the data.

    Five likelihood backends are available, corresponding to the three convergence regimes plus two parametric likelihood families: the Whittle likelihood (which works in the frequency domain, comparing the observed periodogram to a theoretical spectral density) and the composite likelihood (which works in the time domain, combining conditional densities over short blocks). Both are well-established in the time-series literature; the choice between them depends on whether you have more confidence in your spectral model or your conditional density model.

    A distinctive feature is the Berger-robust envelope — a method for combining posteriors across multiple fitted models into a single, wider posterior that hedges against the worst-likelihood-specification scenario. If you are unsure whether the Whittle or composite likelihood better describes your data, the envelope gives you an inferential answer that is honest about that uncertainty rather than forcing an arbitrary choice.

    After sampling, every fit must pass a five-gate diagnostic check before its posterior is admissible: split-R̂ below 1.01, bulk and tail effective sample sizes above 400, zero post-warmup divergences, and energy Bayesian fraction of missing information (E-BFMI) above 0.3. These are the standard HMC convergence diagnostics from the Stan ecosystem, enforced as a gate rather than offered as a suggestion.

    The validation: visible in the data

    The most compelling aspect of HTDV is that it does not merely claim to be well-calibrated — it ships the evidence. Two validation datasets are bundled with the package.

    The first is the factorial simulation described above, with its 3,069-row summary table accessible as a package dataset. The headline finding — that the Bayesian layer is the only one maintaining nominal calibration across the full design — is not an assertion but a reproducible fact. The full study took 31 hours on a 16-core workstation; the scripts to regenerate it from scratch are shipped in the package repository.

    The second is a set of three external benchmarks against published references on public-source data:

    • Post-1984 US CPI inflation, compared against Stock and Watson (2007).
    • Shiller’s log-CAPE ratio, compared against Campbell and Shiller (1998).
    • The US–Canada 10-year yield differential, compared against the naive iid Welch baseline.

    All three layers reproduce all three references with agreement in every case. But the width of the agreement tells the real story. The interval widths scale monotonically with the persistence of the underlying series. At moderate persistence (φ ≈ 0.45, the inflation series), the Bayesian interval is actually narrower than HAR — 0.81 times its width. At high persistence (φ ≈ 0.97, the CAPE series), the Bayesian interval is 2.8 times wider. At near-unit-root persistence (φ ≈ 0.99, the yield differential), it is 15 times wider.

    This gradient is the framework’s central empirical finding. Both layers are technically asymptotically valid. Only the Bayesian layer accounts honestly for the finite-sample uncertainty inflation that occurs as φ approaches 1. The HAR and bootstrap intervals do not widen because they know more — they fail to widen because their asymptotic critical values have not yet caught up with the data.

    When to use it — and when not to

    HTDV is the right tool when your data are time-dependent or spatially dependent, when your samples are of unequal size, when you suspect heavy tails but cannot rule them out, and when you need an inferential answer (a test or an interval) rather than a prediction. It is particularly valuable when the stakes are high enough that you want your conclusion to survive methodological scrutiny — the framework ships its own validation evidence precisely so that a reviewer can interrogate the calibration claims rather than taking them on faith.

    It is the wrong tool when your data are genuinely independent with finite variance — classical methods are simpler, equivalent, and faster. It is also not designed for long-memory processes, explicit unit-root testing, structural breaks (unless you segment the sample first), or forecasting. The framework is built for hypothesis testing and parameter estimation under uncertainty, not for predictive accuracy.

    An open architecture

    The package exposes its full infrastructure: the simulation engine (htdv_simstudy()), the equivalence constants calculator, the diagnostic suite, the posterior-predictive checks on dependence statistics, and the decision tools — ROPE-based decisions (Kruschke, 2018), bridge-sampling Bayes factors, WAIC and leave-future-out cross-validation, and predictive stacking (Yao, Vehtari, Simpson, and Gelman, 2018). Every function is documented with its underlying reference, so the user can trace any method back to its source.

    The complete function reference, mathematical foundations, tutorial walkthroughs (oriented toward novices, applied statisticians, and mathematicians respectively), and the full validation narrative are in the HTDV Wiki on GitHub. The package is installed with a single command — remotes::install_github("IsadoreNabi/HTDV") — and requires rstan as its only hard dependency.

    The larger point

    HTDV embodies a methodological philosophy worth stating explicitly: when no single inferential method is universally valid in the finite-sample regime, the honest response is not to pick the best one and hide its limitations, but to run several and make the disagreement visible. The framework’s value is not that it always gives you a narrower interval or a more powerful test. Its value is that it shows you — concretely, quantitatively — where your inference is on solid ground and where it is standing on asymptotic ice.

    The validation evidence makes this concrete. In 98% of the simulation cells, the Bayesian layer alone passes the calibration benchmarks. The HAR and bootstrap layers pass in the regime where asymptotics have bitten — low persistence, large samples — and fail predictably outside it. The framework does not hide that failure. It turns it into a signal.

    That signal is the product.


    HTDV is released under the MIT license. The companion paper, full validation vignette, and reproducibility scripts are available at github.com/IsadoreNabi/HTDV. For the complete mathematical foundations, function reference, and tutorials, see the project wiki.

  • bayesianOU: Exploring Market Price Gravitation via Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Process

    bayesianOU: Exploring Market Price Gravitation via Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Process

    You can also find this library at CRAN and download it directly from R and RStudio.

    When Market Prices Gravitate: A Bayesian Look at an Old Question in Economics

    An old question, asked again — properly

    There is a question in economics that is older than most of the academic disciplines that border it. Do market prices — the noisy, day-to-day, here-and-now prices at which goods actually change hands — tend to settle toward some underlying center of gravity? And if they do, how fast, how violently, and through what mechanism?

    Classical political economy, from Smith and Ricardo through Marx, thought they do. The idea was that behind the churning surface of market prices there sit “prices of production”: long-run, cost-anchored prices toward which actual prices are pulled, the way a spring pulls a weight back toward its rest position. In the Marxian version, there is one more layer underneath: those prices of production themselves are supposed to gravitate around “values,” the labour embodied in commodities. Whether any of this is true is an empirical question, and for a long time the empirical tools to answer it were not really up to the job.

    A small R package called bayesianOU, written by José Mauricio Gómez Julián and hosted on GitHub, takes a serious swing at that question. It is not the first attempt to test price gravitation statistically, but it is one of the most technically careful I have seen, and it is built in a way that is instructive far beyond the Marxian debate that motivates it. What follows is a walkthrough of what the package does, why it is interesting, and — just as importantly — where it honestly admits its own limits.

    The tool that makes it possible: the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process

    Strip the economics away for a moment and the statistical core of the package is a workhorse object from physics: the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process. Imagine a particle moving in a fluid, attached to a spring. Brownian motion jiggles it randomly; the spring pulls it back toward a fixed point. The further it drifts away, the harder the pull. The result is a wiggly series that never settles but always tends to settle — a mean-reverting random walk.

    The OU process is exactly the mathematical object you want when you suspect a variable is noisy but anchored. It has a “speed of reversion” (how hard the spring pulls) and an “equilibrium level” (where the spring’s rest point is). Estimate those, and you can say something quantitative about gravitation: not just “yes, prices come back,” but “they come back with a half-life of about nine years.”

    That number — the half-life — is the prize. It is the difference between “market prices eventually settle” (which could mean anything) and “market prices settle on a timescale comparable to a business cycle” (which is a falsifiable, interpretable claim).

    What the package actually builds

    The package fits, by Bayesian inference, a family of models built on the OU process but considerably richer than the textbook version. There are two first-class models, sharing one inference engine.

    The single-level model

    The first model asks: do market prices revert toward an equilibrium that is a function of the prices of production, and what does that reversion look like once we let it be nonlinear, volatile, heavy-tailed, and structurally heterogeneous across sectors?

    Each of those adjectives is doing real work, and each corresponds to a feature that simpler approaches handle poorly or not at all:

    • Nonlinear drift. A plain OU process pulls back with a force proportional to the deviation. The package allows a cubic correction, so the restoring force can strengthen super-linearly when prices are far from equilibrium. This matters: real markets may behave gently near the center and violently at the extremes, and a linear model cannot represent that.
    • Stochastic volatility. Financial data, and economic data generally, go through quiet stretches and turbulent ones. The package does not assume a single noise level; it lets the volatility itself wander over time, following its own mean-reverting process on the log-variance. This is the same idea that powers modern stochastic-volatility models in finance, and it is essential for not fooling yourself about the precision of your estimates.
    • Heavy tails. Economic shocks are not Gaussian. Crashes, booms, and policy shocks produce outliers that a normal distribution would call essentially impossible. The package uses Student-t innovations and estimates the degrees of freedom from the data, so the model can discover for itself just how fat-tailed the world is.
    • Hierarchical structure across sectors. An economy has dozens of sectors, and each one presumably has its own reversion speed, its own equilibrium, its own noise. Estimating each sector in isolation throws away the information that they are all part of the same economy. Estimating them all with one set of parameters pretends they are identical. The package takes the middle path — hierarchical, or “partial pooling,” priors — where each sector’s parameters are drawn from a shared distribution whose properties the model also estimates. Sectors borrow strength from one another without being forced into lockstep.
    • A time-varying coupling. This is the most economically loaded feature. The strength with which market prices track prices of production is allowed to depend on the aggregate profit rate (what the package calls TMG). When the general rate of profit is high, the pull of production prices on market prices may be one thing; when it is low, another. Whether that modulation exists, and in which direction, is a hypothesis the model can test rather than assume.

    All of this is estimated jointly, with full Bayesian uncertainty, using Stan’s Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampler. You do not get a point estimate of the reversion speed; you get a posterior distribution, and from it a credible interval and a probability statement like “there is a 95% chance the half-life is between six and eighteen years.”

    The nested cascade

    The second model is the more ambitious one, and it is where the package earns its “nested” branding. Instead of market prices reverting to a fixed equilibrium, they revert to a latent production price — a hidden, unobserved series that itself evolves over time according to its own OU process, driven by the general profit rate. And, if you turn on the third level, that latent production price in turn gravitates around an observed “value” index built directly from labour-content accounting.

    So the full structure is a cascade: market price → latent production price → value. Each arrow is an OU reversion, each with its own speed, and the speeds are constrained so that the outer (market) layer reverts faster than the inner (production) layer — an economically natural separation of timescales, enforced softly so the data can push back.

    The reason this matters is that it converts a slogan — “prices of production gravitate around values” — into a literal statistical hierarchy that can be fit to data and compared against alternatives. The headline empirical result, from a fit to 37 US sectors over 1960–2020, is a value-coupling coefficient essentially equal to one, with the posterior probability of it being positive effectively equal to one. In plain terms: in standardized units, prices of production track labour values almost one-for-one. That is a found result, not an assumed one — the prior on the coupling was centred at zero, deliberately neutral.

    The inference engine, and why it is not a footnote

    It would be easy to glance at the model description, nod, and move on. But how these quantities are estimated is half of what makes the package serious, and it is worth a paragraph for readers who do not think about MCMC every day.

    Bayesian inference works by exploring the space of all parameter values consistent with both the data and the prior, and characterizing that space as a probability distribution. For models this complex — with latent volatility paths, hierarchical structure, and hundreds of parameters — you cannot do that with pencil and paper. You use a Markov chain Monte Carlo sampler, specifically Hamiltonian Monte Carlo, which borrows an idea from physics: give the parameter space a “potential energy” (the log-posterior) and a “kinetic energy” (a randomly chosen momentum), and let the system glide around the posterior like a ball rolling over a landscape.

    Stan’s NUTS sampler automates this about as well as it can be automated, and the package uses it with within-chain parallelism (via Stan’s reduce_sum) to handle the fact that the likelihood must be summed over many timepoints and sectors. The diagnostics — R-hat for chain agreement, effective sample size, divergence counts — are surfaced through a validate_ou_fit function, and the package is explicit that you should look at them before believing anything.

    Model comparison is done with PSIS-LOO, a clever technique that approximates leave-one-out cross-validation without refitting the model dozens of times, by reweighting the posterior draws using importance sampling. It is the modern standard, and the package is appropriately cautious about it: because the model has a latent volatility state at every observation, plain LOO is known to be optimistic, and the documentation says so plainly.

    The honesty that makes it credible

    Here is where the package surprised me, and here is why I think it deserves a wider audience than the Marxian-economics niche it lives in.

    A naïve reading of the results would be triumphant: the value coupling is one-to-one, the reversion exists, the half-life is about nine years. But the package’s own validation section does something rare. It runs the model against legitimate rivals on genuinely held-out data — a full decade, 2011 to 2020 — and reports, without spin, that a random walk beats the OU model at forecasting, that a no-gravitation restriction ties or beats it, and that the value term adds no detectable predictive density.

    That sounds like a refutation. The package argues, carefully, that it is nothing of the sort — and the argument is the most intellectually interesting thing here.

    The key move is to distinguish two different questions. One is structural: does a reversion mechanism exist, and how fast is it? The other is predictive: can you forecast next year’s price better than a naïve benchmark? These are related but not identical, and for a slow process they come apart in a specific, predictable way.

    If gravitation is real but slow — a half-life of nine years on a dataset whose test window is a decade — then over the forecast horizon the process looks, to first order, like a random walk. The reversion is there, but it is too weak to show up in a one-step or few-step prediction. The random walk, which assumes no reversion, will forecast almost as well, because over short horizons a barely-reverting process and a non-reverting one are nearly indistinguishable. So the random walk winning the forecasting horse race is not evidence against gravitation; it is evidence consistent with gravitation being slow.

    This is not special pleading. It is a logical point about what different functionals of a model can and cannot tell you. The structural parameters — estimated from the joint likelihood over the whole panel, borrowing strength across 37 sectors and 61 years — use far more information than any single-series forecast. They can pin down a central tendency that a univariate test cannot. And the package shows, through simulation-based calibration and adversarial negative controls, that the estimation pipeline does not manufacture gravitation when none is present: feed it a true random walk and it reports a half-life of about fifty years; feed it a null value-coupling and the posterior honestly covers zero.

    The low-kappa trap, and why it matters to everyone

    The package names a difficulty it calls the low-kappa trap, and it is worth understanding because it is a trap that catches far more than Marxian price theory.

    Kappa is the reversion speed. As kappa shrinks toward zero, the OU process approaches a pure random walk. The trouble is that there is no bright line separating “slow mean reversion” from “no mean reversion.” It is a continuum, and three distinct problems stack up exactly there:

    • Algebraically, reversion speed and discrete-time persistence are two sides of the same coin; kappa going to zero is the same as the autocorrelation going to one. There is no internal frontier.
    • Statistically, the power of a unit-root test — the standard tool for asking “is this a random walk?” — collapses exactly as the truth approaches the random walk boundary. With a finite sample and a half-life comparable to the sample length, the test simply cannot tell. This is a well-known result in econometrics, and it is why decades of “is the real exchange rate stationary?” papers argued past one another.
    • Numerically, if the reversion speed is parameterized to be strictly positive (as it must be, for the sampler to behave), then “the probability that kappa is greater than zero” is trivially one — it tells you nothing. The informative quantity is the half-life, and the probability that the half-life exceeds some sensible horizon.

    The package’s response to the trap is instructive. It does not pretend the trap is not there. It states all three layers explicitly, reports the slow tail honestly (one sector has a non-trivial posterior probability of a half-life beyond forty years), and argues that the joint hierarchical posterior — which pools information across the whole panel — is a more powerful discriminator than any univariate test. That is a defensible position, and it is stated with the caveat attached rather than buried in a footnote.

    This is the broader lesson. Anyone working with time series that might be slowly mean-reverting — interest rates, real exchange rates, commodity prices, climate variables, pollutant concentrations — runs into exactly this trap. The package’s framing of it, in three layers, is one of the clearest expositions I have read, and it would travel well into any of those domains.

    What I appreciate, and what I would watch for

    A few things stand out as genuinely good practice, and they are worth naming because they are rarer than they should be.

    The separation of economic and sampler convergence. The package is scrupulous about not confusing two senses of “convergence.” Economic convergence — does the price revert? — is a statement about kappa and the half-life. Sampler convergence — did the MCMC chains agree? — is a statement about R-hat and divergences. These share a word and nothing else, and conflating them is a classic source of muddled reasoning. The documentation keeps them lexically distinct throughout.

    Neutral priors on the load-bearing hypotheses. The prior on the profit-rate modulation is centred at zero. The prior on the value coupling is centred at zero. The package does not bake the answer into the question. When the posterior then moves clearly away from zero, that means something.

    Out-of-sample integrity by construction. A subtle and common error in time-series work is “leakage”: accidentally letting future information contaminate the training procedure, so that out-of-sample results are secretly in-sample. The package offers a fit_window switch that keeps the two designs genuinely separate, and it computes the common-factor loadings from the training window only. This is the kind of plumbing detail that separates trustworthy work from work that just looks trustworthy.

    The negative results are reported. Many packages, and most blog posts about them, would quietly omit the fact that a random walk out-forecasts the model. This one leads with it and then reasons about it. That is how a field accumulates reliable knowledge rather than just encouraging headlines.

    What should a careful reader watch for? The half-life estimate of about nine years is, by the package’s own account, probably conservatively slow — a controlled study of the disaggregation step suggests the true figure may be closer to seven or eight. The cubic nonlinearity is a minor refinement on this data (its coefficient sits near its prior). The Student-t degrees of freedom and the stochastic-volatility scale are weakly identified when both are present, a known tension the documentation flags but does not resolve. And the headline value-coupling result, while striking, is measured on standardized levels that share a cost-price component by construction; the package defends this with a “wedge” argument — subtracting the shared component and testing the residual — but a sceptical reader should follow that argument itself rather than take it on trust.

    None of these caveats undermine the project. They are the project. A statistical framework that cannot articulate its own soft spots is not a framework you should believe.

    Why it is worth your time

    You do not need to be a Marxian economist, or any kind of economist, to get something out of this package. If you work with time series that exhibit slow, noisy reversion toward a moving target — and a great deal of the physical and social world does — the modelling ideas here are directly portable: the nonlinear OU drift, the stochastic volatility, the hierarchical pooling across groups, the careful separation of structural estimation from forecasting, and the three-layer diagnosis of the low-reversion trap.

    And if you are interested in the classical question of whether prices gravitate toward values, this is about as good a statistical treatment as you will find: modern machinery, honest reporting, and a willingness to let the data argue back against the theory that motivated the exercise in the first place.

    The repository, the full mathematical specification, the validation blocks, and a frank discussion of every methodological decision live at github.com/IsadoreNabi/bayesianOU, with the wiki carrying the complete technical detail. Read the methodology notes before you quote a number; that is what they are there for.

  • Quantitative Theory of Money or Prices? A Historical, Theoretical, and Econometric Analysis

    Quantitative Theory of Money or Prices? A Historical, Theoretical, and Econometric Analysis

    Does Money Drive Prices, or Do Prices Drive Money?
    Econometrics · Monetary Theory · Machine Learning · Political Economy

    Does Money Drive Prices, or Do Prices Drive Money?

    A 300-year-old debate, four countries, six decades of data, Bayesian statistics, and neural networks — a deep dive into one of the most ambitious monetary studies in recent years

    What you will find in this post
    1. The oldest argument in monetary economics — Hume, Friedman, and why it still matters today
    2. Marx’s forgotten critique — four logical objections that mainstream economics never answered
    3. The role of gold in a post-gold-standard world — why the Fed still dances around the price of gold
    4. A mathematical model for the money-prices relationship — equations explained without the jargon
    5. The data and the methodology — four countries, Bayesian models, neural networks, and random forests
    6. Country-by-country results — what the United States, Canada, the UK, and Brazil each reveal
    7. Why money is never neutral — and what that means for how we think about the economy
    8. Policy implications and open questions — what this means for central banks and for you
    · · ·

    1. The Oldest Argument in Monetary Economics

    There is a question at the heart of economics that sounds deceptively simple: when governments print more money, do prices go up because there is more money chasing the same goods — or does the economy first produce goods at certain prices, and then the amount of money in circulation simply adjusts to match? Put differently: does money cause prices, or do prices cause money?

    This is not an abstract riddle for seminar rooms. The answer determines how central banks set interest rates, whether governments choose austerity or stimulus in a recession, and how we understand inflation. If the quantity of money determines prices, then controlling the money supply is the key to controlling the economy. If prices determine the quantity of money, then the real action is in production, technology, and competition — and monetary policy is, at best, a secondary lever.

    The debate begins with the Scottish philosopher David Hume, writing in the mid-eighteenth century. In his essays on money and trade, Hume proposed what became the foundation of mainstream monetary thought: if you double the quantity of money in an economy while keeping everything else constant, prices will eventually double. Money, in this view, is a veil — it changes the numbers on price tags but does not alter the real productive capacity of the economy. The ratio of money to goods simply adjusts until equilibrium is restored.

    This idea was not without immediate critics. The Scottish economist James Steuart attacked it almost as soon as it appeared (1767). Adam Smith, often considered the father of modern economics, held the opposite view — that prices, not money, are the active variable. But the idea proved remarkably resilient. Over the following two centuries, it was refined into what economists call the Quantity Theory of Money, which reached its most influential modern form in the work of Milton Friedman. For Friedman, Hume was the starting point of all monetary theory. For Robert Lucas, another Nobel laureate, Hume marked the beginning of modern monetary economics.

    But there was always an alternative tradition, running from the classical economists through Karl Marx, that saw the relationship in exactly the opposite direction. A new paper by the Costa Rican economist José Mauricio Gómez Julián, published on arXiv in January 2025, takes this alternative tradition seriously, subjects it to rigorous empirical testing with the most modern tools available — Bayesian statistics, machine learning, deep learning, and ensemble methods — and arrives at conclusions that challenge the mainstream consensus.

    · · ·

    2. Marx’s Forgotten Critique

    When most people hear “Marx” and “money” in the same sentence, they expect ideology. But in his Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859), Marx offered something far more valuable: a meticulous logical dissection of Hume’s reasoning. Gómez Julián’s paper draws on four central aspects of this critique, each of which makes testable claims about the real world.

    First: Money is subordinated to exchange values, not the other way around

    Marx’s fundamental point is that the sphere of circulation (where money changes hands) is ultimately subordinated to the sphere of production (where goods are actually made). This is not just a philosophical claim — it has a concrete implication. The quantity of money in circulation must maintain a certain equilibrium with the quantity of goods and services available for sale. If there is too little money, commercial transactions become difficult — there are not enough means of payment to go around. If there is too much money, sellers can raise prices to absorb the excess.

    But here is the crucial mechanism: if the quantity of money falls below or rises above its “necessary level,” a coercive correction occurs through commodity prices. Prices adjust, and money supply follows — not the other way around. The direction of causation runs from prices to money, mediated by the real commodity foundation of money (in Hume’s and Marx’s time, gold and silver).

    This means that money’s non-neutrality — the fact that changes in the money supply do affect real economic outcomes — is not caused by money determining prices. It is caused by the mediating relationship between prices and the material foundation of money, which creates a feedback loop over time.

    Second: An epistemological critique of Hume’s evidence

    Marx points out that when Hume formulated his theory, he was observing a very specific historical situation: the discovery of American mines and the increase in slave labor, which lowered the extraction cost of gold and silver. Under these conditions, the price of commodities exchanged directly for gold and silver (i.e., exported commodities) did indeed rise. But this rise occurred because gold and silver were functioning as commodities — their production cost had dropped — not because more money was chasing the same goods. The effect on gold as a means of payment (i.e., domestic money) took much longer to materialize. Hume, in Marx’s reading, confused a change in the relative value of a commodity (gold) with a general monetary phenomenon.

    Third: Accounting money vs. means of circulation

    Marx argues that Hume made a fundamental category error: he confused accounting money (the unit in which prices are denominated) with money as a means of circulation (the physical medium of exchange). These are different things with different behaviors. Moreover, Hume failed to consider historical events of his own time that demonstrated the need to account for the exchange value of gold and silver when linking money to prices.

    Fourth: Two critical corollaries

    This is where the theory makes its sharpest predictions. Marx draws two conclusions from his analysis that can be tested empirically:

    Marx’s two testable corollaries
    • Corollary 1: If metallic currency is a symbol of value, then the sum of commodity prices determines the quantity of circulating money. But if the monetary unit is a symbol of value, then the quantity of circulating money is determined by the sum of commodity prices. Marx argues it is the monetary unit — not the metallic currency — that is the symbol of value.
    • Corollary 2: If money derives its value from prices (Marx’s position), then there can be more money in circulation than the sum of commodity prices. But if money determines prices (Hume’s position), then there cannot be more money circulating than the sum of prices. Marx argues that the former is true — and it can be checked against data.

    Gómez Julián checks Corollary 2 directly. “Circulating money” is defined as the monetary aggregate M1 (cash plus checking deposits), and the “sum of commodity prices” is, by definition, nominal GDP. Looking at the statistical systems of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Brazil, the paper finds that M1 exceeds nominal GDP in multiple years for each country. This is straightforward evidence in favor of Marx’s position. The author also notes that previous work on El Salvador showed M1 consistently below nominal GDP — which might seem to contradict the pattern until one considers El Salvador’s dollarization, which fundamentally changes the monetary dynamics.

    “Marx’s central thesis is that the value of money depends on the purchasing power of the commodity or commodities that underlie it, and this purchasing power, in turn, depends on the general level of prices. Such prices, the market prices, are determined by capitalist competition.” — Gómez Julián, summarizing Marx’s framework

    The value theory question

    One cannot discuss Marx’s monetary theory without addressing the foundation beneath it: the labor theory of value (LTV). Marx argues that market prices oscillate around “prices of production,” which are themselves grounded in the socially necessary labor time required to produce goods. If the LTV is correct, then exchange values have an objective basis in production — and the subordination of money to prices follows naturally.

    The paper acknowledges that these monetary claims stand or fall with the validity of the LTV, but it also notes that the neoclassical alternative — the subjective theory of value based on marginal utility — has its own deep problems. The famous Cambridge Capital Controversy of the 1960s demonstrated that the neoclassical foundations (the so-called “neoclassical parables”) do not provide a coherent scientific explanation of economic phenomena. Even Paul Samuelson, one of the greatest neoclassical economists, admitted that capital aggregation problems can only be resolved by adopting something very close to the labor theory of value. Joan Robinson went further, arguing that capital can be nothing more than “accumulated past labor.” Notably, the Penn World Tables — one of the most important databases in empirical economics — do not use marginal productivity of capital to measure capital remuneration, but instead use the real average internal rate of return, precisely because of the aggregation problem.

    · · ·

    3. The Role of Gold in a Post-Gold-Standard World

    If money is ultimately subordinated to prices, and prices are anchored in the real economy, what gives money its value in the modern era? Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, when President Nixon ended the dollar’s convertibility to gold, most economists have treated modern money as purely “fiduciary” — backed by nothing but government decree and public trust. Gómez Julián argues, with substantial evidence, that this is not the full picture.

    The paper presents three pillars of evidence for gold’s continuing monetary role:

    Gold’s enduring monetary significance
    • Greenspan’s own words: “Gold still represents the ultimate form of payment in the world. Fiat money in extremis is accepted by nobody. Gold is always accepted.” This is not a gold bug’s fantasy — it was stated by the man who chaired the Federal Reserve for nearly two decades.
    • The inverse relationship: Gold and the US dollar consistently move in opposite directions. When gold rises, the dollar tends to fall, and vice versa. This has been documented by multiple financial analysts and is visible in decades of market data.
    • Policy history: After the turbulence of the 1970s (high inflation, debt crises, savings crises), Paul Volcker — who took over as Fed chair in 1979 — formally abandoned the monetarist experiment in 1982 and adopted policies aimed at stabilizing the dollar’s value against gold and other commodities. This was supported by the Plaza Accord (1985) and the Louvre Accord (1987). The result was the “Great Moderation” (1982–2007), a period of unusual macroeconomic stability.

    The paper traces a revealing pattern through subsequent Fed chairs. Greenspan continued Volcker’s gold-aware approach. When Ben Bernanke — an economist who openly declared Friedman as his central intellectual influence — took over in 2006, policies diverged from the gold anchor, and gold price volatility surged to its highest level since the end of Bretton Woods. The dollar declined. Janet Yellen, who succeeded Bernanke in 2014, returned to the Volcker-Greenspan orientation, and gold prices stabilized. Jerome Powell initially followed this path but gradually moved away, declaring in 2019 that tying the dollar to gold would prevent the Fed from maximizing employment.

    Gómez Julián pushes back on Powell’s argument on two grounds. First, periods when the Fed stabilized the dollar around gold showed at least the same level of employment stability as periods when it did not. Second, since Bretton Woods, no country has used the gold standard directly — they have anchored their currencies to the dollar, and the dollar has been anchored (in varying degrees) to gold. So Powell’s claim that “no country uses it” misses the layered structure of the international monetary system.

    The dialectical contradiction of gold

    The paper draws on the Marxist economist Ernest Mandel to explain why the United States both needs and resists the gold standard. The gold standard provides stability — but it also requires contractionary policies during recessions, which can deepen crises and, as the case of Heinrich Brüning’s Germany (1930–1932) showed, can undermine democracy by creating the conditions for fascism. The gold standard also requires a delicate balance between short-term dollar demand (from foreign investors parking reserves) and long-term dollar outflow (from American investments abroad). When this balance tips — as it did in the late 1960s — the result is a monetary crisis.

    “The ‘dollar crisis’ and the search for means of international payment independent both of gold and ‘currency reserves’ reflect clear recognition on the part of big international capital of a contradiction inherent in the present-day capitalist system: the contradiction between the dollar’s role as an ‘international money,’ and its role as an instrument to assure the expansion of the American capitalist economy. To fulfill the first function, a stable money is needed. To fulfill the second function, a flexible money is necessary, i.e., an unstable one. There’s the rub.” — Ernest Mandel, 1968, quoted in the paper

    This dialectical tension — the system needs gold stability but also needs monetary flexibility — explains the recurring oscillation between gold-anchored and gold-detached monetary regimes. The paper describes the current arrangement as a “loose gold standard”: not a formal peg, but a persistent gravitational pull.

    · · ·

    4. A Mathematical Model for the Money-Prices-Gold Relationship

    Gómez Julián formalizes the above arguments into a mathematical model. The basic version is elegant in its simplicity:

    Core equation Qm = λp / λgold · β

    In plain language: the quantity of money in circulation (Qm, measured as M1) is equal to the sum of commodity prices (λp, measured as nominal GDP) divided by the international price of gold (λgold), multiplied by a coefficient (β) that represents the velocity of money circulation (assumed, for simplicity, to equal one).

    This equation encodes several intuitive relationships:

    What the equation says — in words
    • If prices (nominal GDP) rise while gold stays the same, the money supply must increase — more money is needed to express the same goods at higher prices.
    • If the gold price rises while prices stay the same, the money supply decreases — fewer monetary units are needed to express the same sum of prices, because gold is now more valuable per unit.
    • If both prices and gold rise, the effect on money depends on which change is larger — it could go either way.
    • If prices rise and gold falls, money unambiguously increases — both forces push in the same direction.

    The paper works through all eight possible combinations of price and gold movements (both up, both down, one up one down, one fixed one moving, etc.), showing that the model’s predictions are internally consistent. This is not just algebra — it is a stress test of the theory’s logical coherence.

    The model can also be expressed in logarithmic form, which has a practical advantage: when you run a regression on logarithmically transformed variables, the coefficients can be interpreted directly as elasticities — percentage changes. For example, a coefficient of 0.13 means that a 1% increase in prices is associated with a 0.13% increase in the money supply, holding gold constant. This logarithmic transformation also tends to smooth out extreme values in the data, improving statistical performance.

    A more general version of the model simply states that the money supply is a function of both prices and gold, without specifying the exact functional form — leaving the data to reveal the shape of the relationship.

    · · ·

    5. The Data and the Methodology

    Four countries, carefully chosen

    The empirical analysis covers quarterly data from four countries, each chosen for a specific reason:

    Country selection and rationale
    • United States (1959–2022): The most developed Western capitalist economy. Economic laws derived from its study are, to varying degrees, applicable to other capitalist countries. It represents the highest stage of development reached by Western capitalism and serves as a mirror of the future for other economies. 63 years of data — longer than a Kondratieff wave (the long cycles of capitalist dynamics, typically 40–60 years).
    • Canada (1961–2022): Chosen for similar reasons to the UK, but representing the welfare state variant of Western capitalism — a different model from both the US and the UK. 61 years of data.
    • United Kingdom (1986–2022): A major developed capitalist economy with more available data than other candidates like Germany or France. 36 years of data.
    • Brazil (1996–2022): An emerging economy (developing country), chosen to test whether the findings generalize beyond advanced capitalism. Since the study had already been done for El Salvador (an underdeveloped country), verifying the results for Brazil would suggest the patterns are general economic laws of capitalist development. 26 years of data.

    A multi-layered methodological approach

    This is not a paper that runs one regression and calls it a day. The methodology unfolds in several stages, each building on the previous one:

    Stage 1: Pairwise direction analysis. The first question is: for each pair of variables (money-prices, gold-prices, money-gold), which variable best predicts which? This is done using Bayesian simple linear regression, where the direction of the relationship is determined by comparing the Expected Log Pointwise Predictive Density from Leave-One-Out cross-validation (ELPD-LOO) — a rigorous measure of how well a model predicts data it has not seen. Higher (less negative) ELPD-LOO means better predictive performance.

    Stage 2: RESET tests for nonlinearity. Linear models assume straight-line relationships. But what if the real relationship is curved? The paper runs Ramsey’s RESET test with quadratic, cubic, and combined terms, bootstrapped using a Bayesian posterior distribution. This reveals whether linear models are missing important nonlinear patterns — and, if so, what kind of curvature is present.

    Stage 3: Empirical distribution fitting. Before building multivariate models, the paper determines the best-fitting probability distribution for each variable (log-normal, Weibull, Gamma, Normal, etc.) using the maximum goodness-of-fit method, with results selected by the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). This is not just a technical exercise — it directly informs how the variables are transformed in later models.

    Stage 4: Bayesian Generalized Linear Models (BGLM). The paper constructs multivariate models using different statistical families (Gamma, Gaussian) and link functions (logarithmic, identity), with gold often transformed into a natural cubic spline (a flexible curve that can capture nonlinear patterns) or fitted as a Weibull random variable. The choice of family, link, and transformation is driven by predictive performance metrics.

    Stage 5: Machine learning and deep learning. Four different ML models are tested individually and in combination:

    Machine learning models used
    • Quantile Random Forest (QRF): An extension of random forests that estimates the entire distribution of the predicted variable, not just its average.
    • Conditional Inference Random Forest: A variant that uses statistical tests to select splitting variables, reducing bias toward variables with many possible splits.
    • Bayesian Regularized Neural Network (BRNN): A neural network that uses Bayesian regularization to prevent overfitting — the model learns to be cautious about its own complexity.
    • Support Vector Machine with Radial Basis Kernel (SVMRadial): A powerful classification/regression method that maps data into higher-dimensional spaces to find optimal decision boundaries.

    Stage 6: Ensemble learning. Finally, the paper tests whether combining multiple models through boosting (a technique where each new model focuses on the errors of the previous ones) produces better predictions than any individual model. The ensemble is structured as a Bayesian Generalized Linear Model with Gaussian family and identity link.

    A critical philosophical point: the paper uses objective Bayesian analysis. This means that all prior information — the starting assumptions the model uses before seeing the data — is derived from empirical analysis of the dataset itself, not from subjective beliefs or assumptions. This approach incorporates what the author calls “epistemological doubt” about parameter estimation, acknowledging that we can never be perfectly certain about any estimated value.

    · · ·

    6. Country-by-Country Results

    United States (1959–2022)

    The pairwise analysis reveals something striking: the simple relationship between M1 and prices is undecidable — both directions fit about equally well by ELPD-LOO. This is already a blow to the simplistic Quantity Theory, which claims a clear causal arrow from money to prices. However, gold is clearly best predicted by prices (not the reverse), and M1 is clearly best predicted by gold (not the reverse). This suggests a chain: prices → gold → money, consistent with Marx’s framework.

    The RESET tests confirm that the relationships are nonlinear. For the M1-prices pair in both directions, all RESET tests yield p-values of zero — meaning the linear models are definitively inadequate. Nonlinearity is everywhere.

    The multivariate model that best fits the data is a BGLM with Gamma family, logarithmic link, and gold transformed into a natural cubic spline with five degrees of freedom. The coefficient on log(prices) is +0.13 — confirming the direct, positive relationship between prices and money supply. The spline coefficients for gold alternate in sign across the five basis functions, confirming the theoretically predicted nonlinear, segment-dependent relationship. The model achieves an MAE of just 0.12 (2.43% of the log(M1) minimum) and an RMSE of 0.21.

    The ensemble model — combining a Bayesian Regularized Neural Network (weight: 0.41) and a Quantile Random Forest (weight: 0.59) — further improves performance: MAE drops to 0.08 on test data, RMSE to 0.25, and the R² reaches 0.985 in training. All coefficients are highly significant (p < 2e-16). The US is the only country where the ensemble outperforms the best individual ML model.

    Canada (1961–2022)

    The pairwise results are cleaner than in the US case: M1 is best predicted by prices, gold is best predicted by prices, and M1 is best predicted by gold. The chain prices → gold → money is clearly visible. RESET tests again confirm pervasive nonlinearity.

    The best multivariate model uses a BGLM with Gamma family, logarithmic link, and gold transformed as a Weibull random variable (shape = 5.88, scale = 6.47). The coefficient on log(prices) is +0.045 — smaller than in the US but still positive and confirming the prices-to-money direction. The Weibull transformation captures the nonlinear gold dynamics in a single parametric term. The model achieves an MAE of 0.23 and RMSE of 0.28.

    Unlike the US, the ensemble did not improve on the best individual ML model. A Quantile Random Forest performed best on its own, achieving a remarkable R² of 0.998 in training and an MAE of just 0.04 on test data. The near-perfect fit suggests that the money-prices-gold relationship in Canada is highly regular and predictable over this period.

    United Kingdom (1986–2022)

    With a shorter sample (36 years), the UK shows a more mixed pattern in pairwise analysis. Notably, the simple relationship between M1 and prices runs in the reverse direction — prices are best predicted by M1, not the other way around. This might seem to support the Quantity Theory, but it only holds in the simple bivariate case. When gold is included in the multivariate model, the direct relationship between prices and money reasserts itself.

    The best multivariate model is a BGLM with Gamma family, logarithmic link, and gold transformed as a natural cubic spline with five degrees of freedom — similar to the US specification. The coefficient on log(prices) is +0.071, and the spline coefficients alternate in sign, as predicted by theory. The model achieves an MAE of 0.06 and RMSE of 0.07 — the tightest fit among the four countries.

    As with Canada, the ensemble did not improve on the best individual model. A Quantile Random Forest again performed best, with R² of 0.993 in training and near-zero RMSE on test data.

    Brazil (1996–2022)

    Brazil, as an emerging economy with a turbulent monetary history, presents the most complex picture. In pairwise analysis, the money-prices relationship again runs in the reverse direction (prices predicted by M1), and the gold-prices relationship is bidirectional. RESET tests show the strongest nonlinearity signals of any country, with many p-values at or near zero.

    The best multivariate model uses a BGLM with Gaussian family (the only country where Gaussian outperformed Gamma), logarithmic link, and gold transformed as a natural cubic spline. The coefficient on log(prices) is +0.05, again confirming the direct relationship. Model performance is solid: MAE of 0.07, RMSE of 0.21.

    Among ML models, a Support Vector Machine with Radial Basis Kernel performed best, achieving R² of 0.991 in training and an MAE of 0.012 on test data. As with Canada and the UK, the ensemble did not improve on this individual model.

    Summary: In all four countries, the multivariate models confirm a positive relationship between prices and money supply, and a nonlinear, segment-dependent relationship between gold and money supply — exactly as the theoretical model predicts.
    · · ·

    7. Why Money Is Never Neutral

    The paper’s central conclusion, stated plainly: money is not neutral at any time horizon — not in the short run, not in the long run, across all four countries studied.

    This is a strong claim, and it contradicts one of the most fundamental assumptions of mainstream economics. The concept of “monetary neutrality” holds that changes in the money supply eventually affect only nominal variables (prices, wages) and leave real variables (output, employment) unchanged. In the long run, the argument goes, the economy returns to its “natural” state regardless of what the central bank does with the money supply.

    Gómez Julián’s results, based on data spanning up to 63 years — longer than a full Kondratieff cycle — provide no support for this proposition. But the paper is careful to explain why money is non-neutral, and the explanation differs from what both mainstream and some heterodox economists might expect.

    Non-neutrality, in this framework, is not caused by the money supply determining prices (the monetarist claim). It is caused by the mediating relationship between prices and the real commodity foundation of money (gold), which determines the money supply. This creates a feedback loop: prices influence gold, gold influences money, and money — through aggregate demand — feeds back into prices. The exchange value of money as a monetary unit is the transmission mechanism.

    Because this feedback is nonlinear (as confirmed by the RESET tests and the spline models across all four countries), and because it operates over time with dynamic lags, the money-prices-gold system constitutes what complexity scientists would call a complex system — a system where small changes can have disproportionate effects, where cause and effect are intertwined, and where linear prediction is fundamentally limited.

    · · ·

    8. Policy Implications and Open Questions

    What this means for policy

    The findings have practical consequences for how we think about monetary policy:

    Policy takeaways
    • The best way to control prices is directly — through industrial policy, competition policy, supply-side interventions, and measures that address the real determinants of production costs. Since prices are ultimately grounded in the sphere of production, intervening there is the most effective approach.
    • But controlling the money supply also works — because the feedback relationship runs in both directions. Contracting M1 can reduce prices, even though the primary direction of causation runs from prices to money. This “theoretically justifies a commonly effective practice in economic policy,” as the author puts it.
    • Friedman’s narrative about the Great Depression is weakened. The Federal Reserve expanded the monetary base during the Depression, yet the Depression happened anyway. During the 2008 crisis, the Fed adopted an aggressive expansionary monetary policy — and it alone was not enough. It had to be accompanied by massive fiscal intervention (the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act), direct asset purchases, near-zero interest rates, and other measures. As Krugman noted, “The Monetary History thesis has just taken a hit.”
    • The gold standard is not incompatible with employment stability. This challenges the argument, made by Jerome Powell and others, that returning to a gold anchor would sacrifice the Fed’s ability to maximize employment. The historical record shows at least equivalent macroeconomic stability during gold-anchored periods.

    Two open questions for future research

    The paper is transparent about what it does not answer:

    Question 1: In the current loose gold standard, how exactly does the feedback between prices, gold, and the money supply work through specific economic policy instruments? The Fed’s tools — interest rates, quantitative easing, reserve requirements — act as latent variables mediating the gold-money relationship. The paper establishes that this mediation exists but acknowledges that its precise mechanisms require further study.

    Question 2: What are the quantitative and temporal limits of monetary non-neutrality? If too much money enters circulation, commodity prices eventually correct the imbalance through a “coercive correction.” But how large can the distortions become before correction occurs, and how long does the adjustment take? Understanding these limits could illuminate phenomena traditionally attributed to monetary factors — such as the “liquidity trap” — from an entirely new angle.

    A methodological statement

    Beyond its economic findings, the paper is also an argument about method. By combining objective Bayesian statistics with modern machine learning — neural networks, random forests, support vector machines, and boosted ensembles — Gómez Julián demonstrates that the tools of artificial intelligence can serve heterodox economic theory, not just mainstream modeling. Using Bayesian regularized neural networks and gradient-boosted ensembles to test predictions derived from Marx’s nineteenth-century monetary theory is, to put it mildly, unusual. But the results are robust, the fit is strong, and the patterns are consistent across four countries with very different economic structures.

    The paper’s approach to the so-called “transformation problem” — the long-standing debate about how labor values map onto market prices — also deserves attention. By assuming inventory valuation at the cost of reproduction (where the current technological state determines the value of inputs), Gómez Julián shows that the system of equations has a unique solution given the degree of exploitation of labor power, sidestepping a controversy that has occupied Marxist economists for over a century.

    · · ·

    The Takeaway

    Three hundred years after David Hume proposed that money determines prices, and one hundred and sixty-five years after Karl Marx argued the opposite, we still do not have a settled answer. Gómez Julián’s paper does not claim to settle it — but it does something arguably more valuable. It shows, with rigorous data and modern methods across four countries and six decades, that the question itself may be wrongly framed as a binary choice.

    Money and prices, along with gold, form a complex, nonlinear, feedback-driven system in which both directions of causation operate simultaneously. But the relationship is asymmetric: prices hold the upper hand. Money is ultimately subordinated to the real economy — to production, to labor, to the commodities that give currency its value — even as it feeds back into prices through aggregate demand. Money is never neutral, but it is never the master either. It is, in the deepest sense, a dependent variable that nonetheless shapes the system it depends on.

    In an era of quantitative easing debates, cryptocurrency experiments, inflation anxiety, and questions about the very nature of money, this is not just an academic finding. It is a framework for thinking about the monetary world we actually inhabit — one that is messier, more dynamic, and more deeply rooted in material reality than either Hume or Friedman imagined.